Diana Klingensmith v. Jennifer Denomme et al. (2010)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE MOTION TO STRIKE AND/OR DISMISS (NO. 124)

FACTS

On October 15, 2009, the plaintiff, Diana Klingensmith, filed a two-count complaint against the defendants, Jennifer Denomme, Rene Denomme and Allstate Insurance Company (Allstate), seeking damages for personal injuries allegedly sustained as the result of a motor vehicle accident.   In her complaint, Klingensmith alleges the following facts.   On July 2, 2008, Klingensmith was operating a motor vehicle in Putnam, Connecticut, and stopped her motor vehicle at a blinking yellow traffic light at the intersection of Pomfret Street and Kennedy Drive.   At that time, a motor vehicle operated by Jennifer, and owned by Rene, failed to obey a flashing red traffic light and entered the intersection, colliding with a motor vehicle operated by Rosanne Samson.   The collision caused Samson's motor vehicle to strike Klingensmith's motor vehicle, thereby causing Klingensmith serious bodily injuries.   Count one alleges a claim for negligence against Jennifer and Rene. Count two, brought against Allstate, seeks uninsured motorist coverage benefits pursuant to Klingensmith's insurance policy with Allstate, on the ground that the accident was caused by Jennifer's negligence, whose vehicle was uninsured at that time.

On May 25, 2010, Allstate filed a third party complaint against Samson seeking equitable subrogation.   In its third party complaint, Allstate claims that the alleged accident was due to the negligence and carelessness of Samson.   Samson filed a motion to strike and/or dismiss Allstate's third party complaint on June 9, 2010, on the ground that Allstate's claim for equitable subrogation is legally insufficient in the context of the present case.   Samson filed a memorandum of law in support of her motion.   On June 16, 2010, Allstate filed an objection to Samson's motion.   Samson filed a reply in further support of her motion on June 17, 2010.

DISCUSSION

The court notes at the onset that the proper vehicle to challenge the legal viability of Allstate's third party complaint is a motion to strike.  “The purpose of a motion to strike is to contest ․ the legal sufficiency of the allegations of any complaint ․ to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Fort Trumbull Conservancy, LLC v. Alves, 262 Conn. 480, 498, 815 A.2d 1188 (2003).   In ruling on a motion to strike, “[t]he role of the trial court [is] to examine the [complaint], construed in favor of the [plaintiff], to determine whether the [plaintiff has] stated a legally sufficient cause of action.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Dodd v. Middlesex Mutual Assurance Co., 242 Conn. 375, 378, 698 A.2d 859 (1997).  “It is fundamental that in determining the sufficiency of a complaint challenged by a defendant's motion to strike, all well-pleaded facts and those facts necessarily implied from the allegations are taken as admitted.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Violano v. Fernandez, 280 Conn. 310, 318, 907 A.2d 1188 (2006).  “A motion to strike admits all facts well pleaded;  it does not admit legal conclusions or the truth or accuracy of opinions stated in the pleadings.”  (Emphasis in original;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  Faulkner v. United Technologies Corp., 240 Conn. 576, 588, 693 A.2d 293 (1997).

Samson argues that Allstate's third party complaint should be stricken on the ground that Allstate's potential liability for Klingensmith's injuries derives from Jennifer's alleged negligence, and Allstate is not exposed to Klingensmith for any alleged negligence on the part of Samson.   Allstate counters that an insurance company may pursue a third party tortfeasor for the recovery of benefits paid to its insured.

“Subrogation is a highly favored doctrine ․ which courts should be inclined to extend rather than restrict.”  (Citations omitted.)  Westchester Fire Ins. Co. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 236 Conn. 362, 372, 672 A.2d 939 (1996).   “[T]here is no general rule to determine whether a right of subrogation exists.   Thus, ordering subrogation depends on the equities and attending facts and circumstances of each case ․ The determination of what equity requires in a particular case, the balancing of the equities, is a matter for the discretion of the trial court.”  (Citation omitted, internal quotation marks omitted.)  Allstate Ins. Co. v. Palumbo, 296 Conn. 253, 260, 994 A.2d 174 (2010).  “The object of [equitable] subrogation is the prevention of injustice.   It is designed to promote and to accomplish justice, and is the mode which equity adopts to compel the ultimate payment of a debt by one who, in justice, equity, and good conscience, should pay it ․ As now applied, the doctrine of equitable subrogation is broad enough to include every instance in which one person, not acting as a mere volunteer or intruder, pays a debt for which another is primarily liable, and which in equity and good conscience should have been discharged by the latter.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Wasko v. Manella, 269 Conn. 527, 532-33, 849 A.2d 777 (2004).

Under the doctrine of equitable subrogation, “a subrogated insurer stands in the shoes of an insured ․” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Allstate Ins. Co. v. Palumbo, supra, 296 Conn. 260.   Moreover, “in an equitable subrogation matter, [t]he insurer [does] not [act] as a mere volunteer;  rather, it [is] obligated by a preexisting contract of insurance to pay the losses of its insured.   Upon such payment, the insurer [becomes] subrogated to any rights that its insured might have had against the party who had caused the loss.   The tortfeasor, who was the party primarily liable for the losses sustained by the insured, [benefits] by the insurer's payment of a debt truly owed by the tortfeasor.  [Our Appellate Court sees] no logical reason to permit a tortfeasor to be unjustly enriched by virtue of having its debt paid by the insurance company of a party who had the foresight to obtain insurance coverage, and thus to escape all liability for its wrongdoing, simply because the insurance company was not permitted to participate in a suit against the tortfeasor in order to recover the money that it had paid to its insured but which was properly payable by the tortfeasor.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Wasko v. Manella, supra, 269 Conn. 548.  “If the insured ․ can bring an action to recover for negligently caused damages against the [tortfeasor], [the court sees] no reason why an insurer that pays for the ․ loss cannot also bring an action against the [tortfeasor].”  Id., 546;  see also Skoog v. Progressive Northwestern Ins. Co., Superior Court, judicial district of Tolland, Docket No. CV 05 40001518 (September 6, 2008, Klaczak, J.T.R.) (denying motion to strike equitable subrogation claim where plaintiff's insured motorist carrier was sued and impleaded third party tortfeasor, alleging third party tortfeasor was responsible for insured's injuries).

In the present case, Allstate, as Klingensmith's insurer, has the same rights against Samson as Klingensmith has against Samson.   Moreover, Allstate is not acting as a mere volunteer;  rather, it may be obligated pursuant to the terms of its insurance contract with Klingensmith to pay her potential losses.   As a result, Samson may be unjustly enriched by virtue of Allstate's payment of a debt that is truly owed by her pursuant to her negligent role in the alleged accident.   As discussed in the case law herein, if Klingensmith is permitted to bring an action to recover for negligently caused damages against Samson, then there exists no logical reason that Allstate, as the insurer who may pay for the potential losses, cannot also bring an action against Samson.   Furthermore, Samson has provided no case law indicating that equitable subrogation is prohibited in the context of the present case.   In light of our Supreme Court's view of equitable subrogation as a highly favored doctrine, and construing the complaint in Allstate's favor, the court finds that Allstate has sufficiently pleaded a claim for equitable subrogation.   As a result, Samson's motion to strike and/or dismiss must be denied.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the court hereby denies Samson's motion to strike and/or dismiss Allstate's third party complaint.

Martin, J.

Martin, Robert A., J.