Alexandra Place v. Connecticut College (2010)

FACTS

Before the court is Connecticut College's motion to strike the first, second, third, fourth, sixth, seventh, tenth and eleventh counts of the complaint, which it filed on May 11, 2010 with a memorandum of law in support of its motion.¹  The plaintiff, Alexandra Place filed a memorandum in opposition on June 3, 2010.   The defendant filed a reply on June 17, 2010.   This court heard oral argument on June 28, 2010.   For reasons stated below, the court grants the motion to strike as to counts one, three, six, ten and eleven.   The motion to strike is denied as to counts two, four and seven.

On March 19, 2010, the plaintiff, Alexandra Place, filed an eleven-count complaint against the defendant, Connecticut College, her former employer.   She alleges the following facts.   Between 2003 and 2009, the plaintiff was employed by the defendant as a French language instructor.   In 2008, the plaintiff discovered that she did not receive and was not receiving the same rate of pay as other similarly situated instructors.   She confronted the “proper authorities” and was told that she would not be rehired.   Each claim asserted in the eleven counts arises out of this core set of facts, although there are additional facts pleaded in each count.   She alleges the following claims:  a statutory action pursuant to General Statutes § 31-72 (count one);  breach of contract (count two);  unjust enrichment (count three);  fraud, deceit and intentional misrepresentation (count four);  breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing (count five);  quantum meruit (count six);  a violation of CUTPA, the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act, General Statutes § 42-110a et seq. (count seven);  wrongful termination in violation of public policy (count eight);  negligent misrepresentation (count nine);  negligent infliction of emotional distress (count ten);  and intentional infliction of emotional distress (count eleven).

DISCUSSION

“The purpose of a motion to strike is to contest ․ the legal sufficiency of the allegations of any complaint ․ to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Fort Trumbull Conservancy, LLC v. Alves, 262 Conn. 480, 498, 815 A.2d 1188 (2003).  “[F]or the purpose of a motion to strike, the moving party admits all facts well pleaded.”  RK Constructors, Inc. v. Fusco Corp., 231 Conn 381, 383 n.2, 650 A.2d 153 (1994).   Accordingly, “[i]f facts provable in the complaint would support a cause of action, the motion to strike must be denied.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  American Progressive Life & Health Ins. Co. of New York v. Better Benefits, LLC, 292 Conn. 111, 120, 971 A.2d 17 (2009).   When ruling on a motion in strike, the court must “construe the complaint in the manner most favorable to sustaining its legal sufficiency.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)   Id. The court notes, however, that “conclusory statements absent supportive facts [are] insufficient to survive [a] motion to strike ․” Melfi v. Danbury, 70 Conn.App. 679, 686, 800 A.2d 582, cert. denied, 261 Conn. 922, 806 A.2d 1061 (2002).

I

First Count:  Violation of General Statutes § 31-72

The defendant argues that to state a claim under our wage statutes, the plaintiff must plead that the employer failed to pay an employee wages.   They do not provide a cause of action where, like here, an employee believes she was underpaid.   The plaintiff counters that she alleges that the defendant withheld her pay, which is legally sufficient to make out a violation of the wage statutes and allows the plaintiff to produce evidence that she was entitled to a wage that she was not paid.

The plaintiff brings count one pursuant to General Statutes § 31-72, which provides in relevant part:  “When any employer fails to pay an employee wages in accordance with the provisions of sections 31-71a to 31-71i, inclusive ․ such employee ․ may recover, in a civil action, twice the full amount of such wages, with costs and such reasonable attorneys fees as may be allowed by the court ․” She alleges that the defendant violated General Statutes §§ 31-71e and 31-71b.²

“The purpose of the [wage] statutes ․ is to protect the sanctity of the wage earned by an employee pursuant to the agreement she or he has made with her or his employer.”  Mytych v. May Dept. Stores Co., 260 Conn. 152, 161, 793 A.2d 1068 (2002).  “Although the statute lists certain nonexclusive factors that may assist in the computation of an employee's wage, it fails to set forth a specific formula by which wages must be calculated or determined.   Rather, it merely requires that wages be paid as compensation to an employee for services rendered.   The determination of the proper amount to be tendered purposely is left vague.

“The language used in [the statute] also suggests that the legislature intended that the employer-employee agreement, as opposed to a statutory formula, control the manner in which wages are calculated.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Id., 159.  “[T]hese statutes do not provide substantive standards as to how wages are calculated.   Their purpose is remedial;  to prevent the employer from taking advantage of the legal agreement that exists between the employer and the employee.”  Id., 160-61.  “The statute does not purport to define the wages due;  it merely requires that those wages agreed to will not be withheld for any reason.”  (Emphasis added.)  Id., 160.

The plaintiff cites Schoonmaker v. Lawrence Brunoli, Inc., 265 Conn. 210, 828 A.2d 64 (2003), without citation to relevant passages or any analysis, for the proposition that because she alleges a violation of the wage statutes, she should be allowed to produce evidence that she was entitled to a wage that she was not paid.   In that case, the employees claimed, among other things, that their employer failed to pay the proper prevailing wages on certain public works projects.  Id., 214, 234-36.   Before the court was the question of whether the trial court had properly instructed the jury as to which party bore the burden of proving the amount and type of work performed by the employees.   Id., 236-39.   The department of labor investigated the employer and found that the employer's record keeping for payroll was inadequate.  Id., 234.   At trial, the employees presented evidence as to their personal notes of tasks they performed, their pay stubs and the department of public works log book for one of the projects.   They compared these notes to the prevailing wage schedule for the work performed when classified appropriately.  Id., 235.   For example, the prevailing wage for carpentry was higher than that of general labor.   Id., 235 n.26. The present case does not bear any resemblance to the prevailing wage claim in Schoonmaker.

Here, the plaintiff alleges that the defendant “[withheld] wages for work performed.”   Such a statement is legally insufficient to state a claim under the wage statutes when the supportive facts she alleges claim only that other instructors were paid a higher rate, not that the defendant failed to pay her wages due.   Although the complaint must be read broadly and realistically, nowhere in count one does the plaintiff allege that she was not paid the wages that she agreed to accept.

Accordingly, the motion to strike count one must be granted.

II

Second Count:  Breach of Contract

The defendant argues that the plaintiff has failed to plead that it breached any of her contracts for employment because she does not allege that the defendant failed to pay her the agreed compensation under those contracts.   The plaintiff argues in response that she has properly pleaded a contractual breach.

In that count, the plaintiff alleges the following additional facts.   The plaintiff and defendant entered into “various contracts” for employment.  “The defendant materially breached the contracts in one or more of the following ways:  (a) in failing to properly compensate the plaintiff, (b) in acting in bad faith in not revealing the true compensation for services;  [c] in failing to pay [the plaintiff] for work performed.”

The necessary elements for a cause of action sounding in breach of contract are:  (1) the formation of an agreement, (2) performance by one party, (3) breach of the agreement by the opposing party and (4) damages and causation.   McCann Real Equities Series XXII, LLC v. David McDermott Chevrolet, Inc., 93 Conn.App. 486, 503-04, 890 A.2d 140, cert. denied, 277 Conn. 928, 895 A.2d 798 (2006).

Unlike the in statutory claim in count one, the plaintiff alleges facts which, if proven, suffice to make out a prima facie case for breach of contract in count two.   She alleges damages arising out of the existence of express agreements, her performance under the contracts and the defendant's material breach of the same.   Specifically, she claims that the defendant materially breached the agreement by “failing to properly compensate [her]” and “failing to pay [her] for work performed.”   Whether the plaintiff can prove contractual breach is not at issue on a motion to strike.

The motion to strike count two is denied.

III

Third Count:  Unjust Enrichment and Sixth Count:  Quantum Meruit

The defendant argues that because the plaintiff has alleged the breach of an express contract, she cannot plead unjust enrichment and quantum meruit, which are equitable remedies by which a plaintiff could recover the benefit conferred on the defendant only in cases in which the plaintiff alleges no express contract.   The defendant maintains that the court should strike both count three and count six because the plaintiff alleges a series of express contracts in count two.   The plaintiff argues in response that she is permitted to plead alternative causes of action.

“Parties routinely plead alternative counts alleging breach of contract and unjust enrichment, although in doing so, they are entitled only to a single measure of damages arising out of these alternative claims ․ Under this typical belt and suspenders approach, the equitable claim is brought in an alternative count to ensure that the plaintiff receives some recovery in the event that the contract claim fails ․ The [moving party's] argument that a party may not, as a matter of law, plead an alternative related count for unjust enrichment when that party has a good faith belief that a valid breach of contract cause of action lies, therefore, is without merit.”  (Citations omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  Stein v. Horton, 99 Conn.App. 477, 485-86, 914 A.2d 606 (2007).

It has been held in several recent Superior Court cases that if the plaintiff incorporates allegations of a breach of an express contract between the parties into a count stating a claim for unjust enrichment cause, the plaintiff violates the rule that those alternative causes of action must be pleaded in separate counts.   See J & N Electric, Inc. v. Notkins, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV 08 5020144 (May 20, 2009, Keegan, J.) (47 Conn. L. Rptr. 804, 805) (granting motion to strike unjust enrichment claim based upon plaintiff incorporating allegations of breach of express contract between plaintiff and defendant into claim);  Burke v. The Boat-Works, Inc., Superior Court, judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk at Stamford, Docket No. CV 04 4001838 (July 26, 2005, Jennings, J.) (same).  But compare with O'Malley v. Devivo, Superior Court, judicial district of New Britain, Docket No. CV 09 4019885 (May 7, 2010, Trombley, J.) [49 Conn. L. Rptr. 801] (denying motion to strike when plaintiff incorporated allegations of formation of an express agreement, but not its breach, into unjust enrichment count).

This logic has similarly been applied to bar the pleading of breach of an express contract within a count stating a claim for quantum meruit.   See Advanced Environmental Interface, Inc. v. Archer Cissell Associates, LLC, Superior Court, judicial district of Middlesex, Docket No. CV 05 4003437 (June 20, 2006, Dubay, J.) (41 Conn. L. Rptr. 525, 526) (granting motion to strike both quantum meruit and unjust enrichment counts when plaintiff incorporated allegations of breach of express agreement);  Whitby School, Inc. v. Grenaille, Superior Court, judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk at Stamford, Docket No. CV 03 0195602 (December 29, 2003, Lewis, J.T.R.) (36 Conn. L. Rptr. 285, 286) (same).

In her complaint, the plaintiff pleads what she terms “factual allegations” in paragraphs three through seven, after identifying the parties in paragraphs one and two.   In each subsequent count, “the plaintiff repeats and realleges the allegations set forth above as though fully set forth herein.”  (Emphasis added.)   Thereafter, she sets forth additional facts related to the count pleaded.   As discussed previously, in count two she alleges that the parties entered into “various contracts,” which she alleges that the defendant “materially breached.”   In counts three and six, she does not incorporate only the first seven paragraphs of her complaint, but rather realleges “the allegations set forth above.”   Although the court must construe the complaint in the manner most favorable to sustaining its legal sufficiency, it cannot redraft the complaint.   The plaintiff may plead unjust enrichment and/or quantum meruit in the alternative, but this is not accomplished by incorporating into such counts all the allegations of the breach of an express contract.   Because count three and count six, as presently pleaded, incorporate the allegations from count two that the defendant breached an express contract, the plaintiff has not properly pleaded alternative causes of action in separate counts.

The motion to strike counts three and six must be granted.

IV

Fourth count:  Fraud, Deceit and Intentional Misrepresentation

The defendant argues that to state a claim for fraudulent or intentional misrepresentation, the specific acts relied on must be set forth in the complaint.   It maintains that the plaintiff does not allege what the representations were or how they were false.   The plaintiff counters that the allegations in count four make out a cause of action.

The plaintiff alleges the following additional facts.  “[The] defendant intentionally made representations of material fact to the plaintiff ․ Specifically, [the] defendant represented to [the] plaintiff:  (1) that the plaintiff was receiving a fair wage;  (2) that she was compensated in the same manner as other similarly situated French language instructors;  (3) that she was compensated in the same manner as other similarly situated instructors;  (4) that the defendant failed to inform her of the true compensation she was entitled to;  (5) that she was led to believe that the compensation that she received was fair and reasonable;  (6) that she was told that there was no other compensation available to her ․ [T]he aforementioned representations ․ were false ․ [and] the defendant knew [that they] were false ․ [T]hese representations were made ․ with the intent to induce the plaintiff ․ to accept contracts and the position and the rate of pay,” which “she would not have undertaken” had she known the “actual facts.”

“Fraud consists in deception practiced in order to induce another to part with property or surrender some legal right, and which accomplishes the end designed ․ The elements of a fraud action are:  (1) a false representation was made as a statement of fact;  (2) the statement was untrue and known to be so by its maker;  (3) the statement was made with the intent of inducing reliance thereon;  (4) the other party relied on the statement to his detriment.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Weinstein v. Weinstein, 275 Conn. 671, 882 A.2d 53 (2005).   Additionally, “[b]ecause specific acts must be pleaded, the mere allegation that a fraud has been perpetrated is insufficient.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Whitaker v. Taylor, 99 Conn.App. 719, 730, 916 A.2d 834 (2007).  “[To] prevail ․ the plaintiff must ․ [allege] sufficient facts to demonstrate his reliance on the statement made by [the defendant].”  Visconti v. Pepper Partners Ltd. Partnership, 77 Conn.App. 675, 683, 825 A.2d 210 (2003).

In the present case, the plaintiff enumerates statements that she claims were representations made to her-e.g., that she was compensated in the same manner as other similarly situated instructors which she claims were false and known by the defendant to be false because it paid other similarly situated instructors a higher salary.   She adequately alleges her reliance on these representations to her detriment because she states that she would not have undertaken those contracts had she known the “actual facts.”   Accordingly, she has pleaded sufficient facts to state a claim for fraud.

The motion to strike count four is denied.

V

Seventh Count:  Violation of CUTPA

The defendant raises three arguments regarding this count.   First, it maintains that the plaintiff has pleaded only legal conclusions, which are insufficient to state a claim sounding in a violation of CUTPA.   Second, the defendant argues that the plaintiff merely alleges that she was underpaid and such an allegation, even if the defendant engaged in “misrepresentations,” is insufficient to state a claim under CUTPA.   Finally, the defendant argues that the plaintiff's claim, at best, merely realleges a breach of contract, but fails to allege substantial aggravating circumstances which would raise such a breach into a CUTPA violation.³  In response, the plaintiff argues that whether the contract claim is elevated to a CUTPA violation cannot be determined without a factual inquiry, which is inappropriate on a motion to strike.

By incorporating the allegations made in the previous six counts, as the plaintiff does, a fair reading of count seven includes the following facts.   When she entered into “various contracts” for employment with the defendant, she did not know that she did not receive the same rate of pay as other similarly situated instructors.   As alleged in count four, the defendant acted “with the intent to induce the plaintiff” to “accept contracts and the position and the rate of pay,” which “she would not have undertaken” had she known the “actual facts.”   In count seven itself, she alleges further that the defendant's “misconduct violates [CUTPA] in that the conduct was unfair, immoral, unethical, oppressive, unscrupulous and/or deceptive and has caused substantial harm to the plaintiff.”

“[General Statutes § ]42-110b(a) provides that [n]o person shall engage in unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce.   It is well settled that in determining whether a practice violates CUTPA [our courts] have adopted the criteria set out in the cigarette rule by the federal trade commission for determining when a practice is unfair:  (1)[W]hether the practice, without necessarily having been previously considered unlawful, offends public policy as it has been established by statutes, the common law, or otherwise-in other words, it is within at least the penumbra of some common law, statutory, or other established concept of unfairness;  (2) whether it is immoral, unethical, oppressive, or unscrupulous;  (3) whether it causes substantial injury to consumers, [competitors or other businesspersons] ․ All three criteria do not need to be satisfied to support a finding of unfairness.   A practice may be unfair because of the degree to which it meets one of the criteria or because to a lesser extent it meets all three ․ Thus a violation of CUTPA may be established by showing either an actual deceptive practice ․ or a practice amounting to a violation of public policy ․ In order to enforce this prohibition, CUTPA provides a private cause of action to [a]ny person who suffers an ascertainable loss of money or property, real or personal, as a result of the use or employment of a [prohibited] method, act or practice ․” (Citations omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  Ramirez v. Health Net of the Northeast, Inc., 285 Conn. 1, 18-19, 938 A.2d 576 (2008).

“The same facts that establish a breach of contract claim may be sufficient to establish a CUTPA violation.  Lester v. Resort Camplands International, Inc., 27 Conn.App. 59, 71, 605 A.2d 550 (1992).   Not every contractual breach rises to the level of a CUTPA violation.  Hudson United Bank v. Cinnamon Ridge Corp., 81 Conn.App. 557, 571, 845 A.2d 417 (2004).”  Greene v. Orsini, 50 Conn.Sup. 312, 315, 926 A.2d 708 (2007).  “[A]bsent substantial aggravating circumstances, [a] simple breach of contract is insufficient to establish [a] claim under CUTPA.”  Lydall v. Ruschmeyer, 282 Conn. 209, 248, 919 A.2d 421 (2007).   Generally, “the aggravating factors present [must] constitute more than a failure to deliver on a promise.”  Greene v. Orsini, supra, 50 Conn.Sup. 315.

“[A] misrepresentation can constitute an aggravating circumstance that would allow a simple breach of contract claim to be treated as a CUTPA violation;  it would in effect be a deceptive act ․” (Citations omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)   Designs on Stone, Inc. v. Brennan Construction Co., Superior Court, judicial district of Ansonia Milford at Milford, Docket No. 059997 (April 9, 1998, Corradino, J.) (21 Conn. L. Rptr. 659, 660).   For example, in Lester v. Resort Camplands International, Inc., supra, 27 Conn.App. 71-72, the defendant lied in order to entice the plaintiffs to enter into the contract.   In Lamotte v. Lamotte Landscaping, LLC, Superior Court, judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk, Docket No. CV 07 5003090 (August 5, 2009, Brazzel-Massaro, J.), the court denied the motion to strike when the plaintiff alleged that the defendant provided “purposeful, intentional, untruthful information concerning the list of customers of the business” in order to induce the plaintiff to purchase a business.

Here, the plaintiff alleges that the defendant's “misconduct violates [CUTPA] in that the conduct was unfair, immoral, unethical, oppressive, unscrupulous and/or deceptive ․” This is, as the defendant maintains, conclusory language without legal effect.   The issue in the present case, as framed by the parties;  see note 3 of this decision;  is whether the plaintiff has pleaded substantial aggravating circumstances attending a claimed breach of contract.   She alleges that the defendant engaged in fraudulent behavior and misrepresentations which induced her to enter into contracts for employment at a rate of pay less than what she would have accepted otherwise.   Thus, she has adequately pleaded a substantial aggravating circumstance attending her claimed contractual breach.   The court notes that whether the plaintiff will ultimately be able to prove a both a breach of contract and attendant aggravating circumstances such that one or more prongs of the cigarette rule are satisfied is irrelevant for purposes of resolving this motion to strike.   Such a question is best resolved on a motion for summary judgment or at trial.   See Metropolitan Trucking v. Rand Whitney Containerboard, LP, Superior Court, judicial district of New London, Docket No. CV 09 5013770 (March 31, 2010, Cosgrove, J.) (49 Conn. L. Rptr. 584).

The motion to strike count seven is denied.

VI

Tenth Count:  Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress

The defendant argues that the plaintiff's bald allegation that it engaged in conduct which created an unreasonable and foreseeable risk of causing the plaintiff emotional distress is insufficient to plead negligent infliction of emotional distress.   It maintains that wrongful termination alone is insufficient to sustain such a claim.   In response, the plaintiff appears to agree with this latter statement of the law, yet maintains that a fair reading of the tenth count shows that it is legally sufficient under Parsons v. United Technologies Corp., 243 Conn. 66, 700 A.2d 655 (1997).

“[N]egligent infliction of emotional distress in the employment context arises only where it is based upon unreasonable conduct of the defendant in the termination process ․ The mere termination of employment, even where it is wrongful, is therefore not, by itself, enough to sustain a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress.   The mere act of firing an employee, even if wrongfully motivated, does not transgress the bounds of socially tolerable behavior.”  (Citation omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  Parsons v. United Technologies Corp., supra, 88-89.  “[I]n cases where the employee has been terminated, a finding of a wrongful termination is neither a necessary nor a sufficient predicate for a claim of negligent infliction of emotional distress.   The dispositive issue ․ [is] whether the defendant's conduct during the termination process was sufficiently wrongful that the defendant should have realized that its conduct involved an unreasonable risk of causing emotional distress and that [that] distress, if it were caused, might result in illness or bodily harm.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Perodeau v. Hartford, 259 Conn. 729, 751, 792 A.2d 752 (2002).   The Supreme Court adopted a bright line rule that a plaintiff may not maintain a claim of “negligent infliction of emotional distress arising out of conduct occurring within a continuing employment context, as distinguished from conduct occurring in the termination of employment.”  Id., 762-63.

In the present case, the plaintiff pleads that “after [she] confronted the defendant about the pay discrepancy she was told her contract would not be renewed.”   She then alleges that by not renewing her employment, “the defendant engaged in conduct which created an unreasonable and foreseeable risk of causing the plaintiff emotional distress.”   The plaintiff has not alleged any facts which show how the discrete act of her actual termination was conducted in a wrongful manner.   She merely alleges wrongful termination, which is insufficient to state a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress in this context.

The motion to strike count ten is granted.

VII

Eleventh Count:  Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

The defendant argues that the plaintiff fails to allege the extreme or outrageous conduct necessary to maintain a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress.   The plaintiff does not counter this argument and indeed concedes in its memorandum that the court should strike this count.   The motion to strike the eleventh count is granted.

CONCLUSION

The court grants the defendant's motion to strike counts one, three, six, ten and eleven.   The motion to strike counts two, four and seven is denied.

Cosgrove, J.

FOOTNOTES

FN1. On the face of the motion to strike these eight counts, the defendant defines the ground for its motion as “[the plaintiff's claims] are facially unsustainable, fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, and, thus, warrant striking ․ Plaintiff's vaguely [pleaded] complaint offers little more than [her] personal-and completely unsupported-opinion that she was underpaid.   Regardless of how [the plaintiff] dresses up her claims, [her] underlying allegations regarding being underpaid do not amount to a viable cause of action.”Practice Book § 10-41 provides:  “Each motion to strike raising any of the claims of legal insufficiency enumerated in the preceding sections shall separately set forth each such claim of insufficiency and shall distinctly specify the reason or reasons for each such claimed insufficiency.”   Merely stating that the “underlying allegations regarding being underpaid do not amount to a viable cause of action” does not specify the reason or reasons for the claimed insufficiency in each count.   Failure to comply with Practice Book § 10-41 can render a motion to strike fatally defective.  Stuart v. Frieberg, 102 Conn.App. 857, 860, 927 A.2d 343 (2007).   However, the plaintiff has not objected to the motion on this basis.   The court may therefore proceed to consider the merits of the motion.   See Bouchard v. People's Bank, 219 Conn. 465, 468 n.4, 594 A.2d 1 (1991);  Viadella v. Yankee Remodeler of New London, Inc., Superior Court, judicial district of New London, Docket No. CV 08 5008382 (March 19, 2010, Cosgrove, J.)..  FN1. On the face of the motion to strike these eight counts, the defendant defines the ground for its motion as “[the plaintiff's claims] are facially unsustainable, fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, and, thus, warrant striking ․ Plaintiff's vaguely [pleaded] complaint offers little more than [her] personal-and completely unsupported-opinion that she was underpaid.   Regardless of how [the plaintiff] dresses up her claims, [her] underlying allegations regarding being underpaid do not amount to a viable cause of action.”Practice Book § 10-41 provides:  “Each motion to strike raising any of the claims of legal insufficiency enumerated in the preceding sections shall separately set forth each such claim of insufficiency and shall distinctly specify the reason or reasons for each such claimed insufficiency.”   Merely stating that the “underlying allegations regarding being underpaid do not amount to a viable cause of action” does not specify the reason or reasons for the claimed insufficiency in each count.   Failure to comply with Practice Book § 10-41 can render a motion to strike fatally defective.  Stuart v. Frieberg, 102 Conn.App. 857, 860, 927 A.2d 343 (2007).   However, the plaintiff has not objected to the motion on this basis.   The court may therefore proceed to consider the merits of the motion.   See Bouchard v. People's Bank, 219 Conn. 465, 468 n.4, 594 A.2d 1 (1991);  Viadella v. Yankee Remodeler of New London, Inc., Superior Court, judicial district of New London, Docket No. CV 08 5008382 (March 19, 2010, Cosgrove, J.).

FN2. Section 31-71b(a) provides in relevant part:  “Each employer ․ shall pay weekly all moneys due each employee on a regular payday ․” Section 31-71e provides in relevant part:  “No employer may withhold or divert any portion of an employee's wages ․ [absent certain enumerated authorized exceptions not relevant here].”.  FN2. Section 31-71b(a) provides in relevant part:  “Each employer ․ shall pay weekly all moneys due each employee on a regular payday ․” Section 31-71e provides in relevant part:  “No employer may withhold or divert any portion of an employee's wages ․ [absent certain enumerated authorized exceptions not relevant here].”

FN3. The defendant does not raise, and thus the court cannot address, whether the plaintiff has properly pleaded a CUTPA violation arising out of an employer-employee relationship.  “[G]rounds other than those specified should not be considered by the trial court in passing upon a motion to strike ․” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Gazo v. Stamford, 255 Conn. 245, 259, 765 A.2d 505 (2001)..  FN3. The defendant does not raise, and thus the court cannot address, whether the plaintiff has properly pleaded a CUTPA violation arising out of an employer-employee relationship.  “[G]rounds other than those specified should not be considered by the trial court in passing upon a motion to strike ․” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Gazo v. Stamford, 255 Conn. 245, 259, 765 A.2d 505 (2001).

Cosgrove, Emmet L., J.