IN RE: Kristal F.1 (2010)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

This case presents a petition by the Department of Children and Families (DCF) asking that the parental rights of the mother and father of Kristal F. (“Kristal” or “the child”) be terminated.   The mother is Jennifer S. and the father is Axie F.

On 10/2/07, an order of temporary custody (“OTC”) was granted on behalf of said child.   The child was adjudicated neglected and committed to the Commissioner of the Department of Children and Families by the Superior Court for Juvenile Matters on 11/24/08.

On 5/11/09, DCF filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of both parents.   The respondent father was properly served, appeared in court and was appointed counsel.   The respondent mother was re-served and a new plea date was scheduled.   She failed to appear, the court found actual notice, and she was defaulted on 8/19/09.

DCF's motion to review the permanency plan of termination of parental rights and adoption and the respondent father's objection were consolidated with the termination action.

Father Axie F. opposed the petition.   The statutory grounds alleged in the petition against both parents are they abandoned their daughter in that each parent failed to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern, or responsibility as to her welfare, General Statutes § 17a-112(c)(3)(A);  that the child had been found in a prior proceeding to have been neglected and each parent had failed to achieve such degree of personal rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that within a reasonable time, considering the age and needs of the child, they could assume a responsible position in the life of the child, General Statutes § 17a-112(j)(3)B;  and the absence of an ongoing relationship between the respective parents and the child.  General Statutes § 17a-112(j)(3)(D).  As to the respondent father, it is also alleged that the child had been found in a prior proceeding to have been neglected and that the child has been denied, by reason of an act or acts of parental commission or omission, including, but not limited to, sexual molestation or exploitation, severe physical abuse or a pattern of abuse, the care, guidance, or control necessary for the child's physical, educational, moral, or emotional well-being, General Statutes § 17a-112(j)(3)(C).  The matter was tried to the court on 1/4/10 and 5/7/10.   The respondent father was present and was represented at trial by counsel.   Also present were attorneys for DCF and the child.   All counsel participated in the examination of witnesses and closing argument.   The petitioner called clinical psychologist Dr. Regina Wilson and DCF social workers Pauline Hjarne and Flaviana Hunter, and introduced sixteen exhibits.   The respondent father called paternal grandmother Josel F., pastor Dornett Abdullah, paternal grandfather Axie F. Sr., and also testified in his own behalf.   The child testified outside of the respondent father's presence pursuant to an agreement of the parties.

The court finds that it has proper jurisdiction of the matter and that there are no pending actions affecting the custody of the minor child.   The court has carefully considered the petition, all of the evidence and testimony presented, including the demeanor and credibility of the witnesses, and the arguments of counsel, according to the standards required by law.   On the basis of the evidence presented and for the reasons stated below, the court grants the termination of parental rights petition and grants the motion to review permanency plan.

FACTS

Based upon clear and convincing evidence, the following constitute the underlying and determinative facts, as well as the pertinent peripheral facts, of the case: ²

Procedural History

On 10/02/07, DCF filed a neglect petition and a motion for order of temporary custody with the Superior Court for Juvenile Matters on Kristal's behalf.   The presenting child protection issues involved father's emotional neglect and physical abuse of Kristal after her disclosure that she was sexually abused by father's relatives in Jamaica, including his denial that the abuse occurred, his physical mistreatment of her after her disclosure and his threat to send her back to Jamaica to live with the relatives that abused her.   Mother never appeared in court on those matters.   Father appeared and contested the OTC and a hearing was scheduled for 11/7/07.   Father failed to appear for the hearing;  however, his attorney attended and the OTC was sustained by agreement.   Also on 11/7/07, the court, Wilson, J., ordered DCF to prepare specific steps for father to sign and file with the court.   Said steps were signed by father on 12/1/07 and filed with the court on 12/5/07.   On 9/17/08 the court, Harleston, J., approved the permanency plan of long-term foster care.   Thereafter, Father contested the neglect petition, and the trial was scheduled for 11/24/08.   Mother failed to appear and she was defaulted.   Father failed to appear, although his counsel was present, and father was defaulted.   The child was then adjudicated neglected and committed to the Commissioner of the Department of Children and Families by the Superior Court for Juvenile Matters, and Father's interim steps were ordered as final steps by the court, Esposito, J. on 11/24/08.   Father's motion to reopen the default was filed on 3/25/09, and was denied by the court, Esposito, J., on 4/7/09.

On 5/11/09, DCF filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of both parents (“TPR”).  On 6/1/09, DCF filed a proposed permanency plan of termination of parental rights and adoption, to which Father objected on 7/2/09;  both were consolidated with the TPR by the court, Harleston, J. on 8/19/09, and thereafter the trial proceeded as above.

KRISTAL F.

Kristal was born on 5/12/94 in Clarendon, Jamaica.   Kristal was separated from her mother as an infant by paternal grandparents and taken to live with them, her father, and her father's three brothers and three sisters, and one sister's husband.   When Kristal was approximately six years old, her father left her in Jamaica with these relatives and started a new family without her in the United States.   At approximately age 7, her paternal grandmother brought her to the United States to her father.   She stayed about two months before being sent back to Jamaica after her half-sister Keen reported that Kristal had performed oral sex on her.

Kristal returned to the United States at age 11 in July or August 2005 and resided with her father, stepmother and her five half-siblings until June 2007, when it was discovered that the sexual behavior between Kristal and Keen had resumed, and that Kristal had also engaged in sexually reactive behavior with her step-brother.   Initially, her father sent Kristal to stay with her Uncle Omar in Hartford until another arrangement was made for her to live with Father's family friend and church pastor, Dornett Abdullah, and her husband, beginning in August 2007.

During these events, Kristal had disclosed to her stepmother and father that she had been sexually abused between the ages of five and six by her paternal aunt Narda, her paternal uncle Benaroy, and her paternal uncle-in-law Devon, while living with them and her paternal grandparents in Jamaica.   The nature of the abuse by the aunt was oral sex, the nature of the abuse by the uncle was penetration and oral sex, and the abuse by the uncle-in-law consisted of fondling.   Her father did not believe her and called her a liar.   He also beat her on more than one occasion while demanding that she recant, and made arrangements for her to live outside of the home as above.

While residing with the Abdullahs, Kristal also confided in Dornett Abdullah about the sexual abuse in Jamaica, her father's disbelief and his violent reaction to her disclosure.   On September 28, 2007, Dornett Abdullah contacted DCF after she heard that Kristal's father and stepmother were planning to send her back to Jamaica to live with the very relatives who had abused her.   DCF already had a safety agreement in place prohibiting unsupervised contact between Kristal and her father, which was violated when Kristal was picked up at school and brought back to his home to see his family members who had just arrived from Jamaica.   DCF then placed a 96-hour hold on Kristal, and on October 2, 2007, an OTC was granted.   Kristal remained with the Abdullahs until DCF determined that they were not licensable due to Mr. Abdullah's past criminal record, and she was placed in a foster home in May 2008.   Her placement was only temporarily successful, and she was twice again moved before her September 2009 placement with a foster home offering the potential for long-term foster care or adoption.

DCF referred Kristal to the Aetna Foundation Children's Center at the St. Francis Hospital Department of Pediatrics on 10/16/07 for an evaluation.   A diagnostic interview on 12/11/07 resulted in a recommendation that Kristal undergo therapy;  a physical examination on 12/13/07 neither supported nor discounted her disclosures.

Kristal was referred to the Child Abuse Treatment Services program (“CATS”) at Klingberg Family Center.   The goal of the program is to help address the bio-psychosocial needs of children with Post Traumatic Stress Disorder and other problems related to traumatic life experiences.   Upon intake on 11/16/07, Kristal's presenting problems were increased anxiety, frequent nightmares, impaired affect modulation, hypervigilance, increased irritability, avoidance of people, places and voices that remind her of the abuse, and sexually reactive behaviors in her father's home coupled with guilt and shame leading to low self esteem.   She also displayed feelings of loss and betrayal by her father, step mother and biological mother.   Although while living with the Abdullahs Kristal attended several therapy sessions and made limited progress, she did not attend consistently, and was discharged for non compliance on 4/21/08.   Her diagnosis at the time of the first discharge was post traumatic stress disorder, sexual abuse of child and separation from mother due to abandonment, separation from father and step mother due to the disclosure and incident of sexual reactivity with step sibling.   After Kristal was moved from the Abdullahs to a foster family, she was re-referred to CATS with an intake on 6/11/08.   Kristal attended her therapy sessions regularly thereafter until she was successfully discharged on 11/24/08.   At discharge, it was noted that Kristal had accomplished a majority of her treatment goals and showed a reduction in her symptoms.   She was discharged with a diagnosis of post traumatic stress disorder in remission, sexual and physical abuse of a child, problems with primary support system, separation from father, family discord and several foster care placements within a year.

Shortly after returning to CATS, Kristal participated in a court ordered psychological evaluation by Dr. Regina Wilson on 6/26/08.   Dr. Wilson is an expert in clinical psychology and in cases involving child sexual abuse.   The evaluation included a clinical interview and six tests to assess personality and emotional functioning:  the VMI, BASC-2, APS-SF, TSCC, Rorschach Inkblot Test-Exner System, and Sentence Completion Series-Adolescent Form. Dr. Wilson prepared a written report of her evaluation and answered written questions propounded by the court.   She also testified extensively at trial.

Dr. Wilson testified that Kristal's diagnosis was parental/child relational problem, not otherwise specified, sexual abuse of a child, adjustment disorder with mixed emotional features, and further assessment to rule out post traumatic stress disorder.

When asked at the time of the evaluation to identify the psychological parents of the child, Dr. Wilson concluded that Kristal has no psychological parent.

Dr. Wilson also concluded at that time that reunification with father was not appropriate because of a number of factors, including Kristal's statements that she did not want to return home, her father's refusal to validate Kristal's sexual victimization, his physical abuse of her, her fear of him, his lack of involvement in the child's life, and his lack of cooperation with the DCF, including his failure to undertake therapy in order to try to understand what Kristal had been through.   At trial, some eighteen months later, she again opined that reunification with father was not an option, citing a lack of change in the situation since the time of her evaluation.

Additional facts will be set forth below as warranted.

MOTHER, JENNIFER S.

Mother Jennifer S. was born on 10/25/73 in Manchester, Jamaica and is of Jamaican descent.   Her parents were never married, and she is one of seven children.   She was raised in and still practices the Pentecostal faith.   She has two younger brothers, one older brother, one younger sister, and two older sisters, all of whom reside in Jamaica.

Mother reported having had a “rough” childhood:  her father was mostly absent and she and her siblings lived with their mother.   She dropped out of school because of financial difficulties after completing the 11th grade.   She is unemployed and last worked in a bar.   She has lived with various family members and does not have her own housing.   At last report, Mother was residing rent free in Jamaica in an apartment owned by her mother, and dependant on family members for support.

Mother has never been married.   She was involved with Axie F. for a short period of time before Kristal was born.   Seander P., her son by another father, was born in 1999 and continues to live with her in Jamaica.

Mother last saw Kristal when she was about five years old.   Mother reported that she has never had a relationship with Kristal, who was removed from her care as an infant to reside in the home of paternal grandparents, and that she remains unable to care for or even to help Kristal, because she cannot support her and lacks her own housing.   Since the involvement of DCF, Mother has spoken with Kristal occasionally when Kristal has initiated a phone call to Jamaica with a calling card provided by DCF.

Additional facts will be set forth below as warranted.

FATHER, AXIE F.

Father Axie F. was born in Jamaica on 4/18/72 to Axie F. Sr. and Josel F. He has three brothers, Omar, Beneroy and Lorenzo F., and two sisters, Narda and Nadine F. A third sister, Kay, is deceased.   Relatively little is known about him, as he refused to provide DCF with any information regarding his education, early social history, health, mental health, past relationships, income, or employment other than stating that he drives a truck and is often out of state.   He has never served in the military.   He immigrated to the United States without Kristal in approximately the year 2000, leaving her behind in Jamaica with his parents when she was approximately six years old.

He is married to Peaches F., with whom he has five children who are half siblings to Kristal.   He resided in New Britain until he was arrested on March 9, 2009, and charged with attempt to commit the sale of illegal drugs in connection with the seizure of 135 pounds of marijuana with an approximate street value of up to $5,000.00 per pound.   His wife Peaches was also arrested on that date and charged with interfering with a police officer.   At the time of trial Father was being held on $750,000 bond at Walker Correctional facility pending trial on the drug charges.

On 11/7/07 the court, Wilson, J., ordered DCF to prepare specific steps for father to sign and file with the court.   Said steps were signed by father on 12/1/07 and filed with the court on 12/5/07.   Thereafter, Father's interim steps were ordered as final steps by the court, Esposito, J. on 11/24/08.   The following steps were ordered in order to facilitate Father's reunification with Kristal:

Keep all appointments set by or with DCF. Cooperate with the DCF's home visits, announced or unannounced, and visits by the children's court appointed attorney and/or guardian ad litem.

Father was not compliant with this step.   Father failed to keep numerous appointments set with or by DCF;  he failed to attend any Administrative Case Reviews, he refused DCF access to his entire home during an initial visit, and thereafter refused to let DCF into his home again.

Participate in counseling and make progress toward identified treatment goals.

Father was not compliant with this step.   Father was ordered to successfully complete the St. Francis Hospital Non-offending Parents Program, a psycho-educational group that helps non-offending parents to understand their child's sexual victimization and helps them deal with their own feelings about it.   When initially referred by DCF Father refused to commit to any appointments, claiming that his trucking job often took him out of state.   Although nearly a year later in November 2008 he attended an initial meeting, thereafter he attended only twice and accordingly did not successfully complete the program.   Father was also ordered to participate in the Child Abuse Trauma Services (“CATS”) program offered by Klingberg, but did not attend or cooperate with recommended therapeutic visitation.

Cooperate with court ordered evaluations or testing.

Father was not compliant with this step.   Father was referred to VOICES for a court ordered psychological evaluation, which was scheduled with Dr. Regina Wilson on 5/2/08, but failed to attend.   The court ordered evaluation was rescheduled for 7/11/08, but Father again failed to attend.

Visit child as often as DCF permits and demonstrate appropriate parent/child interaction during visits.

Father was not compliant with this step.   As Father was generally not willing to engage in supervised visits from the time of the OTC on 10/2/07, the first supervised visit did not occur until 4/7/08.   Although that visit went well, a subsequent unsupervised phone call between them left Kristal upset and fearful.

Father also claims to have visited Krystal on several occasions without DCF's authorization or knowledge when she was residing with the Abdullahs.   A second supervised visit in July 2008 went poorly because Father was intimidating and used a threatening tone, which resulted in a lot of silent time until Kristal began crying and Father left abruptly.   Thereafter, Kristal's CATS therapist recommended therapeutic visits and that Father attend a meeting to begin the process.   As Father would neither meet with the therapist nor commit to therapeutic visits, no additional supervised visits occurred.

After Father's incarceration, Kristal visited him twice at Walker to ask him to consent to the termination of his parental rights, and Father spoke inappropriately during the visits.

Cooperate with the child's therapy.

Father failed to meet with the CATS therapist or to cooperate with the recommended therapeutic visitation.

Secure and maintain adequate housing and legal income.

Father maintained a residence in New Britain but denied DCF access to the entire home, and refused to provide any income information.

Sign releases authorizing DCF to communicate with service providers to monitor attendance, cooperation and progress toward identified goals, and for use in future proceedings before this court.

Father refused to sign any releases.

Accept and cooperate with in-home support services referred by DCF and make progress toward the identified goals.

Father refused in-home services.

Follow recommendations of service providers.

As set forth above, Father did not cooperate with service providers.

No involvement/further involvement with the criminal justice system.

Father was arrested on 3/9/09 and has remained incarcerated as set forth above.

Additional facts will be set forth below as warranted.

ADJUDICATION

The issue in this case is whether the petitioner has proved by clear and convincing evidence that the parental rights of the respondent parents should be terminated.  “In order to terminate a parent's parental rights under [General Statutes] § 17a-112, the petitioner is required to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that:  (1) the department has made reasonable efforts to reunify the family;  General Statutes § 17a-112(j)(1);  (2) termination is in the best interest of the child;  General Statutes § 17a-112(j)(2);  and (3) there exists any one of the seven grounds for termination delineated in § 17a-112(j)(3).”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  In re Melody L., 290 Conn. 131, 148-49, 962 A.2d 81 (2009).

“The legal framework for deciding termination petitions is well established.   [A] hearing on a petition to terminate parental rights consists of two phases:  the adjudicatory phase and the dispositional phase.   During the adjudicatory phase, the trial court must determine whether one or more of the ․ grounds for termination of parental rights set forth in § 17a-112[ (j)(3) ] exists by clear and convincing evidence ․ If the trial court determines that a statutory ground for termination exists, then it proceeds to the dispositional phase.   During the dispositional phase, the trial court must determine whether termination is in the best interests of the child ․ The best interest determination also must be supported by clear and convincing evidence.”   (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  In re Melody L., supra, 290 Conn. 163.  “Except in the case where termination is based on consent, in determining whether to terminate parental rights under this section, the court shall consider and shall make written findings regarding” the seven statutorily-enumerated criteria.  General Statutes § 17a-112(k).

Reasonable Efforts

In order to terminate parental rights, DCF must show by clear and convincing evidence that “it has made reasonable efforts to locate the parent and reunify the child with the parent unless the court finds in this proceeding that the parent is unwilling or unable to benefit from reunification efforts ․ providing that such a finding is not necessary if the court has determined at a hearing that such efforts are not appropriate.”  General Statutes § 17a-112(j)(1).

As set forth above, DCF located the respondent mother in Jamaica and communicated with her on several occasions, but mother was unwilling or unable to participate in reunification efforts.

As set forth above, various services were offered to the father to facilitate a reunification with Kristal, including the St. Francis Non-offending Parents treatment program, the Klingberg Child Abuse Trauma Services for family therapy, including therapeutic visitation, and supervised visitation.   The services were appropriate and designed to lead to the reunification of father and child.   The father, however, was unable to benefit from the services because of his lack of cooperation and failure to attend what was offered despite numerous referrals and appointments made by and with DCF.

The court finds by clear and convincing evidence that DCF made reasonable efforts to reunify the child with the respondent parents.

Each statutory basis set out in General Statutes Sec. 17a-112(j) is an independent ground for termination.  In re Baby Girl B., 224 Conn. 263 (1992).   The petitioner is required to prove at least one of the grounds alleged in its petition by clear and convincing evidence.   Only one ground need be established for the granting of a TPR petition.  In re Juvenile Appeal (84-BC), 194 Conn. 252, 258, 479 A.2d 1204 (1984);  In re Shane P., 58 Conn.App. 234, 242-43 (2000).

Abandonment-General Statutes § 17a-112(c)(3)(A) as to mother, Jennifer S.

This ground is established when the child has been abandoned by the parent in the sense that the parent has failed to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern, or responsibility as to the welfare of the child.   The test for determining abandonment of a child for purposes of termination of parental rights is not whether a parent has shown “some interest” in his or her child, but rather, whether the parent has maintained any reasonable degree of interest, concern, or responsibility as to the child's welfare.  In re Rayna M., 13 Conn.App. 23, 36, 534 A.2d 897 (1987).  “Maintain implies a continuing, reasonable degree of concern.”  In re Deanna E., 61 Conn.App. 185, 193 (2000).   Sporadic efforts are insufficient to negate the claim of abandonment.  Id.

“The commonly understood general obligations of parenthood entail these minimum attributes:  (1) express love and affection for the child;  (2) express personal concern over the health, education and general well-being of the child;  (3) the duty to supply the necessary food, clothing and medical care;  (4) the duty to provide an adequate domicile;  and (5) the duty to furnish social and religious guidance.”  (Citations omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  In re Kezia M., 33 Conn.App. 12, 17-18, 632 A.2d 1122 (1993);  In re Roshawn B., 51 Conn.App. 44, 53, 720 A.2d 1112 (1998).   Attempts to achieve contact with a child, telephone calls, the sending of cards and gifts and financial support are indicia of “interest, concern or responsibility.”   In re Migdalia M., 6 Conn.App. 194, 209, 504 A.2d 533 (1986).

Mother has not appeared in these proceedings for the termination of her parental rights, and a default was entered on 8/19/09.   Juvenile proceedings being essentially civil proceedings, the default against the Mother effectively admits the truth of the petitioner's material allegations.   This admission satisfies the petitioner's obligations;  however, this Court has reviewed the evidence submitted by the petitioner in making its determination.

Kristal and her mother were separated when Kristal was an infant when Kristal was taken to reside in the home of her paternal grandparents.   Since then, Mother saw Kristal once in Jamaica and has not seen her for over a decade.   She has not provided a place for her to live or any financial support for her.   She has never visited her.   She has not sent cards, letters or gifts to the child.   She has not acknowledged the child's birthday or other special days.   Although Mother has spoken to DCF on several occasions during the pendency of this matter, and talks to Kristal when Kristal initiates the call, Mother has not maintained a reasonable showing of concern about or responsibility for Kristal.   Mother is aware of these proceedings for the termination of her parental rights, but she has never appeared at any scheduled hearings held by the Superior Court for Juvenile Matters regarding Kristal, or otherwise presented herself to assume the responsibilities of being her mother.   The evidence is clear and convincing that Mother has abandoned Kristal within the meaning of the statute.

Accordingly, the court finds that the petitioner has satisfied its burden and ground A, the claim of abandonment, has been proven by clear and convincing evidence.

Failure to Rehabilitate-General Statutes § 17a-112(j)(B) as to father, Axie F.

If the parent of a child, who has been found by the court to have been neglected or uncared for in a prior proceeding, fails to achieve such degree of personal rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that within a reasonable time considering the age and needs of the child, they could assume a reasonable position in the life of the child, grounds for termination exist.  General Statutes § 17a-112(b)(2).

Kristal was adjudicated neglected and committed to DCF on 11/24/08.

Personal rehabilitation, as used in the statute, refers to the restoration of a respondent to a constructive and useful role as a parent.  In re Migdalia M., 6 Conn.App. 194 (1986) “․ [Section 17a-112] requires the trial court to analyze the [parent's] rehabilitative status as it relates to the needs of the particular child, and further, that such rehabilitation must be foreseeable within a reasonable time.”  (Citation omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  In re Jeisean M., 270 Conn. 382, 398, 853 A.2d 633 (2004);  In re Eden F., 250 Conn. 674, 706, 741 A.2d 873 (1999).   Whether the age and needs of the child do not support allowance of further time for the parent to rehabilitate must also be considered.  In re Luis C., 210 Conn. 157, 167, 554 A.2d 722 (1989).

The parent's compliance with the court ordered expectations entered at the time of the neglect adjudication are relevant but not dispositive to the rehabilitation finding.  In re Luis C., 210 Conn. 157 (1989).   The ultimate question is whether the parent at the time of the filing of the termination petition is more able to resume the responsibilities of parents than he or she was at the time of the commitment.  In re Michael M., 29 Conn.App. 112 (1992).   In making this determination the court may properly rely upon events occurring after the date of the petition when considering whether the degree of rehabilitation is sufficient to foresee that the parent may resume a useful role in the child's life within a reasonable time.  In re Stanley D., 61 Conn.App. 224, 230 (2000).

Specific steps were set for Father to facilitate his reunification with Kristal by addressing his need to better understand and gain insight about the effect of sexual abuse on his daughter, and to participate in supervised and therapeutic visitation, but as set forth above, he failed to cooperate with or to complete the services DCF arranged for him He twice failed to attend his court-ordered psychological evaluation.   He did not cooperate with supervised visitation and attended only two supervised visitations with Kristal between 10/2/07 and July 2008, after which he failed to cooperate with the therapeutic visits recommended by Kristal's CATS therapist.   During the only two visits that occurred after Father's incarceration at Walker, he suggested that their family's issues were all Kristal's fault and repeatedly asked why she hates him.   Such comments are inappropriate, and indicative of his lack of insight regarding the traumatic impact of her past sexual abuse and the impact of his failure to believe and support her.

Father testified at trial, but the court did not find his testimony credible in a number of respects.   Although Father testified that he was Kristal's primary caretaker during the time they shared a household with his parents and siblings in Jamaica, Kristal remembers things differently.   She recalled that when they lived in the same household in Jamaica her father didn't spend any time with her and that at the time she thought of her Uncle Omar as her father.   Moreover, after Father moved to the United States, Father never once visited Kristal in Jamaica, and between the ages of 6 and 11, before she returned to the United States, she visited him only once.   Father also testified that it was never his intention to send Kristal back to Jamaica to live and that he only intended to scare her into good behavior with those threats, but that testimony does not square with that of his mother.   Paternal grandmother testified that when Kristal was living with the Abdullahs, Father asked her to take Kristal back to Jamaica to live with the paternal family, and, further, admitted that she came to Connecticut to do just that, but was unable to complete the plan because of DCF's intervention.

Father testified that presently he believes Kristal “with doubt.”   It is obvious that Father not only has continued to doubt Kristal's sexual victimization by members of his own family, but also has entirely failed to acknowledge how his disbelief and violent response to her disclosure has contributed to her trauma.   Moreover, it is apparent that Father lacks even a remote understanding of Kristal's resulting mental health issues and emotional state, perhaps in large part because of his refusal to engage in the services DCF arranged for him.

The evidence is clear and convincing that Father has demonstrated no ability rehabilitate himself so as to allow any belief that he could, in any reasonable time, resume his role as a parent for his child.

The court by clear and convincing evidence finds that the petitioner has met its burden and therefore finds for the petitioner on Ground B1.

DISPOSITION

General Statute § 17a-112(k) Criteria

The court has found by clear and convincing evidence that the necessary statutory grounds alleged by the petitioner for the termination of Jennifer S. and Axie F.'s parental rights have been proven.   Before making a decision on whether or not to terminate the respondents' parental rights, the court must now consider and make findings on each of the seven criteria set out in General Statute § 17a-112(j).  In re Romance M., 229 Conn. 345 (1994). These criteria and this court's findings, which have been established by clear and convincing evidence, are as follows:

(1) “The timeliness, nature, and extent of services offered or provided to the parent and the child by an agency to facilitate the reunion of the child with the parent.”

Mother has never appeared in court and has never made herself available for reunification efforts.

As set forth above, the court finds that DCF offered timely, appropriate and reasonable services to Father.

(2) “Whether the Department of Children and Families has made reasonable efforts to reunite the family pursuant the Federal Child Welfare Act of 1980, as amended.”

Mother has never appeared in court and has never made herself available for reunification efforts.

As noted above, DCF made reasonable efforts to reunify father and child.

(3) “The terms of any court orders entered into and agreed upon by any individual or agency and the parent, and the extent to which the parties have fulfilled their expectations.”

The court finds that Specific Steps were ordered as to the respondent father, the terms of which are set forth above, but with his lack of compliance, he was unable to rehabilitate so as to make it in Kristal's best interest to be returned to his care.

(4) “The feelings and emotional ties of the child with respect to the parents, any guardians of his person and any person who has exercised physical care custody or control of the child for at least one year and with whom the child has developed significant emotional ties.”

Kristal has not seen her mother since she was five years old, and does not appear have a significant emotional tie with her.

Kristal is now sixteen years old and has spent significant periods of her life living apart from her father, beginning at age six when he left her in Jamaica to start another family in the United States.   Although she has expressed love for him, she does not trust him, does not acknowledge a parent/ child bond, does not want to live with him, and wants his parental rights to be terminated so that she may be adopted.

(5) “The Age of the Child”

Kristal is sixteen years old.

(6) “The effort of the parent has made to adjust his circumstances, conduct, or conditions to make it in the best interest of the child to return to his home in the foreseeable future including but not limited (A) the extent to which the parent has maintained contact with the child as part of an effort to reunite the child with the parent provided the court may give weight to incidental visitations, communications or contributions and (B) the maintenance of regular contact with the guardian or other custodian of the child.”

The respondent mother has made no such efforts and has not seen Kristal since she was five years old.

As set forth above, the respondent father has made little if any effort to adjust his circumstances, conduct or conditions to make it in the best interest of the child to be reunified with him.

(7) “The extent to which a parent has been prevented from maintaining a meaningful relationship by the unreasonable act of any other person or by the economic circumstances of the parent.”

Although Mother was apparently lacking in financial resources, there is no evidence that she has been prevented from maintaining a meaningful relationship with her daughter by the unreasonable act of any other person or by her economic circumstances.

Father did not face any unreasonable interference from any person or economic circumstance preventing him from establishing or maintaining a meaningful relationship with his daughter.   His inability or unwillingness to care for his child or to reunite with her is a result of his own actions or failures to act.   He was offered services which could have led to reunification, had he taken advantage of them.

Best Interests of the Child

The court must now address the issue of whether termination of parental rights is in the best interest of the child.   This is part of the dispositional phase of a termination proceeding.   See In re Valerie D., 223 Conn. 492, 511, 613 A.2d 748 (1992) (“Our statutes and case law make it crystal clear that the determination of the child's best interest comes into play only after statutory grounds for termination of parental rights have been established by clear and convincing evidence”).

The desire and right of a parent to maintain a familial relationship with a child cannot be separated from the desire and best interest of a child either to maintain or to abandon that relationship, or the interest of the state in safeguarding the welfare of children.   These legitimate interests of parent, child and state require a balancing of the factors involved in those interests ․ In every case involving parental rights, a struggle exists between parents and the state to determine what is in the child's best interest, the child being the focus of the struggle ․ (Citations omitted.)

In re Shaquanna M., 61 Conn.App. 592, 598-99, 767 A.2d 155 (2001).

Former Chief Justice Peters has noted:

Cases involving the termination of parental rights are always difficult ․ Accordingly, the court sought the proper balance between the parents' constitutionally protected interest in the care, custody and control of their children, and the interest of the state, acting as parens patriae, to protect the children's health and safety.

In re Christina M., supra, 90 Conn.App. 566-67.

The court finds that termination is in the best interest of Kristal, who has been in care for over 17 months.

As set forth above, Father has failed to accept that Kristal was abused by members of his family and has made little if any attempt to gain an understanding of the issues that led to her removal.   He did not cooperate with DCF.

At the time of trial, Kristal was in the 10th grade at Bulkeley High School, where she was enrolled in AP honors courses.   During her testimony, Kristal was very clear in expressing her wish that her father's rights be terminated because of his lack of belief in her sexual abuse by his family, his resulting physical abuse of her and their lack of a father/daughter relationship.   She also acknowledged that it was not possible for her to be with her mother, expressed her hope to be adopted, and expressed her understanding of what a termination of parental rights means.

It is also significant that Dr. Wilson describes Kristal as a traumatized child who cannot be reunited with her father in the foreseeable future.   At the time of the evaluation, Dr Wilson concluded that reunification with father was not appropriate because of a number of factors, including Kristal's statements that she did not want to return home, her father's refusal to validate Kristal's sexual victimization, his physical abuse of her, his lack of involvement in the child's life, and his lack of cooperation with the DCF, including his failure to undertake therapy in order to try to understand what Kristal had been through.   At trial, some eighteen months later, she again opined that reunification with father was not an option, citing a lack of change in the situation since the time of her evaluation.

The court may, in its discretion, give great weight to the opinion of a professional in a TPR proceeding.   See In re Emerald C., 108 Conn.App. 839, 860 (2008), cert. denied, 289 Conn. 923 (2008), In re Christina V., 38 Conn.App. 214, 221, 660 A.2d 863 (1995) and In re Shyliesh H., 56 Conn.App. 167, 176, 743 A.2d 165 (1999).

In considering whether termination of the respondents' parental rights would be in the child's best interest, the court has examined multiple relevant factors including the child's interests in sustained growth, development, well-being, stability and continuity of her environment;  her length of stay in foster care;  the nature of her relationship with her biological parents;  the degree and quality of contact maintained with her biological parents;  and her genetic bond to the respondents.

The court has also balanced this child's crucial need for emotional stability, validation, consistency and permanency against the potential benefit of maintaining a connection with her biological parents.   See Pamela B. v. Ment, 244 Conn. 296, 314, 709 A.2d 1089 (1998) (child's physical and emotional well-being must be weighed against the interest in preserving family integrity).   After such scrutiny, and after considering the child's age, and the totality of circumstances, the court concludes that termination of parental rights is in the child's best interest.

The court finds by clear and convincing evidence that termination of the respondents' parental rights is in the best interest of the child.

CONCLUSION

Wherefore, having considered all of the evidence, statutory considerations and having found by clear and convincing evidence that grounds exist for termination of parental rights and also having found, by clear and convincing evidence upon all the facts and circumstances presented, that it is in the child's best interest to terminate the parental rights of Jennifer S. and Axie F., the court hereby terminates their parental rights to Kristal.

It is ordered that the Commissioner of the Department of Children and Families is appointed statutory parent for Kristal.   The Commissioner is to file with the court no later than thirty days following the date of judgment, a written report as to the status of this child as required by statute and such further reports shall be timely presented to the court as required by law.   The Clerk of the Probate Court with jurisdiction over any subsequent adoption of this child shall notify in writing the Deputy Chief Clerk of the Superior Court for Juvenile Matters at New Britain of the date when any adoption is finalized.

With regard to the permanency plan for the child, the court hereby approves the plan of termination of parental rights and adoption and overrules the respondent's objection to that plan.   To the extent not previously found, the court also finds that DCF has made reasonable efforts to effectuate the permanency plan.

Judgment may enter accordingly.

BY THE COURT,

GLEESON, J.

FOOTNOTES

FN2. The court has also taken judicial notice of court records including court memoranda and orders made in these cases for their existence, content and legal effect.   See Tait & Prescott, Tait's Handbook of Connecticut Evidence §§ 2.3.4(d), 2.4.1 and 2.4.2. (4th ed.2008)..  FN2. The court has also taken judicial notice of court records including court memoranda and orders made in these cases for their existence, content and legal effect.   See Tait & Prescott, Tait's Handbook of Connecticut Evidence §§ 2.3.4(d), 2.4.1 and 2.4.2. (4th ed.2008).

Gleeson, Marcia J., J.