Oshno International Foundation et al. v. Brian O'Neill (2010)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION MOTION FOR TEMPORARY INJUNCTION

BACKGROUND

The plaintiffs filed a writ, summons and verified complaint dated April 2, 2010.   The named defendant is Brian O'Neill.   The plaintiffs amended the complaint on May 20, 2010.   In addition to the request for an injunction, the complaint contains claims of misappropriation of trade secrets and unjust enrichment.   The plaintiffs have requested injunctive relief to prevent the sale of the property purchased at auction from Uncle Bob's Self Storage facility by the defendant.

The plaintiff, Oshno International Foundation (Foundation), is a non-profit organization created in 1984 to propagate the works and teachings of Baghwan Shree Rajneesh, a/k/a “Oshno,” who was a contemporary mystic and a prime mover in the meditation movement.   During his lifetime Oshno taught modern meditation through daily discourses that were collected by the plaintiff Foundation.   Some of the works had been published or copyrighted through the work of the Foundation.   The Foundation maintains the original Oshno Archive.   The archive of work consists of original historic documents, original photos, and original video and audio materials.   There are no copies of many of these works.   Additionally, the property in storage consists of tax returns, royalty reports, profit and loss reports and correspondence with accountants for the Foundation.

The American Multimedia Corporation (known as “AMMC”) is a subsidiary of the Foundation.   It conducts its business from a New York office.   Its function is to continue the archiving of the works as well as engage in the copyright and licensing for the works of Oshno.   AMMC was responsible for the storage and preservation of the business records and the property of the Foundation.

In May 2001, the plaintiffs made a decision to store varied materials in one location.   AMMC entered into an agreement on May 7, 2001, with Stamford Self Storage, Inc. the predecessor of Uncle Bob's Self Storage facility at 280 Fairfield Avenue, Stamford, Connecticut.   The storage unit contained approximately ninety-six boxes which included audiovisual equipment, original slides, proprietary information such as tax returns, financial information including profit and loss reports and royalty information.

After a time, the plaintiffs paid for the unit they rented by a direct charge to the AMMC credit card on a monthly basis.   There were three people who had access to the unit and the stored items, Klaus Steeg, Paul Niet, and Apu Pandya.   During the time period from September 2009 to January 2010 none of these individuals checked the unit.   At some time prior to August 2009 AMMC moved its offices in New York and failed to note the change of address with the storage facility.   In September 2009, AMMC received a renewed credit card with a new expiration date.   Because of the change in the expiration date, the monthly charges from Uncle Bob's Storage Facility were rejected in September 2009.   Although attempts to contact AMMC were made by the owners of the storage facility, they were unsuccessful.   The storage facility did not have an accurate address or phone number because the plaintiff AMMC failed to provide the change of address information or telephone contact to the Uncle Bob's Storage Facility.   No payments were received for September, October, November and December.   In December 2009 the facility auctioned the contents of the storage compartment.¹  The defendant, Mr. O'Neill purchased all of the contents for $10.00.

The plaintiffs have requested injunctive relief from the court contending that the statute governing the sale of property upon default at self storage facilities was not intended to apply in a situation such as this;  that permitting the defendant to retain and sell the property stored in the facility will amount to a misappropriation of trade secrets, and;  that the sale of original products which have or are preparing to have a copyright will be adversely affected for copyright status.

The plaintiffs also contend that if some of the items are sold or disseminated that they will be unable to complete their archiving of the work of Oshno.   This task is one that is self-initiated as part of the goals and mission of the foundation.

In regard to the property, the plaintiffs contend that some of the materials that were stored in the unit are confidential business, financial and tax records necessary for defense of the plaintiffs in the event of an audit.

Lastly, the plaintiffs contend that the defendant is unjustly enriched in permitting him to re-sell the items that are not only of value from a monetary extent but also irreplaceable in developing an archive of the life and works of Oshno.

The court conducted a hearing on the request for injunctive relief on June 7, 2010.   The plaintiffs submitted a memorandum of law dated June 7, 2010.   Thereafter, the parties submitted post-hearing memorandums on June 11, 2010.   The plaintiffs submitted a reply memorandum on June 23, 2010.

DISCUSSION

The standard for granting a temporary injunction is well settled.  “In general, a court may, in its discretion exercise its equitable power to order a temporary injunction pending final determination of the order, upon a proper showing by the movant that if the injunction is not granted he or she will suffer irreparable harm for which there is no adequate remedy at law.”   Moore v. Ganim, 283 Conn. 557, 569 n. 25, 660 A.2d 742 (1995).   The primary purpose of a temporary injunction is to maintain the status quo until the rights of the various parties can be sorted out, after a hearing on the merits.  Clinton v. Middlesex Assurance Co., 37 Conn.App. 269, 270, 685 A.2d 814 (1995).   The temporary injunction is a preliminary order, granted at the outset or during the pendency of an action, forbidding the performance of matters such as threatened act ․ until the rights of the parties can be finally determined by the court.  Deming v. Bradstreet, 85 Conn. 650, 659, 84 A. 116 (1912).   A party seeking injunctive relief must demonstrate that:  (1) it has no adequate remedy at law;  (2) it will suffer irreparable harm absent an injunction;  (3) it will likely prevail on the merits;  and (4) the balance of equities tip in its favor.  Waterbury Teacher's Assn. v. Freedom of Information Commission, 230 Conn. 441, 446, 645 A.2d 978 (1994), Danso v. University of Connecticut, 50 Conn.Sup. 256 (2007) [42 Conn. L. Rptr. 697].

The plaintiff seeking injunctive relief bears the burden of proving facts which will establish irreparable harm and the lack of adequate remedy at law.   Kelo v. New London, 268 Conn. 1, 89, 843 A.2d 500 (2004), aff'd.  545 U.S. 469, 125 S.Ct. 2655, 162 L.Ed.2d 439 (2005), Schlichting v. Cotter, 109 Conn.App. 361, 952 A.2d 73 (2008).   Moreover, “[t]he extraordinary nature of injunctive relief requires that the harm complained of is occurring or will occur if the injunction is not granted.   Although an absolute certainty is not required, it must appear that there is a substantial probability that but for the issuance of the injunction, the party seeking it will suffer irreparable harm.”  Karls v. Alexandra Realty Corp., 179 Conn. 390, 402, 426 A.2d 784 (1980).   Whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to relief is determined, not by the situation existing at the time of the alleged violations, but by that which has developed at the time of trial.  Loew's Enterprises, Inc. v. International Alliance, 127 Conn. 415, 419, 17 A.2d 525 (1941), Edson v. Griffin Hospital, 21 Conn.Sup. 55, 63-64, 144 A.2d 341 (1958).

Before the court addresses the claim for a temporary injunction, it must first address the defendant's claim that the plaintiffs have failed to properly serve the defendant.   At the hearing in this matter, the court requested a clearer explanation and legal argument as to this broad defense.   Counsel for the defendant argued that the action was improperly commenced and continued to compare this case with a prejudgment complaint.   In the memorandum of law the defendant refers to the statute applying to a prejudgment remedy, General Statute § 52-278c which states:  “․ any person desiring to secure a prejudgment remedy shall attach his proposed unsigned writ, summons and complaint to the following documents ․” The plaintiffs have not requested a prejudgment remedy in the instant action.   Instead, the plaintiffs have requested injunctive relief pursuant to General Statute § 52-473 which states that:  “an injunction may be granted immediately, if the circumstances of the case demand it, or the court or judge may cause immediate notice of the application to be given to the adverse party ․” The statute further provides that:  “No temporary injunction may be granted without notice to the adverse party unless it clearly appears from the specific facts shown by affidavit or by verified complaint that irreparable loss or damage will result to the plaintiff before the matter can be heard on notice.   It shall be sufficient, on such application for a temporary injunction, to present to the court or judge the original complaint containing the demand for an injunction, duly verified, without further complaint, application or motion in writing.”  General Statute § 52-473(b).  In the instant action, the plaintiffs requested and were granted an injunction ex parte with a hearing date established by the court.   In accordance with the statute, the defendant was served.   He filed an appearance on April 14, 2010 and appeared at the hearing on June 7, 2010.   The defendant failed to object to the proper service prior to the hearing date.   The argument at this time is not only untimely but also relies upon the prejudgment statutes that are not applicable in this action.   Therefore, the court denies any request to dismiss the action based upon this argument.

As noted below, the plaintiffs have presented testimony and evidence related to each of the four elements.   The court will address each of the four elements separately, although there may be some overlap as to the evidence and testimony in regard to each element.

A. ADEQUATE REMEDY AT LAW

The plaintiffs argue that because of the nature of the items contained in the storage facility there is no adequate remedy at law if the defendant is permitted to retain and/or dispose of some of the items.   The plaintiffs have not argued that every item falls within the areas of copyright, trade secrets, and original works but what is clear is that some of the works that have been in the archive collection for over twenty years are one of a kind.   The plaintiffs may have an opportunity to purchase back some of the items, but to date the defendant has not accepted any offer by the plaintiffs.   The more disconcerting area is the retention of financial records that may possibly disclose the strength or weakness of the financial condition through profit and loss statements or accountants correspondence.   The release of financial information separate and distinct from the collection could create unimaginable negative consequences to the plaintiffs.   The plaintiffs argue that without the financial documents, they cannot address any audit of the foundation.   The plaintiffs have also argued that the possession of the documents violates the trade secrets statute as it applies to all of the property.   Although, as noted below, this court does not find that there is a violation of this statute based on the testimony and evidence to date.   However, the concept of the harm to the plaintiffs as a result of the knowledge acquired of the financial status of the foundation and the subsidiary through these records is likely.   Other than an injunction preventing the dissemination of these records there is no relief because the impact to the Foundation attempting to purchase property to continue the archiving process may be forever tainted if competitors or owners of the property have an insight as to their financial ability or the methods and process, if any, that is shared with their accountant.   Additionally, the publishing of personal financial information in this day and age is of paramount concern to any person or entity because of the long reaching and possible devastating impact to the financial stability.

The defendant argues that the plaintiff has an adequate remedy for relief of a replevin action and monetary relief, this is not an accurate analysis of the loss of originals if the plaintiffs can trace them to new owners after sale by the defendant or the financial documents.   The plaintiffs have already attempted to purchase the items at sums well above the $10.00 paid for all of the property.   However, the defendant has refused the offers and continues to search and make the property available to any buyer thus destroying the value of an archive of all materials and allowing them to exist under the ownership of varied individuals with no connection, thus leaving the archive project incomplete.

Therefore, the court finds that the remedies offered by the defendant are not adequate remedies at law.

B. LIKELY TO PREVAIL

The next element for the court to examine in regard to the motion for a temporary injunction is whether the plaintiff is likely to prevail on the merits of its case and whether the balance of equities weigh in favor of the plaintiffs.   The plaintiffs contend in their complaint that “the sale, transfer or other dissemination of the property will cause irreparable harm to the plaintiffs insofar as their copyrighted, confidential and proprietary information will be disclosed to unknown third parties and the plaintiffs will have no remaining copies of much of the information.”   The second count of the complaint alleges unjust enrichment.   The goods that are the subject of this request for injunctive relief were stored in a self-service storage facility.   The operation, including the legal ramifications of a failure to pay the rental fee are established by General Statutes § 42-159 et seq.   The statutes permit a lien upon all personal property located at the facility for any amounts of rent, labor or other valid charges incurred in the disposition of such property.   In particular, the statutes provide that:  “the owner of a self-service storage facility shall have a lien upon all personal property located at such facility for the amounts of any rent, labor, or other valid charges incurred in relation to such personal property, and for any expenses incurred in the necessary preservation of such personal property pursuant to law.   Such lien attaches on the date of default by the occupant.”  General Statute § 42-160.   The agreement entered into on May 7, 2001 for the storage facility states that:  “․ if any property shall remain in the Space after the termination of this agreement, Occupant shall be deemed to have abandoned the Property stored in the Space.   Occupant agrees that abandoned property may be disposed of, at occupant's sole cost and expense, by any lawful means, including a sale of the Property under Connecticut General Statues Section 42-160 et seq.”   The plaintiffs admit that for the months of September, October, November and December, they did not pay the storage fees.   The plaintiffs defaulted in September.  General Statutes § 42-164 permits the sale or disposition sixty days after the date of default.   There is no question before this court that the owner of the facility auctioned this property in accordance with the statutes.   Therefore, without evidence or testimony to the contrary, the court must assume for purposes of this motion for injunctive relief that the property was properly acquired by the defendant.   What the plaintiffs argue in their reply memorandum, is that the procedure established by this statute was never meant to apply to them because the legislative intent was to give a method to dispose of goods that are largely ‘junk.”   The plaintiffs contend that because the material in their storage unit has, in their opinion, significant value, the statute is not intended to allow a sale of these materials when they defaulted.   However, nothing in the statutes make this distinction so that the owner of the storage facility can determine whether the goods in the storage unit are “valuable enough” to be held for an indefinite period of time or considered by the owner as “junk” and sold within a short period after a default.   This argument does not follow the plaintiff's acknowledgement in the May 7, 2001 agreement that limits the value of the property in the storage unit.   The agreement specifically provides:  “Occupant agrees that in no event shall the total value of all Property stored in the Space exceed $5,000.”   The court is aware that the value of some of the property is not the monetary value but is, according to the testimony of Mr. Steeg, the preservation of the life and teachings of Oshno through the property collected including the audio and visual tapes as well as artwork and writings.

The defendant argues that General Statutes § 42-166 which provides:  “A purchaser in good faith of personal property sold to satisfy the lien provided for in section 42-160 takes the property free of any rights of persons against whom the lien was valid, despite noncompliance by the owner with the requirements of this chapter” gives the defendant absolute ownership of the property.   The defendant's position is supported by the language as well as a comprehensive review of the statutory scheme for the sale of goods in a self storage facility.   The court finds that the testimony, the evidence and the law regarding self storage facilities does not support the plaintiff's position that they are likely to prevail on their argument that the statutes do not apply to this scenario.

The plaintiff has also argued that some of the property is protected as trade secrets in accordance with General Statutes § 35-51 et seq.   The plaintiff contends that the defendant obtained and misappropriated property which is protected by the law governing trade secrets.   Although they do not specify what constitutes the trade secret, a specification is not always required if the claim is that the business plan in and of itself is a trade secret.  Elm City Cheese Co. v. Federico, 251 Conn. 59, 752 A.2d 1037 (1999).  General Statute § 35-51(d) provides that a trade secret “means information, including a formula, pattern, compilation, program, device, method, technique, process, drawing, cost data or customer list that:  (1) Derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from not being generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable by proper means by, other persons who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use ․” General Statute § 35-51 provides in part that misappropriation in relation to a trade secret is:  (1) Acquisition of a trade secret of another by a person who knows or has reason to know that the trade secret was acquired by improper means;  (2) disclosure or use of a trade secret of another without express or implied consent by a person who (A) used improper means to acquire knowledge of the trade secret;  or (B) at the time of disclosure or use, knew or had reason to know that his knowledge of the trade secret was (i) derived from or through a person who had utilized improper means to acquire knowledge of the trade secret;  (ii) acquired under the circumstances giving rise to a duty to maintain its secrecy or limit its use, including but not limited to disclosures made under section 1-210, section ․”

The first question in regard to this claim is whether the plaintiffs have provided testimony or evidence to support their claim that the property acquired by the defendant was a trade secret.   The plaintiffs provided the testimony of Klaus Steeg regarding the purchasing of various items that are part of the works or life of Oshno.   However, nothing in his testimony provided a basis to determine that any of the property in and of itself constituted a trade secret.   The compilation of property from Oshno does not “derive independent economic value, actual or potential, from not being generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable by proper means by, other persons who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use ․” The claim of the plaintiffs in part is that the property at issue is original works, one of a kind items or financial data and thus is protected as trade secrets.   This categorization does not make any item, alone or combined, a trade secret in accordance with the statutory language.   Additionally, the argument of the plaintiffs is that the actions of Mr. O'Neill fall within the protection for misappropriation of trade secrets.   This argument also fails because of the lack of testimony or evidence to support a finding that any action on the part of the defendant was with improper means or “without express or implied consent by a person who (A) used improper means to acquire knowledge of the trade secret;  or (B) at the time of disclosure or use, knew or had reason to know that his knowledge was (i) derived from or through a person who had utilized improper means to acquire it;  (ii) acquired under circumstances giving rise to a duty to maintain its secrecy or limits its use ․” General Statute § 32-51(b).  The defendant in the instant action acquired the property as a bidder in an auction.   There is no testimony that prior to bidding on the property he had any contact with the plaintiffs.   Unlike the defendant in Elm City Cheese Co. v. Federico, supra, 251 Conn. 59, Mr. O'Neill had no involvement with the Oshno movement and purchased with the intent of selling goods that he believed were abandoned.   There is nothing in the testimony that indicates the defendant even knows or understands the alleged relevance of the items to a collection.   Accordingly, there is insufficient testimony or evidence to support the claim that Mr. O'Neill misappropriated the property as trade secrets and therefore, the plaintiffs have not satisfied their burden of demonstrating that they are likely to prevail on this claim.

The last argument of the plaintiffs is that they are likely to prevail on a claim of unjust enrichment.   This is a more compelling argument based upon the testimony and evidence.   In order to find that the defendant is unjustly enriched, the plaintiffs must demonstrate that:  1) the defendant has benefitted;  2) the defendant unjustly did not pay the plaintiffs for the benefits;  and 3) the failure of payment was to the plaintiffs' detriment.   Vertex Inc., v. Waterbury, 278 Conn. 557, 573, 898 A.2d 178 (2006).

The defendant contends in his reply that unjust enrichment cannot apply in this situation because “absent any evidence of a contract between the plaintiffs and the defendant and the admission by Mr. Steeg that there was no contractual relationship between same, a claim for unjust enrichment would clearly fail.”   In support of this argument, the defendant recites a selected portion of the decision in Hartford Whalers Hockey Club v. Uniroyal Goodrich Tire Company et al., 231 Conn. 276, 649 A.2d 518 (1994).   The defendant misinterprets and misstates the holding and the law in regard to a claim for unjust enrichment.   In Hartford Whalers Hockey Club, supra, 231 Conn. 284, the court states:  “the fact that the plaintiff could not recover under the contract does not bar its recovery under the theory of unjust enrichment;  indeed lack of a remedy under a contract is a precondition for recovery based upon unjust enrichment.”  (Emphasis added.)   This decision also provides:  “A right of recovery under the doctrine of unjust enrichment is essentially equitable, its basis being that in a given situation it is contrary to equity and good conscience for one to retain a benefit which has come to him at the expense of another.”  Hartford Whalers Hockey Club, supra, 231 Conn. 282 citing Franks v. Lockwood, 146 Conn. 273, 278, 150 A.2d 215 (1959).   In the present action, the plaintiffs have testified that the property that is presently in the possession of the defendant is unique in that some of the items cannot be duplicated.   The defendant purchased all of the items at the auction for a price of approximately ten dollars.   The testimony of Mr. Steeg was that when they discovered who had purchased the property at auction they immediately attempted to purchase the property.   Before the filing of this legal action, the plaintiffs offered to purchase the property for $8,000, then $10,000 and lastly $30,000.   These offers were not accepted.   The defendant testified that he occasionally attends auctions at Uncle Bob's. He is an artist and a restorer who recognizes items which are and are not copyrighted.   He has pursued selling the items that are the subject of this action.   His intention is to sell the items and his belief is that he can sell any items he wishes.   In analyzing the testimony to determine if, at this stage, there is sufficient evidence to support a finding that the plaintiff will likely prevail on this claim, the court follows the analysis in Hartford Whalers Hockey Club, in which the court stated:  “With no other test than what, under a given set of circumstances is just or unjust, equitable or inequitable, conscionable or unconscionable, it becomes necessary in any case where the benefit of the doctrine is claimed, to examine the circumstances and the conduct of the parties and apply this standard.  Cecio Bros., Inc. v. Greenwich, 156 Conn. 561, 564-65, 244 A.2d 404 (1968) (Internal quotation marks omitted).   Providence Electric Co. v. Sutton Place, Inc., 161 Conn. 242, 246, 287 A.2d 379 (1971).  “Unjust enrichment is, consistent with the principles of equity, a broad and flexible remedy.”  Cecio Bros, Inc., v. Greenwich, supra 564.   In the instant matter, the plaintiffs' president testified about the collecting of the property of Oshno for well over twenty years.   It was uncontested that the property contained items that are irreplaceable, that is, approximately 20,000 slides some of which are the art work and the large majority that are unpublished, 16 mm original film from the 1960s, video, audio spools of music that were original recordings, vinyl records, tapes, a photo archive and financial records of AMMC and Oshno that may be needed for audits.   Some of the property is part of the ongoing process to document and copyright while other information is financial and needed for any audit of the organizations.   Allowing the defendant to sell the items at this time without an opportunity to address the concerns of the plaintiff will certainly permit him to have a substantial benefit at the expense of the plaintiffs.   The defendant made it clear that he intends to sell the items without regard to the special nature and preservation of the collection.   Once sold, the plaintiffs are left in a position of abandoning the task, possibly losing at any costs the ability to track and preserve the property as part of the archive.   This claim can amount to an unjust enrichment to the defendant and therefore, the plaintiffs have demonstrated that they are likely to prevail on this claim.

As stated above, the likelihood of success on the statutory claims or trade secrets has not been satisfied at this time, but because the claim of unjust enrichment is likely to prevail, the plaintiffs have satisfied this element.   In addition in balancing the equities in this scenario, the defendant's ability and very resolute opinion that he could sell what he “wishes” in light of the plaintiffs' claims of irreplaceable value and disclosure or destruction of financial information does not weigh favorably for the defendant as noted below.

C. IRREPARABLE HARM

The term “ ‘irreparable’ connotes the inability to make good, to repair, to retrieve or to atone for.”  State v. Parker, 194 Conn. 650, 664, 485 A.2d 139 (1984).   An irreparable injury is an injury that is of such a nature that it cannot be adequately compensated in damages, or cannot be measured by any pecuniary standard.  Connecticut Assn., Clinical Laboratories v. Conn. Blue Cross, Inc., 31 Conn.Sup. 110, 113, 324 A.2d 288 (1973).

The plaintiffs contend that if the defendant is permitted to sell the items from the storage facility they will lose the ability to satisfy the copyright attributed to some of the property.²  They also contend that they will not be able to complete the archiving project that has been ongoing for approximately twenty years.   These claims are more than a claim for monetary relief.   From the testimony of Mr. Steeg, the efforts to archive the history, the teachings and life of Oshno, who is a significant figure in the mediation movement, would be foreclosed by the loss of some of the property.   This damage could not be recovered by any monetary award.   Additionally, the exposure of financial records of the foundation for anyone to see creates a separate issue as to the impropriety of disclosing personal finances that could very well affect their financial standing as well as interfere with their ability to respond to any audit that is conducted for tax purposes or otherwise.

Lastly, the plaintiffs contend that many of the items such as slides or visual items and recordings are one of a kind with no duplicates available.   As such, the sale of these items to third parties would create an irreparable loss.   If the property is sold as the defendant clearly states is his intention, the property may be lost forever to complete any copyright or the collection for the archives.   Accordingly, the court finds that irreparable harm may occur and it is necessary to preserve the status quo of the property through injunctive relief.

D. BALANCING THE EQUITIES

The court can exercise discretion in determining the appropriateness of issuing an injunction.  Berin v. Olson, 183 Conn. 337, 361, 439 A.2d 357 (1981).   In this regard, the court balances the equities to determine the effect of the requested injunction on the parties.   In the instant action, after extensive testimony and a review of the evidence, this court has determined that the issuance of a preliminary injunction would provide equitable relief to the plaintiffs and preserve the status quo until the matter can be more fully addressed.   Based upon the testimony, it is clear that absent an order from this court restricting the sale or distribution of the items taken from the storage unit they may be sold and become unavailable to complete or continue copyright requirements or to be included in the archiving of the historic preservation of the teachings, art, music, and life of Oshno.   At the present time, there are no copies of a number of the items that are presently in the possession of Mr. O'Neill.   Mr. O'Neill has made it clear that he will do what he wishes with the items and apparently has not conveyed information that will permit the plaintiffs to know who has the items if purchased.   Lastly, the disclosure of financial records of the foundation or other individuals could have an irreversible impact upon the foundation or others within the foundation.   There is no assurance that the financial information does not contain personal identifying information that could contribute to identity theft issues that are prevalent in this day and age.   Giving the financial information of a foundation could impact them in untold ways that affect their operations, their growth, and a multitude of areas including the re-purchase of the property in question if this becomes at all feasible.   The refusal to return such basic information to the plaintiffs when it is questionable how much value the information has to anyone except the plaintiffs is of concern to the court that withholding its return could have a irrevocable harmful impact to the plaintiffs' mission.

Given the nature of the items and the uncertainty of their safekeeping, the court has determined in balancing the equities, that the scale tips ever so slightly in favor of the plaintiffs at this point in time.

CONCLUSION

The court grants the motion for a preliminary injunction and orders that the property purchased by the defendant, Mr. Brian O'Neill, from Sovran Acquisition d/b/a Uncle Bob's Storage on or about December 14, 2009 shall not be sold, disseminated, transferred, published, altered or used in any manner by the defendant or any other party until final judgment is entered in this matter.   If any financial information has been disclosed to any person or entity, the defendant shall make every reasonable effort to have the information returned to him immediately and secured to prevent any disclosure as well as to notify the plaintiffs what information has been disclosed and to whom.

THE COURT

Brazzel-Massaro, J.

FOOTNOTES

FN1. Although the plaintiff testified that they had paid monthly for the facility, there was no testimony that they noted in each of the four months that there was no payment because there was no charge on the monthly credit statements for the storage facility that this should have alerted them to an irregularity.   Additionally, the testimony of Mr. Steeg was that the possessions were placed in the facility in Stamford so that they were accessible to the members of the foundation.   During this time period, obviously, no one visited the storage facility so that they would be aware of the failure to pay..  FN1. Although the plaintiff testified that they had paid monthly for the facility, there was no testimony that they noted in each of the four months that there was no payment because there was no charge on the monthly credit statements for the storage facility that this should have alerted them to an irregularity.   Additionally, the testimony of Mr. Steeg was that the possessions were placed in the facility in Stamford so that they were accessible to the members of the foundation.   During this time period, obviously, no one visited the storage facility so that they would be aware of the failure to pay.

FN2. The plaintiffs have not identified specific property that is subject to the copyright provisions as alleged by them in their memorandum in opposition.   The court is left to speculate as to what items, how many, or what is the state of the copyright protections being claimed..  FN2. The plaintiffs have not identified specific property that is subject to the copyright provisions as alleged by them in their memorandum in opposition.   The court is left to speculate as to what items, how many, or what is the state of the copyright protections being claimed.

Brazzel-Massaro, Barbara, J.