Marion Ammons v. Hospital of St. Raphael (2010)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

The plaintiff, Marion Ammons, commenced this action by service of process on the defendant, the Hospital of St. Raphael, on November 5, 2009.   In her amended complaint, dated April 13, 2010, the plaintiff alleges the following facts.   On November 8, 2007, while the plaintiff was walking in the hallway of the emergency room on the defendant's premises to meet a patient of the defendant, she slipped and fell on “hospital-related debris” located “in an area which was traversed by members of the public ․” The plaintiff sustained severe injuries as a result of the incident.

On July 19, 2010, the defendant filed a motion to strike the plaintiff's complaint on the ground that the plaintiff failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted because she fails to allege facts showing that the defendant owed her a duty of care.   The defendant filed a memorandum of law in support of the motion.   On August 20, 2010, the plaintiff filed a memorandum of law in opposition to the motion to strike.   The court heard oral argument on August 23, 2010.

“[A] party may challenge the legal sufficiency of an adverse party's claim by filing a motion to strike.”  Vertex v. Waterbury, 278 Conn. 557, 564, 898 A.2d 178 (2006).  “We take the facts to be those alleged in the complaint that has been stricken and we construe the complaint in the manner most favorable to sustaining its legal sufficiency ․ Thus, [i]f facts provable in the complaint would support a cause of action, the motion to strike must be denied ․ Moreover, we note that [w]hat is necessarily implied [in an allegation] need not be expressly alleged ․ It is fundamental that in determining the sufficiency of a complaint challenged by a defendant's motion to strike, all well-pleaded facts and those facts necessarily implied from the allegations are taken as admitted ․ Indeed, pleadings must be construed broadly and realistically, rather than narrowly and technically.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)   Connecticut Coalition for Justice in Education Funding, Inc. v. Rell, 295 Conn. 240, 252-53, 990 A.2d 206 (2010).   The court must “construe the complaint in the manner most favorable to sustaining its legal sufficiency.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  American Progressive Life & Health Ins. Co. of New York v. Better Benefits, LLC, 292 Conn. 111, 120, 971 A.2d 17 (2009).

In support of its motion to strike, the defendant argues that the plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.   Specifically, the defendant asserts the plaintiff has not alleged her “entrant status or any duty of care owed to her.”   Duty is an essential element of any negligence action, and a negligence claim cannot be asserted without setting forth the required duty of care.   According to the defendant, the plaintiff does not expressly allege that any duty was owed to her.   In addition, the plaintiff's complaint does not include her entrant status, i.e., trespasser, licensee, or invitee, which would define the defendant's duty of care.   The plaintiff counters that the rules of pleading do not require that she explicitly allege her entrant status or the duty of care owed to her by the defendant.

“The status of an entrant on another's land, be it trespasser, licensee or invitee, determines the duty that is owed to the entrant while he or she is on a landowner's property ․ A public invitee is a person who is invited to enter or remain on land as a member of the public for a purpose for which the land is held open to the public ․ A possessor of land has a duty to an invitee to reasonably inspect and maintain the premises in order to render them reasonably safe ․ In addition, the possessor of land must warn an invitee of dangers that the invitee could not reasonably be expected to discover ․ An occupier of land is chargeable with constructive notice of defects when dealing with invitees ․ The determinative question is whether the defective condition existed for such a length of time that the defendant, in the exercise of reasonable care, should have discovered it and remedied it ․ Thus, to establish liability for an injury caused by a [defect on the landowner's premises], a plaintiff must establish that the landowner had either actual or constructive notice of the ․ defective condition.”  Grignano v. Milford, 106 Conn.App. 648, 652, 943 A.2d 507 (2008).¹

The amended complaint does not explicitly allege the plaintiff's entrant status or that the defendant owed her a duty of care.   Although the amended complaint does not include such allegations, it is legally sufficient.   Practice Book § 10-4 provides that “[i]t is unnecessary to allege any promise or duty which the law implies from the facts pleaded.”   Here, the amended complaint alleges that the plaintiff was “walking in a hallway of the emergency room on [the defendant's] premises, on her way to meet a patient of the defendant.”   Further, the plaintiff alleges she slipped as a result of a dangerous and defective condition “in an area which was traversed by members of the public, such as the [p]laintiff.”  (Emphasis added.)   Assuming these stated facts to be true, the plaintiff's entrant status and the duty of care owed to the plaintiff can be implied.   Therefore, the defendant's motion to strike is denied.

Howard F. Zoarski

Judge Trial Referee

FOOTNOTES

FN1. In support of the proposition that the court must strike the plaintiff's complaint for failure to allege the duty of care owed, the defendant cites Sevigny v. Dibble Hollow Condominium Assn., Inc., 76 Conn.App. 306, 320, 819 A.2d 844 (2003), which states that a possessor of land owes different degrees of duty depending on the person's entrant status, i.e., invitee, licensee or trespasser.   The defendant's reliance is mistaken.   The cited excerpt from Sevigny merely asserts that there are different duties of care that correspond to each entrant status.   Sevigny did not discuss whether the specific duty must be expressly asserted in the complaint for it to survive a motion to strike.   Therefore, the defendant's reliance on Sevigny is misplaced as it does not support the proposition that a complaint fails to survive a motion to strike where it fails to allege any duty on the part of the defendant..  FN1. In support of the proposition that the court must strike the plaintiff's complaint for failure to allege the duty of care owed, the defendant cites Sevigny v. Dibble Hollow Condominium Assn., Inc., 76 Conn.App. 306, 320, 819 A.2d 844 (2003), which states that a possessor of land owes different degrees of duty depending on the person's entrant status, i.e., invitee, licensee or trespasser.   The defendant's reliance is mistaken.   The cited excerpt from Sevigny merely asserts that there are different duties of care that correspond to each entrant status.   Sevigny did not discuss whether the specific duty must be expressly asserted in the complaint for it to survive a motion to strike.   Therefore, the defendant's reliance on Sevigny is misplaced as it does not support the proposition that a complaint fails to survive a motion to strike where it fails to allege any duty on the part of the defendant.

Zoarski, Howard F., J.T.R.