Christopher Taylor v. State of Connecticut Department of Correction (2010)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISON RE PLAINTIFF'S REQUEST FOR REASONABLE ATTORNEYS FEES PER C.G.S. § 46a-104

The plaintiff, Christopher Taylor commenced this action against the defendant, Department of Correction (DOC) pursuant to the Connecticut Fair Employment Practices Act (CFEPA), General Statutes § 46a-60, et seq.   The plaintiff alleged in his one-count complaint that he was passed over for an assignment to a unit manager position by the defendant due to his race and color.   The plaintiff further alleged that the defendant retaliated against him in response to complaints of racial discrimination which he filed with the State of Connecticut DOC Affirmative Action Office and with the Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities (CHRO).   After a trial to this court on February 10 and 11, 2010 and submission of proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law by the parties on March 11, 2010, on July 9, 2010, the court enter judgment in favor of the defendant on the plaintiff's claim of racial discrimination and in favor of the plaintiff on his claim of retaliation.   The plaintiff now seeks an award of a reasonable attorneys fee in accordance with § 46a-104.   The court heard evidence on the plaintiff's claim for attorneys fees on August 6, 2010, to which all counsel of record appeared.

DISCUSSION

Our Supreme Court has stated that “[a] court has few duties of a more delicate nature than that of fixing counsel fees.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Schoonmaker v. Lawrence Brunoli, Inc., 265 Conn. 210, 258 (2003).   This court must address that delicate task and such task is that more delicate in discrimination cases.

“The amount of attorneys fees to be awarded rests in the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed on appeal unless the trial court has abused its discretion ․ Sound discretion, by definition, means a discretion that is not exercised arbitrarily or willfully, but with regard to what is right and equitable under the circumstances and the law ․ Judicial discretion is always a legal discretion, exercised according to the recognized principles of equity.   The trial court's discretion imports something more than leeway in decision making and should be exercised in conformity with the spirit of the law and should not impede or defeat the ends of substantial justice.”   (Citations omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  Rodriguez v. Ancona, 88 Conn.App. 193, 201-02, 868 A.2d 807 (2005).

“It is axiomatic that the determination of the reasonableness of attorneys fees appropriately takes into consideration a range of factors.   It is well established that a trial court calculating reasonable attorneys fees makes its determination while considering the factors set forth under Rule 1.5(a) of the Rules of Professional Conduct.   These factors include the time and labor spent by attorneys, the novelty and complexity of the legal issues, fees customarily charged in the same locality for similar services, the lawyer's experience and ability, relevant time limitations, the magnitude of the case and the results obtained, the nature and length of the lawyer-client relationship, and whether the fee is fixed or contingent.   When awarding attorney fees, the court must consider all of the factors and not seize on one to the exclusion of others.”  (Citation omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  Id.

“We have long held that there is an undisputed requirement that the reasonableness of attorneys fees and costs must be proven by an appropriate evidentiary showing ․ We have also noted that courts have a general knowledge of what has occurred at the proceeding before them to supply evidence in support of an award of attorneys fees.”  (Citations omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  Smith v. Snyder, 257 Conn. 456, 471, 839 A.2d 589 (2004).

“[T]he initial estimate of a reasonable attorneys fee is properly calculated by multiplying the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation times a reasonable hourly rate ․ The courts may then adjust this lodestar calculation by other factors ․ For guidance in adjusting attorneys fees, Connecticut courts have adopted the twelve factors set forth in Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 717-19 (5th Cir.1974).   The Johnson factors are (1) the time and labor required, (2) the novelty and difficulty of the questions, (3) the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly, (4) the preclusion of other employment by the attorney due to acceptance of the case, (5) the customary fee for similar work in the community, (6) whether the fee is fixed or contingent, (7) time limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances, (8) the amount involved and the results obtained, (9) the experience, reputation and ability of the attorneys, (10) the undesirability of the case, (11) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client, and (12) awards in similar cases.”   (Citations omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  Ernst v. Deere & Co., 52 Conn.App. 575, 576, 886 A.2d 845 (2005).

The “list of [Johnson ] factors is not ․ exclusive.   The court may assess the reasonableness of the fees requested using any number of factors.”   (Internal quotation marks omitted.)   Id., 576, n.3. Similarly, a contract clause providing for reimbursement of incurred fees “permit[s] recovery upon the presentation of an attorney's bill, so long as that bill is not unreasonable upon its face and has not been shown to be unreasonable by countervailing evidence or by the exercise of the trier's own expert judgment.”  (Citation marks omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)   N.E. Leasing, LLC v. Paoletta, 89 Conn.App. 766, 778, 877 A.2d 840 (2005).

Counsel for the plaintiff in the instant case submitted a Verified Motion For Attorneys Fees and Expenses (Verified Motion) for the work in connection with the plaintiff's employment discrimination claims.   The Verified Motion contains a sworn statement by plaintiff's counsel which outlines the time he expended on the case, his legal credentials, a determination of the lodestar rate used, the time spent and the rate per hour for counsel's associate who attended the plaintiff's deposition, and out of pocket expenses incurred in the prosecution of the litigation.   At the evidentiary hearing, counsel for the plaintiff testified to the items outlined in his sworn statement contained in his Verified Motion for Attorney Fees. Counsel for the plaintiff also testified as to his professional legal credentials, the number of civil rights and employment discrimination cases litigated and their complexity.   Counsel also submitted cancelled checks, which were marked into evidence to verify payment of the out of pocket expenses.   As to the hourly rate, starting with the “lodestar” amount as previously discussed, plaintiff's counsel, Attorney John Williams has been a member of the Connecticut bar since February 1968.   He was the national chair of the civil rights section of the Association of Trial Lawyers of America, has taught at the Yale Law School and has lectured throughout the United States on the subject of civil rights law and litigation.   He has written and published extensively in many law reviews on that subject and continues to do so.   Attorney Williams has litigated countless civil rights cases in Connecticut state and federal courts.   He has also litigated many appeals of civil rights matters in the Connecticut Supreme Court, Connecticut Appellate Court, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit and in the United States Supreme Court.   Given Attorney Williams' knowledge and experience in the area of civil rights law, he is an acknowledged authority regarding these types of cases.   Attorney Williams testified that his standard hourly rate for these types of civil rights matters is $500.   Attorney Williams also testified that given his level of knowledge and experience and the number of cases he has litigated in this area of the law, his hourly rate is reasonable.   Attorney Williams testified that based on his personal familiarity with the billing rates of Connecticut, attorneys who are regularly engaged in the practice of civil rights cases with his level of experience bill at the same rate or higher.   Attorney Williams acknowledged that within the context of employment discrimination litigation this was a straight forward case and if the case were an unusually complicated case, he would have requested an upward adjustment of the lodestar amount.   A total of 24.2 hours of work was performed on Captain Taylor's case.   Attorney Williams performed all of the work except for four hours which was performed by his associate Katrena Engstrom who attended the plaintiff's deposition in Hartford.   Attorney Williams testified that all of his associates bill at the rate of $250 per hour and through the date of the hearing, Attorney Engstrom for many years has billed at this rate.   The court received no evidence regarding Attorney Engstrom's knowledge, skill or experience in the civil rights cases.   Nor did the court receive any evidence on what the hourly rate is for associates practicing in the area of civil rights law.

This court acknowledges the years of knowledge and experience that Attorney Williams possesses in the area of civil rights law, however, the case was tried over a period of only two days and as Attorney Williams testified was a straightforward employment discrimination case.   Although the case was contentious, it was not protracted nor was it volatile.   The case did not present any novel or complex issues.   Both plaintiff's counsel and defendant's counsel represented their clients competently.   In light of the time and labor spent by Attorney Williams on this case, the lack of novelty and complexity of the legal issues presented in this case, Attorney Williams' experience and ability, the magnitude of the case and the results obtained and the nature of the lawyer-client relationship, the court finds that a rate of $375 per hour is reasonable.   As to Attorney Engstrom, the court finds that $150 is a reasonable hourly rate.   Although Attorney Williams has a wealth of knowledge in the area of civil rights law and has litigated numerous civil rights cases, the court, using the Johnson factors adjusts his lodestar rate and finds, based on the issues presented in this case and the length of the trial, that the rate of $375 is reasonable.   Likewise, the court finds that $150 is a reasonable hourly rate for Attorney Engstrom.

The plaintiff is awarded costs in the amount $1,887.48 which is supported by the evidence.

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, the court finds that the plaintiff is entitled to attorneys fees measured by the reasonable hourly rate for each attorney, as previously discussed, multiplied times the reasonable number of hours expended.   Thus, in accordance with General Statutes § 46a-104, and the applicable case law for determining a reasonable attorneys fee, the court awards attorneys fees in the amount of $10,062.48 which represents 20.2 hours at the rate of $375 per hour and 4 hours at the rate of $150 per hour plus $1,887.48 for costs.

Wilson, J.

Wilson, Robin L., J.