Kristen Cooke v. Charles Maynard (2010)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE MOTION TO STRIKE (# 102)

FACTS

On June 22, 2010, the plaintiff, Kristen Cooke, filed a two-count complaint against the defendant, Charles Maynard.   In the complaint, the plaintiff alleges the following facts.   On September 26, 2008, the plaintiff was operating a motor vehicle on Main Street in Middletown, Connecticut, when a vehicle operated by the defendant struck her from behind.   The collision occurred when the plaintiff slowed down and subsequently stopped her vehicle due to traffic.   The defendant did not stop for the traffic and “smashed” his vehicle into the rear of the plaintiff's vehicle.   This caused her to strike the rear of the vehicle stopped immediately in front of her.   As a result of the collision, the plaintiff suffered injuries and other damages.

In the first count of the complaint, the plaintiff alleges that her injuries were caused by the defendant's “negligence and carelessness” in that:  (1) he was following too closely to the rear of the plaintiff's vehicle in violation of General Statutes § 14-240;  (2) he was operating his vehicle at an excessive rate of speed in violation of General Statutes § 14-219;  (3) he was operating his vehicle at an unreasonable rate of speed without due regard for the traffic, weather, width and use of the highway in violation of General Statutes § 14-218a;  (4) he failed to keep his vehicle under proper and reasonable control;  (5) he failed to keep a proper and reasonable lookout for other vehicles;  (6) he failed to apply his brakes in time to avoid a collision;  and (7) he failed to turn his vehicle to avoid a collision.

The second count further alleges that the plaintiff's injuries and damages “were caused by the wilful, wanton and/or reckless misconduct” of the defendant and that at the time of the collision, it was raining heavily, the road was wet and the defendant “was traveling fast.”   Specifically, the plaintiff alleges that the defendant “deliberately or with reckless disregard for the safety of others” operated his vehicle at “an unreasonable rate of speed without having due regard for the traffic, weather, width and use of the highway in violation of [§ ]14-218a,” and at “an excessive rate of speed in violation of [§ ] 14-219.”   The plaintiff claims this “wilful, wanton and/or reckless misconduct of the defendant was a substantial factor in causing [her] injuries and damages.”   In addition to damages and costs, as to the second count, the plaintiff seeks double or treble damages pursuant to § 14-295.

On July 1, 2010, the defendant filed a motion to strike count two of the complaint on the ground that the plaintiff fails to allege sufficient facts to support a cause of action in recklessness.   The defendant's motion is accompanied by a memorandum of law.   The plaintiff filed an objection and memorandum in opposition to the defendant's motion to strike on July 28, 2010.   Oral argument on the motion was heard at short calendar on August 9, 2010.¹

DISCUSSION

“The purpose of a motion to strike is to contest ․ the legal sufficiency of the allegations of any complaint ․ to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Fort Trumbull Conservancy, LLC v. Alves, 262 Conn. 480, 498, 815 A.2d 1188 (2003).  “In ruling on a motion to strike, the court is limited to the facts alleged in the complaint.”   (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Faulkner v. United Technologies Corp., 240 Conn. 576, 580, 693 A.2d 293 (1997).  “The role of the trial court [is] to examine the [complaint], construed in favor of the [plaintiff], to determine whether the [plaintiff has] stated a legally sufficient cause of action.”   (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Dodd v. Middlesex Mutual Assurance Co., 242 Conn. 375, 378, 698 A.2d 859 (1997).  “It is fundamental that in determining the sufficiency of a complaint challenged by a defendant's motion to strike, all well-pleaded facts and those facts necessarily implied from the allegations are taken as admitted.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)   Connecticut Coalition for Justice in Education Funding, Inc. v. Rell, 295 Conn. 240, 252-53, 990 A.2d 206 (2010).

“[I]f facts provable in the complaint would support a cause of action, the motion to strike must be denied.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Id., 252.   Nevertheless, “[a] motion to strike is properly granted if the complaint alleges mere conclusions of law that are unsupported by the facts alleged.”   (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Fort Trumbull Conservancy, LLC v. Alves, supra, 262 Conn. 498.

In support of his motion to strike, the defendant argues that based on the standards of recklessness set out in Brock v. Waldron, 127 Conn. 79, 14 A.2d 713 (1940),² the second count of the complaint is legally insufficient.   The defendant asserts that the plaintiff “simply recast a few of the operative facts of [her] negligence claim and called them reckless,” and, therefore, she fails to allege specific acts by the defendant that would support a claim of recklessness under § 14-295.   The defendant recognizes that the Superior Court is divided on the specificity needed to allege statutory recklessness and maintains “a number of Superior Court decisions have held that the plaintiff must go beyond merely tracking the statutory language contained in ․ [§ ]14-295 and provide a sufficiently detailed recitation of facts to state a recklessness claim.”   In response, the plaintiff argues that she has alleged sufficient facts to support the second count of her complaint because, although there is a split among Superior Court decisions, under the majority view, “the plain language of § 14-295 does not require additional facts be set forth in order to bring a claim for statutory recklessness.”   The plaintiff contends, under the majority view, she only needs to plead that the defendant deliberately or with reckless disregard operated a motor vehicle in violation of one of the enumerated statutes in § 14-295 and that the violation was a substantial factor in causing the plaintiff's injuries.   In the alternative, the plaintiff further argues, that even under the minority view, the second count alleges sufficient facts, in addition to the facts named in the negligence claim, to support a claim of statutory recklessness.

Section 14-295 provides in relevant part:  “In any civil action to recover damages resulting from personal injury, wrongful death or damage to property, the trier of fact may award double or treble damages if the injured party has specifically pleaded that another party has deliberately or with reckless disregard operated a motor vehicle in violation of section 14-218a [or] 14-219 ․ and that such violation was a substantial factor in causing such injury, death or damages to property ․” General Statutes § 14-295.

“Neither the Connecticut Supreme nor Appellate Court has yet had occasion to address the pleading requirements for recklessness under § 14-295.   There has been a split of authority in Superior Court decisions as to what degree of specificity is required in pleading recklessness ․ The split of authority arises from the different constructions the courts have placed on the term specifically pleaded.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)   Grieco v. Morales, Superior Court, judicial district of Litchfield, Docket No. CV 09 5007072 (Jun. 30, 2010, Roche, J.).

This court recently addressed the pleading standard for a statutory recklessness claim in the context of a motion to strike and adopted the majority view.   Campos v. Coleman, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV 10 6009582 (June 9, 2010, Wilson, J.);   Braumann v. Clavette, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV 09 5031138 (April 27, 2010, Wilson, J);  Ferraiuolo v. Nicholson, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV 09 50311385 (December 7, 2009, Wilson J.).   For example, in Braumann v. Clavette, supra, Superior Court, Docket No. CV 09 5031138, this court explained:  “The minority view holds that a plaintiff must not only plead a statutory [violation] as set forth in § 14-295, but also facts that would support a claim of reckless conduct at common law ․ Relying on the usual rules of pleading, these courts generally reason that a plaintiff who is alleging recklessness must allege specific facts that informs both the court and the defendant what conduct is relied upon ․ To permit otherwise, these courts reason, would enable any negligence claim to be brought as a recklessness claim and thereby make it subject to double and treble damages ․ effectively dissolv[ing] any distinction between [the two] claims ․

“The majority view distinguishes between pleading common law recklessness and statutory recklessness, thus holding that a plaintiff need only plead the required language in § 14-295, that is, that the defendant violated one or more of the enumerated statutory provisions named therein, and that the violation was a substantial factor in causing the plaintiff's injuries ․ The majority view is based both on an analysis of the legislative history as well as a review of the statutory language of § 14-295 itself.   These cases conclude that as long as the general requirements of the statute are met, such pleading is enough to survive a motion to strike and to state a cause of action under § 14-295 ․

“There does not appear to be any ambiguity in the language of [§ ]14-295 or how it should be applied or construed.   The statute says that in a civil action seeking damages for personal injuries, the trier of fact may award double or treble damages if the plaintiff has specifically pleaded that another party has deliberately or with reckless disregard operated a motor vehicle in violation of ․ [one or more motor vehicle statutes delineated in the statute].   If a further delineation of facts forming the basis of the recklessness claim were necessary, then such an explicit requirement could have been set out in the statute by the legislature ․ Where the language used by the legislature is plain and unambiguous, there is no room for construction by the courts and the statute will be applied as its words direct ․ This court will therefore continue to apply the majority view ․” (Citations omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  Braumann v. Clavette, supra, Superior Court, Docket No. CV 09 5031138.

In the present case, the plaintiff's allegations in the complaint track the language of § 14-295.   In count two, the plaintiff alleges that the defendant “deliberately or with reckless disregard for the safety of others ․ operat[ed] his motor vehicle at an unreasonable rate of speed without having due regard for the traffic, weather, width and use of the highway in violation [§ ]14-218a ․ and at an excessive rate of speed in violation of [§ ]14-219,” and that this “wilful, wanton and or reckless misconduct of the defendant was a substantial factor in causing [the plaintiff's] injuries and damages.”   Pursuant to the majority view, the plaintiff therefore has alleged sufficient facts to support a claim of recklessness under § 14-295.   For the foregoing reasons, the defendant's motion to strike count two of the plaintiff's complaint is denied.

Wilson, J.

FOOTNOTES

FN1. At oral argument, the plaintiff pointed out an error in her objection and memorandum in opposition to the defendant's motion to strike, which states that in the second count of the complaint she alleged that the defendant violated, among other statutes, § 14-240a.   The plaintiff noted however, as to the second count, that she is proceeding under § 14-218a and § 14-219, as alleged in the complaint, not § 14-240a..  FN1. At oral argument, the plaintiff pointed out an error in her objection and memorandum in opposition to the defendant's motion to strike, which states that in the second count of the complaint she alleged that the defendant violated, among other statutes, § 14-240a.   The plaintiff noted however, as to the second count, that she is proceeding under § 14-218a and § 14-219, as alleged in the complaint, not § 14-240a.

FN2. The plaintiff in that case, alleged in her complaint that the defendant caused the decedent's death by recklessly, carelessly and negligently operating his motor vehicle.  Brock v. Waldron, supra, 127 Conn. 79, 80.   The court held that evidence of the defendant's “momentary thoughtlessness or inadvertence” was insufficient to recover on the theory of common-law recklessness and the plaintiff needed to establish a “persistent course of improper conduct” by the defendant “notwithstanding warning and knowledge of the danger involved.”  Id., 83..  FN2. The plaintiff in that case, alleged in her complaint that the defendant caused the decedent's death by recklessly, carelessly and negligently operating his motor vehicle.  Brock v. Waldron, supra, 127 Conn. 79, 80.   The court held that evidence of the defendant's “momentary thoughtlessness or inadvertence” was insufficient to recover on the theory of common-law recklessness and the plaintiff needed to establish a “persistent course of improper conduct” by the defendant “notwithstanding warning and knowledge of the danger involved.”  Id., 83.

Wilson, Robin L., J.