Carol Gordon v. Marine Innovations, Inc. et al. (2010)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

By complaint dated August 18, 2008, the plaintiff, Carol Gordon, brought a four-count action against the defendants, Marine Innovations, Inc., Michael Botzet, Lori Botzet and Sean Hoff. Michael Botzet and Lori Botzet, president and vice-president of Marine Innovations, Inc., were sued in their official and individual capacities.   Sean Hoff is non-appearing and plaintiff has been notified that Sean Hoff is an incorrect party to this action, having never been an employee or agent of defendant Marine Innovations.

In her complaint, plaintiff alleges that in 2003, Marine Innovations, a Minnesota corporation, installed a 220-foot track and tram system on the plaintiff's property located at 51 Lakeview Terrance in Sandy Hook, Connecticut.   Furthermore, the plaintiff alleges that on or about August 15, 2005, the defendant, Marine Innovations, purporting to repossess the track and tram system for non-payment, wrongfully entered her private and locked premises, disconnected the circuit breaker to the track and tram, and removed it from the premises.

In her complaint, the plaintiff states the following claims:  (1) wrongful repossession in violation of Connecticut General Statutes § 42a-9-201 et seq. or § 42-98;  (2) wrongful entry or trespass;  (3) wrongful taking;  and, (4) wrongful trade practices pursuant to Connecticut General Statutes § 42-110a et seq.   At the same time that the above stated action has been before this court, another action brought by defendant Marine Innovations against Alan Gordon, the husband of plaintiff Carol Gordon, has been before the State of Minnesota District Court, Seventh Judicial District, County of Becker (Case No. C4-07549).   On or about January 13, 2009, a stipulation and order for dismissal was entered into between Marine Innovations, Alan Gordon and Carol Gordon in the State of Minnesota District Court.   Said stipulation and order for dismissal required that Marine Innovations, having removed the incline lift system from Alan Gordon and Carol Gordon's property, reinstall the lift system back onto the property in a workmanlike manner and in a fully functional state, in addition to requiring Marine Innovations to pay certain sums of money to Alan Gordon and Attorney Robert Woodke.

Moreover, the Stipulation also required actions by the plaintiff in the above stated action, specifically that the plaintiff dismiss or otherwise discontinue her Connecticut litigation against Marine Innovations, its officers and employees.   Additionally, the plaintiff is required to not seek to collect any amount from Marine Innovations, or its officers or employees, and must release and forever discharge the officers or employees of Marine Innovations, including but not limited to Michael Botzet and Lori Botzet.

On March 29, 2010, the defendants Marine Innovations, Michael Botzet, and Lori Botzet, filed a motion for summary judgment.   Defendants' motion is based upon the argument that plaintiff's claims against the defendants lack any genuine issues of material facts regarding the allegations made against said parties contained within the plaintiff's complaint.   Additionally, the defendants argue that as a result of the stipulation entered into, the plaintiff may only maintain the present action if there is insurance coverage available for said claims, of which there is not.

On September 22, 2010, the plaintiff filed a brief in opposition to the defendants' motion.   On September 29, 2010, the defendants filed a reply to plaintiff's objection.   The matter was heard at short calendar on October 4, 2010.   For the reasons discussed herein, the court grants the defendants' motion for summary judgment.

DISCUSSION

“[S]ummary judgment is an appropriate vehicle for raising a claim of res judicata ․” (Citations omitted.)  Joe's Pizza, Inc. v. Aetna Life & Casualty Co., 236 Conn. 863, 867 n.8, 675 A.2d 441 (1996).  “Because res judicata ․ may be dispositive of a claim, summary judgment [is] the appropriate method for resolving a claim of res judicata.”  Jackson v. R.G. Whipple, Inc., 225 Conn. 705, 712, 627 A.2d 374 (1993).

“Practice Book § 17-49 provides that summary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Provencher v. Enfield, 284 Conn. 772, 790-91, 936 A.2d 625 (2007).  “[T]he genuine issue aspect of summary judgment requires the parties to bring forward before trial evidentiary facts, or substantial evidence outside the pleadings, from which the material facts alleged in the pleadings can warrantably be inferred ․ A material fact has been defined adequately and simply as a fact which will make a difference in the result of the case.”   (Citation omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  Buell Industries, Inc. v. Greater New York Mutual Ins. Co., 259 Conn. 527, 556, 791 A.2d 489 (2002).

“In seeking summary judgment, it is the movant who has the burden of showing the nonexistence of any issue of fact ․ When documents submitted in support of a motion for summary judgment fail to establish that there is no genuine issue of material fact, the nonmoving party has no obligation to submit documents establishing the existence of such an issue ․ Once the moving party has met its burden, however, the opposing party must present evidence that demonstrates the existence of some disputed factual issue ․ It is not enough ․ for the opposing party merely to assert the existence of such a disputed issue.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Zielinski v. Kotsoris, 279 Conn. 312, 318-19, 901 A.2d 1207 (2006).  “In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the court's function is not to decide issues of material fact, but rather to determine whether any such issues exist.”  Nolan v. Borkowski, 206 Conn. 495, 500, 538 A.2d 1031 (1988).   Moreover, “the ․ court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.”   (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Provencher v. Enfield, supra, 284 Conn. 791.

In their memorandum of law in support of their motion for summary judgment, defendants argue that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that plaintiff's claims are barred by the doctrine of res judicata because of the stipulation and judgment entered into by the parties in the state of Minnesota.   The defendants contend that the Minnesota action is a final judgment.   Moreover, the present action arises out of the same operative facts as the Minnesota action.   The court agrees with the defendants.

The plaintiff counters that res judicata should not apply because it is not precluded if there is insurance available.   However, there is no proof of such insurance except the plaintiff's “belief.”   This is not sufficient to warrant this cause of action in light of the judgment entered into by the parties in the state of Minnesota.

“The doctrine of res judicata [or claim preclusion] provides that [a] valid, final judgment rendered on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction is an absolute bar to a subsequent action between the same parties ․ upon the same claim or demand ․ Moreover, [res judicata] prevents the pursuit of any claims relating to the cause of action which were actually made or might have been made [in the prior action].”  (Citations omitted;  emphasis in original;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  Weiss v. Weiss, 297 Conn. 446, 459, 998 A.2d 766 (2010).  “[T]he appropriate inquiry with respect to [res judicata] is whether the party had an adequate opportunity to litigate the matter in the earlier proceeding ․” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Linden Condominium Assn., Inc. v. McKenna, 247 Conn. 575, 594, 726 A.2d 502 (1999).   Therefore, “[a] plaintiff cannot, under the doctrine of res judicata, withhold certain claims from one action and then raise those claims in a later action when an adequate opportunity existed to raise all claims in one action.”   Daoust v. McWilliams, 49 Conn.App. 715, 726, 716 A.2d 922 (1998).

“For res judicata purposes, a judgment is final if no further judicial action by [the] court rendering judgment is required to determine [the] matter litigated.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Marone v. Waterbury, 244 Conn. 1, 12, 707 A.2d 725 (1998).  “A judgment may be final in a res judicata sense as to a part of an action although litigation continues as to the rest.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  CFM of Connecticut, Inc. v. Chowdhury, 239 Conn. 375, 397, 685 A.2d 1108 (1996).  “Thus, for purposes of res judicata, a judgment will ordinarily be considered final if it is not tentative, provisional, or contingent and represents the completion of all steps in the adjudication of the claim by the court, short of any steps by way of execution or enforcement that may be consequent upon the particular kind of adjudication.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Id., 398-99.  “[O]ne of the critical factors in determining whether a judicial determination is a final judgment for purposes of res judicata is whether it is also a final judgment for purposes of appeal.”  Id., 398.  “An otherwise interlocutory order is appealable in two circumstances:  (1) where the order or action terminates a separate and distinct proceeding, or (2) where the order or action so concludes the rights of the parties that further proceedings cannot affect them.”   (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Id., 399.

“A judgment on the merits is one which is based on legal rights as distinguished from mere matters of practice, procedure, jurisdiction or form ․ A decision with respect to rights and liabilities of the parties is on the merits where it is based on the ultimate fact or state of facts disclosed by the pleadings or evidence, or both, and on which the right of recovery depends.”  (Citations omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)   Rosenfield v. Cymbala, 43 Conn.App. 83, 91-92, 681 A.2d 999 (1996).  “[A] judgment obtained through the grant of summary judgment against a plaintiff constitutes a judgment on the merits for purposes of res judicata.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Boone v. William W. Backus Hospital, 102 Conn.App. 305, 311, 925 A.2d 432, cert. denied, 284 Conn. 906, 931 A.2d 261 (2007).

“[The Supreme Court has] adopted a transactional test as a guide to determining whether an action involves the same claim as an earlier action so as to trigger operation of the doctrine of res judicata.  [T]he claim [that is] extinguished [by the judgment in the first action] includes all rights of the plaintiff to remedies against the defendant with respect to all or any part of the transaction, or series of connected transactions, out of which the action arose.   What factual grouping constitutes a transaction, and what groupings constitute a series, are to be determined pragmatically, giving weight to such considerations as whether the facts are related in time, space, origin, or motivation, whether they form a convenient trial unit, and whether their treatment as a unit conforms to the parties' expectations or business understanding or usage ․ In applying the transactional test, we compare the complaint in the second action with the pleadings and the judgment in the earlier action.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  New England Estates, LLC v. Branford, 294 Conn. 817, 843, 988 A.2d 229 (2010).  “[E]ven though a single group of facts may give rise to rights for several different kinds of relief, it is still a single cause of action.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Weiss v. Weiss, supra, 297 Conn. 461-62.

In the present case, there is no issue of material fact that a valid final judgment was rendered on the merits with regard to the same transaction as is alleged in the present case.   The court finds that both the previous action and the present action arise out of the same transaction.

“[The] decision whether to apply the doctrine of res judicata to claims that have not actually been litigated should be made based upon a consideration of the doctrine's underlying policies, namely, the interests of the defendant and of the courts in bringing litigation to a close ․ and the competing interest of the plaintiff in the vindication of a just claim.  [The Supreme Court has] stated that res judicata should be applied as necessary to promote its underlying purposes.   These purposes are generally identified as being (1) to promote judicial economy by minimizing repetitive litigation;  (2) to prevent inconsistent judgments which undermine the integrity of the judicial system;  and (3) to provide repose by preventing a person from being harassed by vexatious litigation ․ The judicial [doctrine] of res judicata ․ [is] based on the public policy that a party should not be able to relitigate a matter which it already has had an opportunity to litigate ․ Stability in judgments grants to parties and others the certainty in the management of their affairs which results when a controversy is finally laid to rest ․ We review the doctrine of res judicata to emphasize that its purposes must inform the decision to foreclose future litigation.   The conservation of judicial resources is of paramount importance as our trial dockets are deluged with new cases daily.   We further emphasize that where a party has fully and fairly litigated his claims, he may be barred from future actions on matters not raised in the prior proceeding.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  New England Estates, LLC v. Branford, supra, 294 Conn. 843-44.   Res judicata is intended to prevent this type of ad hoc piecemeal litigation.

For the foregoing reasons, the defendants' motion for summary judgment is granted.

This 6th day of December 2010

By the Court

Alexander, J.

Alexander, Joan K., J.