IN RE: Jenniyah T.1 (2010)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

On February 23, 2010, the petitioner, the commissioner of the Department of Children and Families (“DCF”), filed a petition pursuant to C.G.S. § 17a-112 et seq. to terminate the parental rights of Jessica D., and Charles Johnson or John Doe, the father of Jenniyah.²  The mother has appeared and is represented by counsel.   There are no claims of Indian Tribal affiliation.   The court is aware of no other proceedings pending in any other court regarding the custody of this child.   This court has jurisdiction.   Prior to the commencement of this assigned contested action for termination of parental rights, the mother presented to the court properly executed forms consenting to the termination of her parental rights.   Having canvassed the mother, this court found that she had been represented by competent counsel who was present with her when she executed the consent form.   The court further found that the consent had been knowingly and voluntarily entered with a full understanding of the legal consequences of her action.   Her consent has been accepted.

The Department of Child and Families (DCF) through counsel has moved to amend the petition to withdraw the non-consensual grounds and to change the grounds to consent § 17a-112(I) of the mother.   Without objection, the motion was granted

I. FACTS

Respondent-Father

Little is known about the identity and actual male biological progenitor of Jenniyah.   The mother is uncertain of the actual paternity of the child.   She was legally married to a convicted sex offender in Maine at the time of the birth of Jenniyah.   That man has been ruled out through genetic testing as the putative father.   She has named one Charles Johnson as the father although she did not know his actual last name, date of birth or any significant personal history that would assist in locating or identifying the man.   She states that he was a man who worked at the shelter in which she was a resident at the time of conception.   Diligent efforts to identify and locate this person have been unsuccessful.   The court (Rubinow, J.) authorized constructive notice by publication for both Charles Johnson and an Unidentified Person.   Publication has been confirmed.   Both Charles Johnson and the Unidentified Person were defaulted for failure to appear on March 25, 2010 (Simon, J.).

The petition alleges that the named fathers have abandoned the child and have no ongoing relationship with the child.   Both allegations are true.

“A parent abandons a child if the parent has failed to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern or responsibility as to the welfare of the child ․ General Statutes § 17a-112(j)(3)(A).   Abandonment focuses on the parent's conduct ․ Abandonment occurs where a parent fails to visit a child, does not display love or affection for the child, does not personally interact with the child, and demonstrates no concern for the child's welfare ․ Section 17a-112[ (j)(3)(A) ] does not contemplate a sporadic showing of the indicia of interest, concern or responsibility for the welfare of a child.   A parent must maintain a reasonable degree of interest in the welfare of his or her child.   Maintain implies a continuing, reasonable degree of concern.”   (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  In re Ilyssa G., 105 Conn.App. 41, 46-47, In re Justice V., 111 Conn.App. 500, 514 (2008).

The respondent father, whoever he is, has been unavailable for any services.   The Department was unable to deliver services to him or to implement specific steps for his reunification since his actual name and whereabouts are unknown.   The father failed to robustly come forward to claim his off-spring or to actively work to seek reunification with the child.   The child is a virtual stranger to him.   He is not known to have ever participated in the child's life or to assist in the child's welfare.

The respondent male biological parent has not been actively involved with this child nor with the mother and therefore has failed develop a relationship with Jenniyah.   In the case of Michael H. v. Mark K., 898 P.2d. 891, 896 (Cal.1995), the California Supreme Court held that unless the natural father can prove “that he has promptly come forward and demonstrated his full commitment to his parental responsibilities ․ the federal Constitution protects only the parental relationship that the unwed father has actively developed.” citing Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 261 (1983).   The respondent(s) in the present case did not assert his rights to paternity.   He did not vigorously and actively assert his paternal claim.   He has abandoned the child.   He has never provided financial, educational or moral support for the child.   He has no-ongoing established relationship with the child as he has never met the child.   The petitioner has met her burden.

DISPOSITION

As to the dispositional phase of this hearing on the petition for termination of parental rights, the court has considered the evidence and testimony related to circumstances and events up to and including the date upon which the evidence in this matter was completed.   During the dispositional phase, the trial court must determine whether termination is in the best interests of the children.  In re Eden F., 250 Conn. 674, 689 (1999).

The court makes the following seven written findings: ³

(1) As to the timeliness, nature and extent of services offered, provided and made available to the parents and the child by an agency to facilitate the reunion of the child with respondents, the court finds that DCF was unable to offer services to the missing father.

(2) As to whether DCF has made reasonable efforts to reunite the family pursuant to the federal Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, as amended, the court finds that DCF made such efforts.

(3) As to the extent to which all parties have fulfilled their obligations under the terms of any applicable court order entered into and agreed upon by any individual or agency and the parent, the court finds DCF was unable to provide services and no specific steps for the father were ever effectuated.

(4) As to the feelings and emotional ties of the children with respect to the children's parents, any guardian of such child's person and any person who has exercised physical care, custody or control of the child for at least one year and with whom the child has developed significant emotional ties, the court finds that the child does not have any parental emotional bond with the biological father

(5) As to the age of the child, Jenniyah is now 2 years and 3 months old.   The child's attorney and the petitioner recommend permanency which can only be achieved through termination of the parent's rights.4

(6) As to the efforts the parents have made to adjust such parent's circumstances, conduct, or conditions to make it in the best interest of the children to return such children home in the foreseeable future, including, but not limited to, (A) the extent to which the parent has maintained contact with the child as part of an effort to reunite the child with the parent, provided the court may give weight to incidental visitations, communications or contributions, and (B) the maintenance of regular contact or communication with the guardian or other custodian of the child, the court finds that respondent father has had no contact with the child in the past two years.

(7) As to the extent to which a parent has been prevented from maintaining a meaningful relationship with the children by the unreasonable act or conduct of the other parent of the child, or the unreasonable act of any other person or by the economic circumstances of the parent, the court finds no unreasonable conduct by the child protection agency, foster parents or third parties.   DCF has made diligent efforts to locate the father without success.

With respect to the best interests of the child contemplated by C.G.S. § 17a-l12(j)(2), by clear and convincing evidence, and based upon all of the foregoing, the court finds that termination of the parental rights of Jessica D., by her consent, and Charles Johnson or the Unidentified Father to the child Jenniyah T.⁵ is in the best interest of the child.   In finding that termination of the respondents' parental rights would be in the child's best interest, the court has examined multiple relevant factors.

Jenniyah is in the same placement with a preadoptive parent since her removal on March 19, 2009.   Jenniyah refers to her foster parent as “Mommy.”   The child is well adjusted in this home.   She is meeting all her developmental milestones.   The preadoptive mother is dedicated to Jenniyah and committed to her adoption.   She has already prepared draft of documents necessary to achieve full permanency for the child.

In accordance with applicable federal and state law, the court finds, by clear and convincing evidence, that it is in the best interest of Jenniyah and that it is necessary for her well-being, growth, development, safety, security, stability, continuity of care, consistency and permanency, and for closure, that the rights of the biological mother and the unknown biological father be terminated.

IV. ORDER

It is accordingly, ORDERED that the parental rights of Jessica D., upon her consent, and the unknown biological father are hereby terminated.   The Commissioner of the Department of Children and Families is hereby appointed the statutory parent for Jenniyah.

With regard to the permanency plans for the child, the court hereby approves the plan of termination of parental rights and adoption and finds that such plan is in the best interest of the child.   The court also finds that DCF has made reasonable efforts to effectuate the permanency plans.   Status reports shall be submitted within thirty days of this judgment, and such further reports shall be timely presented to the court as required by law.

The Clerk of the Probate Court with jurisdiction over any subsequent adoption of the child shall notify in writing the Deputy Chief Clerk of the Superior Court for Juvenile Matters at 25 School Street, Rockville CT 06066 of the date when said adoption is finalized.

Judgment may enter accordingly.

Foley, Sr. J. # 260

FOOTNOTES

FN2. The father's name is not conclusively known..  FN2. The father's name is not conclusively known.

FN3. These findings are not required as to the consenting parent, Jessica D..  FN3. These findings are not required as to the consenting parent, Jessica D.

FN4. Our Supreme Court has long recognized the deleterious effect of prolonged temporary care of abused and neglected children.  In re Juvenile Appeal (84-CD), 189 Conn. 276, 292, 455 A.2d 1313 (1983).   The Appellate Court has also noted, “[b]ecause of the psychological effects of prolonged termination proceedings on young children, time is of the essence ․ “ In re Alexander V., 25 Conn.App. 741, 748, 596 A.2d 930 (1992), aff'd, 223 Conn. 557, 613 A.2d 780 (1994)..  FN4. Our Supreme Court has long recognized the deleterious effect of prolonged temporary care of abused and neglected children.  In re Juvenile Appeal (84-CD), 189 Conn. 276, 292, 455 A.2d 1313 (1983).   The Appellate Court has also noted, “[b]ecause of the psychological effects of prolonged termination proceedings on young children, time is of the essence ․ “ In re Alexander V., 25 Conn.App. 741, 748, 596 A.2d 930 (1992), aff'd, 223 Conn. 557, 613 A.2d 780 (1994).

FN5. It is not explained in the social study why the mother named Jenniyah with the last name of “T” It is not the same name as the persons named as possible fathers..  FN5. It is not explained in the social study why the mother named Jenniyah with the last name of “T” It is not the same name as the persons named as possible fathers.

Foley, Francis J., S.J.