Julie A. Fedorovich v. Edward A. Fedorovich (2010)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION (POST-JUDGMENT)

After extensive hearings spread over a number of weeks concerning multiple post-judgment issues, the parties have distilled all outstanding issues down to three salient points that the Court will attempt to address.

This was a dissolution of marriage entered on the record with both parties represented and present on September 17, 2008.   This dissolution was memorialized in a document entitled “Marital Settlement Agreement” that was entered into the Court file date stamped on November 6, 2008.   The Court finds that the controlling document is the “Marital Settlement Agreement” which was acknowledged by the plaintiff as her free act and deed on October 22, 2008 and by the defendant on November 6, 2008.   Two of the interrelated issues concern the child support and medical insurance coverage for the minor child Evan Fedorovich, date of birth August 1, 1990 who was eighteen (18) at the time of the dissolution, but had not graduated from high school due to circumstances that will be further explained.

Before the issues concerning the care and support of said Evan Fedorovich are addressed, the Court will turn to an issue involving a certain parcel of real estate at 20 Sedgewick Lane in Litchfield which under the said Marital Settlement Agreement paragraph 8.1.3 was to be transferred by the defendant husband to the plaintiff wife with indemnity and hold harmless language running back to the defendant husband effective on the date of transfer.   The issue focuses on what was the effective date of transfer of this property at 20 Sedgewick Lane, Litchfield, Connecticut:  Is it the date of dissolution which relates back to September 17, 2008 or is it the date on which the actual transfer of deed occurred between the parties with a subsequent recording on March 6, 2009.

The fact that the subject deed wasn't recorded until March 6th of 2009 by plaintiff's counsel raises the issue as to who is responsible for the property during this approximate six-and-a-half (6 1/2) month period in which the subject property at 20 Sedgewick Lane was legally still in the name of the defendant.   There was some credible evidence indicating that the plaintiff was exercising some degree of control over the premises by way of locked access and clean-up of those premises.   The Court finds that due to the churlish conduct of both parties and the resulting toxic atmosphere created by such conduct, the effectuation of the Court Order relating to the transfer of the subject property was not carried out effectively.   The Court finds that both parties are pari delicto and therefore whatever expenses and costs have been incurred relating to said property should be shared equally by each party over the said disputed period of time, to include, but not limited to any mortgage, insurance, taxes, utilities and/or any other ordinary and necessary expenses attaching to said property.   Once that total amount for said time period is agreed to or ordered, it will be shared equally by the parties.¹  (Emphasis added.)

The second issue of major contention between the parties related to the expenses incurred for the benefit of the said minor child Evan Fedorovich who by all credible accounts had engaged in criminal activity that resulted in his arrest and subsequent prosecution in the Bantam G.A. Court.   Evan was represented by Attorney William Ward and after extensive plea negotiations a plea agreement was reached that would involve Evan partaking in a particular program in the State of Utah that was known as RedCliff Ascent (Plaintiff's Exhibit 30a).   This program consisted of a “wilderness component” that the plaintiff wife claims had a therapeutic element to it.   There was conflicting testimony as to whether RedCliff was “therapeutic” in a psychological sense, dealing with a specific diagnosis or at least with a general condition of Evan's.   The Court finds that the plaintiff's intent was that Red Cliff would not only help Evan in dealing with the present emotional crises in his life, but would also persuade the State's Attorney that it was a satisfactory diversionary program that would allow Evan to avoid any period of incarceration for the underlying criminal charges.

The plaintiff wife incurred a substantial expense [in excess of $30,000] in order to enroll Evan in this ten (10) week program in Utah. The Court turns to the child support paragraphs 5.2 and 5.2.1 concerning the medical expenses and costs for said minor child which are uncovered by medical insurance.   The Court notes that both parents were negligent in allowing medical insurance coverage to lapse for the minor child, thereby allowing a period of vulnerability in which the minor child was uninsured.

The Court looks to the said sub-paragraphs as to whether or not “counseling fees” fall under the heading of unreimbursed/uninsured child support expenses.   Further, the defendant claims that the RedCliff option was a decision unilaterally made by the plaintiff wife without a full and consensual consultation with the defendant husband.

The paragraphs 5.2.1 and 11.2 of the “Settlement Agreement” include “counseling” as part of any uninsured or unreimbursed medical expenses.   Therefore, it would appear that the costs incurred at RedCliff, regardless of how effective or ineffective the course may have been for Evan's present and future psychological treatment and development, certainly assisted him in meeting a condition imposed by the State's Attorney that would allow him to serve a probationary period without incarceration.

The issue as to whether the defendant husband agreed to this course of treatment at RedCliff and to the costs that were incurred by the plaintiff wife at the beginning of the program in June of 2009 is perhaps problematic for the defendant, but the Court finds the program at least opened an avenue that in the short term, if not the long term, proved to be beneficial for the son Evan. The Court relies on the case of Bucy v. Bucy, 23 Conn.App. 98 (1990), as still controlling and guiding in the general application of equity in child support issues.   The Court finds that the uninsured and unreimbursed costs that have been incurred for the benefit of Evan are the shared responsibility of each parent.   Therefore, that total cost for RedCliff (Plaintiff's Exhibit # 29) to include Evan's travel are to be shared equally and in effect the defendant husband owes the plaintiff mother one-half (1/2) of that submitted expense [$31,300.00] that was incurred at RedCliff Ascent.

The final issue concerns child support and the extent to which it would continue beyond the age of eighteen (18) under the statute or by way of Section 5.1 of said agreement.   Although it was anticipated that Evan would graduate from high school in June of 2009, the intervening enrollment in RedCliff in Utah prevented that graduation and therefore the next controlling date would be his birthday in which he would turn nineteen (19) on August 1, 2009.   The Court finds that is the controlling date.   The plaintiff makes no further claim for child support beyond that date and therefore the defendant owes whatever the balance is from his last payment submitted to be February 2, 2009 to August 1, 2009 (Defendant's Exhibit # 2 & Plaintiff's Exhibit # 2) in the amount of $2,782 subject to further verification.

The Court finds that neither party is in contempt of the Court although their contempt for one another has clouded their adult reasoning in ability to care for and provide the nurturing support that is so necessary for a troubled youth such as Evan. The Court does not award any costs or attorneys fees to either party and hopefully all further issues between the parties can be reconciled without Court intervention, all in the interest of domestic tranquility.   The Court considers all issues to have been concluded, subject to any implementing orders that the parties and the Court may find necessary.

BY ORDER OF THE COURT,

Roche, J.

FOOTNOTES

FN1. If further orders are necessary to determine such amount with certainty, the parties will submit their claimed amounts as implementing orders.   Exhibits-Plaintiffs # 32, 33, 34, 34a, 34b, 34d, 35a do not clearly allocate such charges to the specific time frame..  FN1. If further orders are necessary to determine such amount with certainty, the parties will submit their claimed amounts as implementing orders.   Exhibits-Plaintiffs # 32, 33, 34, 34a, 34b, 34d, 35a do not clearly allocate such charges to the specific time frame.

Roche, Vincent E., J.