Christy Tellier v. Edward Tellier (2010)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

In this dissolution action, the parties came before the court on June 11, 2010, having agreed, with one exception, upon the division of their real and personal property.   The parties further agreed to all other elements necessary to effect a dissolution of marriage.   In the course of the hearing on June 11, 2010, the parties both moved the court, orally, to resolve their disagreement with regard to the proper division, if any, of a property interest held by the plaintiff.   That interest is described as follows.

The plaintiff, Christy Tellier, holds a fifty-one percent interest in real property, quitclaimed to her in a deed dated July 19, 2005, in which her father holds a life interest.   The plaintiff's father currently resides in the home on that property.   The defendant, Edward Tellier, seeks a promissory note in the amount of $10,000, and a mortgage to secure such debt on the plaintiff's interest in the property.   For the following reasons, the defendant's request is denied.

General Statutes § 46b-81 provides in relevant part:  “(a) At the time of entering a decree annulling or dissolving a marriage or for legal separation pursuant to a complaint under Section 46b-45, the Superior Court may assign to either the husband or wife all or any part of the estate of the other ․ (c) In fixing the nature and value of the property, if any, to be assigned, the court, after hearing the witnesses, if any, of each party, except as provided in subsection (a) of Section 46b-51, shall consider the length of the marriage, the causes for the annulment, dissolution of the marriage or legal separation, the age, health, station, occupation, amount and sources of income, vocational skills, employability, estate, liabilities and needs of each of the parties and the opportunity of each for future acquisition of capital assets and income.   The court shall also consider the contribution of each of the parties in the acquisition, preservation or appreciation in value of their respective estates.”   The court has broad discretion, pursuant to § 46b-81, to assign the property and liabilities of the parties.  Schmidt v. Schmidt, 180 Conn. 184, 191-92, 429 A.2d 470 (1980).   The defendant is seeking an interest in the plaintiff's real property based upon a debt incurred by the plaintiff's parents.

The defendant bases his request in equity, principally on the fact that in February 2005, his parents paid for a medical flight for the plaintiff's father.   The plaintiff's father suffered a stroke while traveling through the state of Wisconsin.   The defendant testified that his parents had three motivations for loaning money to the plaintiff's father.   First, the defendant's parents wanted to assist the plaintiff's father in returning home so that he could keep up the mortgage payments on his house.   Second, they acted out of empathy and altruism.   Third, the plaintiff had traveled to Wisconsin to attend to her father, and it was more convenient for everyone if the plaintiff and her father returned to Connecticut.   The defendant has made it clear that his primary goal in seeking the note and mortgage is to arrange for his parents to be repaid for their generosity.

The plaintiff, on the other hand, is of the view that she has brought many financial and other benefits to the marriage and that the promissory note and mortgage sought by the defendant are not equitable requests.   She argues that the contributions brought to the marriage by both parties are, in effect, roughly equal.   For example, she brought in less income than her husband, who worked long hours and more than one job on occasion, but for her part, she stayed home to care for their two children, by mutual agreement, and she worked prior to having children.   She has agreed to assume full responsibility for the balance due on a car loan, approximately $7000, even though the car has been repossessed.   She has also taken full responsibility for a bill, totaling almost $2000, for orthodonture for the benefit of one of their children.   There are other, similar examples of contributions, both tangible and intangible, made by both parties.

A marriage of any significant duration, and this is such a marriage, is generally an admixture of countless contributions by both husband and wife.   The nature of the contributions are easy to ascertain when they are accompanied by a market price, but they are more difficult to assess when they lack obvious market value, such as providing assistance and guidance to a child while the other parent is at work or addressing the innumerable, quotidian chores and duties endemic to family life.   See Rolla v. Rolla, 48 Conn.App. 732, 738-39, 712 A.2d 440, cert. denied, 245 Conn. 921, 717 A.2d 237 (1998).   This makes it difficult to tally the precise contributions that each party makes to any marriage, including this one.   Nonetheless, the court concludes that over the years, the plaintiff and the defendant made roughly equal efforts to make this marriage succeed.   In the end, those efforts were not successful, but each party did try to meet his or her share of the family responsibilities.

There are additional reasons why the court denies the defendant's request.   Having the plaintiff's father back in Connecticut brought substantial benefit to the defendant.   The plaintiff's father was able to continue making mortgage payments on his house, and after he returned, he allowed the defendant and his family to have a home in which to live, virtually rent free, for several years.   Further, it was far more convenient for the defendant to have his wife back in Connecticut, caring for him and their children, than to have her living in, or traveling to, Wisconsin to care for her father.   Thus, the loan from the defendant's parents to the plaintiff's father resulted in significant benefits to both parties.   Equity does not support the defendant's request.

The court notes that the defendant asserts that his goal is to compensate his parents for their loan.   If the defendant's request is granted, however, and the plaintiff's father outlives the defendant's parents, then the compensation would go to his parents' estate and so, presumably, would thereafter benefit the defendant and not his parents.   Thus, the defendant asks this court to order an operation which is contingent upon a sequence of events that cannot be predicted with accuracy.   As such, it is a request that may not be authorized by § 46b-81.  Rubin v. Rubin, 204 Conn. 224, 232, 527 A.2d 1184 (1987) ( “The present order, while contingent, is definite;  yet the date upon which it may take effect, as well as the situation of the parties upon that date, is necessarily uncertain.   Until our legislature amends § 46b-81 to authorize contingent transfers of expected property, we shall not read such an intent into the statute.”)   The court need not resolve this question, however, due to the other infirmities in the defendant's request.

Finally, the defendant argues that he understands that he, or perhaps his parents, could bring a collection action against the plaintiff, her father, or both, depending upon the exact nature of the loan, but that he made this request in an effort to avoid the expense of a collection action.   A divorce proceeding is not a vehicle for a collection action on behalf of others who are not parties to the proceeding.   Further, although the defendant's proposal would result in economies to both the creditor and the debtor, a divorce proceeding is not an ad hoc collection action.   For all of the foregoing reasons, the defendant's request is denied.

With regard to the remaining issues relevant to a dissolution of marriage, based upon the testimony presented on June 11, 2010, and the documents filed by the parties, the court finds as follows:

1. The parties were married on August 23, 1997, in Winsted, Connecticut;

2. The parties have lived in Connecticut for at least twelve months prior to June 11, 2010;

3. The marriage has broken down irretrievably;

4. The plaintiff and defendant have two minor children, William Richard Tellier, born on June 16, 2000, and Christopher James Tellier, born on June 30, 2003, issue of their marriage;

5. The parties entered into a settlement agreement, dated June 11, 2010, that was read, approved, and signed by both parties;

6. Both parties are satisfied with the terms of that agreement;

7. The agreement is fair, equitable, and is incorporated by reference into the judgment of the court;

8. Judgment of dissolution shall enter.

9. The court will retain jurisdiction to consider the issue of an educational support order at a future date.

BY THE COURT,

Danaher, J.

Danaher, John A., J.