Berneatha Gaines, Administrator of the Estate of Devin Gaines v. Blakeslee Arpaia Chapman, Inc. et al. (2010)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO STRIKE

Plaintiff brought this wrongful death action against defendant Blakeslee Arpaia Chapman, Inc. (hereinafter “Blakeslee”) by Complaint dated January 16, 2009.   In her original Complaint, plaintiff alleged that on July 10, 2007, her dependent drowned on property owned by Blakeslee.   By Motion to Cite in Party Defendants dated July 7, 2010, plaintiff sought to add Deep River Properties, Inc. and Deep River Resources, Inc. (hereinafter “the Deep River defendants”) as defendants based on allegations that they owned the property at issue.   Plaintiff's Motion was granted by the court (Holzberg, J.) by Order dated July 1, 2010.

By Motion to Strike dated August 26, 2010, the Deep River defendants seek to have the claims against them stricken based on the argument that the claims were brought after expiration of the applicable statute of limitations.   Plaintiff filed an Objection dated September 9, 2010, defendant filed a Reply Memorandum dated September 30, 2010, and the parties presented oral argument before the court on October 4, 2010.

“A motion to strike challenges the legal sufficiency of a pleading, and, consequently, requires no factual findings by the trial court.”  Bernhard-Thomas Building Systems, LLC v. Dunican, 286 Conn. 548, 552-53 (2008).  “The allegations of the pleading involved are entitled to the same favorable construction a trier would be required to give in admitting evidence under them and if the facts provable under its allegations would support a defense or a cause of action, the motion to strike must fail.”  Mingachos v. CBS, Inc., 196 Conn. 91, 108-09 (1985).

The question before the court is whether plaintiff's amendment of its complaint adding the Deep River defendants relates back to the date this action was filed, in which case it falls within the two-year limitations period contained in § 52-255 and the Motion to Strike should be denied.¹  “Our relation back doctrine provides that an amendment relates back when the original complaint has given the party fair notice that a claim is being asserted stemming from a particular transaction or occurrence, thereby serving the objectives of our statute of limitations, namely, to protect parties from having to defend against stale claims.   While an amendment that corrects a minor defect relates back to the date of the original complaint, one stating a separate cause of action is barred by the statute of limitations.   Further, if the amendment is deemed to be a substitution or entire change of a party, it will not be permitted.   If the amendment does not affect the identity of the party sought to be described in the complaint, but merely corrects the description of that party, the amendment will be allowed ․ The test applied in order to determine whether an amendment is correcting a misnomer as opposed to substituting a new party or claim requires consideration of the following:  (1) whether the defendant had notice of institution of the action;  (2) whether the defendant knew he was a proper party;  and (3) whether the defendant was prejudiced or misled in any way.”  (Citations omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  Palazzo v. Delrose, 91 Conn.App. 222, 225-26 (2005).

Courts have applied the relation back doctrine where a new party closely related to an existing party has been added through amendment.   See, e.g., Doran v. Osman, Judicial District of Stamford-Norwalk at Stamford, Docket No. CV 05-5000079 (November 1, 2006, Jennings, J.) [42 Conn. L. Rptr. 265].   The applicability of the doctrine in this case will rest upon a factual determination regarding the relationship between the Deep River defendants and Blakeslee.   See, Rodriguez v. Wilmorite, Judicial District of Danbury, Docket No. 31 22 52 (December 4, 1996, Moraghan.J.).   While plaintiff argued that Blakeslee and the Deep River defendants are essentially alter egos, it is inappropriate for the court to make such a factual determination in resolving a motion to strike.  “Facts that are not alleged in a complaint may be added to the procedural mix and facts in avoidance of the statutory time limitation of action can be considered in a motion for summary judgment, whereas they cannot be considered in a motion to strike.”  Girard v. Weiss, 43 Conn.App. 397, 416 (1996).   As a result, defendants' Motion to Strike is hereby denied without prejudice to defendants raising the limitations issue through a Motion for Summary Judgment.

James W. Abrams, Judge

FOOTNOTES

FN1. Plaintiff raises § 52-123 of the Connecticut General Statutes, which provides that no action should be abated due to “circumstantial errors, mistakes or defects,” as a defense to defendants' Motion to Strike.   However, the court finds plaintiff's failure to name the actual owner of the property to be a substantive, rather than circumstantial, defect.   See, e.g., Dyck O'Neal Inc. v. Wynne, 56 Conn.App. 161, 166 (1999).   In addition, plaintiff's argument that the court effectively decided the limitations issue when it allowed plaintiff to amend her Complaint to add the Deep River defendants is not supported by the law.   See, e.g., Rizzuto v. Davidson Ladders, Inc., 280 Conn. 225, 256 (2006)..  FN1. Plaintiff raises § 52-123 of the Connecticut General Statutes, which provides that no action should be abated due to “circumstantial errors, mistakes or defects,” as a defense to defendants' Motion to Strike.   However, the court finds plaintiff's failure to name the actual owner of the property to be a substantive, rather than circumstantial, defect.   See, e.g., Dyck O'Neal Inc. v. Wynne, 56 Conn.App. 161, 166 (1999).   In addition, plaintiff's argument that the court effectively decided the limitations issue when it allowed plaintiff to amend her Complaint to add the Deep River defendants is not supported by the law.   See, e.g., Rizzuto v. Davidson Ladders, Inc., 280 Conn. 225, 256 (2006).

Abrams, James W., F.S.M.