Steven Stanley 1 v. Rosalyn Stanley (Hine 1) (2010)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

This action to dissolve the marriage of the parties on the grounds of irretrievable breakdown began with a return date of September 22, 2009, before which the defendant had filed an answer admitting the allegations of the complaint and filed her own cross-complaint.   The parties appeared for trial on May 19 and July 22, 2010, the plaintiff representing himself and the defendant appearing with counsel.   Both parties testified, offered certain exhibits into evidence, and the plaintiff also called the following additional witnesses to testify:  Attorney DeAnn Varunesle, an assistant attorney general;  Annette Griffin, a bail bonds person;  Arthur Thomas, a friend of the defendant;  and Greg Lindsay, the finance of the defendant's sister.   The court has carefully considered all the evidence presented,² and the matter is now ready for decision.

The parties were married on June 9, 2009, in Rockville, Connecticut.   They have no minor children.   Neither has received any state or municipal financial assistance during the marriage.   The marriage has broken down irretrievably without hope of reconciliation.   Both resided in Connecticut during the twelve months preceding the bringing of this action and prior to trial.   The parties never lived together, each one maintaining separate residences, but they went out frequently in the evenings drinking.   For the most part after the marriage and before being incarcerated, each one paid its own bills although the plaintiff did frequently give the defendant money for alcohol.   The defendant testified credibly that she was intoxicated most of the time between June and entering a rehab facility several months later.

The evidence shows a short marriage marred by frequent arrests for offenses alleged to have been committed against the other.   At the time of their marriage, the plaintiff was serving a term of probation with a condition of no contact with the defendant.   A few days later, the parties went to Rockville criminal court hoping to obtain a sentence modification that would allow them to have contact;  they also expected to be served with arrest warrants for an incident between them several days earlier and hoped to persuade the prosecutor's office not to pursue those charges.   Eventually, however, both were arrested.   Both parties were released, but the plaintiff was arrested again in September after the defendant filed a complaint with the police stating that he had contacted her in violation of a protective order.   Before his arrest for that the plaintiff had been out on bond, although whether for the arrests referred to here or for others the evidence was not clear, and had posted his Jeep Cherokee with bondswoman Annette Griffin as collateral for his payment of the bond premium.   He was unable to post bond on these new charges, however, and as a result lost the Jeep Cherokee.

At trial the plaintiff sought an order that the defendant reimburse him for the lost Jeep Cherokee because he claimed that the defendant's statements to the police leading to his September arrest, which subsequently prevented him from being able to redeem the Jeep Cherokee from Griffin, were false.   The defendant, however, testified that the charges she made to the police were true.   Although she admitted pleading guilty under the Alford doctrine to violating a protective order by initiating the contact with him in the September incident, she testified credibly that she had done so on the advice of her attorney that she faced a more severe sentence if she did not do so.   And while the plaintiff testified that the charges against him based on the defendant's September complaint to the police were nolled, he admitted that this was part of a plea bargain under which he did plead guilty to interfering with a police officer.   On these and the other facts proven at trial, the evidence is not sufficient to persuade the court that the complaint made by the defendant in her September complaint to the police was false in its entirety.

The plaintiff also sought return of $342 that he gave to the defendant during the marriage to help her out with housing difficulties, but it is common for married persons to make gifts to each other and help provide for each other's support, and the court does not believe such a gift here warrants an order for restitution as part of the judgment of dissolution.

Finally, the plaintiff claimed that the defendant was somehow responsible for his loss of a dirt bike that he had purchased, but the evidence was not credible that she had any part in his losing such an item.

Neither party asks for alimony, and there is no evidence that they have any property or debt in common.   At the time of trial both were incarcerated in Connecticut state correctional facilities.   The plaintiff never filed a financial affidavit using the standard judicial branch form JD-FM-6, but he did complete several financial affidavits on applications for waiver of fees, form JD-FM-75, that he filed, most recently on June 2, 2010.   The defendant filed two financial affidavits on form JD-FM-6 before trial, and one on form JD-FM-75 just prior to trial.   The most recent financial affidavits filed by each party, in connection with applications for waivers of fees, show that the plaintiff has income as a prisoner of $20 per month gross and net and the defendant of $15 per month gross and net.   The plaintiff has no other income.   On 21 occasions between September 29, 2009, and February 19, 2010, the defendant's family and friends sent her gifts that were deposited into her prison trust account ranging from $30 to $250 and totaling slightly more than $1,150.   In view of their regular nature, these gifts represent additional unearned income to the defendant averaging $243 per month.   Her total monthly income from her earnings as a prisoner and gifts from friends and family is thus $258 gross and net.   Each party is found to have the property and debt listed on its financial affidavit, and said property and debt are found to have the values listed thereon.³  Other than the plaintiff's request for restitution for the Jeep, dirt bike, and $342, he made no specific requests regarding property distribution.   The defendant merely seeks a dissolution of the marriage, for the parties to go their separate ways, for each to retain its own property and debts, and a court order recognizing her name.   Having considered the factors set forth in General Statutes § 46b-81 regarding equitable distribution of property,⁴ the court finds that each party should maintain its own property and be responsible for its own debts.   Having considered the factors set forth in General Statutes § 46b-82 with regard to alimony,⁵ none shall be ordered here.

ORDERS

After considering all of the evidence in light of the parties' proposed orders, the arguments of the parties, and the statutory criteria set forth in General Statutes § 46b-81 as to equitable distribution of property and debt and § 46b-82 as to alimony, and court decisions construing the same, the court hereby enters the following orders:

1. Dissolution of marriage

The marriage of the parties, having broken down irretrievably, is hereby dissolved.

2. Defendant's Name

The defendant has been and shall continue to be known as Rosalyn Hine.

3. Equitable Distribution

Each party shall keep its own property free of claim by the other and shall be responsible for its own debts and liabilities, indemnifying and holding the other party harmless thereon.

4. Certified copies of judgment

Both parties being indigent, the clerk shall send a certified copy of the judgment of dissolution to each one.

BY THE COURT

STEPHEN F. FRAZZINI

JUDGE OF THE SUPERIOR COURT

FOOTNOTES

FN2. At trial the plaintiff frequently made factual assertions about matters he claimed were relevant in colloquy with the court or while he was questioning a witness, often as part of an offer of proof or an attempt on his part to explain why the matter he was seeking to introduce should be admitted into evidence.   At these times he was not testifying or under oath.   The court stated to the plaintiff several times that statements he was making while questioning a witness were not evidence unless affirmed by the witness and that statements to the court while examining a witness or arguing the admissibility of proposed evidence were not evidence.   In this decision, the court has considered all the evidence admitted at trial, but not factual assertions made in argument that were not introduced into or supported by the evidence..  FN2. At trial the plaintiff frequently made factual assertions about matters he claimed were relevant in colloquy with the court or while he was questioning a witness, often as part of an offer of proof or an attempt on his part to explain why the matter he was seeking to introduce should be admitted into evidence.   At these times he was not testifying or under oath.   The court stated to the plaintiff several times that statements he was making while questioning a witness were not evidence unless affirmed by the witness and that statements to the court while examining a witness or arguing the admissibility of proposed evidence were not evidence.   In this decision, the court has considered all the evidence admitted at trial, but not factual assertions made in argument that were not introduced into or supported by the evidence.

FN3. Although the plaintiff's last financial affidavit listed a vehicle worth $8700 with a loan balance of $250, the other financial affidavits that he filed all listed the loan balance as $2500, and they all also listed a “car loan” with an amount owed of $2500.   The court thus finds that the $250 specified as the loan balance on the plaintiff's motor vehicle on his last financial affidavit was a scrivener's error, and that the actual loan balance on the vehicle is $2500..  FN3. Although the plaintiff's last financial affidavit listed a vehicle worth $8700 with a loan balance of $250, the other financial affidavits that he filed all listed the loan balance as $2500, and they all also listed a “car loan” with an amount owed of $2500.   The court thus finds that the $250 specified as the loan balance on the plaintiff's motor vehicle on his last financial affidavit was a scrivener's error, and that the actual loan balance on the vehicle is $2500.

FN4. Section 46b-81(c) of the General Statutes states as follows:  “In fixing the nature and value of the property, if any, to be assigned, the court, after hearing the witnesses, if any, of each party, except as provided in subsection (a) of Section 46b-81, shall consider the length of the marriage, the causes for the annulment, dissolution of the marriage or legal separation, the age, health, station, occupation, amount and sources of income, vocational skills, employability, estate, liabilities and needs of each of the parties and the opportunity of each for future acquisition of capital assets and income.   The court shall also consider the contribution of each of the parties in the acquisition, preservation or appreciation in value of their respective estates.”.  FN4. Section 46b-81(c) of the General Statutes states as follows:  “In fixing the nature and value of the property, if any, to be assigned, the court, after hearing the witnesses, if any, of each party, except as provided in subsection (a) of Section 46b-81, shall consider the length of the marriage, the causes for the annulment, dissolution of the marriage or legal separation, the age, health, station, occupation, amount and sources of income, vocational skills, employability, estate, liabilities and needs of each of the parties and the opportunity of each for future acquisition of capital assets and income.   The court shall also consider the contribution of each of the parties in the acquisition, preservation or appreciation in value of their respective estates.”

FN5. Section 46b-82(a) of the General Statutes provides in relevant part:  “In determining whether alimony shall be awarded, and the duration and amount of the award, the court shall ․ consider the length of the marriage, the causes for the ․ dissolution of the marriage ․ the age, health, station, occupation, amount and sources of income, vocational skills, employability, estate and needs of each of the parties and the award, if any, which the court may make pursuant to Section 46b-81, and, in the case of a parent to whom the custody of minor children has been awarded, the desirability of such parent's securing employment.”.  FN5. Section 46b-82(a) of the General Statutes provides in relevant part:  “In determining whether alimony shall be awarded, and the duration and amount of the award, the court shall ․ consider the length of the marriage, the causes for the ․ dissolution of the marriage ․ the age, health, station, occupation, amount and sources of income, vocational skills, employability, estate and needs of each of the parties and the award, if any, which the court may make pursuant to Section 46b-81, and, in the case of a parent to whom the custody of minor children has been awarded, the desirability of such parent's securing employment.”

Frazzini, Stephen F., J.