Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities Ex Rel. et al. v. Alyssa Peterson (2010)

RULING ON THE DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS (# 107)

Defendant Alyssa Peterson (“defendant”) moved to dismiss the complaint, alleging that the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction.   The plaintiff, the Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities (“plaintiff”) objects to the motion, asserting that this court has jurisdiction to hear this matter pursuant to General Statutes §§ 46a-83 and 46a-89.   The motion to dismiss is denied.

FACTS

The plaintiff filed its complaint on August 3, 2010, pursuant to General Statutes § 46a-83(d)(2).   That section provides, in pertinent part, as follows:  “If the investigator makes a determination that there is reasonable cause to believe that a violation of Section 46a-64c has occurred, the complainant and the respondent shall have twenty days from receipt of notice of the reasonable cause finding to elect a civil action in lieu of an administrative hearing ․ Further, General Statutes § 46a-89 addresses the situation where, as here, an underlying complaint filed with the Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities alleges a violation of Section 46a-64c.   In such a situation, Section 46a-89 provides, in pertinent part as follows:  the commission may bring a petition in the superior court for the judicial district in which the discriminatory practice which is the subject of the complaint occurred ․

The complaint alleges that the defendant discriminated against two of her tenants because, at a certain point arising during their tenancy, they began to receive government assistance.   The complaint also alleges that the defendant deprived the tenants of certain privileges that were made available to tenants who were not receiving government assistance.   The complaint alleges, further, that the defendant ultimately, and wrongfully, forced the tenants to seek alternative housing.   Finally, the complaint alleges that the tenants were residing within the judicial district of Litchfield at the time the foregoing events occurred.

The defendant filed the motion to dismiss on October 19, 2010, and the plaintiff filed an objection on November 5, 2010.   The defendant replied to the plaintiff's objection on November 19, 2010.   This matter was heard at the November 22, 2010 short calendar.

The defendant bases her motion on her belief that this case involves “federal contractual rights” and therefore can only be brought in the United States District Court.   The defendant further argues that her actions were not discriminatory in nature.   She argues that the complaint relies on incomplete information and that the tenants engaged in criminal activity while renting an apartment from her.   The defendant attached exhibits to her motion which, she argues, support the latter arguments.

The plaintiff objects to the motion to dismiss, arguing that there is no basis for the claim that the United States District Court has exclusive jurisdiction over this matter.   The plaintiff relies on General Statutes §§ 46a-83(d) and 46a-89 in support of its claim that this court does have subject matter jurisdiction in this case and that proper venue lies in the judicial district of Litchfield.

DISCUSSION

A motion to dismiss attacks “the jurisdiction of the court, essentially asserting that the plaintiff cannot as a matter of law and fact state a cause of action that should be heard by the court.”  Beecher v. Mohegan Tribe of Indians of Connecticut, 282 Conn. 130, 134, 918 A.2d 880 (2007).  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)   In determining whether a court has subject matter jurisdiction “every presumption favoring jurisdiction should be indulged.”   Connor v. Statewide Grievance Committee, 260 Conn. 435, 443, 797 A.2d 1081 (2002).   In deciding a motion to dismiss, a court “must consider the allegations in the complaint in their most favorable light ․ In this regard, a court must take the facts to be those alleged in the complaint, including those facts necessarily implied from the allegations, construing them in a light most favorable to the pleader.”  Cogswell v. American Transit Ins. Co., 282 Conn. 505, 516, 923 A.2d 638 (2007).   The court will only look beyond the complaint, in the normal course, when the complaint is supplemented by “undisputed facts established by affidavits submitted in support of the motion to dismiss ․ [and/or] other types of undisputed evidence ․” Conboy v. State, 292 Conn. 642, 651, 974 A.2d 669 (2009).¹  (Emphasis in original).

In her pleadings, and at oral argument, the defendant asked the court to go beyond the face of the complaint to make factual determinations which, she contends, completely rebut the plaintiff's allegations.   The defendant misunderstands the distinction between standing to bring a cause of action as opposed to the validity of the cause of action.   The defendant argues that the various documents attached to the complaint, to her motion, and to her memorandum compel the conclusion that the plaintiff cannot succeed on the merits.   Even if the defendant is correct in this regard, “the question of [w]hether the plaintiff will be successful ․ on the merits is immaterial to the issue of standing.”  Reitzer v. Board of Trustees of State Colleges, 2 Conn.App. 196, 201, 477 A.2d 129 (1984).   See also Pitruzello v. Muro, 70 Conn.App. 309, 312, 798 A.2d 469 (2002) (“A ruling on a motion to dismiss is neither a ruling on the merits of the action ․ nor a test of whether the complaint states a cause of action ․ Motions to dismiss are granted solely on jurisdictional grounds”).  (Citations omitted.)

CONCLUSION

The defendant's argument that the complaint is without merit is not properly before the court in the context of a motion to dismiss.   The defendant's motion to dismiss is denied.

BY THE COURT

John A. Danaher III

FOOTNOTES

FN1. In circumstances not present in this case, such as when there is a need to determine whether there are sufficient minimum contacts with Connecticut to permit an action to be brought, an evidentiary hearing may be held in order to decide a motion to dismiss.   See, e.g., Standard Tallow Corp. v. Jowdy, 190 Conn. 48, 56, 459 A.2d 503 (1983)..  FN1. In circumstances not present in this case, such as when there is a need to determine whether there are sufficient minimum contacts with Connecticut to permit an action to be brought, an evidentiary hearing may be held in order to decide a motion to dismiss.   See, e.g., Standard Tallow Corp. v. Jowdy, 190 Conn. 48, 56, 459 A.2d 503 (1983).

Danaher, John A., J.