LLC v. Family Farm Casualty Insurance Company (2010)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE MOTION TO STRIKE # 102

I FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The plaintiff, Lawns Etc., LLC, commenced this six-count complaint against the defendant, Family Farm Casualty Insurance Company, on February 4, 2010.   The plaintiff states the following causes of action against the defendant:  declaratory relief (count one);  breach of covenant of good faith and fair dealing (count two);  breach of contract (count three);  unjust enrichment (count four);  negligence (count five);  and violation of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA), General Statutes § 42-110b et seq. (count six).   In count one, the plaintiff alleges the following facts.   Since April 2004, the plaintiff has been insured by the defendant pursuant to a workers' compensation and employer's liability policy.   Following an audit in 2008, the defendant realized that it was overcharging the plaintiff for workers' compensation premiums since 2005, and on September 23, 2008, processed a credit in the plaintiff's favor in the amount of $3150.   In October 2008, the plaintiff and the defendant were notified that an individual claimed to have injured his back while working for the plaintiff.   Although the plaintiff has a policy and credit with the defendant, the defendant denied coverage of the individual's claim and failed to provide the plaintiff with a defense to the claim.PAGE 1]

In count four, the plaintiff incorporates paragraphs one through eight from count one and alleges the following additional facts.   From 2004 through the present, the defendant received the benefit of the plaintiff's continuous payments and premiums under the policy.   Despite benefitting from the premiums and payments, the defendant unjustly denied the plaintiff of insurance coverage under the policy in connection with the employee's claim against the plaintiff, and the defendant's failure to defend the claim has been and continues to be to the plaintiff's financial detriment.

In count six, the plaintiff incorporates paragraphs one through eight from count one and alleges the following additional facts.   The defendant engaged in a number of deceptive, unethical and unfair business practices, in violation of CUTPA.¹  The defendant committed these deceptive, unethical and unfair acts for the purpose of creating a gap in the plaintiff's coverage and/or to deprive the plaintiff of insurance coverage as to its employee's claim.   The defendant's deceptive acts were performed in the course of the defendant's trade, offend public policy and cause substantial injury to consumers.   The plaintiff has suffered substantial and ascertainable damages.

On April 23, 2010, the defendant filed a motion to strike counts four and six of the plaintiff's complaint, as well as the “plaintiff's prayer for relief corresponding to those counts.”   The motion was accompanied by a memorandum of law.   On June 10, 2010, the plaintiff filed a memorandum of law in opposition to the motion to strike.   On June 14, 2010, the defendant filed a reply to the plaintiff's memorandum of law in opposition.   This matter was heard at short calendar on June 22, 2010.

II DISCUSSION

A. Legal Standard

“The purpose of a motion to strike is to contest ․ the legal sufficiency of the allegations of any complaint ․ to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Fort Trumbull Conservancy, LLC v. Alves, 262 Conn. 480, 498, 815 A.2d 1188 (2003).  “[F]or the purpose of a motion to strike, the moving party admits all facts well pleaded.”  RK Constructors, Inc. v. Fusco Corp., 231 Conn. 381, 383 n.2, 650 A.2d 153 (1994);  see also Ferryman v. Groton, 212 Conn. 138, 142, 561 A.2d 432 (1989).   Accordingly, “[i]f facts provable in the complaint would support a cause of action, the motion to strike must be denied.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Batte-Holmgren v. Commissioner of Public Health, 281 Conn. 277, 294, 914 A.2d 996 (2007).   On the other hand, “[a] motion to strike is properly granted if the complaint alleges mere conclusions of law that are unsupported by the facts alleged.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)   Fort Trumbull Conservancy, LLC v. Alves, supra, 262 Conn. 498.

The court must “construe the complaint in the manner most favorable to sustaining its legal sufficiency.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)   Sullivan v. Lake Compounce Theme Park, Inc., 277 Conn. 113, 117, 889 A.2d 810 (2006).  “[I]f facts provable in the complaint would support a cause of action, the motion to strike must be denied.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Broadnax v. New Haven, 270 Conn. 133, 173, 851 A.2d 1113 (2004).  “Moreover ․ [w]hat is necessarily implied [in an allegation] need not be expressly alleged ․” (Citation omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  Lombard v. Edward J. Peters, Jr., P.C., 252 Conn. 623, 626, 749 A.2d 630 (2000).

B. Count Four:  Unjust Enrichment

In its motion to strike, the defendant argues that the plaintiff's claim for unjust enrichment fails as a matter of law because it is an equitable claim which is not properly alleged in connection with the existence of an express contract.   In its memorandum of law in support of its motion to strike, the defendant contends the plaintiff has alleged the existence of an express contract in count four by incorporating the allegations from count one-specifically, paragraphs three, four and eight.²  The defendant maintains that under Ayotte Brothers Construction Co. v. Finney, 42 Conn.App. 578, 680 A.2d 330 (1996), unjust enrichment only applies when no remedy is available pursuant to a contract.   Moreover, the defendant avers that while Practice Book § 10-25 permits a plaintiff to pursue a cause of action for both unjust enrichment and breach of contract in the same complaint, Practice Book § 10-26 requires these pleadings to be asserted in separate counts.   The defendant cites to Alvarez v. Fleet National Bank, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV 01 0450643 (April 19, 2004, Skolnick, J.), as support for the argument that a claim for unjust enrichment must be stricken when it incorporates or asserts allegations of an express contract.

In its memorandum of law in opposition, the plaintiff argues that it has complied with Practice Book §§ 10-25 and 10-26 by pleading breach of contract in count three and pleading unjust enrichment in count four.   The plaintiff contends that Alvarez is distinguishable from the present case.   The plaintiff argues that The Final Cut, LLC v. Sharkey, Superior Court, judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk at Stamford, Docket No. CV 08 5007365 (May 5, 2009, Adams, J), is more closely analogous and highlights the distinction between alleging the existence of a contract and its breach.

“The elements of a breach of contract action are the formation of an agreement, performance by one party, breach of the agreement by the other party and damages.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Keller v. Beckenstein, 117 Conn.App. 550, 558, 979 A.2d 1055, cert. denied, 294 Conn. 913, 983 A.2d 274 (2009).  “Unjust enrichment is a legal doctrine to be applied when no remedy is available pursuant to a contract ․ Recovery is proper if the defendant was benefited, the defendant did not pay for the benefit and the failure of payment operated to the detriment of the plaintiff.”  Russell v. Russell, 91 Conn.App. 619, 637, 882 A.2d 98 (2005).  “Although restitution for unjust enrichment often applies to situations in which there is no written contract, it can also apply to situations in which there is a written contract and the party seeking restitution has breached the contract.”  United Coastal Industries, Inc. v. Clearheart Construction Co., 71 Conn.App. 506, 513, 802 A.2d 901 (2002).

Practice Book § 10-25 provides:  “The plaintiff may claim alternative relief, based upon an alternative construction of the cause of action.”   Practice Book § 10-26 provides:  “Where separate and distinct causes of action, as distinguished from separate and distinct claims for relief founded on the same cause of action or transaction, are joined, the statement of the second shall be prefaced by the words Second Count, and so on for the others;  and the several paragraphs of each count shall be numbered separately beginning in each count with the number one.”  “Parties routinely plead alternative counts alleging breach of contract and unjust enrichment, although in doing so, they are entitled only to a single measure of damages arising out of these alternative claims ․ Under this typical belt and suspenders approach, the equitable claim is brought in an alternative count to ensure that the plaintiff receives some recovery in the event that the contract claim fails.”  (Citations omitted.)  Stein v. Horton, 99 Conn.App. 477, 485, 914 A.2d 606 (2007).

Alvarez is one of a number of Superior Court cases that have found that “a claim for unjust enrichment should be stricken if it asserts allegations referring to an express agreement between the parties.”  Alvarez v. Fleet National Bank, supra, Superior Court, Docket No. CV 01 0450643.³  On the other hand, several Superior Court opinions, including The Final Cut, permit incorporating allegations of a contract so long as the allegation that the contract was breached does not appear in the count for unjust enrichment.⁴

In the present case, the plaintiff does incorporate the existence of an agreement between itself and the defendant into count four.   Nevertheless, the plaintiff has not alleged in count four that there was a breach of contract.   “[M]erely incorporating allegations regarding the existence of a contract into an unjust enrichment claim does not necessarily mean that the unjust enrichment claim should be stricken, so long as it has not been alleged that the contract was breached.”  The Final Cut, LLC v. Sharkey, supra, Superior Court, Docket No. CV 08 5007365.   Therefore, the defendant's motion to strike count four is denied.

C. Count Six:  CUTPA

The defendant also moves to strike count six of the plaintiff's complaint, which states a cause of action for a violation of CUTPA, on the ground that the count is legally insufficient as the plaintiff has failed to allege that the defendant violated the Connecticut Unfair Insurance Practices Act (CUIPA), General Statutes § 38a-815 et seq.   In its memorandum of law in support, the defendant argues that for insurance-related conduct to constitute a violation of CUTPA, the conduct must also constitute a violation of CUIPA.   The defendant cites to Mead v. Burns, 199 Conn. 651, 509 A.2d 11 (1986), and Lees v. Middlesex Ins. Co., 229 Conn. 842, 643 A.2d 1282 (1994), as support for the proposition that a CUTPA claim cannot exist independently of a CUIPA claim.

The plaintiff argues that it has sufficiently alleged conduct by the defendant in count six that would constitute a CUIPA violation.   The plaintiff contends that two of its allegations in paragraph nine of count six ⁵ -specifically, that the defendant overcharged the plaintiff for workers' compensation coverage for three years and the defendant provided confusing and misleading information to the plaintiff regarding credits and premiums affecting the policy-along with its allegation in paragraph ten that the defendant's actions “were taken under the dishonest purpose of creating a gap” in the plaintiff's coverage, violates General Statutes § 38a-816(1)(f), which prohibits “misrepresentations about premium rates, for the purpose of inducing or tending to induce the ․ lapse ․ of an insurance policy.”   Moreover, the plaintiff avers that the defendant has misapplied Lees and Mead, which only concerned what the plaintiff must prove in order to prevail, not what the plaintiff must plead.   The plaintiff cites to Active Ventilation Products, Inc. v. Property & Casualty Ins. Co. of Hartford, Superior Court, complex litigation docket at Hartford, Docket No. X09 CV 085023757 (July 15, 2009, Shortall, J.) as support for this argument.

In response, the defendant argues that the plaintiff did not actually cite to CUIPA in count six, directly contravening Practice Book § 10-3(a), which provides in relevant part that “[w]hen any claim made in a complaint ․ is grounded on a statute, the statute shall be specifically identified by its number.”   The defendant also argues that under § 38a-816(1)(f), as the court noted in Active Ventilation Products, Inc. v. Property & Casualty Ins. Co. of Hartford, supra, Superior Court, Docket No. X09 CV 085023757, the plaintiff must plead and prove the four established elements of negligent misrepresentation.   According to the defendant, the plaintiff failed to plead the third element of negligent misrepresentation, i.e. that the plaintiff reasonably relied on the defendant's misrepresentation.   Thus, the defendant maintains, the plaintiff has failed to plead a legally sufficient CUIPA claim, and, as a result, has therefore failed to plead a legally sufficient CUTPA claim.

“It is well established that CUTPA affords a private cause of action to individuals ․ [I]ndividuals may bring an action under CUTPA for violations of CUIPA.   In order to sustain a CUIPA cause of action under CUTPA, a plaintiff must allege conduct that is proscribed by CUIPA ․ Section 38a-816(1) prohibits misrepresentations and false advertising of insurance policies.   Traditionally, an action for negligent misrepresentation requires the plaintiff to establish (1) that the defendant made a misrepresentation of fact (2) that the defendant knew or should have known was false, and (3) that the plaintiff reasonably relied on the misrepresentation, and (4) suffered pecuniary harm as a result ․ In order to determine whether the plaintiff sufficiently alleged misrepresentations within the meaning of § 38a-816(1)(a), [the court] must examine each allegation made in [the operative count] of the plaintiff's complaint.”  (Citations omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  Nazami v. Patrons Mutual Ins. Co., 280 Conn. 619, 625-26, 910 A.2d 209 (2006).

In Active Ventilation Products, Inc. v. Property & Casualty Ins. Co. of Hartford, supra, Superior Court, Docket No. X09 CV 085023757 the court denied the defendant's motion to strike the plaintiff's claim for a violation of CUTPA through CUIPA.   The court noted that the plaintiff “allege[d] two violations of CUTPA through CUIPA:  first, a violation of § 38a-816(1), in the making of certain representations to Active Ventilation in the process of selling said insurance policy to [Active Ventilation] ․ and, second, a violation of § 38a-816(6), in delaying the processing of [Active Ventilation's] claims ․ without either paying or denying such claims within a reasonable time.”   (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Id. The court, citing to Nazami v. Patrons Mutual Ins. Co., supra, 280 Conn. 625-26, ruled that “for a cause of action under [§ 38a-816(1) ] of CUIPA to succeed the plaintiff must allege and prove the four established elements of a negligent misrepresentation claim” but found that “the claim of a violation of 38a-816(1) [was] defective for its failure to allege that the [defendant] made representations of fact, as opposed to opinion.”Active Ventilation Products, Inc. v. Property & Casualty Ins. Co. of Hartford, supra, Superior Court, Docket No. X09 CV 085023757.   Nevertheless, “the motion to strike [was] directed at the entire count,” meaning that it would not “fail if either of Active Ventilation's claims [were] legally sufficient to state a CUTPA/CUIPA cause of action.”  Id. Because the court found that “the claim of unfair settlement practices [was] viable, the count survive[d].”  Id.

In the present case, the plaintiff, in its memorandum of law, argues that it has alleged a violation of CUTPA through CUIPA-specifically, a violation of § 38a-816(1)(f).  Nevertheless, just as the plaintiff in Active Ventilation Products failed to allege all of the elements of negligent misrepresentation, prompting the court to find its claim for a violation of § 38a-816(1) to be defective, the plaintiff in the present case has failed to allege it reasonably relied on a misrepresentation made by the defendant.   Even when construing the complaint in the manner most favorable to sustaining its legal sufficiency, nowhere in count six, or in paragraphs one through eight of count one, which are re-alleged in count six, can the court find an allegation of reasonable reliance.   Moreover, unlike the plaintiff in Active Ventilation Products, the plaintiff here does not allege a violation of § 38a-816(6) or, for that matter, any other violation of CUTPA through CUIPA that is legally sufficient to state a CUTPA/CUIPA cause of action.   Because, under Mead and Lees, the “failure to ground [an] alleged CUTPA violation in CUIPA is fatal,”see Active Ventilation Products, Inc. v. Property & Casualty Ins. Co. of Hartford, supra, Superior Court, Docket No. X09 CV 085023757,⁶ and because the plaintiff has failed to assert a violation of CUIPA, the plaintiff's CUTPA claim must be stricken.   Therefore, the defendant's motion to strike count six is granted.

D. Prayer for Relief

Finally, the defendant asserts that the prayers for relief corresponding to counts four and six should be stricken, as those counts are legally insufficient.   Specifically, the defendant contends that “[a]lthough not expressly stated, the plaintiff's claim for costs and reasonable attorney's fees are made pursuant to Connecticut General Statutes Section 42-110g(d),” should be stricken because the plaintiff has failed to allege facts supporting a legally sufficient CUTPA claim.   The defendant also argues that any claim associated with the plaintiff's cause of action for unjust enrichment must be stricken as it, likewise, is legally insufficient.

“Practice Book ․ § 10-39, allows for a claim for relief to be stricken only if the relief sought could not be legally awarded.”  Pamela B. v. Ment, 244 Conn. 296, 325, 709 A.2d 1089 (1998).   Despite the defendant's reference to the prayer for relief “corresponding to” count six, the plaintiff inserts his prayer for relief at the foot of the complaint, and does not identify, as to his individual claims for relief, the corresponding counts.   Therefore, the court cannot infer that the plaintiff intends for his claims for costs and attorneys fees to correspond only with count six.   Although the defendant moves to strike these claims from the complaint on the ground that count six is legally insufficient, the defendant fails to demonstrate that the claims for costs and attorneys fees would not be supported by any of the other counts.   Therefore, the defendant's motion to strike is denied as to the prayer for relief “corresponding to” count six.   See Pasquariello v. Castle Rock Owner's Assn., Inc., Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV 09 6006082 (August 5, 2010, Zoarski, J.T.R.) (denying motion to strike prayer for relief when it was unclear whether claims for attorneys fees and punitive damages corresponded to claim for CUTPA violation or to other counts of complaint).   The defendant's motion to strike is also denied as to the prayer for relief “corresponding to” count four, as the court has already determined that plaintiff has stated a legally sufficient cause of action for unjust enrichment.

III CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the court denies the motion to strike as to count four and the prayers for relief.   The court grants the motion to strike as to count six.

Marano, J.

FOOTNOTES

FN1. The plaintiff alleges the following acts of the defendant constitute CUTPA violations:  denying coverage of the plaintiff's employee's claim against the plaintiff, which should have been insured by the policy;  failing to defend the plaintiff against its employee's claim, when such defense was provided for by the policy;  overcharging the plaintiff for workers' compensation coverage for three years;  failing to process and apply the plaintiff's credit within a reasonable time frame;  attempting to cancel the plaintiff's policy in violation of General Statutes § 31-348 and/or the policy's terms;  failing to send the plaintiff notice of the cancellation pursuant to § 31-348;  failing to renew the policy pursuant to General Statutes § 38a-323;  failing to process the plaintiff's credit, as the defendant had done in the past, to insure continuous coverage under the policy;  providing confusing and misleading information to the plaintiff regarding credits and premiums affecting the policy..  FN1. The plaintiff alleges the following acts of the defendant constitute CUTPA violations:  denying coverage of the plaintiff's employee's claim against the plaintiff, which should have been insured by the policy;  failing to defend the plaintiff against its employee's claim, when such defense was provided for by the policy;  overcharging the plaintiff for workers' compensation coverage for three years;  failing to process and apply the plaintiff's credit within a reasonable time frame;  attempting to cancel the plaintiff's policy in violation of General Statutes § 31-348 and/or the policy's terms;  failing to send the plaintiff notice of the cancellation pursuant to § 31-348;  failing to renew the policy pursuant to General Statutes § 38a-323;  failing to process the plaintiff's credit, as the defendant had done in the past, to insure continuous coverage under the policy;  providing confusing and misleading information to the plaintiff regarding credits and premiums affecting the policy.

FN2. Paragraphs three, four and eight provide in relevant part:3.  Plaintiff has been insured by Defendant pursuant to a Workers' Compensation and Employer's Liability Policy since approximately April 2004 (“Policy”).4. On or about April 15, 2008, Defendant renewed the policy for the period effective April 15, 2008 to April 15, 2009.   On information and belief, said renewed policy was identified by Defendant as Policy No. 0601W6225 ․8.  Despite the Policy and Plaintiff's significant credit with Defendant, Defendant denied coverage of [the] claim and has further failed to provide Plaintiff with a defense to [the] claim..  FN2. Paragraphs three, four and eight provide in relevant part:3.  Plaintiff has been insured by Defendant pursuant to a Workers' Compensation and Employer's Liability Policy since approximately April 2004 (“Policy”).4. On or about April 15, 2008, Defendant renewed the policy for the period effective April 15, 2008 to April 15, 2009.   On information and belief, said renewed policy was identified by Defendant as Policy No. 0601W6225 ․8.  Despite the Policy and Plaintiff's significant credit with Defendant, Defendant denied coverage of [the] claim and has further failed to provide Plaintiff with a defense to [the] claim.

FN3. J & N Electric, Inc. v. Notkins, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV 08 5020144 (May 20, 2009, Keegan, J.) [47 Conn. L. Rptr. 804] (granting motion to strike when plaintiff alleged existence and breach of express oral contract in count seeking unjust enrichment);  Burke v. Boatworks, Inc., Superior Court, judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk at Stamford, Docket No. CV 04 4001838 (July 26, 2005, Jennings, J.) (granting motion to strike when plaintiff incorporated allegations about plaintiff contracting with defendant into count for unjust enrichment);  Ravski v. Connecticut State Medical Society, Superior Court, complex litigation docket at Waterbury, Docket No. X01 CV04 4000582S (January 26, 2005, Sheedy, J.) (granting motion to strike when unjust enrichment count incorporated by reference allegations of an express contract);  Heaven v. Timber Hill, LLC, Superior Court, judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk at Stamford, Docket No. CV 02 0188007 (December 6, 2002, Lewis, J.) (granting motion to strike when allegations of express contract incorporated in unjust enrichment count);  Berman & Sable v. National Loan Investors, LP, Superior Court, complex litigation docket at Waterbury, Docket No. X06 CV 00 016745 (January 16, 2002, McWeeny, J.) (granting motion to strike when count for unjust enrichment alleged parties had a contract)..  FN3. J & N Electric, Inc. v. Notkins, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV 08 5020144 (May 20, 2009, Keegan, J.) [47 Conn. L. Rptr. 804] (granting motion to strike when plaintiff alleged existence and breach of express oral contract in count seeking unjust enrichment);  Burke v. Boatworks, Inc., Superior Court, judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk at Stamford, Docket No. CV 04 4001838 (July 26, 2005, Jennings, J.) (granting motion to strike when plaintiff incorporated allegations about plaintiff contracting with defendant into count for unjust enrichment);  Ravski v. Connecticut State Medical Society, Superior Court, complex litigation docket at Waterbury, Docket No. X01 CV04 4000582S (January 26, 2005, Sheedy, J.) (granting motion to strike when unjust enrichment count incorporated by reference allegations of an express contract);  Heaven v. Timber Hill, LLC, Superior Court, judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk at Stamford, Docket No. CV 02 0188007 (December 6, 2002, Lewis, J.) (granting motion to strike when allegations of express contract incorporated in unjust enrichment count);  Berman & Sable v. National Loan Investors, LP, Superior Court, complex litigation docket at Waterbury, Docket No. X06 CV 00 016745 (January 16, 2002, McWeeny, J.) (granting motion to strike when count for unjust enrichment alleged parties had a contract).

FN4. O'Malley v. Devivo, Superior Court, judicial district of New Britain, Docket No. CV 09 4019885 (May 5, 2010, Trombley, J.) (49 Conn. L. Rptr. 801) (denying motion to strike because plaintiff did not incorporate allegation of breach of agreement into count for unjust enrichment, even though count for unjust enrichment did include allegation of agreement);  Landeen Transport, LLC v. Tuccinardi Topsoil, Inc., Superior Court, judicial district of Waterbury, Docket No. CV 09 5013799 (November 2, 2009, Brunetti, J.) (denying motion to strike because even though count for unjust enrichment included allegations of contract formation, allegation of breach not incorporated);  Fanion v. Radei, Superior Court, judicial district of Windham, Docket No. CV 07 5001250 (November 5, 2007, Martin, J.) (denying motion to strike because allegation of breach of contract not incorporated into count for unjust enrichment even though other allegations incorporated)..  FN4. O'Malley v. Devivo, Superior Court, judicial district of New Britain, Docket No. CV 09 4019885 (May 5, 2010, Trombley, J.) (49 Conn. L. Rptr. 801) (denying motion to strike because plaintiff did not incorporate allegation of breach of agreement into count for unjust enrichment, even though count for unjust enrichment did include allegation of agreement);  Landeen Transport, LLC v. Tuccinardi Topsoil, Inc., Superior Court, judicial district of Waterbury, Docket No. CV 09 5013799 (November 2, 2009, Brunetti, J.) (denying motion to strike because even though count for unjust enrichment included allegations of contract formation, allegation of breach not incorporated);  Fanion v. Radei, Superior Court, judicial district of Windham, Docket No. CV 07 5001250 (November 5, 2007, Martin, J.) (denying motion to strike because allegation of breach of contract not incorporated into count for unjust enrichment even though other allegations incorporated).

FN5. See footnote one..  FN5. See footnote one.

FN6. See also DeCrecenzo v. CPM Ins. Services, Inc., Superior Court, judicial district of New London, Docket No. CV 07 5010892 (December 19, 2007, Cosgrove, J.) [44 Conn. L. Rptr. 679] (“plaintiff's CUTPA claim must be stricken due to the absence of any allegations of underlying CUIPA violations”);  Professional Mechanical Contractors, Inc. v. Archambault, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. CV 06 5003166 (August 21, 2007, Wagner, J.T.R.) (“[p]laintiff has failed to allege a violation of CUIPA, a necessary prerequisite in a CUTPA claim involving an insurance broker”);  Gabris v. Bjorklund, Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield, Docket No. CV 03 0405907 (May 11, 2004, Dewey, J.) (plaintiff “cannot maintain his CUTPA action absent an underlying CUIPA claim”);  Krassner v. CPM Ins. Services, Inc., Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV 01 0456362 (August 9, 2002, Booth, J.) (32 Conn. L. Rptr. 702) (“plaintiff has not alleged a CUIPA claim and accordingly the CUTPA claim is stricken”);  Steiger v. Giordano Associates, Inc., Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV 01 0448867 (February 27, 2002, Thompson, J.) (31 Conn. L. Rptr. 617) (“in this court's opinion, the Court in Mead ․ held that a plaintiff may not maintain a CUTPA action for an insurance practice which does not also constitute a violation of CUIPA”)..  FN6. See also DeCrecenzo v. CPM Ins. Services, Inc., Superior Court, judicial district of New London, Docket No. CV 07 5010892 (December 19, 2007, Cosgrove, J.) [44 Conn. L. Rptr. 679] (“plaintiff's CUTPA claim must be stricken due to the absence of any allegations of underlying CUIPA violations”);  Professional Mechanical Contractors, Inc. v. Archambault, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. CV 06 5003166 (August 21, 2007, Wagner, J.T.R.) (“[p]laintiff has failed to allege a violation of CUIPA, a necessary prerequisite in a CUTPA claim involving an insurance broker”);  Gabris v. Bjorklund, Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield, Docket No. CV 03 0405907 (May 11, 2004, Dewey, J.) (plaintiff “cannot maintain his CUTPA action absent an underlying CUIPA claim”);  Krassner v. CPM Ins. Services, Inc., Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV 01 0456362 (August 9, 2002, Booth, J.) (32 Conn. L. Rptr. 702) (“plaintiff has not alleged a CUIPA claim and accordingly the CUTPA claim is stricken”);  Steiger v. Giordano Associates, Inc., Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV 01 0448867 (February 27, 2002, Thompson, J.) (31 Conn. L. Rptr. 617) (“in this court's opinion, the Court in Mead ․ held that a plaintiff may not maintain a CUTPA action for an insurance practice which does not also constitute a violation of CUIPA”).

Marano, Richard M., J.