State of Connecticut v. Stephen Cook (2010)

RULING ON STATE'S MOTION TO CONSOLIDATE

The state has moved to consolidate the trials of the three above captioned defendants.   At the hearing on the motion, all three defendants objected to the motion, arguing that a joint trial would be prejudicial to the rights of each of the accused.

The state has charged all three defendants with assault in the first degree and conspiracy to commit assault in the first degree.   The state alleges that on August 25, 2009 the three defendants were in a car, located in Derby, that intentionally rammed a car being operated by the victim.   The state further alleges that two men from the defendants' car then used a handgun to fire upon the victim, causing him serious physical injury.   All three defendants were apprehended in the vicinity of the scene within a relatively short period of time after the shooting.

The test for such motions can be found in State v. Booth, 250 Conn. 611 (1999), cert. denied sub. nom.  Brown v. Connecticut, 529 U.S. 1060, 120 S.Ct. 1568, 146 L.Ed.2d 471 (2000).  “[W]hether to consolidate or sever the trials of defendants involved in the same criminal incident lies within the sound discretion of the trial court ․ Ordinarily justice is better subserved where parties are tried together ․ Joint trials of persons jointly indicted or informed against are the rule, and separate trials the exception resting in the discretion of the court ․ A separate trial will be ordered where the defenses of the accused are antagonistic, or evidence will be introduced against one which will not be admissible against others, and it clearly appears that a joint trial will probably be prejudicial to the rights of one or more of the accused ․ [T]he phrase prejudicial to the rights of the [accused] means something more than that a joint trial will probably be less advantageous to the accused than separate trials.”  (Citations omitted, internal quotation marks omitted.)  Id., 620.

The court finds that the defendants have not proven that they have antagonistic defenses.   From the argument of the parties, it appears that all three defendants deny the charges and do not want to be “bootstrapped” into a conviction based upon the evidence against the other defendants.  “When ․ the jury can reasonably accept the core of the defense offered by either defendant only if it rejects the core of the defense offered by his codefendant, the defenses are sufficiently antagonistic to mandate separate trials ․ To compel severance the defenses must be antagonistic to the point of being irreconcilable and mutually exclusive.”  State v. Booth, 621 (citations omitted).   No defendant argued that he will deny culpability and implicate another;  rather, all three appear from their arguments to simply deny culpability and leave the state to its proof.  “It is the party's responsibility to present information to the court from which it can determine whether the defenses are going to be antagonistic or the evidence will unduly prejudice [any] defendant.  Id.

The court also finds that the parties have, not proven that evidence will be introduced against one which will not be admissible against others, and it clearly appears that a joint trial will probably be prejudicial to the rights.   While the parties argued that there would be a spillover effect from the presentation of evidence implicating one party, no concrete example was offered to the court.   Our courts have stated that neither claiming “finger-pointing” nor vague and general assertions are sufficient bases for a court to find that severance of the cases is warranted.  “The phrase prejudicial to the rights of the accused means something more than that a joint trial will probably be less advantageous to the accused than separate trials.”  Id., 620 (citation omitted).

“A joint trial expedites the administration of justice, reduces the congestion of trial dockets, conserves judicial time, lessens the burden upon citizens who must sacrifice both time and money to serve upon juries, and avoids the necessity of recalling witnesses who would otherwise be called to testify only once ․ [W]here proof of the charges against the defendants is dependent upon the same evidence and alleged acts ․ severance should not be granted except for the most cogent reasons.”  (Citation omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  State v. Booth, supra, 622.

Any concern regarding the transference of guilt from one defendant to another will be alleviated by the cautionary instructions that the court will give to the jury.   As recognized in Booth, “[c]autionary instructions to the jury concerning what evidence may be considered against which defendant can often alleviate any potential prejudice.   The spillover effect ․ usually is best avoided by precise instructions to the jury on the admissibility and proper uses of the evidence introduced by the government ․ (Citations omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted).  State v. Booth, supra, 250 Conn. 631-32.

For all of the foregoing reasons, the state's motion to consolidate is GRANTED.

Keegan, J.

Keegan, Maureen M., J.