Sybiline Alexander v. Bonnie Lawry et al. (2010)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (# 122)

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The plaintiff, Sybiline Alexander, commenced the present action by service of process against the named defendants, Bonnie and William Lawry, on May 9, 2008.   The plaintiff filed a motion to cite the defendant who brings the present motion, Tonya Feliciano (hereinafter the defendant), into the action on January 28, 2009, which was granted by the court, Holden, J., on February 9, 2009.   The operative complaint is the amended version filed on March 6, 2009, and it alleges the following facts.   On or about February 24, 2007, the plaintiff was operating her motor vehicle in an easterly direction on Sargent Drive in New Haven.   The defendant was operating her motor vehicle behind the plaintiff's motor vehicle.   Bonnie Lawry was operating her motor vehicle, owned by William Lawry, behind the defendant's motor vehicle.   Bonnie Lawry's motor vehicle struck the defendant's motor vehicle, which then struck the plaintiff's motor vehicle.¹  The plaintiff's motor vehicle struck the motor vehicle in front of it.   The operator and/or owner of that motor vehicle is not a party to the present action.   The plaintiff was injured as a result of the collision.   Count three of the amended complaint is against the defendant and sounds in negligence.

The defendant filed the present motion for summary judgment accompanied by a memorandum of law in support thereof and exhibits on June 18, 2010.   The plaintiff has not opposed the motion.   The court heard the matter at short calendar on August 2, 2010.

DISCUSSION

“Summary judgment is a method of resolving litigation when pleadings, affidavits, and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law ․ The motion for summary judgment is designed to eliminate the delay and expense of litigating an issue when there is no real issue to be tried.”  (Citations omitted.)  Wilson v. New Haven, 213 Conn. 277, 279, 567 A.2d 829 (1989).  “In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the trial court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.”   (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Durrant v. Board of Education, 284 Conn. 91, 99-100 n.7, 931 A.2d 859 (2007).  “[T]he ‘genuine issue’ aspect of summary judgment requires the parties to bring forward before trial evidentiary facts, or substantial evidence outside the pleadings, from which the material facts alleged in the pleadings can warrantably be inferred ․ A material fact has been defined adequately and simply as a fact which will make a difference in the result of the case.”  (Citation omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  Buell Industries, Inc. v. Greater New York Mutual Ins. Co., 259 Conn. 527, 556, 791 A.2d 489 (2002).

“In seeking summary judgment, it is the movant who has the burden of showing the nonexistence of any issue of fact.   The courts are in entire agreement that the moving party for summary judgment has the burden of showing the absence of any genuine issue as to all the material facts, which, under applicable principles of substantive law, entitle him to a judgment as a matter of law.”   (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Zielinski v. Kotsoris, 279 Conn. 312, 318, 901 A.2d 1207 (2006).

“The courts hold the movant to a strict standard.   To satisfy his burden the movant must make a showing that it is quite clear what the truth is, and that excludes any real doubt as to the existence of any genuine issue of material fact ․ As the burden of proof is on the movant, the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the opponent ․ When documents submitted in support of a motion for summary judgment fail to establish that there is no genuine issue of material fact, the nonmoving party has no obligation to submit documents establishing the existence of such an issue ․ Once the moving party has met its burden, however, the opposing party must present evidence that demonstrates the existence of some disputed factual issue ․ It is not enough, however, for the opposing party merely to assert the existence of such a disputed issue.   Mere assertions of fact ․ are insufficient to establish the existence of a material fact and, therefore, cannot refute evidence properly presented to the court ․” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Zielinski v. Kotsoris, supra, 279 Conn. 318-19.   When a party moves for summary judgment “and there [are] no contradictory affidavits, the court properly [decides] the motion by looking only to the sufficiency of the [movant's] affidavits and other proof.”  Heyman Associates No. 1 v. Insurance Co. of Pennsylvania, 231 Conn. 756, 795, 653 A.2d 122 (1995).

In the present action, the defendant moves for summary judgment on the ground that there is no genuine issue of material fact that the collision between Lawry and the defendant, not the collision between the defendant and the plaintiff, was both the cause in fact and proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury.   The defendant argues that she is thus entitled to a judgment as a matter of law because the plaintiff cannot prove that she was negligent.

In support of her motion, the defendant submits a copy of requests for admissions that she served upon the plaintiff on April 6, 2010 and a copy of the plaintiff's answers to the requests for admissions, dated April 27, 2010.   Practice Book § 13-23(a) provides in relevant part:  “Each matter of which an admission is requested is admitted unless, within thirty days after the filing of the notice required by [Practice Book § ]13-22(b), or within such shorter or longer time as the judicial authority may allow, the party to whom the request is directed files and serves upon the party requesting the admission a written answer or objection addressed to the matter, signed by the party or by his attorney ․ The responding party shall attach a cover sheet to the response which shall comply with [Practice Book §§ ]4-1 and 4-2 and shall specify those requests to which answers and objections are addressed.”   Section 13-22(b) provides in relevant part:  “The party serving such request shall not file it with the court but instead shall file notice with the court which states that the party has served a request for admission on another party, the name of the party to whom the request has been directed and the date upon which service ․ was made.”

The defendant argues that the plaintiff did not respond to her requests for admissions within the requisite thirty-day period because the plaintiff never filed her answers with the court.   The plaintiff has thus admitted that the collision between Lawry and the defendant, not the collision between the defendant and the plaintiff, was both the cause in fact and proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury, because cause in fact and proximate cause are among the issues addressed in the unanswered requests for admissions.   Because the plaintiff cannot fulfill the causation criterion of the negligence test, she cannot prevail on her action, and the defendant is therefore entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.

The court begins by addressing the defendant's argument that the plaintiff has not timely answered the defendant's requests for admissions because she did not file a copy of her answers with the court.   The defendant contends that § 13-23(a) requires that answers to requests for admissions be filed with and served upon both the requesting party and the court within the requisite thirty-day period in order to be timely.   The express language of the rule, however, imposes no such requirement.   Furthermore, the court in McCoy v. State Dept. of Mental Health and Addiction Services, Superior Court, judicial district of New London, Docket No. 121494 (November 13, 2001, Hurley, J.T.R.) (30 Conn. L. Rptr. 683), addressed this exact issue and held that the defendant's answers to the plaintiff's requests for admissions were timely under § 13-23(a) because they had been served upon the plaintiff within the requisite thirty-day period, even though they had not been filed with the court.

The McCoy court specifically wrote:  “A review of the language in ․ § 13-23(a) read in connection with other Practice Book sections supports the conclusion that the defendant did serve a timely response to the plaintiff's request and that clearly there is no requirement to file a copy [of] said responses with the court ․ The court finds ․ that the Practice Book section clearly states that a written answer or objection is to be served on the party [,] not the court.   The court finds that even though there is a duty to file a cover sheet stating that the responses were filed, that this does not require the court to find that the defendant did not respond to the plaintiff's request for admission in a timely and appropriate fashion ․” Id., 684.

The court in the present action is persuaded by the McCoy court's reasoning.   In the present action, the plaintiff's answers to the defendant's requests for admissions are dated April 27, 2010, which is well within thirty days of April 6, 2010, the date on which the defendant filed the notice required by § 13-22(b).  The defendant does not challenge the date or her receipt of the plaintiff's answers to her requests for admissions.   The court thus concludes that the plaintiff's answers to the defendant's requests for admissions were timely filed under § 13-23(a), and the court will consider them in deciding the present motion for summary judgment.

The court now considers the plaintiff's answers to the defendant's requests for admissions.  “The essential elements of a cause of action in negligence are well established:  duty;  breach of that duty;  causation;  and actual injury.”  RK Constructors, Inc. v. Fusco Corp., 231 Conn. 381, 384, 650 A.2d 153 (1994).   At issue in the present motion is the causation element of the negligence test.  “[A] plaintiff [in a negligence action] must establish that the defendant's conduct legally caused the injuries, that is, that the conduct both caused the injury in fact and proximately caused the injury.   The test for cause in fact is, simply, would the injury have occurred were it not for the actor's conduct.

The test of proximate cause is whether the defendant's conduct is a substantial factor in producing the plaintiff's injury.   The substantial factor test asks ․ whether the harm which occurred was of the same general nature as the foreseeable risk created by the defendant's negligence ․ The question of proximate causation generally belongs to the trier of fact because causation is essentially a factual issue.”  (Citation omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  Archambault v. Soneco/Northeastern, Inc., 287 Conn. 20, 32-33, 946 A.2d 839 (2008).

In her answers to the defendant's requests for admissions, the plaintiff admits that, “[o]n the date and approximate time of the collision alleged in the plaintiff's complaint,” the defendant's vehicle was “slowing down” and “in the process of stopping.”   Defendant's Ex. B, Answers to Requests for Admissions ¶¶ 8-9.   She denies, however, that she “could see” the defendant's vehicle “slowing down.”   Defendant's Ex. B, Answers to Requests for Admissions ¶ 15.   A similar inconsistency exists between the plaintiff's answers to requests # 27 and # 28.   In request # 27, the plaintiff admits that “the proximate cause of [the defendant's] vehicle striking [the plaintiff's] vehicle was ․ Lawry's vehicle striking [the defendant's] vehicle.”   Defendant's Ex. B, Answers to Requests for Admissions ¶ 27.   In request # 28, however, the plaintiff answers “unknown” in response to the request that she admit that “had ․ Lawry's vehicle not struck [the defendant's] vehicle, [the defendant's] vehicle would not have struck [the plaintiff's] vehicle.”   Defendant's Ex. B, Answers to Requests for Admissions ¶ 28.   The plaintiff further admits that “[the defendant's] vehicle could not have avoided being struck by ․ Lawry's vehicle” but answers “unknown” in response to the request that she admit that “[the defendant] could not have prevented an impact to [the plaintiff's] vehicle.”   Defendant's Ex. B, Answers to Requests for Admissions ¶ ¶ 31-32.

“Issues of negligence are ordinarily not susceptible of summary adjudication but should be resolved by trial in the ordinary manner.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Fogarty v. Rashaw, 193 Conn. 442, 446, 476 A.2d 582 (1984).  “Summary judgment procedure is especially ill-adapted to negligence cases, where ․ the ultimate issue in contention involves a mixed question of fact and law, and requires the trier of fact to determine whether the standard of care was met in a specific situation ․ [T]he conclusion of negligence is necessarily one of fact.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Michaud v. Gurney, 168 Conn. 431, 434, 362 A.2d 857 (1975).   This action illustrates these principles of law.   The defendant moves on the ground that she is entitled to judgment as a matter of law because the plaintiff has admitted that the defendant did not in fact or proximately cause her injury and therefore cannot prove that the defendant was negligent.   The plaintiff, however, has not admitted that Lawry's collision with the defendant, the cause in fact of her injury.

Furthermore, the court cannot discern the manner in which the defendant was driving at the time of the incident from the plaintiff's answers to the defendant's requests for admissions.  “[S]ummary judgment is appropriate only if a fair and reasonable person could conclude only one way.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Dugan v. Mobile Medical Testing Services, Inc., 265 Conn. 791, 815, 830 A.2d 752 (2003).   In the present action, a fair and reasonable person could not conclude only one way, based on the available evidence.   This is due to inconsistencies in the plaintiff's answers to the defendant's requests for admissions:  the plaintiff's denial in response to the defendant's request that she admit that she could see the defendant's vehicle slowing down and her response of “unknown” to requests that she admit that the defendant's motor vehicle was “decreasing in speed at a reasonable rate,” positioned at “a safe distance behind” her motor vehicle, “traveling at a reasonable speed” and positioned at a “reasonable distance away from” her motor vehicle.   Defendant's Ex. B, Answers to Requests for Admissions, ¶¶ 18-22.   The defendant has not met her initial burden of establishing she is entitled to judgment as a matter of law because there is no genuine issue of material fact.   The court thus denies her motion for summary judgment.   Cf. Turner Construction Co. v. Eppoliti, Inc., Superior Court, judicial district of Danbury, Docket No. 323118 (November 3, 1997, Moraghan, J.) (denying motion for summary judgment because of genuine issues of material fact raised by plaintiff's inconsistent responses to defendant's requests for admissions).

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, the defendant's motion for summary judgment on the third count of the plaintiff's amended complaint is denied.

Wilson, J.

FOOTNOTES

FN1. The defendant commenced an action against Bonnie and William Lawry by service of process on February 11, 2009.   See Feliciano v. Lawry, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV 09 5026914.   Lawry filed a motion to consolidate on April 16, 2009, which was granted by the court, Silbert, J., on May 4, 2009..  FN1. The defendant commenced an action against Bonnie and William Lawry by service of process on February 11, 2009.   See Feliciano v. Lawry, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV 09 5026914.   Lawry filed a motion to consolidate on April 16, 2009, which was granted by the court, Silbert, J., on May 4, 2009.

Wilson, Robin L., J.