IN RE: Trevor V.1 (2010)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

On May 18, 2010, the petitioner, the commissioner of the Department of Children and Families, (“DCF”), filed a petition pursuant to C.G.S. § 17a-112 et seq. to terminate the parental rights of LaShawn T., and Andrew V. as to the minor child Trevor V. d.o.b. 11/3/09.   The parents have appeared and are represented by counsel.   The legal father, that is the man legally married to the child's mother at the time of Trevor's birth, has been served with process in the neglect proceeding and has failed to appear for any of the earlier proceedings.   He has continuously represented that he is not the father of the last two children born to LaShawn, namely Catherine Y. in 2007, and Trevor V. born in 2009.   Andrew V. has at all times relevant, acknowledged that he is the father of Trevor.   Neither biological parent claims Indian Tribal affiliation.   The court is aware of no other proceedings pending in any other court regarding the custody of this child.   This court has jurisdiction.

DCF has notified all three possible parental claimants of the pendency of these proceedings, of the date of the contested hearing and offered them transportation to court.   None of the parents, actual or legal, came to court for the hearing.   The court views this as an indication of the level of concern they have for this child.   The foster parents were in court to express their level of interest in Trevor's welfare.   The foster mother made a statement to the court regarding the joy that they experience parenting Trevor.   They are committed to adoption of the child if that becomes possible.

The court received Exhibits A-U as full exhibits and heard briefly from two social workers.   After considering the testimony of the social workers and examining the documents in evidence, the court makes the following findings by clear and convincing evidence LaShawn is thirty-four years of age.   She reports a dysfunctional home of origin.

She was pregnant at age sixteen with the first of her six children.   None of the children are in her care.   The child protection agency has been involved with LaShawn for fifteen years, since 1995.   They have offered her the full panoply of available services for persons with mental health, substance abuse, domestic violence and parental deficits, to no avail.   Indeed, DCF was involved with LaShawn while she was pregnant, assisting her with the care of Trevor's older sister Catherine who was two years old at the time.   Even with DCF monitoring LaShawn, she was using crack cocaine and missing pre-natal visits at the time of Trevor's birth.   Trevor was born with cocaine in his system.

Three days after the birth of Trevor, the child protection agency sought and obtained an order of temporary custody of both children.   The orders were subsequently sustained.   A petition alleging neglect was filed simultaneously and the children were found to be neglected in that they had been exposed to conditions and circumstances injurious to their welfare on February 24, 2010 (Suarez, J.).

Trevor has been in foster care since removal from the hospital.   He has never been in the care of LaShawn or Andrew V. Both of the parents have continued to abuse drugs, involve themselves in criminal activity and been incarcerated while the case has been pending.   Each parent has had a few visits with Trevor, but none of the visitation has been consistent and regular over time.  (See Exhibit U).

Petitioner's Exhibit A describes the history of LaShawn's (Ms. T.) history according to DCF.

Ms. T. reported all of her relationships with men have been abusive because that is all she has known.   Ms. T. remembers growing up in a home where her parents were substance abusers and her father was abusive.

Ms. T. admits to a history of substance use and reported her first use at the age of 16.   Ms. T. stated her drug of choice is crack cocaine and she has been in substance abuse treatment in the past.   She has previously attended substance abuse treatment programs at numerous facilities in the State of Connecticut.   Ms. T. has been referred to services since 1995 to address her substance abuse issues.   The following is a list of programs Ms. T. participated in to address her substance abuse:  Victory Outreach, Gunster, Morris Foundation, Valley Mental Health, Lower Naugatuck Valley Counsel, Holebrook Recovery Center, Project Courage, Parent Child Resource Center, Crossroads Inpatient Drug Facility, Elm City, Stonington Institute, New Perceptions and Natchaug Hospital.   Ms. T. has not gained insight nor was she successful in these programs.

Ms. T. reported a minimal employment history.   She reported that she has been employed with the Fairfield Executive Livery as a receptionist from August 2008 to September 2008.   She also has work experience in the field of customer service.   Ms. T. is currently unemployed.   Most recently, Ms. T. held employment at McDonalds, prior to her giving birth to her son, Trevor.

Ms. T. has a criminal history.   In July 2008, she was arrested and charged with Larceny in the 2nd Degree and Breach of Peace in the 2nd Degree.   In March 2009, Ms. T. was sentenced to serve six months in jail time suspended after 1 year of probation and 25 hours of community service.   In June 2009, she was arrested and charged with Breach of Peace.   As a result of this charge, Ms. T. was sentenced to 6 months jail, execution suspended, and probation for one year.   In September 2009, she was arrested and charged with Operating a Motor Vehicle without a License.   In October 2009, she was arrested and charged with Failure to Appear, Disorderly Conduct, Operating a Motor Vehicle without a License and Articles Obstructing View. In January 2010, Ms. T. was arrested and charged with Assault in the 3rd degree, Disorderly Conduct and Violation of a Protective Order.

Ms. T. has not been compliant with her conditions of probation through the Derby Superior Court.   As a result, a warrant was put out for her arrest.   On January 1, 2010, Ms. T. was arrested for violating the protective order.   On February 4, 2010, Ms. T. was picked up on her warrant from Derby Superior Court and was subsequently incarcerated at York Correctional Facility in Niantic, CT. Ms. T. was bailed out by her mother on February 28, 2010.   On May 4, 2010, Ms. T. was convicted of the violation of the protective order and sentenced to two years jail, execution suspended with probation for two years.   Her next court hearing in Derby Superior Court is in May 2010.

Ms. T. has given birth to 6 children, Maurice B. Jr., Eric T., Zhanasia T., Tyreesha T., Catherine Y., and Trevor V. Ms. T. has not raised any of her children.   Maurice was removed at 4 years old, Eric Jr. was removed at age 22 months, Zhanasia was placed in relative care at age 11 months via a family arrangement, Tyreesha was removed at age 10 months, Catherine was removed at age 9 months and again at 23 months and Trevor two days after his birth.   Maurice and Tyreesha have been adopted, Eric Jr. and Zhanasia are currently being cared for by paternal relatives and Catherine and Trevor are in DCF foster care.

Ms. T. has had the Department involved with her family since 1995 with substance abuse and domestic violence being the constant theme.   Ms. T. has not addressed her substance abuse issues and has not had a consistent period of sobriety.   Ms. T. has not maintained contact with any of her children.

The biological father of the child has suffered a dysfunctional family of origin as well.   He was removed from his parents at birth and remained in foster care for six years.   He then lived in a residential program until age nine.   He was then adopted by a woman who was herself abusive and failed to protect him from sexual exploitation.   As a result, Andrew suffers from depression and frequent suicidal ideation.   He, like LaShawn is criminally active and burdened by drug addiction.   Indeed, the social studies report that the great attraction of LaShawn and Andrew is that they enable one another in pursuit of cocaine.   Their relationship is profoundly dysfunctional and co-dependent.   Neither of them has successfully parented a child.   The prospects of that ever happening are extremely modest.   Certainly neither of them is able to fully and competently care for themselves at this time.

The petition alleges that both parents have abandoned Trevor and that they have failed to rehabilitate themselves.  C.G.S. § 17a-112(j)(3)(B)(i).

“It is not lack of interest alone which is the criterion in determining abandonment.   Abandonment under [§ 17a-112(c)(3)(A) ] requires failure to maintain interest, concern or responsibility as to the welfare of the child.   Attempts to achieve contact with a child, telephone calls, the sending of cards and gifts, and financial support are indicia of interest, concern or responsibility for the welfare of a child ․ Where a parent fails to visit a child, fails to display any love or affection for the child, has no personal interaction with the child, and no concern for the child's welfare, statutory abandonment has occurred ․ General Statutes [§ 17a-112(c)(3)(A) ] does not contemplate a sporadic showing of the indicia of interest, concern or responsibility for the welfare of a child.   A parent must maintain a reasonable degree of interest in the welfare of his or her child.   Maintain implies a continuing, reasonable degree of concern.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  In re Drew R., 47 Conn.App. 124, 129, 702 A.2d 647 (1997).

Here it is clear that both parents are largely self-absorbed in their quest for drugs and unwilling to engage in services necessary for their rehabilitation, personally or parentally.   They have subordinated the needs of the child for their own pursuits.   The petitioner has satisfied the court that Trevor has been effectively abandoned by all parental claimants.

The second ground is failure to rehabilitate C.G.S. § 17a-112(j)(3)(B)(i).   This ground alleged in the petition as to respondents is that the child was found in a prior proceeding to have been neglected or uncared for and the parents have failed to achieve such degree of personal rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that within a reasonable period of time, considering the age and the needs of the child, either of them could assume a responsible position in the life of the child.   The factual determination for this court is whether the parents have achieved rehabilitation as contemplated under C.G.S. § 17a-112(j)(3)(B), that is, rehabilitation sufficient to render either of them able to care for Trevor.

‘Personal rehabilitation as used in [Section 17a-112] refers to the restoration of a parent to his or her former constructive and useful role as a parent ․ [The statute] requires the trial court to analyze the [parent's] rehabilitative status as it relates to the needs of the particular child, and further, that such rehabilitation must be foreseeable within a reasonable time ․ [The statute] requires the court to find, by clear and convincing evidence, that the level of rehabilitation [she] has achieved, if any, falls short of that which would reasonably encourage a belief that at some future date [she] can assume a responsible position in her child's life.’  In re Eden F., 250 Conn. 674 (1999) at 706.

It is a matter of record that the child was previously adjudicated neglected on February 24, 2010.   Since that date each of the parents has been in jail.   Each of them has unsuccessfully completed substance abuse treatment.   Neither of them is self-sufficient.   Neither of them has demonstrated a period of sobriety for an extended period of time sufficient for either of them to be considered as a parental resource for Trevor.   The court is satisfied that they have not achieved, nor are they likely to achieve, a level of rehabilitation which would encourage the belief that at some reasonably foreseeable time they could effectively parent this child.   The petitioner has met her burden of proof by clear and convincing evidence.

DISPOSITION

As to the dispositional phase of this hearing on the petition for termination of parental rights, the court has considered the evidence and testimony related to circumstances and events up to and including the date upon which the evidence in this matter was completed.   During the dispositional phase, the trial court must determine whether termination is in the best interests of the children.  In re Eden F., 250 Conn. 674, 689 (1999).

The court makes the following seven written findings:

(1) As to the timeliness, nature and extent of services offered, provided and made available to the parents and the child by an agency to facilitate the reunion of the children with respondents, the court finds that DCF has made reasonable efforts over 15 years for the mother and has made reasonable efforts since the child's birth for the father.   The court finds that neither the father nor the mother are willing or able to benefit from the offered services.

(2) As to whether DCF has made reasonable efforts to reunite the family pursuant to the federal Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, as amended, the court finds that DCF offered appropriate and available services.

(3) As to the extent to which all parties have fulfilled their obligations under the terms of any applicable court order entered into and agreed upon by any individual or agency and the parent, the court finds that specific steps were entered in this case to inform the parents of their obligations to obtain a reunification with Trevor.   Both parents violated the specific steps by re-arrest and incompletion of necessary services.

(4) As to the feelings and emotional ties of the child with respect to the child's parents, any guardian of such child's person and any person who has exercised physical care, custody or control of the child for at least one year and with whom the child has developed significant emotional ties, the court finds that the child does not have a parental emotional bond with the biological parents.   The child has adjusted very well in the foster home and the foster parents are providing the day-to-day physical, emotional, moral and educational support the child needs.   The foster parents are committed to Trevor and would like to adopt him.

(5) As to the age of the child, Trevor will be one year old this week.   The child's attorney recommends permanency which can only be achieved in this case through termination of the parent's rights.²

(6) As to the efforts the parents have made to adjust such parent's circumstances, conduct, or conditions to make it in the best interest of the children to return such children home in the foreseeable future, including, but not limited to, (A) the extent to which the parent has maintained contact with the child as part of an effort to reunite the child with the parent, provided the court may give weight to incidental visitations, communications or contributions, and (B) the maintenance of regular contact or communication with the guardian or other custodian of the child, the court has previously addressed this issue.   Giving the parents additional time would not likely enable them to adjust their circumstances, conduct or conditions to make it in the best interest of the child to be reunited within a time-frame suitable for Trevor.  In re Luis C., 210 Conn 157, 167, 554 A.2d 722 (1989);  In re Juvenile Appeal, 183 Conn 11, 15, 438 A.2d 801 (1981).

(7) As to the extent to which a parent has been prevented from maintaining a meaningful relationship with the children by the unreasonable act or conduct of the other parent of the child, or the unreasonable act of any other person or by the economic circumstances of the parent, the court finds no unreasonable conduct by the child protection agency, foster parents or third parties.

With respect to the best interests of the child contemplated by C.G.S. § 17a-112(j)(2), by clear and convincing evidence, and based upon all of the foregoing, the court finds that termination of the parental rights of LaShawn T. and Andrew V. to the child is in the best interest of Trevor.   Permanency, consistency and stability are crucial for children.   The child is now in a foster home where he is very well cared for by foster parents who are fully committed to him.

In finding that termination of the respondents' parental rights would be in the child's best interest, the court has examined multiple relevant factors including the child's interests in sustained growth, development, well-being, stability and continuity of his environment;  the length of stay in foster care;  the nature of the relationship with foster parents and biological parents;  the degree of contact maintained with their biological parents;  and their genetic bond to respondents.  In re Alexander C., 60 Conn.App. 555, 559, 760 A.2d 532 (2000);  In re Shyina B., 58 Conn.App. 159, 167, 752 A.2d 1139 (2000).

ORDER

It is accordingly, ORDERED that the parental rights of LaShawn T. and Andrew V. are hereby terminated as to the minor child Trevor.

The Commissioner of the Department of Children and Families is hereby appointed the statutory parent for this child.

With regard to the permanency plan for the child, the court hereby approves the plan of termination of parental rights and adoption and finds that such plan is in the best interest of the child.   The court also finds that DCF has made reasonable efforts to effectuate the permanency plan.   A case report shall be submitted within thirty days of this judgment, and such further reports shall be timely presented to the court as required by law.

The Clerk of the Probate Court with jurisdiction over any subsequent adoption of the child shall notify in writing the Deputy Chief Clerk of the Superior Court for Juvenile Matters at Willimantic, 81 Columbia Avenue, Willimantic CT 06226 of the date when said adoption is finalized.

Judgment may enter accordingly.

Foley, Sr. J.

FOOTNOTES

FN2. Our Supreme Court has long recognized the deleterious effect of prolonged temporary care of abused and neglected children.  In re Juvenile Appeal (84-CD), 189 Conn. 276, 292, 455 A.2d 1313 (1983).   The Appellate Court has also noted, “[b]ecause of the psychological effects of prolonged termination proceedings on young children, time is of the essence ․ “ In re Alexander V., 25 Conn.App. 741, 748, 596 A.2d 930 (1992), aff'd, 223 Conn. 557, 613 A.2d 780 (1994)..  FN2. Our Supreme Court has long recognized the deleterious effect of prolonged temporary care of abused and neglected children.  In re Juvenile Appeal (84-CD), 189 Conn. 276, 292, 455 A.2d 1313 (1983).   The Appellate Court has also noted, “[b]ecause of the psychological effects of prolonged termination proceedings on young children, time is of the essence ․ “ In re Alexander V., 25 Conn.App. 741, 748, 596 A.2d 930 (1992), aff'd, 223 Conn. 557, 613 A.2d 780 (1994).

Foley, Francis J., S.J.