State of Connecticut v. Anthony J. Tryzna (2010)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

The issue before the court is whether or not the defendant, who is charged with various misdemeanor crimes and was earlier ruled incompetent to stand trial, has been restored to competency.

A contested hearing was held before the undersigned on August 27, 2010.   The following procedural history is relevant:

The defendant was charged with counts of threatening, breach of peace, and assault third degree following two separate incidents that occurred in September 2009.   The defendant's mother is the complainant in both cases.   On October 2, 2009, in response to a motion by the defendant's counsel, the court ordered that the defendant be clinically evaluated to determine his competency to stand trial.   The court acted pursuant to the provisions of C.G.S. § 54-56d.

The court-ordered evaluation was conducted on October 20, 2009 by a forensic evaluation team from the Department of Mental Health and Addiction Services (hereafter DMHAS).   In a report to the court dated November 23, 2009, the evaluation team unanimously opined that the defendant was competent to stand trial.  (Defendant's Exhibit C.)

At a hearing on November 30, 2009, defense counsel moved for an additional competency evaluation.   The court granted that motion.   The defendant was examined by a different clinical evaluation team from DMHAS on January 5, 2010.   In a report dated January 21, 2010, those evaluators unanimously agreed that the defendant was unable to understand the legal proceedings against him and was unable to assist in his own defense.  (Defendant's Exhibit E, p. 2.) The team's report noted that the defendant is “․ not capable of establishing a collaborative relationship with his attorney, understanding his attorney's instructions and advice, or making sound decisions based upon that advice.”   (Defendant's Exhibit E, p. 9.)

On January 25, 2010, the court found that the defendant was not competent to stand trial.   The court also found it likely that the defendant could be restored to competency following a 60-day period of in-patient psychiatric treatment.   The court remanded the defendant to the custody of DMHAS for placement at the Whiting Forensic Division of the Connecticut Valley Hospital in Middletown.

Officials from Whiting Forensic filed a report with the court on April 27, 2010.  (Defendant's Exhibit F.) A licensed clinical social worker and a psychiatrist from Whiting Forensic co-signed that report.   In their report, the mental health professionals opined that the defendant was competent to stand trial.  (Defendant's Exhibit F, p. 8-9.)   At a hearing held on April 30, 2010, defense counsel moved for a continuance so that the defendant could be independently evaluated by a psychiatric expert retained by the defense.   The court granted the motion, and continued the matter without finding.

The defendant's expert, Kenneth Selig, M.D., J.D., examined the defendant and submitted a written report dated July 2, 2010.  (Defendant's Exhibit G.) A supplemental written report from Whiting Forensic was filed with the court on August 27, 2010.  (Defendant's Exhibit H.) That report was signed by Susan McKinley, L.C.S.W., a forensic competency monitor at the hospital, and Mark Cotterell, M.D., the principal psychiatrist with the Whiting Forensic restoration services unit.

Dr. Selig testified as a defense witness at the hearing on August 27, 2010.   Ms. McKinley was called to testify by the State.   The court has carefully considered the testimony of both witnesses, and all of the documentary evidence that was introduced at the hearing.  (Defendant's Exhibits A-H.) The court finds that all of the facts recounted below were proven by a fair preponderance of the evidence at hearing.

FACTUAL FINDINGS

In September 1999, the defendant, who has a long history of mental illness, was charged at courts in Hartford and Enfield with a number of criminal offenses, the most serious of which included Arson First Degree, Risk of Injury to a Child, Robbery Third Degree, and Failure to Appear First Degree.   (Defendant's Exhibit A, p. 1 and 6.) On November 9, 2000, following a § 54-56d competency evaluation that was ordered by the court (Clifford, J.), the defendant was found incompetent to stand trial due to mental illness.   He was thereafter sent by the court to Connecticut Valley Hospital for restoration treatment.  (Defendant's Exhibit B, p. 1.) Reports submitted to the court around that time indicated that the defendant had been diagnosed with obsessive compulsive disorder, and chronic, undifferentiated schizophrenia.  (Defendant's Exhibit A, p. 2.) Records also indicated that the defendant had previously sustained a traumatic brain injury.  (Defendant's Exhibit A, p. 2.)

In January 2001, the competency evaluators at Connecticut Valley Hospital reported to the court that the defendant was not competent to stand trial because his mental illness rendered him unable to understand the nature of the proceedings against him and to assist in his defense.  (Defendant's Exhibit B, p. 6.) The officials at Connecticut Valley Hospital also opined then that the defendant was not likely to be restored to competency within the time limits set by statute.   Mark Puglisi, the competency monitor at Connecticut Valley, noted in his report that the defendant was “․ unable, due to his mental illness, to form a collaborative relationship with his defense.”  (Defendant's Exhibit B, p. 6.) After a hearing on February 1, 2001, the court found the defendant not competent to stand trial on the pending charges, and also found that he would not be restorable to competency within the statutory time limit.  (Defendant's Exhibit F, p. 4.) Following that finding by the court, the defendant remained for a period of time at Connecticut Valley Hospital.   (Defendant's Exhibit F, p. 4.) The defendant continuously received psychiatric treatment, either on an in-patient basis in psychiatric hospitals, or at a residential treatment facility, from February 2001 through April 2009.   (Defendant's Exhibit F, p. 4.)

In April 2009, the defendant was discharged from a residential treatment program and moved in with his mother.  (Defendant's Exhibit F, p. 4.) He was arrested twice during September 2009 on the charges that are currently pending before this court.

The defendant has consistently refused to cooperate with a formal competency restoration evaluation at Whiting Forensic.  (Defendant's Exhibit H, p. 1-4.)   However, the staff members at the Whiting Forensic unit have observed the defendant extensively during his hospitalization there, and have also interacted with him on a daily basis.  (Testimony of Ms. McKinley;  Defendant's Exhibit H, p. 1-4.)   The opinions offered by the competency evaluators at Whiting Forensic are based on those contacts with the defendant, and upon a review of the defendant's psychiatric records.  (Testimony of Ms. McKinley;  Defendant's Exhibit H, p. 1-2.)

Ms. McKinley wrote in her report and testified at hearing that the defendant is competent to stand trial, and can cooperate with his counsel, and assist in his defense, if he chooses to do so.   The mental health professionals at Whiting Forensic do not believe that the defendant is currently delusional, and found that he did not exhibit thinking or behavior that was indicative of a psychotic process or mood disturbance.  (Defendant's Exhibit H, p. 4.) The defendant has not been diagnosed with psychotic illness, and has not been prescribed anti-psychotic medications, during his current placement at the Whiting Forensic unit.  (Defendant's Exhibit G, p. 2.) A report from Whiting Forensic dated April 19, 2010 states that the defendant reported experiencing auditory and visual hallucinations but refused to provide details about those experiences.  (Defendant's Exhibit F, p. 5.) The report that Whiting Forensic officials submitted to the court on August 27, 2010 lists the defendant's Axis I diagnoses as dysthymic disorder, obsessive compulsive disorder, factitious disorder, gender identity disorder, sexual masochism by history, alcohol abuse by history and cannabis abuse by history.  (Defendant's Exhibit H, p. 4.)

Per Ms. McKinley, the competency restoration staff members at Whiting Forensic believe that the defendant is feigning incompetency.   The defendant allegedly told a staff member at Whiting Forensic that he hoped to receive a certain hospital classification in order to avoid his charges and remain in the hospital.  (Defendant's Exhibit F, p. 7.) The most recent report from Whiting Forensic notes:  “It remains our opinion that Mr. Tryzna's behavior is a deliberate effort to avoid the competency evaluation process, to disrupt any formal assessment of him and to thwart the judicial process.”  (Defendant's Exhibit H, p. 4.)

Dr. Selig, the defendant's psychiatric expert, interviewed and evaluated the defendant on June 24, 2010.   He also reviewed police reports about the defendant's most recent arrests, and the defendant's psychiatric records.

Dr. Selig concluded that the defendant is delusional, is not competent to stand trial, and is unlikely to be restored to competency during the time period established by statute, even if he receives anti-psychotic medication.   (Defendant's Exhibit G, p. 2 and 3.) Dr. Selig noted in his report that the defendant is “a foreseeable and imminent danger to his mother as a result of his chronic psychotic illness and should be committed civilly to CVH if he won't sign in voluntarily.”  (Defendant's Exhibit G, p. 2.)

Dr. Selig also opined in his report that the defendant “has an elaborate, longstanding delusional system involving his and his mother being involved in an apocalyptical battle for the survival of the human race.”  (Defendant's Exhibit G, p. 2.) The psychiatrist wrote that the defendant “believes his mother is evil itself and has powers of persuasion and manipulation designed to influence others to do evil things especially harmful to him.”  (Defendant's Exhibit G, p. 2.) “He feels that others are seduced by his mother and only he understands her methods well enough to combat her.   That is the main reason why he insists on representing himself.   He feels that no one else knows how to get his mother to admit the evil that she does.   He is convinced that he will be able to do so if allowed to cross examine her.”  (Defendant's Exhibit G, p. 2.) Dr. Selig indicated in both his written report and in his testimony at the hearing that the defendant believes his mother has influenced his public defender, the judge, and the officials at Whiting Forensic to be against him.   The psychiatrist observed during the evaluation that the defendant “was very talkative with paranoid, grandiose, and religious themes.”  (Defendant's Exhibit G, p. 2.) Dr. Selig also noted:  “There was no evidence of malingering or strategizing.   He [the defendant] began to wonder at the end, when I expressed hesitation in agreeing with him, whether I, too, had been taken in by his mother.”  (Defendant's Exhibit G, p. 2.) When the psychiatrist attempted to interview the defendant for a second time on the day before the August 27th hearing, Mr. Tryzna refused to meet with him.  (Testimony of Dr. Selig.)

Dr. Selig also opined during his testimony that if the defendant was feigning incompetency, he likely would have mentioned the apocalyptic struggle with his mother to the officials at Whiting Forensic.

The expert witnesses who testified in this case offered very different opinions about the defendant's competency to stand trial.   The court finds that both witnesses have considerable professional expertise, and that both testified honestly about their respective points of view.   However, the court finds the testimony and professional opinions of Dr. Selig to be the more persuasive evidence, particularly when viewed in conjunction with the other credible evidence about the defendant's prior legal and psychiatric history.

The defendant was diagnosed approximately 10 years ago with obsessive compulsive disorder and chronic, undifferentiated schizophrenia.   He has subsequently received diagnosises, inter alia, of bipolar affective disorder, obsessive compulsive disorder, dysthymic disorder and psychotic disorder, not otherwise specified.  (Defendant's Exhibit E, p. 5, and Defendant's Exhibit H, p. 4.) The defendant has received continuous and intensive psychiatric treatment, in hospitals or residential programs, for most of the past decade.   The court credits Dr. Selig's testimony that during the evaluation of the defendant on June 24, 2010, the defendant made claims about being involved in a struggle for the survival of the human race with his evil and manipulative mother.   The court credits Dr. Selig's professional opinion that the defendant is delusional as a result of mental illness, and that these delusions render the defendant unable to assist in his defense, and make him an imminent and significant danger to his mother's physical safety.

The court also accepts Dr. Selig's opinion that the defendant is not feigning incompetency.   Although the officials at Whiting Forensic did not observe delusional thinking by the defendant, the evidence suggests that this may be due to the defendant's guarded, distrustful and oppositional attitude, and his unrelenting refusal to participate in a formal competency evaluation conducted by staff there.

In making the forgoing findings, the court has accorded evidentiary weight to the determinations in 2000 and 2001 that the defendant was incompetent to stand trial, and was not restorable to competency.   The competency evaluators noted the defendant's “significant psychiatric impairments,” “grandiosity” and “unrealistic, illogical train of thought regarding his court case,” then when they concluded that the defendant's mental illness rendered him unable to understand the nature of the proceedings and to assist in his defense.   (Defendant's Exhibit B, p. 4-6.)

ORDERS

Based on all of the forgoing evidence, and pursuant to the provisions of C.G.S. § 54-56d, the court finds as proven that the defendant is not competent to stand trial due to his mental illness, because he is unable to assist in his defense.   The court also finds that there is not a substantial probability that the defendant will attain competency within the 18-month period of treatment allowed by C.G.S. § 54-56d(i).

Due to the defendant's chronic mental illness, the nature of his pending criminal charges and his bizarre, delusional thoughts about his mother, the court finds that the defendant poses an imminent and serious risk of physical danger to that person.   The court finds that civil commitment of the defendant to a hospital for persons suffering from psychiatric disabilities would appear to be appropriate for that reason.

Based on all the evidence presented at hearing, and pursuant to the provisions of C.G.S. § 54-56d(m), the court orders the defendant placed in the custody of the Commissioner of Mental Health and Addiction Services.   The court also orders said Commissioner, or the Commissioner's designee, to apply for a civil commitment of the defendant in accordance with the provisions of C.G.S. §§ 17a-495 to 17a-528, inclusive.

Based on the specific, credible evidence presented at hearing about the physical danger that the defendant poses to his mother, this court finds that the defendant should not be released pending the outcome of the civil commitment process.   The court recommends that the defendant should currently be treated in a physically secure hospital for persons with psychiatric disabilities.

The court declines at this time to order further periodic examinations of the defendant as to the defendant's competency, under the provisions of C.G.S. § 54-56d(m).  Given the length of time that has elapsed during the pendency of these cases, the opinion of Dr. Selig that the defendant is unlikely to be restored to competency, even if he is medicated, and the 2001 finding by the prior court that the defendant was incompetent to stand trial and not restorable, the court does not believe that further examinations are warranted.

The court requests the Clerk to forward a copy of this decision to the Commissioner of Health and Addiction Services and to the complainant.   The court commends Senior Assistant State's Attorney Keith DuBoff and Assistant Public Defender Scott Abkowicz for their highly competent and professional presentations and advocacy during this proceeding.

Entered at Enfield, Connecticut this 10th day of September 2010.

SO ORDERED.

BY THE COURT,

Dyer, J.

Dyer, Richard W., J.