Timothy B. Price et al. v. Transamerica Life Insurance Company et al. (2010)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

The plaintiffs, David Price and Timothy Price, are the only children of Elaine S. Price, who died on September 5, 2009, at her home in Orange, Connecticut.   In a two-count complaint, the plaintiffs seek the proceeds of life insurance policies on their mother's life issued by the defendants, Transamerica Life Ins. Co. (Transamerica), and John Hancock Ins. Co. (John Hancock).   Following service of the writ, summons and complaint on October 5, 2009, the defendant Charles Randall Price, in his individual capacity and as the trustee of the Elaine S. Price irrevocable trust, filed a motion to intervene in this action, which was granted on November 20, 2009.

The plaintiffs allege the following facts:  “Upon information and belief,” the defendant Charles Randall Price intentionally caused the death of Elaine Price.   The defendant Transamerica issued a life insurance policy on Elaine Price's life which became payable upon her death.   Following her death, Charles Randall Price, the named beneficiary, made a request for the payment of the proceeds of that policy.   Additionally, the defendant John Hancock issued a second life insurance policy on Elaine Price's life that also became payable upon her death.   Under that policy, the beneficiary is the Elaine S. Price irrevocable trust, of which Charles Randall Price is the sole trustee and primary beneficiary.   Charles Randall Price has also made a request for payment under this policy.   The plaintiffs further allege that, pursuant to estate planning documents in effect of the date of Elaine Price's death and the laws of intestacy, in the event that Charles Randall Price predeceases Elaine Price, her assets are to be distributed to the plaintiffs in equal shares.   They do not allege that they are either contingent or third-party beneficiaries to either the Transamerica or John Hancock policy.

The gravamen of the plaintiffs' complaint is that, in accordance with the provisions of General Statutes § 45a-447(c)(1), because Charles Randall Price was the named beneficiary of both life insurance policies and he intentionally caused the death of Elaine Price, the policies are now payable as though Charles Randall Price had predeceased Elaine Price.   Therefore, the plaintiffs claim the right to the insurance proceeds.

Pending before the court is a motion to dismiss filed by the defendant Charles Randall Price, in his individual capacity and as the trustee of the Elaine S. Price Irrevocable Trust.¹

I

“A motion to dismiss ․ properly attacks the jurisdiction of the court, essentially asserting that the plaintiff cannot as a matter of law and fact state a cause of action that should be heard by the court ․ A motion to dismiss tests, inter alia, whether, on the face of the record, the court is without jurisdiction.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Beecher v. Mohegan Tribe of Indians of Connecticut, 282 Conn. 130, 134, 918 A.2d 880 (2007).  “If a party is found to lack standing, the court is without subject matter jurisdiction to determine the cause.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Fort Trumbull Conservancy, LLC v. New London, 282 Conn. 791, 802, 925 A.2d 292 (2007).

“The burden rests with the party who seeks the exercise of jurisdiction in his favor ․ clearly to allege facts demonstrating that he is a proper party to invoke judicial resolution of the dispute.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Goodyear v. Discala, 269 Conn. 507, 511, 849 A.2d 791 (2004).   “[I]n determining whether a court has subject matter jurisdiction, every presumption favoring jurisdiction should be indulged.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Connor v. Statewide Grievance Committee, 260 Conn. 435, 443, 797 A.2d 1081 (2002).

II

“The law governing descent and distribution emanates from the legislature and is purely statutory ․ The legislature has, by statute, carved out exceptions to the statutes governing descent and distribution to deprive an ostensibly rightful heir, falling within the ambit of those exceptions, of an otherwise lawful inheritance.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Sandford v. Metcalfe, 110 Conn.App. 162, 168, 954 A.2d 188, cert. denied, 289 Conn. 931, 958 A.2d 160 (2008).

The defendants argue that General Statutes § 45a-447(c)(1) does not provide a private right of action and, therefore, the plaintiffs' claims should be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because they lack standing to bring the claims in the Superior Court.   The plaintiffs argue that § 45a-447(c)(1) does expressly or implicitly provide a cause of action for individuals, such as themselves, who are challenging the eligibility of a named beneficiary for benefits under a life insurance policy.

General Statutes § 45a-447(c)(1) provides in relevant part:  “A named beneficiary of a life insurance policy ․ who intentionally causes the death of the person upon whose life the policy is issued ․ is not entitled to any benefit under the policy ․ and the policy ․ becomes payable as though such beneficiary had predeceased the decedent.”  General Statutes § 45a-447(c)(2)(D) provides in relevant part:  “In any proceeding brought under this subsection, the burden of proof shall be upon the person challenging the eligibility of the named beneficiary for benefits under a life insurance policy or annuity.”

Pending before the court is the issue of the plaintiffs' standing and whether § 45a-447(c)(1) provides a private right of action which appears to be an issue of first impression in that the parties have not submitted and the court has not found any Connecticut case law directly addressing this question.

The principles governing statutory construction are well established.  “When construing a statute, [o]ur fundamental objective is to ascertain and give effect to the apparent intent of the legislature ․ In other words, we seek to determine, in a reasoned manner, the meaning of the statutory language as applied to the facts of [the] case, including the question of whether the language actually does apply ․ In seeking to determine that meaning, General Statutes § 1-2z directs us first to consider the text of the statute itself and its relationship to other statutes.   If, after examining such text and considering such relationship, the meaning of such text is plain and unambiguous and does not yield absurd or unworkable results, extratextual evidence of the meaning of the statute shall not be considered ․ When a statute is not plain and unambiguous, we also look for interpretive guidance to the legislative history and circumstances surrounding its enactment, to the legislative policy it was designed to implement, and to its relationship to existing legislation and common law principles governing the same general subject matter ․” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Gerardi v. Bridgeport, 294 Conn. 461, 467-68, 985 A.2d 328 (2010).

The plaintiffs contend that an express right of action exists for claims arising under § 45a-447(c)(1) pursuant to § 45a-447(c)(2)(D) which provides:  “In any proceeding brought under this subsection, the burden of proof shall be upon the person challenging the eligibility of the named beneficiary for benefits under a life insurance policy or annuity.”

The defendants argue that a person challenging the distribution of life insurance benefits does not have an express right of action in the Superior Court unless the named beneficiary is deceased.   They acknowledge that § 45a-447(c)(1) was amended to in 2009 to provide an express private right of action in the Superior Court for “an interested person” in cases where the named beneficiary dies before the murder charge is adjudicated.   See General Statutes § 45a-447(c)(2)(B).²  They argue, however, that in cases where the named beneficiary is still alive, residual beneficiaries under life insurance policies, such as the plaintiffs, must bring challenges to distribution of benefits “in the traditional common law manner-by objecting in the probate court, by bringing a probate appeal, by suing the fiduciary for distribution in accordance with the rule, or by bringing a declaratory judgment action or an interpleader action.” ³  (Def.'s Supp. Mem. Supp. Mot. Dismiss, p. 6.)

Under well settled principles of statutory construction, the court finds that the statute does not expressly provide for a private cause of action.   While the statute was amended in 2009 to create a private right of action under the specific circumstance whereby the guilt of an accused named beneficiary cannot be established before that person dies, the legislature did not expressly change the language of § 45a-447 to address the situation, which is presently before the court, where the accused named beneficiary is still alive.   In their present form, § 45a-447(c)(1) and § 45a-447(c)(2)(D), do not expressly allow a private right of action under the circumstances of this case.

Having made this finding, the court now turns to the question of whether the plaintiffs have an implied right to bring a civil action under § 45a-447(c)(1).   Our Supreme Court has provided the following rules for determining whether a party has met its burden of showing that an implied right of action exists under a statute.  “We begin our analysis with the well settled fundamental premise that there exists a presumption in Connecticut that private enforcement does not exist unless expressly provided in a statute.   In order to overcome that presumption, the [plaintiffs bear] the burden of demonstrating that such an action is created implicitly in the statute ․ ‘In determining whether a private remedy is implicit in a statute not expressly providing one, several factors are relevant.   First, is the plaintiff one of the class for whose ․ benefit the statute was enacted ․ ? Second, is there any indication of legislative intent, explicit or implicit, either to create such a remedy or to deny one?  ․ Third, is it consistent with the underlying purposes of the legislative scheme to imply such a remedy for the plaintiff?’  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Napoletano v. CIGNA Healthcare of Connecticut, Inc., 238 Conn. 216, 249, 680 A.2d 127 (1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1103, 117 S.Ct. 1106, 137 L.Ed.2d 308 (1997).

“Consistent with the dictates of ․ § 1-2z, however, we do not go beyond the text of the statute and its relationship to other statutes unless there is some textual evidence that the legislature intended, but failed to provide expressly, a private right of action.   Textual evidence that would give rise to such a question could include, for example, language granting rights to a discrete class without providing an express remedy or language providing a specific remedy to a class without expressly delineating the contours of the right ․

“Finally, we note that [i]n examining [the three Napoletano ] factors, each is not necessarily entitled to equal weight.   Clearly, these factors overlap to some extent with each other, in that the ultimate question is whether there is sufficient evidence that the legislature intended to authorize [these plaintiffs] to bring a private cause of action despite having failed expressly to provide for one ․ Therefore, although the [plaintiffs] must meet a threshold showing that none of the three factors weighs against recognizing a private right of action, stronger evidence in favor of one factor may form the lens through which we determine whether the [plaintiffs] satisf[y] the other factors.   Thus, the amount and persuasiveness of evidence supporting each factor may vary, and the court must consider all evidence that could bear on each factor.   It bears repeating, however, that the [plaintiffs] must meet the threshold showing that none of the three factors weighs against recognizing a private right of action ․

“The stringency of the test is reflected in the fact that, since this court decided Napoletano, we have not recognized an implied cause of action despite numerous requests.”  (Citation omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  Gerardi v. Bridgeport, supra, 294 Conn., 468-70.

As to the first Napoletano factor, the plaintiffs argue that they are among the class of persons for whose benefit the statute was enacted.   The defendants contend that the plaintiffs would qualify under this factor if they were suing on behalf of the Elaine Price estate, which they claim is the proper residual beneficiary under the life insurance policies, rather than in their individual names.   Regardless, the parties appear to concede that the residual beneficiary of a life insurance policy is among the class of persons who is meant to benefit under General Statutes § 45a-447(c)(1).   After all, the stated purpose of § 45a-447(c)(1) is to prohibit a named beneficiary who intentionally causes the death of the insured from receiving any benefit under the policy.   Among the class of persons who would be protected by § 45a-447(c)(1) would certainly be those persons who would receive the policy benefits if the named beneficiary is deemed to predecease the insured by way of the statute.

The second factor concerns whether there are any indications of legislative intent, explicit or implicit, either to create a right of action or to deny one.   The plaintiffs contend that there is no evidence indicating an intent to deny a right and that the express language of § 45a-447(c) indicates the existence of a private right.   The plaintiffs further contend that the legislative history of the 1983 amendments enacting § 45a-447(c)(1) indicate legislative intent to create a private right of action.

The defendants argue that nothing in the express language of the statute implies the existence of a private right of action, nor does the legislative history prior to the 2009 amendment enacting § 45a-447(c)(2)(B) indicate legislative intent to create a private right of action.

The legislative history provided by the plaintiffs does not support either an explicit or implicit legislative intent to create a private right of action under § 45a-447(c)(1).   Senator Owens explained that the amendment creating § 45a-447(c) was simply an expansion of existing law concerning the distribution of benefits to slayers:  “[U]nder existing law a beneficiary of a life insurance policy or annuity is prohibited from collecting any benefits if he is convicted of murdering an individual who is the annuitant or the insured.   This would extend this prohibition to include any beneficiary who in any way causes the death intentionally of the insured or the annuitant.”   26 S. Proc., Pt. 11, 1983 Sess., p. 3920.   Nowhere in the legislative history is there any indication that the legislature sought to change the existing probate procedure to allow a private right of action in the Superior Court.

Furthermore, the existence of § 45a-447(c)(2)(B) does not change this analysis.   As discussed above, § 45a-447(c)(2)(B) establishes a private right of action in cases where the named beneficiary has died before he or she can be tried for murder or guilt is otherwise established.   That provision, added in 2009, does not expressly create a private right of action in cases, as the instant one, where the named beneficiary is still alive.

The plaintiffs contend, however, that such a private right of action can be implied from the language in § 45a-447(c)(2)(D), which provides that “[i]n any proceeding brought under this subsection,” the “person” who challenges the named beneficiary's right to benefits under a life insurance policy has the burden of proof.   Although the 1983 legislative history, from which they cite, does not discuss the existence of a private right of action, the plaintiffs assert that this section creates an implication of a private right of action because this remedy would be toothless if the challenger could not bring a claim in the Superior Court.

The defendants argue to the contrary that a person seeking to challenge a distribution of life insurance benefits to a named beneficiary who caused the death of the insured has various remedies for doing so absent a private right of action in the Superior Court.   The court agrees.   A significant remedy for challengers such as the plaintiffs would be to contest the accused perpetrator's status in the context of the probate proceedings of the insured's estate.   A probate judge who must follow all the statutes governing descent and distribution including those creating exceptions which deprive an “ostensibly rightful heir” would decide whether to apply § 45a-447(c)(1) to the facts of the case.   See Sandford v. Metcalfe, supra, 110 Conn.App. 168;  Aggrieved persons could appeal from the Probate Court to the Superior Court.  General Statutes § 45a-186.

Another potential remedy would be to bring a declaratory judgment action in the Superior Court, which has jurisdiction pursuant to General Statutes § 52-29 to “declare rights and other legal relations on requests for such a declaration.”   This authority encompasses the power to determine rights to title or possession of property that may be considered part of a decedent's estate.  “The jurisdiction of courts of probate to determine title or rights or to construe instruments or to apply the doctrine of cy pres or approximation pursuant to subsection (a) of this section is concurrent with the jurisdiction of the Superior Court and does not affect the power of the Superior Court as a court of general jurisdiction.”  General Statutes § 45a-98.   See, e.g., McNamara & Goodman v. Pink, 44 Conn.Sup. 592, 594, 696 A.2d 1328 [18 Conn. L. Rptr. 660] (1997) (Superior Court has subject matter jurisdiction, concurrent with Probate Court, to adjudicate the issue of disbursement of insurance recovery being held in escrow).

Finally, courts have decided questions arising from § 45a-447(c)(1) by way of interpleader actions.   See Security Equity Life Ins. Co. v. Diviney, United States District Court for the District of Connecticut, Docket No. 5:91 CV 797(WWE) (D.Conn. August 11, 1995) (policyholder's administratrix proved by preponderance of evidence that policyholder's partner intentionally caused the death of the policyholder and, therefore, had predeceased the policyholder as a matter of law).

This leads to the third Napoletano factor:  whether it is consistent with the underlying purposes of the “legislative scheme” to imply such a private right of action for the plaintiffs.   The plaintiffs contend that permitting a private right of action under § 45a-447(c)(1) is consistent with the underlying purpose of that statute, while the defendants argue that allowing such a private right of action would be inconsistent with the broader statutory scheme concerning inheritance as set forth in the statutes concerning probate of decedents' estates.

The court is persuaded that the defendants' broader view is the better approach.   While Section 45a-447(c)(1) provides guidance to courts dealing with the fact pattern which has given rise to the present action, this section does not, either expressly or implicitly empower a residual beneficiary to bring a civil action in the Superior Court to claim life insurance proceeds where the named beneficiary is still alive.

Finally, in accordance with the undisputed language of both insurance policies, the residual beneficiary of both insurance policies is the estate, not the plaintiffs.   Because they are neither beneficiaries of the Transamerica or the John Hancock policy nor fiduciaries of the estate, they lack standing to sue these companies directly for the proceeds of these policies.   Therefore, the jurisdiction of the Superior Court has not been properly invoked.⁴

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, for all the foregoing reasons, the defendants' motion to dismiss is hereby granted because the plaintiffs lack standing to bring their complaint and, as a result, the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over these claims.

Peck, J.

FOOTNOTES

FN1. Although the motion to dismiss and a supporting memorandum of law were originally filed by Charles Randall Price, they were subsequently adopted by Transamerica and John Hancock.   At oral argument on the motion, held on February 1, 2010, the court requested simultaneous supplemental briefs on the issue of whether § 45a-447(c)(1) provides a private right of action and whether the plaintiffs are the proper parties to bring such an action under the facts of this case.   The parties were heard on this issue at short calendar on April 5, 2010..  FN1. Although the motion to dismiss and a supporting memorandum of law were originally filed by Charles Randall Price, they were subsequently adopted by Transamerica and John Hancock.   At oral argument on the motion, held on February 1, 2010, the court requested simultaneous supplemental briefs on the issue of whether § 45a-447(c)(1) provides a private right of action and whether the plaintiffs are the proper parties to bring such an action under the facts of this case.   The parties were heard on this issue at short calendar on April 5, 2010.

FN2. General Statutes § 45a-447(c)(2)(B) provides:  “For the purposes of this subsection, an interested person may bring an action in the Superior Court for a determination, by a preponderance of the evidence, that a named beneficiary who has predeceased the interested person would have been found guilty under section 53a-54a, 53a-54b, 53a-54c, 53a-54d, 53a-55 or 53a-55a had the named beneficiary survived.”.  FN2. General Statutes § 45a-447(c)(2)(B) provides:  “For the purposes of this subsection, an interested person may bring an action in the Superior Court for a determination, by a preponderance of the evidence, that a named beneficiary who has predeceased the interested person would have been found guilty under section 53a-54a, 53a-54b, 53a-54c, 53a-54d, 53a-55 or 53a-55a had the named beneficiary survived.”

FN3. See General Statutes § 45a-447(c)(2)(C):  “In the absence of such a conviction [of murder] or determination, the Superior Court may determine by the common law, including equity, whether the named beneficiary is entitled to any benefit under the policy or annuity.”  (Emphasis added.).  FN3. See General Statutes § 45a-447(c)(2)(C):  “In the absence of such a conviction [of murder] or determination, the Superior Court may determine by the common law, including equity, whether the named beneficiary is entitled to any benefit under the policy or annuity.”  (Emphasis added.)

FN4. Although the plaintiffs argue alternatively that even if the court decides that the estate and/or trusts were the proper plaintiffs, the court should permit them to substitute these parties pursuant to General Statutes §§ 9-20 or 52-123 and/or Practice Book § 9-20, without deciding whether the claims stated herein could be maintained by these entities, the court declines to do so in any event.   The defect in question is more than circumstantial as there is no indication in the record that either of the plaintiffs is a legal representative of the estate or trusts..  FN4. Although the plaintiffs argue alternatively that even if the court decides that the estate and/or trusts were the proper plaintiffs, the court should permit them to substitute these parties pursuant to General Statutes §§ 9-20 or 52-123 and/or Practice Book § 9-20, without deciding whether the claims stated herein could be maintained by these entities, the court declines to do so in any event.   The defect in question is more than circumstantial as there is no indication in the record that either of the plaintiffs is a legal representative of the estate or trusts.

Peck, A. Susan, J.