Lucie M. Daigle v. Charlene M. Daigle (2010)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

The defendant, Charlene M. Daigle, moves to strike the fourth count of the plaintiff's revised complaint, which count seeks the remedy of the partition sale of real estate.

A motion to strike “admits all the facts well pleaded;  it does not admit conclusions or the truth or accuracy of opinions stated in the pleadings.”   Mingachos v. CBS, Inc., 196 Conn. 91, 108 (1985).

In the fourth count the plaintiff, Lucie Daigle, alleges that she gave the defendant, her daughter, $200,000 to facilitate the purchase of a residence by the defendant.   The defendant, as part of the agreement, was to provide her mother with a life estate in that property.   On August 19, 2005, the defendant acquired the property and conveyed a life interest to her mother.

The defendant moves to strike this count, which seeks partition, as the ground that the plaintiff has failed to allege facts which would allow the court to order a partition sale under General Statutes § 52-500 as claimed by the plaintiff.   This statute permits a court to order a partition sale “when the whole or a part of the land is vested in any person for life with remainder to his heirs, general or special, or, on failure of the heirs, to any other person ․” § 52-500(b).

This provision contravenes the common-law rule which refused to recognize a right to request partition by a life tenant with respect to the remainder interest.  Penfield v. Jarvis, 175 Conn. 463, 468-69 (1978).   The basis for this prohibition was that partition was only available to cotenants who had immediate right to possession, Id. Subsection 52-500(b) affords a limited right to partition by sale in a life tenant but “only when the life tenant holds the estate ․ ‘with remainder to his heirs ․ or, on failure of such heirs, to any other person.’  “ Id., 473.

In the present case, the fourth count lacks any allegation that the plaintiff holds a life estate with the remainder vested in her heirs or any other person.   To the contrary, the plaintiff avers that the defendant only conveyed to the plaintiff a life tenancy reserving the remainder interest to herself.

In a similar case, a trial court held that § 52-500 was inapplicable.   Blouin v. Blouin, Superior Court, New Haven J.D., d.n. CV 92-331741 (May 21, 1993), Hodgson, J. A son owned property and conveyed a life estate in a second house on the parcel to his father.   The father sought a partition which the court rejected because the court concluded that the mere ownership on a life estate with “no provision for successors to that interest” failed to satisfy the limited exception created by § 52-500(b).

The court agrees with this conclusion and determines that the fourth count of the revised complaint fails to set forth a cognizable claim for partition either under § 52-500 or under the common law.   The motion to strike, is therefore, granted.

Sferrazza, J.

Sferrazza, Samuel J., J.