James E. McKinney v. Administrator, Unemployment Compensation Act et al. (2010)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE MOTION FOR JUDGMENT (# 102)

FACTS

On November 27, 2009, the plaintiff, James E. McKinney (claimant), filed a petition, against the administrator of the Connecticut Unemployment Compensation Act, appealing from the decision of the employment security board of review (board).   The board affirmed the appeals referee's denial of the claimant's application for unemployment benefits.   The board determined that the claimant had voluntarily left work without good cause and thus was ineligible for benefits under General Statutes § 31-236(a)(2)(A).   As the ground for appeal, the claimant argues that the board's decision was based on an erroneous finding of fact.

As the basis for its decision, the board found the following facts.¹  L & S Transport, LLC (employer) had employed the claimant as a driver beginning July 1, 2008, and ending March 25, 2009.²  The claimant worked first shift hours for the employer in connection with a six-month contract the employer had with the United States Postal Service (post office).   The contract was scheduled to expire on March 31, 2009.   On March 25, 2009, the employer told the claimant that his contract with the post office would not be renewed upon its expiration six days later.   The employer told the claimant that, nevertheless, he could work hours from 4:30 p.m. to 8:45 p.m. and cover drivers who were on vacation.   The claimant had, without objection, previously worked night and early morning hours for the employer.   Nevertheless, the claimant told the employer that he did not want to work at night, although he did not claim to the employer that he could not work those hours because his wife suffered from anxiety.³  He then told the employer:  “just give me a pink slip” and left the premises.   As the claimant was then leaving, the employer told the claimant that the claimant was “upset and might not be thinking rationally.”   The employer then told the claimant to consider the offer and respond later.   On March 31, 2009, the claimant informed the employer that he was going to work for the company to which the post office awarded the new contract.

The administrator moved for judgment on January 29, 2010, arguing that the board's decision is reasonably supported by the evidence, that there is a logical basis for the decision and that the court is bound by the board's findings of fact.   In addition to the motion the administrator filed a memorandum of law in support of the motion and on September 1, 2010, a supplemental brief in support of its motion.   On August 27, 2010, argument on the motion for judgment was heard by this court.

DISCUSSION

The limited scope of review of administrative agency decisions permitted by the Superior Court is well settled.  “[R]eview of an administrative agency decision requires a court to determine whether there is substantial evidence in the administrative record to support the agency's findings of basic fact and whether the conclusions drawn from those facts are reasonable ․ [T]he trial court may [not] retry the case or substitute its own judgment for that of the administrative agency on the weight of the evidence or questions of fact ․” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  JSF Promotions, Inc. v. Administrator, Unemployment Compensation Act, 265 Conn. 413, 417, 828 A.2d 609 (2003).   Furthermore, “[a]n agency's factual and discretionary determinations are to be accorded considerable weight by the courts.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Id., 417-18.

In support of his appeal, the claimant argues that he did not stop working until the end of his contract terms on March 31, 2009.   The administrator argues that the board's findings are binding on this court and that the claimant should have brought a motion to correct to challenge any findings.   Due to the limited scope of review this court will consider only “whether the administrative action resulted from an incorrect application of the law to the facts found or could not reasonably or logically have followed from such facts.   Although the court may not substitute its own conclusions for those of the administrative board, it retains the ultimate obligation to determine whether the administrative action was unreasonable, arbitrary, illegal or an abuse of discretion.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Mattatuck Museum-Mattatuck Historical Society v. Administrator, Unemployment Compensation Act, 238 Conn. 273, 276, 679 A.2d 347 (1996).

In the present case, the administrator cites to cases where the court upheld the decision of the board because it agreed with its findings and conclusions.   There is no question that the board can make new findings of fact that may differ from the referee's findings of fact.   Pursuant to General Statutes § 31-249, the board can hear additional evidence or testimony.   It is also required under § 31-249 when it modifies the referee's findings of fact that its decision “shall include its findings of fact and conclusions of law.”   The board did not in this matter hear additional evidence or testimony nor did it include its findings of fact which in fact modified the referee's findings.   The administrator argues that the claimant is unable correct the board's finding that the date of termination was March 25, 2009, rather than March 31, 2009, since he failed to file a Motion to Correct pursuant to Practice Book § 22-4.  Practice Book § 22-4 provides in relevant part that “[i]f the appellant desires to have the finding of the board corrected he or she must, within two weeks after the record has been filed in the superior court, unless the time is extended for cause by the board, file with the board a motion for the correction of the finding.”

While, the administrator is correct that a motion to correct is the proper vehicle for correcting the board's factual findings, “[i]f, however, the issue is one of law, the court has the broader responsibility of determining whether the administrative action resulted from an incorrect application of the law to the facts found or could not reasonably have followed from such facts.   Although the court may not substitute its own conclusions for those of the administrative board, it retains the ultimate obligation to determine whether the administrative action was unreasonable, arbitrary, illegal or an abuse of discretion.”  (Citations omitted.)  United Parcel Service, Inc. v. Administrator, Unemployment Compensation Act, 209 Conn. 381 (1988).  “While the limits on a court function in reviewing decisions of the board are well recognized, the failure of a claimant to file a motion to correct has not been considered fatal to the court's ability to review a decision to determine whether the board acted unreasonably, or arbitrarily.   What could be more unreasonable or arbitrary than a decision to deny unemployment compensation based on a conclusion which has no support at all in the record upon which it purports to be based?”   Crenshaw v. Administrator, Unemployment Compensation Act, Superior Court, judicial district of New Britain, Docket No. CV 99 0498448 (April 13, 2000, Shortall, J.) (27 Conn. L. Rptr. 80).   See also Samson v. Administrator, Unemployment Compensation Act, 29 Conn.Sup. 316, 284 A.2d 890 (1971);  Petula v. Administrator, Unemployment Compensation Act, 33 Conn.Sup. 119, 365 A.2d 635 (1974).

In the present case, the evidence presented clearly indicates that March 31, 2009, was the claimant's last day of employment.   In fact the employer's statements clearly identify March 31, 2009 as the claimant's last day of work.⁴  There is no evidence in the record to support the finding of the board that March 25, 2009, was the claimant's last day of work at L & S Transport LLC. In light of all of the evidence that the board had before it the board's action was arbitrary and unreasonable.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the court remands the case to the board for further findings of fact based on the record and revision of its decision if necessary.

PELLEGRINO, JTR

FOOTNOTES

FN1. The board's decision is reprinted in the record at pages 44-47.   The board adopted with two modifications, the findings of fact of the appeals referee, which are reprinted at page 33 of the record..  FN1. The board's decision is reprinted in the record at pages 44-47.   The board adopted with two modifications, the findings of fact of the appeals referee, which are reprinted at page 33 of the record.

FN2. The appeals referee had found that the claimant worked for the employer until March 31, 2009.  (Record, p. 33, ¶ 2.)   The board modified this finding in its decision.  (Record, p. 46.).  FN2. The appeals referee had found that the claimant worked for the employer until March 31, 2009.  (Record, p. 33, ¶ 2.)   The board modified this finding in its decision.  (Record, p. 46.)

FN3. The board had modified the sixth finding of fact of the appeals referee to add the following after the last sentence:  “The claimant never claimed that his wife suffered from anxiety.”  (Record, p. 46.).  FN3. The board had modified the sixth finding of fact of the appeals referee to add the following after the last sentence:  “The claimant never claimed that his wife suffered from anxiety.”  (Record, p. 46.)

FN4. The employer's fact finding supplement indicates that the claimant worked in his position with L & S Transport LLC from July 1, 2008, until March 31, 2009.  (Record, p. 3-12.).  FN4. The employer's fact finding supplement indicates that the claimant worked in his position with L & S Transport LLC from July 1, 2008, until March 31, 2009.  (Record, p. 3-12.)

Pellegrino, Joseph H., J.T.R.