Daniel D'Amico v. Ace Financial Solutions, Inc. et al. (2010)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION ON MOTION TO DISMISS

This court revisits the issue of the viability of the one remaining count in this complaint, in light of the Appellate Court ruling in Daniel D'Amico v. Ace Financial Solutions, Inc. et al., 122 Conn.App. 230 (2010), the very case before this court.   On June 8, 2010, the defendant Berkley Administrators of Connecticut, Inc. (“Berkley”), in favor of whom summary judgment as to all but one count was granted (and affirmed, id.). filed a Motion to Dismiss the remaining count, on the grounds that this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, because of the exclusivity provision of the Workers' Compensation Act, Conn. Gen.Stat. § 31-284.

In his complaint in this action, the plaintiff alleges that he was injured on the job as a Department of Corrections employee in 1992 and that the defendants Ace and Berkley mishandled his workers' compensation claim.   In the remaining count, the plaintiff alleges that Berkley intentionally inflicted emotional distress on the plaintiff by its conduct while serving as a third-party administrator for the defendant Ace Financial (“Ace”), which had a contract with the State of Connecticut to provide liability coverage under the Workers' Compensation Act for state workers.

In the cause of action at issue here-the Eighth Count-the plaintiff uses the identical words to allege intentional infliction of emotional distress against Berkley as he did against Ace in the Fourth Count.   The trial court granted summary judgment to the defendants as to all the other counts, including the Fourth Count-the identically worded count against Ace-but declined to grant summary judgment on the Eighth Count, leaving the door open for the plaintiff to assert an “egregious conduct” exception to the exclusivity of the Workers' Compensation Act against Berkley, the third-party administrator.

That door has now been closed by the holding of the Appellate Court in D'Amico v. Ace Financial Solutions, Inc. et al., supra.   The plaintiff appealed the trial court's ruling, which granted summary judgment on eight of the nine counts in the complaint.¹  The Appellate Court held that the exclusivity provision applies with equal force to Ace the insurer and to Berkley the third-party administrator in the handling of this workers' compensation claim.   In addressing the potential egregious conduct exception, the Appellate Court stated that this case “is not of the type the [supreme] court had in mind when it carved out the exception for egregiousness.”   Id. 237, n.6.

That the Appellate Court had before it the identically worded language in the Fourth Count against Ace as appears in the Eighth Count against Berkley compels this court to grant the Motion to Dismiss.   The appellate holding makes clear that the exclusivity provision of the Workers' Compensation Act applies to the alleged conduct of the defendant Berkley and that the egregiousness exception does not apply.

This court lacks subject matter jurisdiction.   The Motion to Dismiss is granted.

Patty Jenkins Pittman, Judge

FOOTNOTES

FN1. The denial of summary judgment on the Eighth Count was not an appealable final judgment..  FN1. The denial of summary judgment on the Eighth Count was not an appealable final judgment.

Pittman, Patty Jenkins, J.