Standard Petroleum Company, Inc. v. Michael Fox et al. (2010)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE MOTION TO STRIKE REVISED COMPLAINT, Motion# 116

The plaintiff's claim in this matter arises out of the alleged tortious interference by the defendant with the contract between the plaintiff and one of its dealers, Anthony Palmer.   The defendant is the Executive Director of the Gasoline and Automotive Service Dealers of America, the industry or trade association for Anthony Palmer and others.   The defendant filed a motion to strike the Revised Complaint dated November 16, 2009, which alleges a single count of intentional interference with a contractual relationship.   The Revised Complaint was filed after the court (Arnold, J.) granted the defendant's previous motion to strike a prior complaint attempting to set forth the same cause of action.

This court will not repeat the well-settled standard for reviewing motions to strike and the applicable law of tortious interference set out in great detail by Judge Arnold.   It is equally applicable to the present motion.

The defendant claims that the Revised Complaint does not cure the deficiencies identified by the court (Arnold, J.) in its memorandum of decision striking the tortious interference claim.   Those deficiencies included a determination that the complaint failed to allege improper motive, fraud, malice or misrepresentation of fact by the defendant, as well as a failure to allege actual loss.

While the complaint does not allege that the defendant's conduct caused an actual breach of the contract between the plaintiff and Palmer, such an allegation is not required.   See, Suffield Development Associates, LP v. National Loan Inv., 64 Conn.App. 192, 203 (2001), reversed on other grounds, 260 Conn. 7 (2002).   The Revised Complaint's allegations, construed in the light most favorable to sustaining the pleading, satisfies this element of the cause of action.   At paragraph 7, the plaintiff alleges that the interference caused an attempted renegotiation of the contract by Palmer;  a reduction in the price of the gasoline;  the diverting of resources and manpower to maintain the contract with Palmer, “all to [plaintiff's] economic loss and damage.”

Similarly, the Revised Complaint allegations regarding the conduct of the defendant, his motive and the accuracy of his statements to Palmer have now been sufficiently pled to survive a motion to strike.   Specifically, he avers that the statements were malicious, “known to be false and a misrepresentation of fact” done with the purpose of inducing a breach of the Dealer Supply Contract between plaintiff and Palmer.   See, Solomon v. Aberman, 196 Conn. 359, 365 (1985).

The motion to strike the revised complaint is DENIED.

K. DOOLEY, J.

Dooley, Kari A., J.