IN RE: Jonathan P.1 (2010)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

These actions are brought by The Department of Children and Families (“DCF” or “Petitioner”) seeking to terminate the parental rights of the biological mother and the biological father of Jonathan P. (hereinafter referred to as “Jonathan P.” or “the child”).   The biological mother of this child is Myrna R. (hereinafter referred to as “Myrna R.” or “Mother”).   The biological father is Rafael P. (hereinafter referred to as “Rafael P.” or “Father”).

On 2/27/09, DCF filed a Petition of Neglect and a Motion for an Order of Temporary Custody on behalf of Jonathan P.

On 5/7/09, Jonathan P. was committed to the Department of Children and Families until further order of the Superior Court for Juvenile Matters.

On 1/5/10, the Superior Court for Juvenile Matters at Hartford approved a permanency plan of Termination of Parental Rights and Adoption.

On 3/2/10, Petitions to Terminate the Parental Rights of Myrna R. and Rafael P. were filed.

On 4/1/10, the Court confirmed service on Mother and Father respectively.   Mother and Father were present, entered denials, and were advised and applied for attorneys.

On 4/1/10, a CMC was ordered for 4/12/10, and subsequently a trial date was set for 8/27/10.   Thereafter, at trial on 8/27/10, the court canvassed Mother and found that she knowingly and voluntarily consented to the termination with the assistance of competent counsel.   The court found such termination as to Mother was in the best interest of the child by clear and convincing evidence, and the trial as to Father commenced.   Father was not in attendance.

At the time of trial, counsel for DCF submitted two exhibits, Exhibits A and B. No witnesses testified.

The court finds that there is no action pending in any other court affecting custody of this child and that this court has jurisdiction in this matter.

The grounds of the Petition for TPR as to the biological Father, Rafael P., are Abandonment and No Ongoing Parent-Child Relationship.

The court has applied the burden of proof applicable to the Termination of Parental Rights and Neglect Petitions, has reviewed the Neglect Petition and the social studies and exhibits that were submitted in evidence.   The court has utilized the applicable legal standards in considering the evidence and the testimony of any witnesses.

I

FACTUAL FINDINGSA. Background/Present Situation/Reasons for Petition

Mother, Myrna R., has a history with DCF dating back to 1/2/02, for issues surrounding physical abuse, physical neglect, medical neglect and inadequate supervision of her two older sons, Roberto and Jose. She had not met even the basic needs of her children.   She has unaddressed mental health issues and has cognitive limitations.   She has been diagnosed with depression, for which she has been hospitalized;  and schizophrenia, and she has failed to address her mental health issues through available treatment services.   Her mental health issues negatively impact her ability to provide appropriately for her children.

Mother has not provided for the basic medical or educational needs of her children.   She failed to provide for Jose's and Roberto's medical needs in that she missed various medical appointments for the children.   On 4/28/08, Jose and Roberto were removed from Mother's care under a 96-Hour Hold. The boys were placed with their father and sole guardianship was given to him in February 2009.

Jonathan P. was born on 2/19/09, at Hartford Hospital via emergency C-section due to the child's heart deceleration in-utero related to Mother's gestational diabetes.   The child remained in the hospital for a week and a half while being treated for jaundice.

Jonathan P. is eighteen months old and has been doing extremely well over the last several months.   On 4/21/10, a PPT was held, and a pre-adoptive foster home was identified.   On 5/24/10, Jonathan P. was placed in his pre-adoptive foster home.   He has been thriving in this home where he has established familial bonds and seeks out his foster parents for comfort and his daily needs.

Jonathan P. is medically up to date.   He had a medical appointment scheduled on 8/26/10 with his new health provider, Middlesex Pediatrics.   His foster parents report that he is eating and sleeping well.   He had a follow-up visit with the neonatologist this past April and no underlying conditions were identified with respect to his developmental delays.

Jonathan P. has weekly supervised visitation with his Mother and maternal grandmother.   DCF referred Mother and the child to Family Connections in Hartford, a service provider that the Department uses to assist with supervised visitation for families.   The referral was for two-hour weekly supervised visits.   This was a convenient and familiar location for Mother who had visited with her older children at that agency.

On 6/12/10, supervised visits between Mother and Jonathan P. were scheduled to begin.   Out of a possible ten visits over the period 6/14/10-8/16/10, Mother attended only four.   On one occasion, the child was ill and could not attend.

Since Jonathan P. came into DCF's care, Father had requested visitation on one occasion.   On 8/27/09, Father showed up unannounced to a supervised visit and he was informed that he needed to contact the social worker to schedule visitation.   On 9/9/09, Father contacted DCF and asked to attend the supervised visit the following day, with paternal grandmother and paternal aunt who were visiting from Puerto Rico. DCF granted this request but Father did not follow through with the visit.

Mother is supposed to be attending a weekly support group at the CRT, Behavioral Health Unit to address her mental health issues.   On 8/18/10, the clinician provided an updated report to DCF, which indicated that Mother had begun the CRT program on 5/14/08, following a brief psychiatric hospitalization.   She is diagnosed with a Depressive disorder and Adjustment disorder with disturbed emotions and behaviors.   The recommendation is weekly therapy, but Mother has only averaged one to two group sessions per month.   She is supposed to meet with the psychiatrist once a month but she tends to miss appointments.

Myrna R. shares a three-bedroom apartment with her mother, Juanita R., and her mother's boyfriend, Pedro E. Juanita R. is Myrna R.'s financial conservator.   She has tried to convince Mother to get her own apartment, but she refuses to move out on her own.   Mother was given housing assistance but it was discontinued because she did not locate an apartment within the allocated time frame.   Juanita R. reports that Myrna R. is like a small child and does not want to leave her side.

On 2/16/10, Myrna R. had an altercation with her mother's live-in boyfriend and punched him in the face.   The police were called and Myrna R. was taken to the emergency room for a psychiatric evaluation and discharged several hours later.

Myrna R. claims that she is no longer involved in a romantic relationship with Rafael P. He is unemployed, has substance abuse issues, and lives with his wife in Hartford.

Father has had minimal contact with DCF. He has refused to provide DCF with his address and has requested that DCF mail be sent to one of his niece's address.   He reports no employment due to arthritis in his back for which he is receiving physical therapy.   It is unknown if Father receives SSD.

DCF has offered services to Father but he has refused to participate.   In April 2009, DCF made a referral for Father for parenting classes but he did not follow through.   The same offer was made in October 2009, but Father refused these services.

Father claims that he attends NA/AA groups.   He has three years of probation, and although he reports compliance with his conditions of probation, he was arrested in September 2009 for criminal trespassing and was ordered to complete one day of community service for this offense.

DCF last contacted Father on 4/1/10, the plea date of the Termination of Parental Rights.   He was provided with contact information to begin services and schedule visitation with his child but he has not contacted DCF to date.

B. Mother, Myrna R.

Myrna R. was born on 5/23/72, to Juanita R. and Pedro N. in Caguas, Puerto Rico. She has two younger siblings, a brother and a sister.   Myrna R. resides with her mother in Hartford, CT. Her father was an alcoholic and died in 1991 due to his alcoholism.

Myrna R. had a normal and happy childhood with good parental and sibling relationships.   When she was nine, she moved to Hartford, Connecticut with her mother and siblings and attended the Martin Luther King Elementary School, the SANDS Elementary School, the Quirk Middle School and Hartford High School, from which she graduated.   She was a special education student and received services.

Myrna R. has no employment history except for one part-time job doing dishes at a cafeteria while she was in high school.

At age 17, Myrna R. met Jose O., Sr., and after dating for several months, she moved into an apartment with him.   They were together for about six years, during which time Jose O. fathered their two sons.   She claims that during their relationship, Jose O. abused drugs and alcohol.   He was also physically abusive toward her and she ended their relationship and moved in with her mother.

Myrna R. was in a relationship with Rafael P. for about six months, during which time he fathered their son, Jonathan P. They did not have a stable relationship and only saw each other on and off.

Mother has been hospitalized once or twice for depression and suicidal ideation;  the last time was when DCF removed her children in April 2008.   She suffers from depression and insomnia, and has been diagnosed with depression and schizophrenia.   Although she has been in treatment and taken medication for these conditions, she has been inconsistent with following through.   Mother has a history of alcohol abuse.

Mother has no military service and no police record.

C. Biological Father, Rafael P.

Rafael P. was born on 3/6/69.   As he has had minimal contact with DCF, little is known about his background.   He visited with Jonathan P. in the hospital a few times after he was born.   Father provided contact information for his niece as a possible placement resource.   He has not contacted DCF regarding visitation with his son or to ask about his well being since September 2009.

On 8/27/09, Father showed up unannounced to a supervised visit and he was informed that he needed to contact the social worker to schedule visitation.   On 9/9/09, Father contacted DCF and requested to attend the supervised visit the following day, along with paternal grandmother and paternal aunt who were visiting from Puerto Rico. DCF granted this request but Father did not follow through with the visit.

Father has substance abuse issues.   Up until 06/09/10, Father, who is a convicted felon, was residing at a Halfway House in Hartford.   He is reportedly now residing with his niece in Hartford.   He is unemployed due to arthritis in his back for which he receives physical therapy.

Rafael P. has three years of probation and claims that he has cooperated with services offered by the Department of Corrections.   On 1/27/10, DCF contacted his probation officer who reported that Rafael P. is cooperating with his probation conditions.   The probation officer reported that Father is attending the Institute for the Hispanic Family for substance abuse issues, and the Charter Oak Clinic for mental health issues and he is complying with medication.   DCF has been unable to confirm this information with the Institute for the Hispanic Family and with the Charter Oak Clinic due to Father not signing releases.

D. Child, Jonathan P.

Jonathan P. was born on 2/10/09, to Myrna R. and Rafael P. in Hartford, Connecticut.   He is Mother's third child.   He has two half-siblings whose sole custody is vested in their father:  Jose (age 14) and Roberto (age 8).   Jonathan P. remained in the hospital for approximately one week after birth due to his jaundice.

Jonathan P. was placed in a licensed DCF foster home after being discharged from the hospital.   He is doing very well in his foster care placement where his needs are met and attention is given to his medical care.   He has no residual jaundice and he eats and sleeps well.

Jonathan receives Birth to Three services on a weekly basis and staff work with him to improve his motor skills and overall development.

Jonathan P. has two hours of weekly supervised visits with his Mother.   When Mother visits, she barely engages him, but does display some affection towards him.   He interacts with his environment (crawling and exploring the items in the visitation room) but does not seek out interaction with his Mother.   He smiles when she kisses him.

E. Relative Resources

No resources were provided.

II

TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS ADJUDICATION

The court must determine whether the proof provides clear and convincing evidence that a pleaded ground exists to terminate biological Father, Rafael P.'s rights as of the date of the filing of the petition.

A. Reasonable Efforts Finding

Unless a court has found in an earlier proceeding that efforts to reunify are no longer appropriate, in order to terminate parental rights, DCF initially must show by clear and convincing evidence that it “has made reasonable efforts to locate the parent and to reunify the child with their parents, unless the court finds in this proceeding that the parents are unable or unwilling to benefit from reunification efforts.”  C.G.S. Sec. 17a-112(j)(1).   “Reasonable efforts means doing everything reasonable, not everything possible.”  In re Jessica B., 50 Conn.App. 554, 566, 718 A.2d 997 (1998).

Reasonable efforts to unify Jonathan P. with Rafael P. are not possible because Father has not seen his son for an extended period of time and he has not engaged in any treatment services that might be offered by DCF. He has not been in contact with DCF regarding the well-being of the child or the status of his case.

Father is unwilling or unable to benefit from efforts in that he has not made himself available to DCF despite attempts to engage him in services.   It is unknown whether Father is actively using substances as he is not presently in treatment.   He has not shown any interest in caring for his child as he has not seen him, apart from visits at his birth, nor has he inquired about his well being.

Reasonable efforts to reunify the child with Father are no longer appropriate because he has failed to visit the child in order to establish an on-going relationship with him.

The following reasonable and active efforts were made to prevent removal and/or to reunify the child with his Mother, Myrna R., including DCF case management services, transportation assistance, parenting classes and substance abuse services.   She has been referred to ABH evaluations, substance abuse screening and hair testing at ADRC. She has attended a weekly support group at the CRT, Behavioral Health Unit for her mental health issues.   DCF has facilitated visitation services.

DCF offered parenting, visitation, transportation, substance abuse screening and evaluation services to Father but he did not follow through.

B. Grounds for Termination:  Abandonment-General Statutes § 17a-112(j)(3)(A) as to Biological Father, Rafael P.

This ground is established when the child has been abandoned by the parent in the sense that the parent has failed to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern, or responsibility as to the welfare of the child.   Sporadic efforts are insufficient to negate the claim of abandonment.   The test for determining abandonment of a child for purposes of termination of parental rights is not whether a parent has shown “some interest” in his or her child, but rather, whether the parent has maintained any reasonable degree of interest, concern, or responsibility as to the child's welfare.  In re Rayna M., 13 Conn.App. 23, 36, 534 A.2d 897 (1987).

Attempts to achieve contact with a child, telephone calls, the sending of cards and gifts and financial support are indicia of “interest, concern or responsibility.”  In re Migdalia M., 6 Conn.App. 194, 209, 504 A.2d 533 (1986).

The commonly understood general obligations of parenthood entail these minimum attributes:  (1) express love and affection for the child;  (2) express personal concern over the health, education and general well-being of the child;  (3) the duty to supply the necessary food, clothing and medical care;  (4) the duty to provide an adequate domicile;  and (5) the duty to furnish social and religious guidance.  (Citations omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  In re Kezia M., 33 Conn.App. 12, 17-18, 632 A.2d 1122 (1993);  In re Roshawn R., 51 Conn.App. 44, 53, 720 A.2d 1112 (1998).

Ground A-Abandonment as to Jonathan P. by Biological Father, Rafael P.

1.  Father has only seen his child minimally, shortly after his birth.

2. Father has not provided financial support for his child.

3. Father has never sent cards, gifts or letters to his child.

4. Father has never acknowledged his child's birthday or other special days.

5. Father has never participated in his child's education or shown an interest in his health or welfare.

6. Father has never inquired about his child or seriously requested visitation with him.

C. Grounds for Termination:  No Ongoing Parent-Child Relationship-General Statutes § 17a-112(j)(3)(D) as to Biological Father, Rafael P.

This ground alleged by DCF requires proof, by clear and convincing evidence, that there is no ongoing parent-child relationship, which means “the relationship that ordinarily develops as a result of a parent having met on a day-to-day basis the physical, emotional, moral and educational needs of the child and to allow further time for the establishment or reestablishment of such parent-child relationship would be detrimental to the best interest of the child.”

This statutory definition, as it has been interpreted in case law, requires a finding that “no positive emotional aspects of the relationship survive.”   In re Jessica M., 217 Conn. 459, 470, 586 A.2d 597 (1991).  “It is inherently ambiguous when applied to noncustodial parents who must maintain their relationship with their child through visitation.”  Id., 459;  In re Valerie D., 223 Conn. 492, 531, 613 A.2d 748 (1992).   Although the ultimate question is usually whether the child has any present memories or feelings for the natural parent, the existence of a loving relationship or a “psychological parent” relationship with one other than the natural parent does not, of itself, establish the no ongoing parent-child relationship ground for termination.  In re Jessica M., supra, 473-75.

Unlike the other nonconsensual grounds to terminate parental rights, the absence of a parent-child relationship is considered a “no fault” ground for termination.   To establish this ground requires the trial court to make a two-pronged determination.   First, there must be a determination that no parent-child relationship exists;  and second, the court must look to the future and determine whether it would be detrimental to the child's best interest to allow time for such a relationship to develop.   The absence of a parent-child relationship can be demonstrated in situations where a child has never known his or her parents so that no relationship ever developed between them, or where the child has lost that relationship so that despite its former existence, it has now been completely displaced.  In re Juvenile Appeal (Anonymous), 177 Conn. 648, 670, 420 A.2d 875 (1979).

Judicial interpretation has imposed a requirement that a child have “present memories or feelings” for the parent, and “at least some aspects of these memories and feelings are positive” to overcome this ground.  In re Jessica M., supra, 217 Conn. 475;  In re Juvenile Appeal (84-6), 2 Conn.App. 705, 709, 483 A.2d 1101, cert. denied, 195 Conn. 801 (1984).   The existence of positive feelings usually depends on the viewpoint of the child.  In re Rayna M., 13 Conn.App. 23, 35, 534 A.2d 897 (1987).   As the Appellate Court recently noted, “the feelings of the child are of paramount importance.”  In re Tabitha T., 51 Conn.App. 595, 602 (1999).  “Feelings for the natural parent connotes feelings of a positive nature only.”  Id.

Ground D-No Ongoing Parent-Child Relationship as to Biological Father, Rafael P.

1.  Paragraphs 1 through 6 of Ground A by Father are hereby incorporated by reference in their entirety.

2. Father has only seen his child on rare occasions.

3. The child would not recognize his Father.  (See number 6 below.)

4. Father is a stranger to the child.

5. The child has no present positive memories of Father.

6. To permit additional time to develop a parent-child relationship will not be in the child's best interests because he has bonded with his foster mother.   Father has seen or had contact with the child only rarely since the child's birth.

Summary of Adjudicatory Findings

This court has found that the Commissioner has proved the following adjudicatory grounds by clear and convincing evidence:  (1) that the biological Father, Rafael P., has abandoned Jonathan P., and that there is no-ongoing parent-child relationship between Father and this child.

Mother consented to the termination of her parental rights in open court.   She filed written consent.   This court found that Mother voluntarily and knowingly consented to the termination of her rights, having received the advice and assistance of competent legal counsel and having understood the consequences of her actions.   Her consent was accepted by this court.

The court finds that notice has been given in accordance with the Connecticut General Statutes and the Practice Book.

The court took jurisdiction in this matter;  there is no pending action affecting custody of the child in any other court.

The petition has been amended to allege as the sole ground for termination of the Mother, her consent to the termination.

The court having read the verified petition and the social studies, made the following findings by clear and convincing evidence.

Adjudication. The Mother has consented to the termination of her rights to her child and the consent was accepted by the court.

No findings are necessary to be made pursuant to Conn. Gen.Stat. § 17a-112 with regard to the Mother due to her consent.

III

DISPOSITION

Except in the case where termination is based on consent, if grounds have been found to terminate parental rights applying the appropriate standard of proof the court must then consider whether the facts as of the last day of trial establish, by clear and convincing evidence, after consideration of the factors enumerated in C.G.S. § 17a-112(k), that termination is in the child's best interest.   If the court does find that termination is in the child's best interest, an order will enter terminating parental rights.

A. C.G.S. § 17a-112(k) Criteria

The court has found by clear and convincing evidence that the statutory grounds alleged by DCF for the termination of parental rights have been proven.

Before making a decision whether or not to terminate Rafael P's parental rights, as he did not consent, the court will consider and make findings on each of the seven criteria set forth in C.G.S. § 17a-112(k).  In re Romance M., 229 Conn. 345, 355, 641 A.2d 378 (1994).

These criteria and this court's findings, which have been established by clear and convincing evidence, are as follows:

1. “The timeliness, nature and extent of services offered or provided to the parent and the child by an agency to facilitate the reunion of the child with the parent.”

This court finds by clear and convincing evidence that DCF has made reasonable efforts to reunify the child with his Father.

Considered carefully, the clear and convincing evidence shows that DCF offered timely, appropriate and comprehensive services to the respondent parents to facilitate [their] reunification with [their] child and made reasonable efforts to reunite [them] with [their] child.  In re Victoria B., 79 Conn.App. 245, 258-60, 829 A.2d 855 (2003).

Based on this clear and convincing evidence of the circumstances now present in this case, the court finds that Rafael P. is unable and/or unwilling to benefit from reasonable reunification efforts.  CGS § 17a-112(j)(1).   His nonconcern clearly and convincingly make him unable and/or unwilling to benefit from reasonable reunification efforts.  In re Tyqwane V., 85 Conn.App. 528, 535-36, 857 A.2d 963 (2004).

The parents have been provided with many services to rehabilitate and return the child to their care and the referrals were made in a timely manner to facilitate a successful reunification.   Rafael P. has not been able to take full advantage of services as he has been unwilling to cooperate with the Department in any way.

2. “Whether DCF has made reasonable efforts to reunite the family pursuant to the Federal Child Welfare Act of 1980, as amended.”

This court finds that the clear and convincing evidence in this matter proves that Father is presently unable and/or unwilling to benefit from such reunification services as was contemplated by the federal Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, as amended.

DCF has made reasonable efforts to maintain contact with both parents.

3. “The terms of any court order entered into and agreed upon by any individual or agency and the parent, and the extent to which all the parties have fulfilled their obligations of such order.”

The clear and convincing evidence indicates that Father has failed to present himself for steps to be ordered by the court.

4. “The feelings and emotional ties of the child with respect to his parents, any guardian of such child's person and any person who has exercised physical care, custody or control of the child for at least one year and with whom the child has developed significant emotional ties.”

The child has been able to exhibit no bonding with his parents due to their reluctance to accept their roles as parents and the unavailability of Father.   This child has developed a strong bond with his foster parent with whom he has lived since birth.

Since Father has not been available much of the time, the child was unable to bond with him.

5. “The age of the child.”

Jonathan P. (DOB 2/19/09) is eighteen months old.

6. “The efforts the parent has made to adjust such parent's circumstances, conduct or conditions to make it in the best interest of the child to return to such child's home in the foreseeable future, including, but not limited to (A) the extent to which the parent has maintained contact with the child as part of an effort to reunite the child with the parent provided that the court may give weight to incidental visitations, communications or contributions and (B) the maintenance of regular contact or communication with the guardian or other custodian of the child.”

The court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the parents have not made realistic and sustained efforts to conform their conduct to minimally acceptable parental standards.

The clear and convincing evidence indicates that they have refused to cooperate with DCF or programs presented.

The court finds, by clear and convincing evidence, that the parents have not made the changes necessary in their lifestyles that would indicate that they would be safe, responsible and nurturing parents for their child.   To permit the child to return to the parents' care would compromise the safety of the child.

7. “The extent to which a parent has been prevented from maintaining a meaningful relationship with the child by the unreasonable act or conduct of the other parent of the child, or the unreasonable act of any other person or by the economic circumstances of the parent.”

This court finds by clear and convincing evidence that no unreasonable conduct by DCF, foster parents, Department of Corrections or third parties prevented Rafael P. from maintaining a relationship with his child, nor did his economic circumstances prevent such relationship, although the limitations and restrictions inherent in the foster care system remained in effect.

Father has maintained no contact with the child and the petitioner.

B. Best Interest of the Child-C.G.S. § 17a-112(j)(2)

The court is next called upon to determine whether termination of Myrna R.'s and Rafael P.'s parental rights to Jonathan P. would be in his best interest.²  Applying the appropriate legal standards ³ to the clear and convincing facts of this case, the court finds this issue in favor of the State of Connecticut and DCF.

In determining whether termination of Father's parental rights would be in the child's best interests, the court has examined multiple relevant factors, including the child's interest in sustained growth, development, well-being, stability and continuity of his environment;  his length of stay in foster care;  the nature of his relationship with his biological parents;  and the degree of contact maintained with his biological parents.⁴  In re Alexander C., 60 Conn.App. 555, 559, 760 A.2d 532 (2000);  In re Shyina B., 58 Conn.App. 159, 167, 752 A.2d 1139 (2000);  In re Savanna M., 55 Conn.App. 807, 816, 740 A.2d 484 (1999).   In a matter such as this, the court is further called upon to balance the [child's] intrinsic needs for stability and permanency against the benefits of maintaining a connection with [his] parents.   See Pamela B. v. Ment, 244 Conn. 296, 314, 709 A.2d 1089 (1998) (the child's physical and emotional well-being must be weighed against the interest in preserving family integrity).

Under such scrutiny, the clear and convincing evidence in this matter establishes that it is not in the child's best interest to continue to maintain any legal relationship with his parents.

The clear and convincing evidence also shows that his parents have failed to gain insight into becoming safe, nurturing and responsible parents for him.   The clear and convincing evidence shows that their judgment and conduct remains questionable, and has not improved since the child was taken into DCF care.

The parents' performance clearly and convincingly shows that they lack the attributes and characteristics necessary to fulfill valid parental roles.   Their recalcitrance concerning referrals clearly and convincingly shows that, without commitment to consistent substance abuse treatment, as well as individual and parenting counseling, it is likely that they have extinguished what little chance they ever had to be able to serve as safe, nurturing and responsible parents for any child.

An additional factor to consider in this case is time.   The clear and convincing evidence demonstrates the child's pressing need for permanence and stability.   Unfortunately, and in view of the rehabilitation history, much time would be required for Mother and Father to show that they have addressed their issues, undertaken the necessary counseling and succeeded in it, established themselves in the community and shown that they were capable of being safe, nurturing and responsible parents for their child.

Jonathan P. cannot delay his need for permanence and stability in exchange for his parents' uncertain future.

Based upon the parents' behavior and performance so far, this court cannot foresee them ever having the ability or the opportunity to be able to follow the regimen necessary for this child to maximize his abilities and achievements.

The clear and convincing evidence shows that the time needed for the parents to attempt to rehabilitate and establish themselves in the community as safe, nurturing and responsible parents, if that were possible, is time that their child cannot afford.

The parents' performance clearly and convincingly shows that they lack the attributes and characteristics necessary to fulfill valid parental roles.   Their conduct clearly and convincingly shows that it is unlikely that they will ever be able to conform their behavior to appropriate norms or be able to serve as safe, nurturing and responsible parents for this child.

Our courts have recognized that “long-term stability is critical to a child's future health and development ․” In re Eden F., 250 Conn. 674, 709, 741 A.2d 873 (1999).   Furthermore, “[b]ecause of the psychological effects of prolonged termination proceedings on young children, time is of the essence” when resolving issues related to the permanent or temporary care of neglected children.  In re Alexander V., 25 Conn.App. 741, 748, 596 A.2d 934 (1991), aff'd, 223 Conn. 557, 613 A.2d 780 (1992);  see also In re Juvenile Appeal (84-CD), 189 Conn. 276, 292, 455 A.2d 1313 (1983).   The court is obliged to agree with DCF and concludes that the clear and convincing evidence in this case establishes that the child is entitled to the benefit of ending, without further delay, the period of uncertainty as to the availability of his biological parents as caretakers.

Having balanced the child's individual and intrinsic needs for stability and permanency against the benefits of maintaining a connection with his parents, the clear and convincing evidence in this case establishes that the child's best interests cannot be served by continuing to maintain any legal relationship to his parents.  Pamela B. v. Ment, supra, 244 Conn. 313-14.

Accordingly, with respect to the best interests of the child as contemplated by CGS § 17a-112(j)(2), by clear and convincing evidence, and based upon all of the foregoing, including the testimony and evidence presented, the court finds that termination of the parental rights of Myrna R. and Rafael P. as to Jonathan P. is in the best interest of the child in question.

IV

CONCLUSION

The court having considered all statutory considerations, and having found by clear and convincing evidence that grounds exist for termination of parental rights, further finds upon all the facts and circumstances presented, that it is in Jonathan P.'s best interests to terminate the parental rights of Myrna R., the biological Mother of the child and Rafael P., the biological Father of the child.   Accordingly, it is ordered that their parental rights to Jonathan P. are hereby terminated.

It is further ordered that the Commissioner of the Department of Children and Families be appointed the statutory parent for this child for the purpose of securing an adoptive family and a permanent placement for him.

The statutory parent is ordered to file the appropriate written reports with the court, as is required by state and federal law and which show the efforts to effect the permanent placement of this child.

BY THE COURT,

WOLLENBERG, J.

FOOTNOTES

FN2. The final element of the termination of parental rights statute, CGS § 17a-112(j), requires that before granting a duly noticed petition for such termination, the court must find, “by clear and convincing evidence ․ (2) that termination is in the best interest of the child ․”.  FN2. The final element of the termination of parental rights statute, CGS § 17a-112(j), requires that before granting a duly noticed petition for such termination, the court must find, “by clear and convincing evidence ․ (2) that termination is in the best interest of the child ․”

FN3. “Termination of parental rights means the complete severance by court order of the legal relationship, with all its rights and responsibilities, between the child and the child's parent or parents ․ Termination of parental rights is a most serious and sensitive judicial action.  In re Barbara J., 215 Conn. 31, 44, 574 A.2d 203 (1990).”  (Citation omitted, internal quotation marks omitted.)  In re Steven N., 57 Conn.App. 629, 632, 749 A.2d 678 (2000).  “[T]he question ․ to be decided in a dispositional phase is whether it is in the best interests of the child to sever the parent-child relationship.   That is different from the question of who should have custody of the child if termination of parental rights is determined to be in the best interests of the child.   See Practice Book § 33-5.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  In re Carissa K., 55 Conn.App. 768, 776, 740 A.2d 896 (1999).  “In making this determination, the trial court can consider all events occurring prior to the date of the dispositional hearing, including those occurring after the filing of the termination petition.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  In re Kasheema L., 56 Conn.App. 484, 488, 744 A.2d 441, cert. denied, 252 Conn. 945, 747 A.2d 522 (2000)..  FN3. “Termination of parental rights means the complete severance by court order of the legal relationship, with all its rights and responsibilities, between the child and the child's parent or parents ․ Termination of parental rights is a most serious and sensitive judicial action.  In re Barbara J., 215 Conn. 31, 44, 574 A.2d 203 (1990).”  (Citation omitted, internal quotation marks omitted.)  In re Steven N., 57 Conn.App. 629, 632, 749 A.2d 678 (2000).  “[T]he question ․ to be decided in a dispositional phase is whether it is in the best interests of the child to sever the parent-child relationship.   That is different from the question of who should have custody of the child if termination of parental rights is determined to be in the best interests of the child.   See Practice Book § 33-5.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  In re Carissa K., 55 Conn.App. 768, 776, 740 A.2d 896 (1999).  “In making this determination, the trial court can consider all events occurring prior to the date of the dispositional hearing, including those occurring after the filing of the termination petition.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  In re Kasheema L., 56 Conn.App. 484, 488, 744 A.2d 441, cert. denied, 252 Conn. 945, 747 A.2d 522 (2000).

FN4. “[T]he genetic bond shared by a biological parent and his or her child, although not determinative of the issue of the best interest of the child, is certainly a factor to consider.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  In re Savanna M., 55 Conn.App. 807, 816, 740 A.2d 484 (1999)..  FN4. “[T]he genetic bond shared by a biological parent and his or her child, although not determinative of the issue of the best interest of the child, is certainly a factor to consider.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  In re Savanna M., 55 Conn.App. 807, 816, 740 A.2d 484 (1999).

Wollenberg, William L., J.T.R.