Judith K. Fusari v. State of Connecticut, Office of Claims Commissioner (2010)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION AND ORDER

I

Judith K. Fusari (Fusari) seeks to institute an action against the state through an application for waiver of fees pursuant to General Statutes § 52-259b.¹  Fusari alleges that she is unable to pay the filing fees or marshal fees due to her financial condition.   Inasmuch as Fusari meets the financial requirements of subsection (b) of the statute, this court has no discretion and, therefore, waives the filing fee.

II

The court takes judicial notice that, previous to the instant case, Fusari filed a suit against Andrew Holden, an assistant clerk in the judicial district of New Britain, on December 21, 2009 alleging counts labeled as “temporary insanity,” “discrimination,” “tampering,” “cruel and unusual punishment,” “denial,” “breaking the law,” “conspiracy” and “concealing evidence.”   Fusari v. Holden, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. CV 10 5034649.   Fusari's allegations seem to have arisen from an interaction she had with Holden regarding a fee waiver in another matter.²

On February 22, 2010, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction.   The court, Sheldon, J., granted the defendant's motion on April 1, 2010 explaining that it lacked subject matter because Fusari claimed “money damages against a state official as to which the state, acting through its claims commissioner, has not waived its sovereign immunity by consenting to suit.”   Fusari filed an appeal that was dismissed by the Appellate Court on May 11, 2010 because of her failure to file the documents required by an order of that court.

In the present action, Fusari seeks to bring an action against the state for Holden's actions.   In a complaint, dated July 6, 2010, she now alleges counts labeled as “legal malpractice,” “conspiracy,” “fraudulence,” “abuse and use,” “tampering,” “incompetence,” “temporary insanity,” “larceny by extortion,” “concealing evidence,” “cruel and unusual punishment,” “battering,” “manipulation and trickery,” “conspiracy,” “discrimination and bias,” “force” and “bribes.”   The complaint does not allege the same interaction with Holden that was the basis for the complaint dismissed on April 1, 2010, but it also does not allege any new interaction with him.³  Regardless,^{4 5}

III

In memoranda of decision, dated March 30, 2010, in Fusari v. Urbaniak, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. CV 10 5034720, and Fusari v. Merck, Sharp & Dohme, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. CV 10 5034719, this court noted a troubling escalation in the number of suits filed by Fusari in recent years.   At that time, the court counted more than seventy actions filed since 2008.   Since then, Fusari has filed several more actions bringing her total to over 100 cases ⁶ filed since 2008.   So far in 2010, she has filed dozens of actions in three different judicial districts, not including the cases she seeks to initiate today.

From the sheer volume of the cases initiated, it would appear that Fusari is unwilling or incapable of considering the merits of her proposed claims or of abiding by the procedures that all must follow in bringing and prosecuting a claim.   This may be occurring because the state's taxpayers carry the financial burden of her filing the proposed claims.   See In re Sindram, 498 U.S. 177, 180, 111 S.Ct. 596, 112 L.Ed.2d 599 (1991) (“[p]ro se petitioners have a greater capacity than most to disrupt the fair allocation of judicial resources, because they are not subject to the financial considerations-filing fees and attorneys fees-that deter other litigants from filing frivolous petitions”).   This court in no way wishes to prevent Fusari from seeking to file legitimate claims, but it cannot tolerate redundant or frivolous ones in light of its limited resources and its obligation to ensure that its resources “are allocated in a way that promotes the interests of justice.”   See In re McDonald, 489 U.S. 180, 184, 109 S.Ct. 993, 103 L.Ed.2d 158 (1989).

“The policy of the court is to be solicitous to the self-represented.   However, the right of self-representation provides no attendant license not to comply with relevant rules of procedural and substantive law ․ Practice Book § 10-1 requires each pleading to ‘contain a plain and concise statement of the material facts' and a signature on a pleading constitutes ‘a certificate ․ that to the best of the signer's knowledge, information and belief there is good ground to support it.’  Practice Book § 4-2(b).  This court possesses inherent authority to limit the filing of frivolous or repetitive lawsuits that ultimately are destined for withdrawal or dismissal.”  (Citation omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)   In re 34 Fee Waiver Applications by Frank Perrelli, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven (October 27, 2008, Lager, J.).

In light of these principles, the court finds that Fusari's proposed pleadings have become unduly burdensome.   The court takes judicial notice that most of Fusari's cases have been dismissed and that she has brought several suits claiming to enforce judgments rendered in her favor in other suits when in fact the underlying suits were dismissed.   Consequently, the court concludes that it has the inherent authority to review and dismiss, sua sponte, all proposed complaints that are frivolous or redundant or that do not state a cognizable claim.   Although there is nothing this court can do about the entry and filing fees that Fusari has incurred;  see footnote 6;  the taxpayers of this state have been saved, and should not have to bear the cost of, the fees for service of process.   A copy of this memorandum of decision and order shall be forwarded by the clerk to Fusari, Holden and the chief clerk of every judicial district in the state.

Berger, J.

FOOTNOTES

FN1. Section 52-259b provides:  “(a) In any civil or criminal matter, if the court finds that a party is indigent and unable to pay a fee or fees payable to the court or to pay the cost of service of process, the court shall waive such fee or fees and the cost of service of process shall be paid by the state.“(b) There shall be a rebuttable presumption that a person is indigent and unable to pay a fee or fees or the cost of service of process if (1) such person receives public assistance, or (2) such person's income after taxes, mandatory wage deductions and child care expenses is one hundred twenty-five per cent or less of the federal poverty level.   For purposes of this subsection, ‘public assistance’ includes, but is not limited to, state-administered general assistance, temporary family assistance, aid to the aged, blind and disabled, supplemental nutrition assistance and Supplemental Security Income.“(c) Nothing in this section shall preclude the court from finding that a person whose income does not meet the criteria of subsection (b) of this section is indigent and unable to pay a fee or fees or the cost of service of process.   If an application for the waiver of the payment of a fee or fees or the cost of service of process is denied, the court clerk shall, upon the request of the applicant, schedule a hearing on the application.”.  FN1. Section 52-259b provides:  “(a) In any civil or criminal matter, if the court finds that a party is indigent and unable to pay a fee or fees payable to the court or to pay the cost of service of process, the court shall waive such fee or fees and the cost of service of process shall be paid by the state.“(b) There shall be a rebuttable presumption that a person is indigent and unable to pay a fee or fees or the cost of service of process if (1) such person receives public assistance, or (2) such person's income after taxes, mandatory wage deductions and child care expenses is one hundred twenty-five per cent or less of the federal poverty level.   For purposes of this subsection, ‘public assistance’ includes, but is not limited to, state-administered general assistance, temporary family assistance, aid to the aged, blind and disabled, supplemental nutrition assistance and Supplemental Security Income.“(c) Nothing in this section shall preclude the court from finding that a person whose income does not meet the criteria of subsection (b) of this section is indigent and unable to pay a fee or fees or the cost of service of process.   If an application for the waiver of the payment of a fee or fees or the cost of service of process is denied, the court clerk shall, upon the request of the applicant, schedule a hearing on the application.”

FN2. Fusari's allegations contain no date or dates of the relevant event or events..  FN2. Fusari's allegations contain no date or dates of the relevant event or events.

FN3. Again, Fusari's allegations contain no date or dates of any relevant event or events..  FN3. Again, Fusari's allegations contain no date or dates of any relevant event or events.

FN4. Fusari seeks $102 million in damages and an island or a lake in or out of the country, among other things..  FN4. Fusari seeks $102 million in damages and an island or a lake in or out of the country, among other things.

FN5. Fusari apparently attempted to send the complaint in the present case to the claims commissioner because the complaint is stamped as received in the office of the claims commissioner on July 8, 2010, but the stamp has been crossed out.   Based on an exhibit attached to a proposed complaint that Fusari seeks to file against the claims commissioner, it seems that the claim was returned because of her failure to follow procedure from which Fusari argues, without citing any authority, that she is exempt.   Perhaps, there are pending claims with the claims commissioner, but Fusari does not allege or provide documentation that the claims commissioner has authorized her to sue anyone as required by General Statutes § 4-160(c)..  FN5. Fusari apparently attempted to send the complaint in the present case to the claims commissioner because the complaint is stamped as received in the office of the claims commissioner on July 8, 2010, but the stamp has been crossed out.   Based on an exhibit attached to a proposed complaint that Fusari seeks to file against the claims commissioner, it seems that the claim was returned because of her failure to follow procedure from which Fusari argues, without citing any authority, that she is exempt.   Perhaps, there are pending claims with the claims commissioner, but Fusari does not allege or provide documentation that the claims commissioner has authorized her to sue anyone as required by General Statutes § 4-160(c).

FN6. But for the specific language of § 52-259b that gives the court no discretion on the waiver of the filing fee upon a proper showing of indigency, many of her complaints would presumably not have been filed.   Yet, because of the statute, Fusari's filing fees are waived, her cases are filed and the state's resources are wasted..  FN6. But for the specific language of § 52-259b that gives the court no discretion on the waiver of the filing fee upon a proper showing of indigency, many of her complaints would presumably not have been filed.   Yet, because of the statute, Fusari's filing fees are waived, her cases are filed and the state's resources are wasted.

Berger, Marshall K., J.