State of Connecticut v. Stephen Hayes (2010)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE MOTION TO PRECLUDE CAPITAL PENALTY HEARING BECAUSE CONNECTICUT'S DEATH PENALTY SCHEME VIOLATES THE STATE AND FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONS (No. 49)

The motion now before the court attacks the constitutionality of Connecticut's capital felony statute;  Conn. Gen.Stat. § 53a-46a;  on a number of grounds.   The motion was filed on January 19, 2010 and argued on July 27, 2010.   Unhappily for the defendant, all of the grounds asserted have been rejected by either the Supreme Court of the United States or the Supreme Court of Connecticut.   Our Supreme Court has repeatedly upheld the constitutionality of the statute as construed by that court.  State v. Colon, 272 Conn. 106, 383, 864 A.2d 666 (2004), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 848 (2005).   The defendant's arguments are manifestly made to preserve the issues for reviewing courts.   Under these circumstances, his specific arguments can be answered with appropriate citations.

1. “Permitting, and indeed, requiring the capital sentencer to refuse to consider and weigh established mitigating factors in determining whether to impose a death sentence, through § 53a-46a(d)'s requirement that the sentencer first decide whether the mitigating factors are ‘mitigating in nature, considering all the facts and circumstances of the case,’ violates the constitutional requirement that the sentencer fully consider and give full independent mitigating effect to mitigating evidence in making the ultimate decision whether to impose death.”   This argument was rejected in State v. Rizzo, 266 Conn. 171, 290-99, 833 A.2d 363 (2003).   See Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 650 (1990).

2. “By failing to restrict ‘all the facts and circumstances of the case,’ § 53a-46a(d) permits the sentencer to consider arbitrary and discriminatory factors, as well as other factors not authorized by § 53a-46a, in determining whether mitigating factors are mitigating in nature, rendering its sentencing determination arbitrary and capricious, in violation of due process, equal protection, and the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.”   This argument was rejected in State v. Cobb, 251 Conn. 285, 462, 743 A.2d 1 (1999), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 841 (2000).

3. “No standards guide prosecutorial discretion to seek death, and the disproportionate and arbitrary likelihood of facing and receiving a death sentence due to the disparate charging practices of the State's Attorneys render our death penalty scheme arbitrary and capricious, in violation of due process, equal protection and the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.”   This argument has been rejected in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 199 (1976).   In view of the fact that the Supreme Court of Connecticut has now upheld the constitutionality of several death sentences resulting from the very prosecutorial discretion of which the defendant complains, his state constitutional argument is unconvincing.   In addition, given the horrific nature of the triple homicide alleged in this case (two of the alleged victims being children), it is unlikely that a “central review” structure would yield a different prosecutorial decision than the one reached by the State's Attorney here.

4. “Race inevitably influences capital charging decisions and sentencing outcomes, violating our state constitutional protections against race discrimination, and producing arbitrary and unreliable death sentences, in violation of our state constitutional prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment.”   This claim must be presented in a habeas corpus proceeding.   State v. Reynolds, 264 Conn. 1, 234, 836 A.2d 224 (2003), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 908 (2004).

5. “Permitting the imposition of death on persons who do not themselves kill violates evolving standards of proportional punishment most recently articulated in Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S.Ct. 2641 (2008).”   This argument has been rejected in Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 158 (1987), and State v. Peeler, 271 Conn. 338, 440-50, 857 A.2d 808 (2004), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 845 (2005).

The motion is denied.

Jon C. Blue

Judge of the Superior Court

Blue, Jon C., J.