Janine Cannizzaro v. Stephan Marinyak et al. (2010)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, Mtn, 237.

This is a personal injury action brought by the plaintiff against the defendants arising out of a motor vehicle accident.   The defendant Stephan Marinyak is alleged to have operated his motor vehicle negligently and recklessly and while intoxicated.   The defendant Town Fair Tire is alleged to have been negligent in its performance of a wheel alignment on defendant Marinyak's vehicle.   Defendant Town Fair Tire brought a third-party complaint against third-party defendant Adan Rahim d/b/a/ Barnum Getty Services, seeking common law indemnification based upon Rahim's alleged negligence in the installation of the front axle of Marinyak's vehicle.   Rahim seeks summary judgment on the third-party complaint.   He argues that there is no genuine issue of material fact as to the claim for common-law indemnification.

Standard of Review

A party seeking summary judgment has the very heavy burden of demonstrating the absence of any genuine issue of material facts which, under applicable principles of law, entitle him to judgment as a matter of law.  PB § 17-44;  Appleton v. Board of Education, 254 Conn. 205 (2000).   Conversely, the party opposing such a motion must provide an evidentiary foundation to show the existence of a genuine issue of material fact.  Id. This evidentiary foundation must be demonstrated with counter-affidavits and concrete evidence.  Pion v. Southern New England Telephone, 44 Conn.App. 657, 663 (1997).   A party's conclusory statements may not be sufficient to establish the existence of a disputed material fact, even if in affidavit form.  Gupta v. New Britain General Hospital, 239 Conn. 574, 583 (1996).

Supporting and opposing affidavits must be made on personal knowledge and must set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence.  PB § 17-46.   Indeed, only evidence that would be admissible at trial may be used to support or oppose a motion for summary judgment.  Great Country Bank v. Pastore, 241 Conn. 423, 436 (1997).

Litigants have a constitutional right to have issues of fact decided by a jury and therefore summary judgment is generally viewed as illsuited to negligence actions.  Michaud v. Gurney, 168 Conn. 431, 434 (1975).  “Summary judgment procedure ‘is especially ill-adapted to negligence cases, where ․ the ultimate issue in contention involves a mixed question of fact and law, and requires the trier of fact to determine whether the standard of care was met in a specific situation ․ [T]he conclusion of negligence is necessarily one of fact.’  “ Id., at 434, quoting, Pine Point Corporation v. Westport Bank & Trust Co. 164 Conn. 54, 56 (1972).

Further, the applicable standard for assessing motions for summary judgment disfavors arguments premised on the plaintiff's alleged lack of evidence.   Indeed, until the moving party comes forward with evidence which would establish that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, the non-moving party is under no obligation to produce any evidence.  Ramirez v. Health Net of the Northeast, Inc., 285 Conn. 1, 10-11 (2008).

Discussion

Here, the third-party defendant, Rahim, sets forth evidence which he claims leads to only one conclusion:  that he was not in control of the situation to the exclusion of Town Fair Tire as required for common-law indemnification;  that he was not negligent in the installation of the front axle of Marinyak's vehicle; ¹  and that even if he was negligent, it was Town Fair Tire's negligence that was the cause of the accident.²

In response, Town Fair Tire has identified that evidence from which it will ask a jury to infer Rahim's negligence in the installation of the axle and the evidence from which it intends to establish that Town Fair Tire was not negligent in any fashion.   These issues are uniquely suited to a jury determination.   Whether such inferences should be drawn or conclusions reached are not for the court.

A closer question is the issue of “control,” which presents a mixed issue of law and fact.   However, even on this issue, each side has argued how the available evidence could result in a determination that Rahim was or was not “in control” for purposes of the indemnification claim.   For example, Rahim argues that the undisputed fact that Town Fair Tire's alignment and inspection was completed after the service he performed leads inescapably to the conclusion that he did not “control” the situation to the exclusion of Town Fair Tire.³ In response, Town Fair Tire asserts that its inspection and access to the vehicle would not, of necessity, disclose defects in Rahim's work and that the installation of the front axle and the condition of the axle was not within its province.   Thus, Town Fair Tire argues, the condition of the axle remained within Rahim's “control.”   These are factual determinations.   “The function of the trial court is to determine whether an issue of fact exists but not to try that issue if it does exist.”  Michaud v. Gurney, supra, 168 Conn. at 433.

In sum, there remain genuine issues of material fact in this case and the motion for summary judgment is denied.

K. DOOLEY, J.

FOOTNOTES

FN1. This argument relies, in part, on the fact that the axle was never inspected and that there has been no expert witness disclosure to support such a finding.   As indicated, this argument misconstrues the applicable standard for assessing a motion for summary judgment.   See, Ramirez, supra..  FN1. This argument relies, in part, on the fact that the axle was never inspected and that there has been no expert witness disclosure to support such a finding.   As indicated, this argument misconstrues the applicable standard for assessing a motion for summary judgment.   See, Ramirez, supra.

FN2. Rahim also argues that the lack of a previous relationship and therefore a duty owed between the parties renders common-law indemnification inapplicable.   While this issue would be appropriate for disposition via summary judgment, the court agrees with Town Fair Tire that this issue was resolved in Skuzinski v. Bouchard Fuels, Inc., 240 Conn. 694 (1997).   No such pre-existing relationship or duty deriving there from is required.  Id. at 701..  FN2. Rahim also argues that the lack of a previous relationship and therefore a duty owed between the parties renders common-law indemnification inapplicable.   While this issue would be appropriate for disposition via summary judgment, the court agrees with Town Fair Tire that this issue was resolved in Skuzinski v. Bouchard Fuels, Inc., 240 Conn. 694 (1997).   No such pre-existing relationship or duty deriving there from is required.  Id. at 701.

FN3. Both arguments are advanced in the event that “the situation” is determined to be the condition of the front axle rather than the accident itself..  FN3. Both arguments are advanced in the event that “the situation” is determined to be the condition of the front axle rather than the accident itself.

Dooley, Kari A., J.