Eileen Krasnow v. 31 LLC (2010)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT # 120

The defendant, Bridgeport Phase II Owner, LLC, has moved for summary judgment on all counts of the plaintiff's complaint directed against this defendant on the grounds that the plaintiff's claims are premised on the application of the doctrine of adverse possession.   This defendant argues that the plaintiff has failed to produce any evidence to support the application of the doctrine of adverse possession.   The plaintiff's complaint is dated October 24, 2008 and bears a return date of November 25, 2008.   The complaint contains sixteen counts.   Counts thirteen through sixteen are directed towards this defendant, and the subject motion is only applicable to these counts.   Count Thirteen is an action to quiet title.   Count Fourteen alleges adverse possession.   Count Fifteen alleges trespass, and Count Sixteen alleges nuisance.   The plaintiff seeks a judgment pursuant to General Statutes § 47-31:(1) determining the rights of the parties in and to the adverse possession and seeking title thereto, in Krasnow as against the defendant;  and (2) declaring that the title to the adverse possession property is quieted and settled in Krasnow.¹  The plaintiff also seeks temporary and permanent injunctive relief:  (1) enjoining the defendant from asserting any claims over the property;  (2) ordering the defendant to release any claims they may have over the property;  and (3) to retreat from and not enter into or on the property.   The plaintiff also seeks a judgment declaring that title to the property is quieted and settled in the plaintiff.   The plaintiff by way of further relief seeks money damages and punitive damages.²

I

Facts

The plaintiff is the title owner of a building located at 35 Cannon Street, Bridgeport, Connecticut, which she uses as a law office, shared with family members, including her husband.   The building was acquired by the husband in 1971.   Title to this property was transferred by the husband to the plaintiff, his wife, in 1981.   This action seeks to quiet title to a small alleyway (“alley”) which backs on five separate properties, including the plaintiff's property.   It is situated within the boundaries of the property located at 991 Main Street, Bridgeport, Connecticut, which is owned by the defendant, Bridgeport Phase II. The plaintiff, Krasnow, asserts that her use of the alley since 1981 to take 10- to 15-minute cigarette breaks;  to receive occasional deliveries;  to run telephone lines;  to reconstruct and improve a wooden door at the alley entrance;  and to store her trash, has given her exclusive ownership rights to the alley under the legal doctrine of adverse possession.

The property at 991 Main Street was acquired by this defendant as part as an overall $22,000,000 redevelopment of the Downtown North area of the City of Bridgeport.   In return for the City's agreement to transfer title to this defendant by way of a quitclaim deed, this defendant undertook to perform a $10,000,000 renovation to the property at 991 Main Street into a mixed residential and retail space.   This defendant, for the purposes of this motion, accepts as true, the plaintiff's claim of the uses of the alley for the aforementioned purposes.   The sole dispute concerns whether such uses are sufficient to establish a transfer of title by way of adverse possession.³

II

Standard of Law for Summary Judgment

“Practice Book § 17-49 provides that summary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.   In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the trial court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party ․ The party moving for summary judgment has the burden of showing the absence of any genuine issue of material fact and that the party is, therefore, entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Viola v. O'Dell, 108 Conn.App. 760, 763-64, 950 A.2d 539 (2008).

“A material fact is a fact that will make a difference in the outcome of the case ․ Once the moving party has presented evidence in support of the motion for summary judgment, the opposing party must present evidence that demonstrates the existence of some disputed factual issue ․ It is not enough, however, for the opposing party merely to assert the existence of such a disputed issue.   Mere assertions of fact ․ are insufficient to establish the existence of a material fact and, therefore, cannot refute evidence properly presented to the court ․” Campbell v. Plymouth, 74 Conn.App. 67, 80-81, 811 A.2d 243 (2002).

“[I]ssue-finding, rather than issue-determination, is the key to the procedure ․ [T]he trial court does not sit as the trier of fact when ruling on a motion for summary judgment ․ [Its] function is not to decide issues of material fact, but rather to determine whether any such issues exist.”   (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Precision Mechanical Services, Inc. v. T.J. PFund Associates, Inc., 109 Conn.App. 560, 564, 952 A.2d 818, cert. denied, 289 Conn. 940, 959 A.2d 1007 (2008).  “The test is whether a party would be entitled to a directed verdict on the same facts ․ A motion for summary judgment is properly granted if it raises at least one legally sufficient defense that would bar the plaintiff's claim and involves no triable issue of fact.”  (Emphasis added;  internal quotation marks omitted.)   Weiner v. Clinton, 106 Conn.App. 379, 383, 942 A.2d 469 (2008).   The issue of adverse possession is normally a question of fact.  Rudder v. Mamanasco Lake Park Ass'n, 93 Conn.App. 759, 779, 890 A.2d 645 (2006);  General Statutes § 52-575.⁴

III

Adverse Possession

The “essential elements of adverse possession are that the owner shall be ousted from possession and kept out uninterruptedly for fifteen years under a claim of right by an open, visible and exclusive possession of the claimant without license or consent of the owner ․ Adverse possession must be proven by the claimant ․ by clear and convincing evidence.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Anderson v. Poirier, 121 Conn.App. 748, 752 (2010);  Roberson v. Aubin, 120 Conn.App. 72, 74, 990 A.2d 1239 (2010);  see also General Statutes § 52-575.   The standard of proof for establishing title by adverse possession is “clear and positive proof.”  Roche v. Fairfield, 186 Conn. 490, 498, 442 A.2d 911 (1982);  Ruggiero v. East Hartford, 2 Conn.App. 89, 96, 477 A.2d 668 (1984);  Clark v. Drska, 1 Conn.App. 481, 484, 473 A.2d 325 (1984).   This burden of proof places a higher burden upon the claimant than the preponderance of the evidence standard.   See Clark v. Drska, supra, 486-87 (“clear and positive” standard equated to “clear and convincing” standard).   Whether the elements of adverse possession or ouster have been established are questions of fact for the trial court.  Id., 484-85.”

“[A]n adverse possessor may interrupt his or her continuous possession by acting in a way that acknowledges the superiority of the real owner's title ․ [T]he possession of one who recognizes or admits title in another, either by declaration or conduct, is not adverse to the title of such other ․ Occupation must not only be hostile in its inception, but it must continue hostile, and at all times during the required period of fifteen years challenge the right of the true owner, in order to found title by adverse use upon it ․ Such an acknowledgment of the owner's title terminates the running of the statutory period, and any subsequent adverse use starts the clock anew.”   (Citations omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  Id.

“In general, exclusive possession can be established by acts, which at the time, considering the state of the land, comport with ownership;  viz., such acts as would ordinarily be exercised by an owner in appropriating land to his own use and the exclusion of others ․ Thus, the claimant's possession need not be absolutely exclusive;  it need only be a type of possession which would characterize an owner's use ․ It is sufficient if the acts of ownership are of such a character as to openly and publicly indicate an assumed control or use such as is consistent with the character of the premises in question.”   (Citations omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  Roche v. Fairfield, supra, 186 Conn. 502-03.

IV

DiscussionA.Government Immunity from Claims of Adverse Possession

The defendant argues that the disputed property was owned by the City of Bridgeport until it was deeded to Bridgeport Phase II in November 2005, as part of a City redevelopment project.   The City had acquired the subject property pursuant to a Certificate of Taking dated February 2, 2001.   Because the disputed property was being held by the City of Bridgeport from February 2, 2001 until its transfer to the defendant on November 18, 2005, the plaintiff's purported possession of the alley, did not begin to run until November 18, 2005.   This period of time falls far short of fifteen years required for adverse possession.

It is well-established that a state, municipal or governmental agency is immune from claims of adverse possession when it holds the disputed property for a “public use.”  American Trading Real Estate Properties, Inc. v. Town of Fairfield, 215 Conn. 68, 77, 574 A.2d 796 (1990);  see also Goldman v. Quadrato, 142 Conn. 398, 402-03, 114 A.2d 687 (1955) (“Title to realty held in fee by a state or any of its subdivisions for a public use cannot be acquired by adverse possession”).   Properties held in fee simple ownership by municipalities must be presumed to be held for future use.  American Trading Real Estate Properties, Inc. v. Town of Fairfield, supra, 215 Conn. 80.   Land is held for “public use” even when the municipality is not presently making use of it, but is simply holding for development a some later time.  Id. 79.   Absent some evidence of a municipal intention to abandon its plans for future development of the property, the land is immune from claims of adverse possession.  Id., 79-80.   The party seeking title by adverse possession has the burden of rebutting that presumption.  Id. 80.

The plaintiff claims it can rebut the presumption of municipal immunity and that summary judgment is inappropriate.   It is the plaintiff's argument that Goldman v. Quadrato, supra, 142 Conn. 403, the controlling factor is not whether the municipality holds title to the property, but “the use to which the realty [is] put after its acquisition.”  Id., 404.   It is the plaintiff's position that whether the property was held for public use after its acquisition by the City of Bridgeport is a question of fact.   The plaintiff claims the defendant has failed to offer evidence that the City dedicated the alley to public use from the time of its acquisition by the City in 2001 until its transfer by the City to this defendant in 2005.   The plaintiff also argues that the defendant has not presented evidence that:  (1) the public has used the alley;  (2) that the City informed the plaintiff that it owned the alley during the period of 2001 through 2005;  (3) that the public needed access to the alley;  that Krasnow should not prevent access to the alley;  or (4) that the City ever plowed, graded, paved or otherwise maintained the alley.   The plaintiff also argues that her claim of ownership is based on her time of possession and that of her predecessor in title, which dates back to 1972.   Thus, any record interest in the alley had been extinguished before the City took title to the subject property in 2001.

The court finds that the defendant does not have to prove specific ways in which the City dedicated the alley to public use from 2001 through 2005.   There is a presumption of public use.  “Municipal immunity from adverse possession is the rule and not the exception, and we have consistently held that the party seeking to acquire title by adverse possession bears the burden of proving all of the elements of adverse possession.”  American Trading Real Estate Properties, Inc. v. Town of Fairfield, supra, 215 Conn. 80.

By way of documentation submitted by the defendant in support of this motion the defendant has established that the alley at question was part of the Downtown North Arcade parcel that had been held by the City for future development.⁵  The arcade was acquired by the Bridgeport Economic Development Corporation on behalf of the City pursuant to a Certificate of Taking dated February 2, 2001.   The City held the property until November 18, 2005 when it transferred title to Urban Green/Bridgeport Phase II, an urban renewal development firm by way of a quitclaim deed.   In furtherance of the City's redevelopment plans, the defendant undertook a $22,000,000 redevelopment project.

The plaintiff next argues that because her husband took title in the property in 1971, her period of ownership should be “tacked on” to her husband's period of ownership to create the requisite fifteen-year time period, prior to the City's ownership of the property.   The plaintiff's theory that she is entitled to the subject property involves the concept of “tacking.”   Tacking requires the continuous possession of two or more persons.  Matteo v. Dan Beard, Inc., 15 Conn.App. 458, 479-81, 546 A.2d 854, appeal denied, 209 Conn. 812, 550 A.2d 1082 (1988).   It is sufficient if there is an adverse possession continued uninterruptedly for fifteen years whether by one or more persons.   Id. “[T]he possession [however] must be connected and continuous.”  Har v. Boreiko, 118 Conn.App., 787, 799-800, 986 A.2d 1072 (2010).   Accordingly, to determine the question of tacking the court would be required to hear evidence and clear and convincing proof by the plaintiff regarding claims of open, notorious exclusive and uninterrupted possession by the plaintiff's predecessor in title, without the consent of the owner, prior to her assuming title to the property in 1981.   The plaintiff must prove that her predecessor in title's use was adverse.  Marquis v. Drost, 155 Conn. 327, 331, 231 A.2d 527 (1967).

The court notes that there has never been a legal claim of adverse possession filed by the plaintiff or her husband, her predecessor in title until this present action.   A lockable, ten-foot-tall steel gate was erected by someone other than the plaintiff or her husband in the interim, subsequent to the plaintiff acquiring title.   This replaced a wooden gate that was present when her husband acquired title in 1971.   The erection of either gate would break the privity of possession between the plaintiff's estate and that of her husband.   The erection of the fence can be an act that reinstates the title owner's claim and can be evidence of shared dominion, which would defeat the plaintiff's claim of adverse possession.  Whitney v. Turmel, 180 Conn. 147, 148, 429 A.2d 826 (1980), Lisiewski v. Seidel, 95 Conn.App. 696, 702, (2006).   The circumstances surrounding the erection of the gate to the alley and the dates of the erection are questions of fact, which directly affect the question of tacking.   While the court is convinced that the City was immune from claims of adverse possession during its ownership of the property, the question of the plaintiff's ability to tack on her predecessor period of ownership prior to the City taking title is a question of fact.   The question of adverse possession is a question of fact for the trier.  Id., 799.

B.

Exclusive Possession

In order to prevail on her adverse possession claim, the plaintiff must prove by clear and convincing evidence that her use of the alley was exclusive.   The defendant claims the plaintiff cannot meet this burden for four reasons.   First, from the moment Krasnow took title, and possibly before, access to the alley was gained through a gate which Krasnow did not install or control.   Krasnow at her deposition stated that when she took title to her property at 35 Cannon Street in 1981, a hinged wooden gate blocked access to the alley.   Krasnow could not remember if the wooden gate had been in place when her husband had acquired title to 35 Cannon Street, in 1971.   Subsequent to Krasnow acquiring title in 1981, someone other than the plaintiff and her husband took down the wooden gate and erected a ten-foot-tall locking steel-barred gate.   Krasnow at her deposition testified that she did not know who erected the steel gate, but she did not complain to or attempt to contact anyone regarding the erection of this gate.   It does not appear the steel gate has ever been locked, nor has Krasnow ever locked it.   Krasnow has admitted she cannot control or limit access to the alley, as access to the alley has been open to all since the date of Krasnow's ownership.   In 2008, the owners of 41 Cannon Street, Bridgeport, opened a restaurant and began storing trash in the alley.   The restaurant did not ask Krasnow's permission to do so and Krasnow did not complain or attempt to stop the restaurant from doing so.   The restaurant also vented its exhaust system out into the alley.   Again, the restaurant did not ask Krasnow's permission to do so and Krasnow did not attempt to stop the restaurant from doing so.

The defendant also argues that Krasnow has never erected any signs or notices prohibiting entrance to the alley or proclaiming her ownership.   She has not attempted to prohibit anyone from using the alley or called the police for assistance against trespassing, although she has now accused the defendants in this action of trespassing.   Krasnow is present at her office is generally from 9:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. from Monday through Thursday and 9:00 a.m. to 3:00 p.m. on Thursday.   She does not know if anyone else uses the alley during these hours or the hours she is away from work.   She has also admitted that she was unaware if construction workers for the defendant used the alley or took lunch breaks there during the renovation of the premises at 991 Main Street, Bridgeport, Connecticut.   The defendant continues that Krasnow has failed to take any other actions which would indicate ownership or control of the alley.   While she has occasionally swept debris from the alley area by her office, she never arranged for snow removal, surface repairs, paving or landscaping of the alley.   Finally, the defendant argues that sporadic and occasional use or maintenance of a disputed parcel of property are insufficient to establish exclusivity for a claim of adverse possession.

The plaintiff asserts that her use of the alley and that of her family's law firm, since 1981 to take 10- to 15-minute cigarette breaks;  to receive occasional deliveries;  to run telephone lines;  to reconstruct and improve a wooden door at the alley entrance;  and to store trash, has given her exclusive ownership rights to the alley under the legal doctrine of adverse possession.   She also maintains through an affidavit of her predecessor in title, Edward Krasnow, that during his possession he occupied the alley by way of an open, notorious exclusive and uninterrupted possession from 1972 to 1981.

In its Reply Memorandum of Law the defendant argues that the plaintiff “lacks standing to assert her claim” since her law firm's use of the alley does not inure to the plaintiff's benefit for purposes of adverse possession.   Derigibus v. Silberman Furniture Co., 121 Conn. 633, 638-40, 186 A. 553 (1936).

The requisite exclusive possession fails if the adverse user shares dominion over the property with other users.  Arcari v. Dellaripa, 164 Conn. 532, 536, 325 A.2d 280 (1973).   If dominion is shared, then the exclusivity element of adverse possession is absent.  Bowen v. Serksnas, supra, 121 Conn.App. 508-09 (2010).  “Furthermore, “[a]n adverse possessor may interrupt his or her continuous possession by acting in a way that acknowledges the superiority of the real owner's title ․ [T]he possession of one who recognizes or admits title in another, either by declaration or conduct, is not adverse to the title of such other ․ Occupation must not only be hostile in its inception, but it must continue hostile, and at all times during the required period of fifteen years challenge the right of the true owner, in order to found title by adverse use upon it ․ Such an acknowledgment of the owner's title terminates the running of the statutory period, and any subsequent adverse use starts the clock anew.”  (Citations omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  Id., 512.   The court finds that the use of the alley by the plaintiff and/or her law firm and her predecessor in title, as these uses affect the plaintiff's claim of adverse possession, are genuine issues of material fact.

Lastly, the defendant objects that the plaintiff has filed a self-serving affidavit from Edward Krasnow which contradicts and conflicts with the plaintiff's prior sworn deposition testimony.   The court agrees with the defendant that an issue of fact cannot be created by the submission of a self-serving affidavit that contradicts prior sworn testimony.   The court notes, however, that the deposition testimony was that of the plaintiff, Mrs. Krasnow, and the affidavit is from Mr. Krasnow.   The court's decision does not rest solely on the affidavits submitted by the Krasnows.   Rather, the court's decision is reached upon a review of the entire record submitted by the respective parties.   While there may be an identity of interests problem between Mr. Krasnow and the plaintiff, Mrs. Krasnow in this action, the court feels that the testimony of the respective parties will be subjected to vigorous cross-examination by the defendant and will be evaluated accordingly, by the trier of fact.

V

Conclusion

The defendant has made a strong argument for the granting of summary judgment.   However, upon a review of the complaint, the legal briefs and the supporting materials submitted, the court is not convinced that there are no genuine issues of material fact despite the defendant's position that all material facts are undisputed.   While the granting of summary judgment in adverse possession cases is not unheard of, it is well-settled that the issue of adverse possession where facts are disputed, is to be determined by the trier of fact.  Har v. Boreiko, 118 Conn.App. 787, 986 A.2d 1072 (2010);  Rudder v. Mamanasco Lake Park Ass'n, supra, 93 Conn.App. 779;  Allen v. Johnson, 79 Conn.App. 740, 745, 831 A.2d 282, cert. denied, 266 Conn. 929, 837 A.2d 802 (2003).   Accordingly, the motion for summary judgment is denied.

THE COURT

By Judge Richard E. Arnold

FOOTNOTES

FN1. General Statutes § 47-31 reads in relevant part as follows:(a) An action may be brought by any person claiming title to, or any interest in, real or personal property, or both, against any person who may claim to own the property, or any part of it, or to have any estate in it, either in fee, for years, for life or in reversion or remainder, or to have any interest in the property, or any lien or encumbrance on it, adverse to the plaintiff, or against any person in whom the land records disclose any interest, lien, claim or title conflicting with the plaintiff's claim, title or interest, for the purpose of determining such adverse estate, interest or claim, and to clear up all doubts and disputes and to quiet and settle the title to the property.   Such action may be brought whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to the immediate or exclusive possession of the property.(b) The complaint in such action shall describe the property in question and state the plaintiff's claim, interest or title and the manner in which the plaintiff acquired the claim, interest or title and shall name the person or persons who may claim the adverse estate or interest.   In any such action the plaintiff may join as defendants any unknown person or persons who claim or may claim any rights, title, estate or interest in or lien or encumbrance on the property described in the complaint, adverse to that of the plaintiff, whether the claim or possible claim be vested or contingent.   If in the complaint, the plaintiff alleges that there are or that there may be persons who have or may have some right, title, estate or interest in or lien or encumbrance on the real or personal property but the persons cannot be located or are unknown to the plaintiff, or both, and describes the actual or possible estate or interest of such person or persons, and how derived, so far as may be known to him from a reasonable search of the available land records or otherwise, he may join as defendants all unknown persons who may have made any such claim by stating in the summons, after setting forth the names of known claimants, the words, “and all unknown persons, claiming or who may claim any rights, title, interest or estate in or lien or encumbrance upon the real property described in this complaint, adverse to the plaintiff, whether such claim or possible claim be vested or contingent,” and it shall not be necessary to set forth therein any further description of the unknown person or persons.   If, there are no known claimants, or possible claimants, to the property described in the complaint, the action shall be deemed to be maintained against all unknown persons claiming or who may claim any rights, title, estate, or interest, or lien or encumbrance upon the real or personal property described in the complaint, adverse to that of the plaintiff, whether the claim be vested or contingent, and the action may be prosecuted to judgment in the same manner and with like effect as though there had been known claimants or possible claimants designated as party defendants ․(d) Each defendant shall, in his answer, state whether or not he claims any estate or interest in, or encumbrance on, the property, or any part of it, and, if so, the nature and extent of the estate, interest or encumbrance which he claims, and he shall set out the manner in which the estate, interest or encumbrance is claimed to be derived.(e) No judgment for costs shall be rendered in such action against any defendant, who, by his answer, disclaims all estate or interest in or encumbrance on such property, but costs shall be taxed in his favor at the discretion of the court;  and the court shall, in any such case, without further proof, render judgment that such defendant has no estate, interest in or encumbrance on such property or any part of it.(f) The court shall hear the several claims and determine the rights of the parties, whether derived from deeds, wills or other instruments or sources of title, and may determine the construction of the same, and render judgment determining the questions and disputes and quieting and settling the title to the property..  FN1. General Statutes § 47-31 reads in relevant part as follows:(a) An action may be brought by any person claiming title to, or any interest in, real or personal property, or both, against any person who may claim to own the property, or any part of it, or to have any estate in it, either in fee, for years, for life or in reversion or remainder, or to have any interest in the property, or any lien or encumbrance on it, adverse to the plaintiff, or against any person in whom the land records disclose any interest, lien, claim or title conflicting with the plaintiff's claim, title or interest, for the purpose of determining such adverse estate, interest or claim, and to clear up all doubts and disputes and to quiet and settle the title to the property.   Such action may be brought whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to the immediate or exclusive possession of the property.(b) The complaint in such action shall describe the property in question and state the plaintiff's claim, interest or title and the manner in which the plaintiff acquired the claim, interest or title and shall name the person or persons who may claim the adverse estate or interest.   In any such action the plaintiff may join as defendants any unknown person or persons who claim or may claim any rights, title, estate or interest in or lien or encumbrance on the property described in the complaint, adverse to that of the plaintiff, whether the claim or possible claim be vested or contingent.   If in the complaint, the plaintiff alleges that there are or that there may be persons who have or may have some right, title, estate or interest in or lien or encumbrance on the real or personal property but the persons cannot be located or are unknown to the plaintiff, or both, and describes the actual or possible estate or interest of such person or persons, and how derived, so far as may be known to him from a reasonable search of the available land records or otherwise, he may join as defendants all unknown persons who may have made any such claim by stating in the summons, after setting forth the names of known claimants, the words, “and all unknown persons, claiming or who may claim any rights, title, interest or estate in or lien or encumbrance upon the real property described in this complaint, adverse to the plaintiff, whether such claim or possible claim be vested or contingent,” and it shall not be necessary to set forth therein any further description of the unknown person or persons.   If, there are no known claimants, or possible claimants, to the property described in the complaint, the action shall be deemed to be maintained against all unknown persons claiming or who may claim any rights, title, estate, or interest, or lien or encumbrance upon the real or personal property described in the complaint, adverse to that of the plaintiff, whether the claim be vested or contingent, and the action may be prosecuted to judgment in the same manner and with like effect as though there had been known claimants or possible claimants designated as party defendants ․(d) Each defendant shall, in his answer, state whether or not he claims any estate or interest in, or encumbrance on, the property, or any part of it, and, if so, the nature and extent of the estate, interest or encumbrance which he claims, and he shall set out the manner in which the estate, interest or encumbrance is claimed to be derived.(e) No judgment for costs shall be rendered in such action against any defendant, who, by his answer, disclaims all estate or interest in or encumbrance on such property, but costs shall be taxed in his favor at the discretion of the court;  and the court shall, in any such case, without further proof, render judgment that such defendant has no estate, interest in or encumbrance on such property or any part of it.(f) The court shall hear the several claims and determine the rights of the parties, whether derived from deeds, wills or other instruments or sources of title, and may determine the construction of the same, and render judgment determining the questions and disputes and quieting and settling the title to the property.

FN2. In Counts One through Twelve, the plaintiff alleges similar claims against the other defendants and seeks similar remedies and relief..  FN2. In Counts One through Twelve, the plaintiff alleges similar claims against the other defendants and seeks similar remedies and relief.

FN3. A similar motion for summary judgment has been filed by the defendant Shore Winds No. 41 Cannon Street, LLC, adopting the same positions as the present defendant, Bridgeport Phase II Owner, LLC. It is the intent of the court, that this decision will be dispositive of the companion motion..  FN3. A similar motion for summary judgment has been filed by the defendant Shore Winds No. 41 Cannon Street, LLC, adopting the same positions as the present defendant, Bridgeport Phase II Owner, LLC. It is the intent of the court, that this decision will be dispositive of the companion motion.

FN4. General Statutes § 52-575(a) reads as follows:(a) No person shall make entry into any lands or tenements but within fifteen years next after his right or title to the same first descends or accrues or within fifteen years next after such person or persons have been ousted from possession of such land or tenements;  and every person, not entering as aforesaid, and his heirs, shall be utterly disabled to make such entry afterwards;  and no such entry shall be sufficient, unless within such fifteen-year period, any person or persons claiming ownership of such lands and tenements and the right of entry and possession thereof against any person or persons who are in actual possession of such lands or tenements, gives notice in writing to the person or persons in possession of the land or tenements of the intention of the person giving the notice to dispute the right of possession of the person or persons to whom such notice is given and to prevent the other party or parties from acquiring such right, and the notice being served and recorded as provided in sections 47-39 and 47-40 shall be deemed an interruption of the use and possession and shall prevent the acquiring of a right thereto by the continuance of the use and possession for any length of time thereafter, provided an action is commenced thereupon within one year next after the recording of such notice.   The limitation herein prescribed shall not begin to run against the right of entry of any owner of a remainder or reversionary interest in real estate, which is in the adverse possession of another, until the expiration of the particular estate preceding such remainder or reversionary estate..  FN4. General Statutes § 52-575(a) reads as follows:(a) No person shall make entry into any lands or tenements but within fifteen years next after his right or title to the same first descends or accrues or within fifteen years next after such person or persons have been ousted from possession of such land or tenements;  and every person, not entering as aforesaid, and his heirs, shall be utterly disabled to make such entry afterwards;  and no such entry shall be sufficient, unless within such fifteen-year period, any person or persons claiming ownership of such lands and tenements and the right of entry and possession thereof against any person or persons who are in actual possession of such lands or tenements, gives notice in writing to the person or persons in possession of the land or tenements of the intention of the person giving the notice to dispute the right of possession of the person or persons to whom such notice is given and to prevent the other party or parties from acquiring such right, and the notice being served and recorded as provided in sections 47-39 and 47-40 shall be deemed an interruption of the use and possession and shall prevent the acquiring of a right thereto by the continuance of the use and possession for any length of time thereafter, provided an action is commenced thereupon within one year next after the recording of such notice.   The limitation herein prescribed shall not begin to run against the right of entry of any owner of a remainder or reversionary interest in real estate, which is in the adverse possession of another, until the expiration of the particular estate preceding such remainder or reversionary estate.

FN5. The plaintiff has not objected to the submission of the documentation by the defendant..  FN5. The plaintiff has not objected to the submission of the documentation by the defendant.

Arnold, Richard E., J.