State of Connecticut v. John Johnson (2010)

VOP Hearing

THE COURT:  Okay. I'm ready to make a ruling on whether or not the State has established by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant was on probation and violated any terms and conditions of his probation.   I find that the State has established by a preponderance of the evidence or more the following essential allegations.   That the defendant was convicted of the crime of robbery in the first degree on or about January 4th of 2002.   That he received at that time a sentence of eight years suspended after four years incarceration with five years of probation.   There were special conditions of probation associated with that original disposition and those are on the orders of probation which is in evidence in this case.   That subsequently-I'm sorry.   Subsequently he began his original probationary term on or about January 21st, 2005.   Those orders were reviewed with and understood by the defendant after January 21st, 2005.   It may have been in August, but they were reviewed with and understood by the defendant.   Now, I further find that the defendant was violated for the terms and conditions of his probation and this is the first violation by way of an arrest warrant on or about October 25th, 2005.   That was for an assault.   That case, that violation was disposed of on January 3 of 2006.   The disposition in that case was four years, which was the balance of what he owed, four years suspended after five months and probation to continue to April 1st of 2010.   So he served another five months.   He went on probation after serving that sentence, the unsuspended part of that sentence and that is why we are here now.   The defendant was on probation.   He was being supervised by a probation officer who went over again the court ordered and general conditions of probation.   Chief among the general conditions of probation were that he commit no crime or crimes and while he was on this second probation there were two instances.   One in Stratford on or about August the 9th, 2009, and the second in Bridgeport on or about number 7(sic), 2009, which the State claims constitute a violation of his probation.   The Court has considered all of the evidence including the testimony of Ebony Villanueva and police officers and the firemen who were called today to testify.   And the Court finds that their testimony was credible, believable, and persuasive.   I think that as to the Stratford matter, even though it rests solely on Miss Villanueva's complaint as to the Stratford matter, the defendant showed up uninvited to a beach picnic in Stratford and accosted Miss Villanueva.   As she put it, got in her face.   Was hostile, screaming and yelling as if he was going to hit her.   She made an immediate complaint to the Stratford Police Department.   Now, the State has said-I just want this to be clear for the record-that there's some corroboration to that event by way of the fact that a judge signed an arrest warrant and that there's a matter pending.   The fact that a judge may have signed an arrest warrant would not be corroboration and if that's what the State suggested, if it did do that, if that-and if I misheard it I misheard it.   But if the State's suggestion was that constitutes corroboration of the Stratford matter of course that would not constitute corroboration, the fact that police applied for an arrest warrant and a judge signed an arrest warrant.   If I didn't hear it that way correctly then I stand corrected.   But I thought heard testimony concerning the Stratford was credible, believable and persuasive.   And that he violated criminal laws of the State of Connecticut in the nature of threatening and breach of the peace and the like.   Subsequent to that, the second incident in Bridgeport on or about November 27, 2009 really goes over about two different days.   November 27, 2009 and the following day, the 28th.   Again, I listened to her testimony.   What happened on the 27th was by her account, by all accounts, even much more serious.   He ripped off her clothes.   Tied her up.   Threw soda on her.   Band basically kept her restrained and confined in this state.   Committed some acts of physical abuse against her.   All for what I'm not sure.   But it's clear to me that the State has met its burden of proof by more than a preponderance of the evidence in that regard.   This went on for some time.   The next day she managed to get herself to the Bridgeport Hospital with something of a ruse and reported the abuse to the authorities.   Police were notified and-stay with me one minute here.   Police were notified.   She spoke to the police.   After she got out of the hospital she did encounter the defendant again and-to retrieve some belongings.   Met up with the defendant.   They went to downtown Bridgeport to see somebody whose office wasn't open.   And this was the incident at the fire station where she was able to get into the fire station.   Defendant tried to pursue her in, was denied entry.   Police were called.   They detained the defendant.   Gave them something of a tough time.   Had a screwdriver in his pocket which, again, it's not the fact that it was used.   Capable of use.   Certainly a screwdriver is capable of use for purposes of a dangerous instrument.   An officer had a slight injury.   But again, many threats.   Certainly verbal abuse against the victim that day.   And he was arrested on that day.   There's corroboration of the victim's account through the fire station attendant, the policeman.   And again, I find their corroboration to be useful and they do in fact corroborate the account of the victim, Miss Villanueva.   So on the second occasion State has established again that the defendant has violated the criminal laws of the State of Connecticut.   So I do find that the State has established by the fair preponderance of the evidence or more that the defendant is in violation of his probation for those reasons.

Now as to the dispositional phase I'll hear the State and I'll hear the defense.

ATTY. KELLEY:  Just one moment, your Honor.

THE COURT:  By my account, just so that we're all on the same page, if I've done my math correctly, he owes a total of forty-three months on his original sentence.

ATTY. KELLEY:  That's what the State has according to its records as well, your Honor.

ATTY. MURPHY:  I concur, your Honor.

THE COURT:  All right.   I'll hear from the State.   Go ahead.

MR. LATRONICA:  Your Honor, with regards to whether the beneficial aspects of probation have been exhausted for this particular defendant State would first just would like to go over or point out that the underlying robbery was-that we heard about, the defendant was actually on probation at that time when that offense was committed from an earlier offense that was disposed of on January 24th, 2000.   And subsequent we also heard that he committed an assault in the third degree.   And now is standing-is here today, another violation of probation and that this would tend to show probation is not being or is effective for the defendant just based on his history alone, his charge history alone and that court record.   As far as exhausting the beneficial aspects of probation the State would argue that the considerations the Court should have is, one, whether or not this individual-confinement of this individual is necessary for protection of the public.   And we think that by-through establishing not only through his record, but establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant did engage in criminal activities on-at the-in the Stratford incident and also the Bridgeport incident demonstrates that he's indeed a threat, if not only to Mrs. Villanueva but also to law enforcement officials and potentially to the general public.   His conduct and his actions would not make the State or would not have the State believe that he's not a threat in that consideration.   And also another-another aspect the Court should consider is the defendant's need for guidance or assistance which can effectively be administered through probation supervision.   One of the conditions of the defendant's probation was to continue taking his-his course of med or of his prescribed treatment to treat his condition and he does not appear to be able to do that out on probation.   There were two for the-for the two-in the Stratford and Bridgeport offense there were two competency examinations.   The first one the defendant was found not-incompetent to stand trial.

THE COURT:  Say it again.   The defendant what?

MR. LATRONICA:  The defendant was found not competent to go to trial.   And-but there was a recommendation that after a period of time, I believe it was sixty days, and new medication the defendant would most likely be competent to stand trial.   The defendant received this new medication at the direction of the state.   And subsequently the new-the second competency hearing on April 5th, 2010 was found competent to stand trial, which is indicative of the defendant's inability to get the proper course of treatment while on probation.

THE COURT:  I just-I just want to make sure that I understand everything.   These competency proceedings to which you're referring to.   They were incident-they were incident to the G.A. cases then because this VOP didn't even originate until April-

ATTY. KELLEY:  Correct.

THE COURT:-of  2010.   okAy.

MR. LATRONICA:  Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT:  I just want to make sure.

MR. LATRONICA:  Moreover, your Honor, some additional evidence or additional arguments in favor or against probation for this-for the defendant is that the defendant has several incidents of misconduct while being incarcerated.   There is allegations of attempts to strangle or physical altercations with other people while being incarcerated.   And also the-

ATTY. KELLEY:  May I have just one moment?

MR. LATRONICA:  Sorry, your Honor.

THE COURT:  Take your time.

MR. LATRONICA:  The incidents that I were referring to earlier, your Honor, were from the competency examination reports.   That there were seven to eight reported incidents of misconduct in these reports and that was where the attempt to strangle another patient came from.   And also there is a reference to a March 19th altercation with other parties while incarcerated.   And then refer back to the four violations of probation kind of demonstrate that the defendant is not a candidate for probation.   That he's had four opportunities to try to benefit from probation and has been unable to do so thus far.   Finally, I think the last consideration is whether probation is not inconsistent with the ends of justice.   And that's ultimately for the Court to decide.   But the State's position would be it would be injustice or be unjust not to hold the defendant accountable for his violations on these four occasions.   That it also would be unjust for the defendant to be left without the ability to get assistance from the state in establishing and maintaining a course of treatment that would help him effectively manage his condition and also to expose the public and more specifically Mrs. Villanueva to the potential threat posed by the defendant when he's not receiving his proper treatment for his condition.

THE COURT:  Okay.

MR. LATRONICA:  Thank you.

THE COURT:  All right.   Thank you.

Attorney Murphy.

ATTY. MURPHY:  Your Honor, I think it might be appropriate for Mr. Johnson to make some remarks.

THE COURT:  That's fine.

Mr. Johnson, you have a right to address the Court before I decide what sentence to impose.   So I'll hear from you if you wish to.   Do you wish speak to me?

THE DEFENDANT:  I do.

THE COURT:  All right.   Go ahead.   Everything is based on Ebony-

THE COURT:  I'm going to ask you to keep your voice up for me.

THE DEFENDANT:  Everything is based on Ebony telling the story.   So I don't believe that like whatever she say I should really be arrested for it because Ebony-Ebony was emotional, emotional case already and it just spills over into a big mess.   And probation-probation violation based on two stories that this girl made up.   She-the first-the first. violation was at Short Beach.   I wasn't even around long enough to cause that whatever happened.   That mess that happened.   I wasn't even around.   When I got out the car Ebony-Ebony started to talk to me.   Once she started to talk to me, me being me, I just go back in the car and I left.   So that's why there were no cops.   No cops had to come to the scene.   The reason why, her motive for doing all of this, because she had a baby that name was John and he ended up getting killed.   So my name was John Johnson.   Ebony always told me that if we have a baby she gonna name it John. And that's the reason why she doing it.   She's blackmailing me because she found out that she wasn't pregnant like that.   So that's why she was blackmailing me.   She waits the next day and then she brung-she brung all this stuff about me.   That screwdriver.   That screwdriver was in my pocket because I was digging in the trash, looking see if I threw anything away cleaning my room and I stick it in my pocket and took the trash out.   And I didn't resist or nothing the officers.   You look at my DOC history you'll never see that Johnson had a problem with the COs that he-that they have to put their hands on him to the point where he was fighting back or anything.   When the COs get involved or (indiscernible) gets involved that's a mit automatically.   I know I'm not going to wing it.

THE COURT:  All right.   Thank you.

Mr. Murphy.

ATTY. MURPHY:  Yes, your Honor.   I'll try to be brief.   There's a reference by the State to the competency examinations ordered by Mr. Paoletta regarding the pending matter.   First exam was February 2nd and two months later on April 1st was a reevaluation.   First result was declared incompetent to stand trial.   Two months later he was reexamined, reevaluated.   Apparently he was competent to stand trial.   In that time when he was-diagnosis contained in those reports.   I don't think it's necessary unless the Court desires to have these marked as exhibits as something that might assist the Court.   Or may I read from a public document?   It's obviously in possession of the State.   There's certain pertinent parts I think might-might be relevant.

THE COURT:  That's up to you.   These documents-I may be wrong, but I think these documents are for interested persons only.   The State, defense attorneys, the court and others who have an interest in it.   So I don't know that they are in the public domain.   So if you would like to give me a copy and you can refer me to what you want me to look at I will.   I don't know the need to mark those.   They're part of another file.   But that's up to you.   If you want to mark them you can, but then they do become exhibits.   But I would take judicial notice of them as they're in another court docket number.   I think that might be the best way for you to proceed, but that's up to you.

ATTY. MURPHY:  I think that would be appropriate that we mark them.   I'd like to submit them.

THE COURT:  Okay. Again, I just want-if you mark them as exhibits that's your choice.   But then they would be full exhibits in the case.

ATTY. MURPHY:  I understand that.   And-

THE COURT:  Fine.

ATTY. MURPHY:-any  confidentiality I wave on behalf of my client.   It's-

THE COURT:  All right.

ATTY. MURPHY:  If I may have them marked.

THE COURT:  Whatever you feel is appropriate.

ATTY. MURPHY:  Defendant's exhibit A.

THE CLERK:  First one A.

ATTY. MURPHY:  A and B.

THE COURT:  Now, since they're full exhibits you can certainly read all or any part of them you wish.

ATTY. MURPHY:  Yes. And then may I submit them to the Court at this time, your Honor?

THE COURT:  All right.   You have copies?

ATTY. MURPHY:  Yes. I have copies.

THE COURT:  All right.

ATTY. MURPHY:  And I'll just use (indiscernible) copies.

THE COURT:  You want to refer me to anything in particular?

ATTY. MURPHY:  Yes. We'll begin at the-

THE COURT:  Or do you want me to just look at these myself?   I'm happy to do that.   Why don't I do that.

ATTY. MURPHY:  All right.   That's true.   I'm looking at page four of seven pages of, I believe, defendant's exhibit 1. And I'm not going through this whole thing, your Honor, because it's tedious.   If I might go to the conclusions on the document dated February 11th, which refers to a February 2nd exam.   And it's a-let me try page seven of seven.   I've got a few things that I-

THE COURT:  All right.

ATTY. MURPHY:-want-

THE COURT:  Go ahead.

ATTY. MURPHY:  If I may read.   Mr. Johnson has under conclusion-this was the report that declared him incompetent to stand trial, which is what (indiscernible).   Mr. Johnson has an extensive history of psychiatric treatment.   His symptoms have been slow to respond to medication in the past.   He presents with certain significant concentration deficits.   Unable to engage in a give and take discussion.   And so forth.   Another page which sets forth four of seven at the bottom under mental status exam.   I'm just jumping down there.   Miss Caplan noted the defendant experiences auditory hallucinations, thought insertions, and thought broadcasting as well as delusional thinking.   Despite his denial the defendant exhibited serious deficits in concentration.   You may recall, your Honor, that Miss Villanueva testified that she was accused by Mr. Johnson of being a CIA agent or working for the government or some such nonsense and Miss Villanueva referred to Mr. Johnson stating he had a chip implanted in his brain.   And I refer you quickly back to the other exhibit.   The front page is dated April 7. Where it was determined he was competent to stand trial.   Under page four of six pages under diagnosis.   Axis I, he's diagnosed with schizoaffective, paranoid type.   The hearing of the voices.   I think the Court might take judicial notice of the fact that hearing voices, thinking that chips implanted in his brain are classic symptoms of schizophrenia, paranoid type.   Everybody's out to get me, et cetera, et cetera.   The current medication listed in that same document bras Haldol, Abilify, and Cogentin.   And Haldol and Abilify are antipsychotic drugs.   Fairly potent.   Mr. Johnson has had serious mental issues, mental health issues and I would say that a long period of incarceration would not benefit society.   He obviously needs extensive monitoring and treatment in this area to see if there's any hope of restoring him to normalcy, whatever that means.   And I urge that the Court consider perhaps extending his probation and ordering him through the Probation Department extensive mental health screening and possible inpatient treatment if deemed necessary.   And that's all I have to say.

THE COURT:  Okay. Anything further from the State?

MR. LATRONICA:  Just briefly, your Honor.   State's position is that the information pointed out in these reports more shows that the defendant isn't-beneficial aspects-beneficial should have been exhausted.   All the offenses in the defendant's record are violent offenses.   The majority of them are violent offenses.   And in terms of maintaining on his current course of treatment there is some indication from the Officer Brand, the probation officer, that there was difficulty with staying on top of the course of treatment.   And then on the conclusions of the report dated April 7th that found the defendant competent for trial that at this point after receiving treatment and being on the medications indicated, the Haldol and other things, the defendant could be remanded to the Department of Corrections because there's no need for further inpatient psychiatric care at this time.   So that the combination of the fact that the defendant has a violent criminal history, has trouble staying on the course of treatment that he has been recommended by psychiatrists and by doctors and the fact that now he's-appears to, according to this report, have stabilized would all be in favor of not probation, but going back and be incarcerated for the remainder of his period.   His balance.

THE COURT:  Okay. All right.   You know, the thread that runs through Mr. Johnson's criminal history is-regrettably it's a thread of violence.   Violence toward others.   Robbery.  Assaultive behavior.   Unlawful restraint.   Threatening.  I would not disagree that there seems to be-there seem to be some indications that Mr. Johnson is-unfortunately does not enjoy robust psychiatric-a robust psychiatric state of mind.   That's unfortunate.   But it is very troubling that these acts of violence are perpetrated against others.   Some I guess-the robbery, I'm assuming, did not involve Mrs. Villanueva.   I don't know.

ATTY. KELLEY:  It did not.

THE COURT:  But that's-but certainly these most recent events, the ones that are before the Court today, do.   And I'll tell you, especially the one around Thanksgiving day in November of 2009 at the apartment where he ripped her clothes off, tied her up, threw soda on her, water on her.   Threatened to burn her with a cigarette, needles.   You know, she was-you wouldn't treat-you wouldn't treat an animal that way.   You certainly don't treat another person that way.   And this woman was in a very, very abusive relationship.   You know, having to-she had, I assume, some of her own issues that she's dealing with, trying to cope with.   But, you know, what happened to her on these days and especially in November really are beyond description to me.   I can't fathom it.   I do not think that it would serve any useful purpose to continuing him on probation now.   I do not think that even a split sentence would be desirable now.   He's had probations before and while he's been on those probations he's been violated or he's committed new crimes.   And these incidents do not help his cause.   Not by a long shot.   And I think that while I hope Mr. Johnson gets the treatment that he needs within Corrections, my worry is right now, frankly, is Miss Villanueva and the public.   And I think that they are at risk if he is not incarcerated right now.   So the judgment prev-I don't think the beneficial aspects of probation can be served.

The judgment previously entered is reopened.   The sentence is vacated.   And, Mr. Johnson, you are sentenced to a term of forty-three months to serve.   Any fees and costs are waived.   This court adjourns.

Kavanewsky, John F., J.