Paul Maccio v. Rohan Gangrade et al. (2010)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION ON MOTION TO STRIKE (# 109)

The plaintiff seeks money damages for injuries sustained by him in a motor vehicle collision.   The plaintiff alleges that the defendant Gangrade was the operator of the car that struck him, and that Camrac, Inc. leased the car to Gangrade.   He further alleges that Camrac, Inc. is liable under General Statutes § 14-154a.   Camrac, Inc. has moved to strike the complaint as against it, on the basis of 49 U.S.C. § 30106(a).   For the reasons stated herein, the motion is granted.

Motions to strike based upon the Graves Amendment, 49 U.S.C. § 30106(a), are replete in our Superior Court caselaw.   Under the Graves Amendment, an action against a lessor of cars under § 14-154a is preempted if (1) the owner is engaged in the trade or business of renting or leasing motor vehicles, (2) there is no negligence or criminal wrongdoing on the part of the owner.   See Rodriguez v. Testa, 296 Conn. 1, 10 (2010).   The defendant Camrac, Inc. argues that it satisfies both requirements.   In response, the plaintiff argues that because he has not alleged that Camrac, Inc. is engaged in the trade or business of renting or leasing motor vehicles, the motion to strike fails.

“A motion to strike challenges the legal sufficiency of a pleading ․ and, consequently, requires no factual findings by the trial court ․ [W]e construe the complaint in the manner most favorable to sustaining its legal sufficiency ․ [I]f facts provable in the complaint would support a cause of action, the motion to strike must be denied ․ Thus, we assume the truth of both the specific factual allegations and any facts fairly provable thereunder.   In doing so, moreover, we read the allegations broadly ․ rather than narrowly.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Greco v. United Technologies Corp., 277 Conn. 337, 347 1269 (2006).  “In Connecticut, we long have eschewed the notion that pleadings should be read in a hypertechnical manner.   Rather, [t]he modern trend ․ is to construe pleadings broadly and realistically, rather than narrowly and technically ․ [T]he complaint must be read in its entirety in such a way as to give effect to the pleading with reference to the general theory upon which it proceeded, and to do substantial justice between the parties ․ Our reading of the pleadings in a manner that advances substantial justice means that a pleading must be construed reasonably, to contain all that it fairly means, but carries with it the related proposition that it must not be contorted in such a way so as to strain the bounds of rational comprehension.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)   Dimmick v. Lawrence & Memorial Hospital, Inc., 286 Conn. 789, 802 (2008).

Reading the complaint broadly and realistically, the court finds that the plaintiff has alleged that the defendant was in the business of or engaged in the trade of leasing or renting motor vehicles, He alleged in paragraph 4 that Gangrade was operating the motor vehicle as the “lessee of the defendant Camrac, Inc.” and in paragraph 5, that the defendant is liable to the plaintiff pursuant to § 14-154a.   The plaintiff's use of the word “lessee” can be fairly read to mean that Camrac was in the business of leasing cars to individuals.   Moreover, his reliance on § 14-154a to support his cause of action only buttresses the court's decision.   To read this complaint in any other manner would lead to absurd results.

The motion to strike as to Camrac, Inc. is hereby granted.

MAUREEN M. KEEGAN, J.

Keegan, Maureen M., J.