John Roe # 1 v. Boy Scouts of America, Corp., Connecticut Rivers Council, Inc. et al. (2010)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION ON MOTION TO STRIKE

This is a six-count complaint against the defendants, the Boy Scouts of America Corp., Connecticut Rivers Council, Inc., and James W. Harris, III. In Count Two of his complaint, in which he alleges claims for breach of fiduciary duty against the Boy Scouts of America Corp., and Connecticut Rivers Council, Inc., the plaintiff, John Roe # 1 alleges the following facts.   From on or about 1991 until 1997, the plaintiff was sexually abused, molested and assaulted by Harris who was a Boy Scout troop leader and campmaster at a camp that was “owned, operated, maintained and/or controlled by” the defendants.   Harris' abuse of the plaintiff took place while he was acting in his capacity as a troop leader and/or campmaster and the risk of harm and type of injury sustained by the plaintiff was foreseeable to the defendants and was proximately caused by the defendants' “breach of the duty arising out of [their] fiduciary and confidential relationship with the children who were involved with the Boy Scouts of America, and in particular the troop of which Harris was a troop leader.”   In paragraphs three and four of the prayer for relief the plaintiff seeks attorneys fees and punitive damages based on the allegations in Count Two.

On May 21, 2010, the defendants filed this motion to strike paragraphs three and four of the prayer for relief on the ground that the facts alleged in Count Two of the complaint do not support a claim for punitive damages.

I

Practice Book § 10-39 “allows for a claim for relief to be stricken only if the relief sought could not be legally awarded.”  Pamela B. v. Ment, 244 Conn. 296, 325, 709, A.2d 1089 (1998).

The defendants argue that the court should strike paragraphs three and four of the prayer for relief because there is no legal basis for the award of attorneys fees and punitive damages requested by the plaintiff.   Specifically, the defendants claim that to recover punitive damages, the plaintiff must explicitly allege that they engaged in reckless, wanton or wilful malicious conduct, and that the plaintiff has failed to do so.   The plaintiff maintains that punitive damages are appropriate when the allegations, together with the reasonable inferences provable therefrom, show that a defendant acted with “reckless indifference to the rights of others.”

“This court has broad discretion in determining whether [punitive] damages are appropriate” and may award attorneys fees as a component of punitive damages.   To be entitled to an award of punitive damages, a plaintiff must show that “the [defendants'] behavior evidenced a reckless indifference to the rights of others or an intentional and wanton violation of those rights.”  Bhatia v. Debek, 287 Conn. 397, 420 (2008).   If the evidence discloses that a defendant was recklessly indifferent to the rights of a plaintiff, an actual intention to do harm to the plaintiff is not necessary.  Berry v. Loiseau, 223 Conn. 786, 811, 614 A.2d 414 (1992).  Stohlts v. Gilkinson, supra, 648.  “Whether the defendant acted recklessly is a question of fact ․” Dunn v. Leepson, 79 Conn.App. 366, 371, 830, A.2d 325, cert. denied, 266 Conn. 923, (2003).

Award of punitive damages is not foreclosed by the plaintiff's failure to use the term “reckless” in Count Two of the complaint as long as the plaintiff alleges facts that could support a finding that the defendants acted with a reckless disregard for the rights or safety of the plaintiff or for the consequences of their actions.  Stohlts v. Gilkinson, supra, 87 Conn.App. 648.

In Count Two, the plaintiff alleges that he was sexually abused, molested and assaulted by Harris, who was a Boy Scout troop leader and campmaster and was “acting under the guise of, on behalf of and as the agent of the [defendants].”   The plaintiff alleges that the risk of harm and types of injury that he sustained were foreseeable to the defendants, given the “unique degree of trust and confidence that existed between [the defendants] and the children who were involved with the Boy Scouts of America,” and that his injuries were proximately caused by the defendants' “breach of the duty arising out of [their] fiduciary and confidential relationship with the children who were involved with the Boy Scouts of America, and in particular the troop of which Harris was a troop leader.”

The plaintiff further alleges, inter alia, that the defendants:  failed to properly monitor and supervise Harris;  failed to promulgate or enforce protocols, rules or guidelines relative to the screening or other examination of volunteers so as to prevent sexual predators such as Harris from serving as troop leaders;  knew, should have known or could have known upon investigation that Harris allowed minors, such as the plaintiff, to sleep in the same tent with him without the presence of others while they were on camping trips that were sanctioned by the defendants and to sleep with him in the campmaster's cabin while he was on duty as a campmaster;  knew, should have known or could have known upon investigation that Harris sexually assaulted minors such as the plaintiff;  failed to investigate, warn or inform parents and guardians of the danger that Harris posed to children;  that, once the defendants were aware of the allegations of abuse perpetrated by Harris, they failed to investigate to determine victims and to advise them of the abusive actions of Harris;  and that, as a result of the defendants' “fraudulent concealment” of Harris' action and breach of their fiduciary duties, the plaintiff suffered serious physical, emotional and monetary damages.

These facts could support a finding that the defendants' conduct evidenced a reckless disregard for the rights or safety of the plaintiff, or for the consequences of the defendants' actions.

Defendants' motion to strike is denied.

Wagner, J., J.T.R.

Wagner, Jerry, J.T.R.