State of Connecticut v. Robert Dearing (2010)

RULING ON MOTION TO SUPPRESS HEARING

(The following is an excerpt of the proceedings.)   THE MARSHAL:  This court is now back in session.

You may be seated.

Good afternoon, Your Honor.

THE COURT:  Good afternoon.

ATTY. SMITH:  Good afternoon, Your Honor.

THE COURT:  Returning to the matter of State versus Robert Dearing.   Okay. What was before the Court was a motion to suppress statements made by the defendant to Officer Slavin.   The Court will note that there isn't any indication as to which statements the State intended to use and the defense motion was any and all statements made and so it's just an observation.

In this particular matter, the Court earlier today ruled that the defendant was in custody at the time he made the statements, so the remaining question is whether he had waived his Fifth Amendment right prior to giving the statements and whether the statements were voluntary.

The Court inquires into all the circumstances surrounding the interrogation issue, looked at the totality of the circumstances in making that determination.

The following information was presented in court:  That the defendant is age 30;  he'd been working.   He does appear to be competent, was not under the influence of anything, and the Court details following the standard in-considered the standard laid out in State v. Whitaker concerning the circumstances such as age, experience, education, background, intelligence, and the capacity to understand the warnings.

And as to whether or not the statement is voluntary, again, in examining all of the circumstances, there are a number of factors that the Court considers including the accused's maturity, education, physical condition, mental health, whether or not he had been advised, the location and length of the detention, the intensity and prolonged nature of the interrogations, the presence of physical punishment including the lack of food or sleep.   So the Court has considered all of those things.

In this instance, the defendant, while at home, the two officers appeared, identified themselves, informed him that they were conducting a criminal investigation and his name had come up in that investigation.   He had voluntarily accompanied the officers to the police department.   While he's at the department there isn't any indication that he had been threatened, coerced, had been detained in terms of the length of time that is considered in terms of the interrogation.   He didn't-There isn't any evidence he was deprived of anything and, as I indicated before, that he was under the influence and didn't seem to understand what was going on.

The defendant was Mirandized and as the case law indicates, the Miranda warnings, what's required, is that the substance or fully effective equivalent be provided.   In this instance the officer indicated that he did advise him of the substance of the warning and they were actually read verbatim from the card that the officers used.

There isn't any dispute that the defendant did not sign the card acknowledging this when asked to do so, but he did disclose that he had previously been arrested, he had some familiarity with the procedures, had dealt with the Naugatuck Police Department and he did acknowledge that he understood the advisement.

Additionally, although he refused, he did indicate that he was willing to talk.   He volunteered the statement that he had been abused.   The Court credits the officer's testimony that when the defendant indicated that he did not want to talk about his abuse, although he had volunteered the statement, the officer did not ask any further questions about it.

The nature of the interrogation was such, although counsel has used the terms rapid and-rapid succession, that was not the officer's testimony.   It was a question and answer.   He posed the questions and the accused answered those questions.

At some point he did indicate that he no longer wanted to talk about the matter and when he did that, the officer stopped then ask-asking any questions concerning that, so there-from the testimony, there does not even appear to have been any questions concerning his abuse and so the Court does not draw the inference or accept the suggestion that somehow there was some confusion.

The defendant volunteered the statement, said he didn't want to talk about it, and the officer indicated he did not question him about it.   He did question him on other matters and the defendant answered those questions and then indicated at some point he wanted to stop.

There was some suggestion and argument concerning the re-advisement, however, this is not--the circumstances of this case do not lend themselves to that requirement given the Court's understanding of clearly what happened in the two matters.   The voluntary statement, there was no question at all about it;  and when he answered the questions and the officer stopped when he indicated he didn't want to talk any further.

And so in looking at the totality of the circumstances, the Court finds the defendant was given the substance of the Miranda warnings;  that he gave the statement voluntarily;  that he did invoke the Fifth Amendment right to remain silent;  and when he did so, the officer did not question him any further and there wasn't any disagreement that the defendant never requested the right to counsel and so the Court finds that there was no indication of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel, again, prior to the statements that are at question and there-nothing's been presented to the Court concerning any statements made subsequent to the implication of the right.

So based on the totality of the circumstances test, the Court finds that there was a voluntary waiver.   When the defendant revoked that waiver, the officer ceased questioning, and the Court finds based on what was described that the statement was voluntary, so the motion to suppress is denied and, however, again, the statements obviously will be subject to the other rules of evidence since I don't know the details, again, of all the statements other than what I read in the report.

(The matter continued.)

Juliett L. Crawford, Judge

Crawford, Juliett L., J.