Eugene Mercer v. Edward Blanchette (2010)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION ON MOTION TO DISMISS

The plaintiff Eugene Mercer brings this civil action for defamation and negligent infliction of emotional distress, along with other counts under various statutes and constitutional provisions, against the defendant Edward Blanchette, who is employed by the Connecticut Department of Corrections (“DOC”) as its Clinical Director.   Blanchette wears another hat as well.   As part of a consent decree in the case of Doe v. Meachum, Civ. No. H-88-562 (PCD)(JGM), Blanchette has been appointed by the federal District Court of Connecticut to membership on a three-person panel to monitor compliance with the court order entered in that case.   It is Blanchette's conduct while serving as an appointee to this Agreement Monitoring Panel (“AMP”) in the Doe v. Meachum litigation that gives rise to the plaintiff's claims against Blanchette.

The plaintiff is an inmate housed at the Osborne Correctional Institution in Somers, CT. The plaintiff was also a plaintiff in Doe v. Meachum, and he continues to be involved in the litigation by having an interest in the work of the AMP. It was at a meeting of the AMP on January 27, 2010, at which the panel was to hear complaints regarding non-compliance with the consent decree that the defendant uttered the offending statements.   From the plaintiff's complaint, it appears that the context of the statements was a hearing on a grievance or complaint about health care treatment brought to the AMP by the plaintiff himself.

At any rate, as part of the AMP's discussion regarding the grievance and the remedy, the defendant is alleged to have stated 1) that he found it difficult to fight for the plaintiff who constantly files lawsuits demanding treatment;  2) that the plaintiff had deliberately infected another inmate with the HIV virus;  and 3) that the plaintiff had demanded experimental treatment with human growth hormone.   The plaintiff alleges that the latter two statements are false and defamatory, and that they were uttered out of malice, with the intent to retaliate against the plaintiff for exercising his constitutional right of access to the court to redress grievances.   The plaintiff brings this action for money damages against Blanchette in Blanchette's individual and official capacity.

The defendant has filed a Motion to Dismiss this action on a number of grounds, including that this court should decline jurisdiction on the grounds of absolute immunity and comity.   While under our state practice, the issue of immunity is more appropriately raised by way of a special defense, and determined, if not at trial, by way of a motion for summary judgment, this court is convinced that dismissal at this stage is mandated, in order to avoid the undue interference with the conduct of concurrent federal court proceedings.

THE DOCTRINE OF ABSOLUTE IMMUNITY IN JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS

It is a long-standing common-law rule that communications uttered or published in the course of judicial proceedings are absolutely privileged so long as they are in some way pertinent to the subject matter of the controversy.  Petyan v. Ellis, 200 Conn. 243, 245-46, 510 A.2d 1337 (1986).   Connecticut case law recognizes that this absolute privilege granted to statements made in furtherance of a judicial proceeding extends to every step of the proceeding until final disposition.  Kelley v. Bonney, 221 Conn. 549, 565-66, 606 A.2d 693 (1992).   Moreover this privilege is absolute even if the statement is defamatory and is published falsely and maliciously.  Craig v. Stafford Construction, Inc., 271 Conn. 78, 84, 856 A.2d 372 (2004).

In this case, there is no factual dispute about the nature of the proceedings in which the offending statements were published.   The federal district court appointed monitors in the nature of Special Masters and delegated to them the function of overseeing the remedies that had been put in place as part of the court order in the Doe v. Meachum litigation.   Blanchette made the statements at a hearing on inmate grievances as part of the Agreement Monitoring Panel.   Not only were the statements made in the course of a judicial or quasi-judicial proceeding, see Chadha v. Charlotte Hungerford Hospital, 272 Conn. 776, 786-87, 865 A.2d 1163 (2005), they were made by a member of the tribunal.   In such a context, the statements are absolutely privileged and cannot subject the speaker to liability for money damages in any capacity.

THE INTERFERENCE WITH A CONCURRENT FEDERAL PROCEEDING

On the subject of comity and respect for the proceedings of our sister court, the Connecticut Supreme Court has held that “except in the most compelling circumstances, the courts of this state should decline to afford litigants the opportunity to launch collateral attacks on orders issued by federal courts and should refuse to grant relief that would entail interfering with the execution of such orders.”  Santora v. Miklus, 199 Conn. 179, 189, 506 A.2d 549 (1986).

The federal court continues to exercise jurisdiction over its decree in Doe v. Meachum and over the work of its Agreement Monitoring Panel.   The ability of one aggrieved by the proceedings under the consent decree to file a civil lawsuit in state court against a member of the Panel for statements made by the Panel member in the course of proceedings designed to assist in the adjudication of the decree is simply untenable.   While under ordinary circumstances this court might await a later stage of these state court proceedings to address this issue comity counsels haste.

CONCLUSION

Absolute immunity bars this action.   This court lacks jurisdiction to afford the relief requested by the plaintiff.   The Motion to Dismiss is granted.

Patty Jenkins Pittman, Judge

Pittman, Patty Jenkins, J.