Patrick Wood v. LLC (2010)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

RE MOTION TO SET ASIDE VERDICT (# 163.00)

This case comes to this court as a motion to set aside the verdict entered August 4, 2010.   The verdict was in order and signed by the Foreperson.

“A court is empowered to set aside a jury verdict when, the court's opinion, the verdict is contrary to the law or unsupported by the evidence.   A verdict should not be set aside, however, where it is apparent that there was some evidence on which the jury might reasonably have reached its conclusion.”   (Internal quotations marks omitted.)  Marchell v. Whelchel, 66 Conn.App. 574, 582 (2001).   Moreover, “the evidence is viewed in a light most favorable to the prevailing party and to sustaining the verdict;” Ipacs v. Cranford, 65 Conn.App. 441, 443 (2001);  and “the verdict should be disturbed only by considerations of the most persuasive character, as where the verdict shocks the sense of justice ․ Only under the most compelling circumstances may the court set aside the verdict because to do so interferes with the litigant's constitutional right in appropriate cases to have the issues of fact decided by a jury.”  (Internal quotations marks omitted).   See Hunte v. Amica Insurance Co., supra 541.

In the case of Wichers v. Hatch, 252 Conn. 174, beginning at page 189 and following the court states as follows:  “As we previously have stated, although the trial court has a broad legal discretion in this area, it is not without its limits.  ‘Because in setting aside a verdict the court has deprived a litigant in whose favor the verdict has been rendered of his constitutional right to have disputed issues of fact determined by a jury;  Richert v. Frazer, 152 Conn. 678, 681 A.2d 702 (1965);  the court's action cannot be reviewed in a vacuum.   The evidential underpinnings of the verdict itself must be examined ‘Upon issues regarding which, on the evidence, there is room for reasonable difference of opinion among fair-minded men, the conclusion of a jury, if one at which honest men acting fairly and intelligently might arrive reasonably, must stand, even though the opinion of the trial court and this court be that a different result should have been reached.’'  Horvath v. Tontini, 126 Conn. 462, 464, 11 A.2d 846 (1940).'  Jacobs v. Goodspeed, 180 Conn. 415, 417, 429 A.2d 915 (1980).  ‘[I]f there is a reasonable basis in the evidence for the jury's verdict, unless there is a mistake in law or some other valid basis for upsetting the result other than a difference of opinion regarding the conclusions to be drawn from the evidence, the trial court should let the jury work their will.’  Id., 419.”

In addition, the Wichers court said on page 186:  “In Birgel v. Heintz, 163 Conn. 23, 27-28, 301 A.2d 249 (1972), we held that ‘[i]n passing upon a motion to set aside a verdict, the trial judge must do just what every juror ought to do in arriving at a verdict.   The juror must use all his experience, his knowledge of human nature, his knowledge of human events, past and present, his knowledge of the motives which influence and control human action, and test the evidence in the case according to such knowledge and render his verdict accordingly ․ The trial judge in considering the verdict must do the same ․ and if, in the exercise of all his knowledge from this source, he finds the verdict to be so clearly against the weight of the evidence in the case as to indicate that the jury did not correctly apply the law to the facts in evidence in the case, or were governed by ignorance, prejudice, corruption or partiality, then it is his duty to set aside the verdict and to grant a new trial ․ The trial judge has a broad legal discretion and his action will not be disturbed unless there is a clear abuse ․ A mere doubt of the adequacy of the verdict is an insufficient basis for such an action ․ A conclusion that the jury exercised merely poor judgment is likewise insufficient ․ The ultimate test which must be applied to the verdict by the trial court is whether the jury's award falls somewhere with the necessarily uncertain limits of just damages or whether the size of the verdict so shocks the sense of justice as to compel the conclusion that the jury were influenced by partiality, prejudice, mistake or corruption.”

The jury rendered its verdict on August 4, 2010.   The motion sets forth specific grounds that are relied on as a basis for the court to grant the motion to set aside the verdict.   The court finds that the motions are denied.   The court finds that the verdict is not contrary to the law, that at best, the issues raised in the motion are issues that may properly be raised on appeal.

The litigants have a right to have factual issues resolved by the jury.   A trial court is not to sit as the seventh juror, but rather to decide whether viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, the jury could reasonably have reached the verdict it did.   The court finds the jury could reasonably have reached this verdict and the amount found.   The amount falls within the necessarily uncertain limits of fair and reasonable damages.   The court finds there was no error in any of the items claimed by the defendant in its motion.

Accordingly, Motion 163 is denied.

Note:  This court has quoted the language of the higher courts in this decision.   The court notes these quotes fail to be gender neutral.

EDWARD R. KARAZIN, JR.

JUDGE TRIAL REFEREE

Karazin, Edward R., J.T.R.