IAFF 834 v. City of Bridgeport (2010)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE APPLICATION TO VACATE ARBITRATION AWARD, APPLICATION TO CONFIRM ARBITRATION AWARD

The action was commenced by IAFF Local 834 (“Union”) and requests that the court vacate an arbitration award involving matters between the plaintiff Union and the defendant City of Bridgeport (“City”).¹  Thereafter, the City filed its Application to Confirm the Arbitration Award.   Both applications have been filed under the same docket number, and the court will file this one memorandum of decision to dispose of both applications, as both applications address identical issues regarding the arbitration award, which was rendered by the State Board of Mediation and Arbitration panel on January 22, 2009.

The Union and the City are parties to a collective bargaining agreement that provides for the arbitration of disputes regarding certain terms and conditions of the employment of Union members.   Ronald Morales was hired by the City of Bridgeport Fire Department in approximately August 1987 and was terminated on or about February 29, 2008.   Events that had occurred in May, June and July 2006, had caused the Fire Department to bring eight charges against Morales.²  Following a disciplinary hearing on these charges, Morales was found to be in violation of certain provisions of the Department's Rules and Regulations, a Department Directive and a Chief's Order.³  The penalties imposed on Morales by the City included a fifteen working day suspension and the demotion of Morales from Provisional Senior Fire Inspector to the position of Fire Inspector.

Thereafter Morales filed a grievance disputing the penalties.   The grievance was denied by the City. The Union then claimed the matter for arbitration.   The submission by the parties to the arbitration panel requested that the arbitrators consider the following:

Was the discipline of Grievant (15 working day suspension and demotion as Provisional Senior Inspector to Fire Inspector) contained in Chief Rooney's October 6, 2006 letter for just cause?”  “If not, what should the remedy be?

The three-person arbitration panel, thereafter, heard sworn testimony and received evidence and exhibits during multiple days of hearings.   On January 22, 2009, the arbitration panel rendered its decision by way of an Arbitration Award, a copy of which has been reviewed by the court.   The panel ruled that just cause existed for the suspension and demotion and stated as follows:

A review and weighing of all of the evidence clearly indicates that the actions taken by the grievant during the months of May, June and July 2006, were in the vast majority, but not all instances clear violations of the Rules and Regulations of the Fire Department.   What stands out is the grievant's overall insubordinate conduct when disagreeing with the Fire Chief's authority to institute changes in the Fire Marshal Division.   The grievant never exercised his contractual right to file a grievance when in disagreement with this exercise of authority by the Fire Chief.   This conduct alone of insubordination on many occasions would warrant the discipline given the grievant.   However, in his leadership position as a Provisional Senior Fire Inspector, the grievant's conduct was especially objectionable and his suspension and demotion was warranted ․ The above clearly indicates that the grievant is no stranger to discipline and the penalty of suspension in recent years ․ Based on the above discussion, there is a clear preponderance of the evidence to support a finding of just cause for the discipline imposed by the City on the grievant.

The union claims that this award must be vacated because the arbitration panel has exceeded its powers or so imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made, as the award:  (1) does not conform to the submission;  (2) is beyond the scope of the submission;  (3) is contrary to law;  and (4) is indefinite and illegal because it is in violation of General Statutes § 52-418.⁴  More particularly, the Union heard testimony and evidence concerning eight charges that were alleged against Morales.   The award stated that the actions taken by the grievant during May, June and July 2006 “were in the vast majority, but not all instances ” clear violations of the rules and regulations of the fire department.  (Emphasis added.)   The Union argues that it is virtually impossible to determine what charges the grievant was found to be responsible for and which charges he was relieved of responsibility.⁵  Accordingly, the Union claims the decision is not final as to the charges presented to the panel.

The City requests that the court confirm the award arguing that the panel clearly resolved the issue in dispute and its analysis leaves no doubt that it understood the parties' respective positions and considered the evidence carefully.   The City claims the decision was within the scope of the submission, which was broad.   The panel was asked to determine whether the discipline issued to the grievant was for just cause and the City argues that is precisely the issue the panel decided.

I

Standard of Law

The court's analysis of the parties' claims is guided by well-established principles regarding a party's application to vacate or confirm a consensual arbitration award.  “Judicial review of arbitral decisions is narrowly confined ․ When the parties agree to arbitration and establish the authority of the arbitrator through the terms of their submission, the extent of our judicial review of the award is delineated by the scope of the parties' agreement ․ When the scope of the submission is unrestricted, the resulting award is not subject to de novo review even for errors of law so long as the award conforms to the submission ․ Because we favor arbitration as a means of settling private disputes, we undertake judicial review of arbitration awards in a manner designed to minimize interference with an efficient and economical system of alternative dispute resolution ․” Economos v. Liljiedahl Brothers, Inc., 279 Conn. 300, 305, 901 A.2d 1198 (2006).  “Because [courts] favor arbitration as a means of settling private disputes, [courts] undertake judicial review of arbitration awards in a manner designed to minimize interference with an efficient and economical system of alternative dispute resolution.”  Board of Police Commissioners v. Stanley, 92 Conn.App. 723, 733, 887 A.2d 394 (2005), quoting State v. AFSCME, Council 4, Local 387, AFL-CIO, 252 Conn. 467, 474, 747 A.2d 480 (2000).

“Where the submission does not otherwise state, the arbitrators are empowered to decide factual and legal questions ․ Courts will not review the evidence nor, where the submission is unrestricted, will they review the arbitrators' decision of the legal questions involved ․ In other words, [u]nder an unrestricted submission, the arbitrators' decision is considered final and binding;  thus the courts will not review the evidence considered by the arbitrators nor will they review the award for errors of law or fact ․” Id.

“Arbitration is a creature of contract and the parties themselves, by the terms of their submission, define the powers of the arbitrators ․ The authority of an arbitrator to adjudicate the controversy is limited only if the agreement contains express language restricting the breadth of issues, reserving explicit rights, or conditioning the award on court review.   In the absence of any such qualifications, an agreement is unrestricted ․ Because we favor arbitration as a means of settling private disputes, we undertake judicial review of arbitration awards in a manner designed to minimize interference with an efficient and economical system of alternative dispute resolution ․ Under an unrestricted submission, the arbitrators' decision is considered final and binding:  thus the courts will not review the evidence considered by the arbitrators nor will they review the award for errors of law or fact ․ The resulting award can be reviewed, however, to determine if the award conforms to the submission.”  (Citations omitted:  internal quotation marks omitted.)  Industrial Risk Insurers v. Hartford Steam Boiler Inspection & Ins. Co., 258 Conn. 101, 109-10, 779 A.2d 737 (2001).

In the case of an unrestricted submission, our Supreme Court has recognized three grounds for vacating such an award:  (1) the award rules on the constitutionality of a statute;  (2) the award violates clear public policy;  and (3) the award contravenes one or more of the statutory proscriptions of General Statutes § 52-418.   See Economos v. Liljedahl Brothers, Inc., supra, 279 Conn. 305-06;  Garrity v. McCaskey, 223 Conn. 1, 6 (1992).   The union brings its application to vacate the arbitration award pursuant to General Statutes § 52-418(a)(4), which provides that an arbitration award shall be vacated if the arbitrators have exceeded their powers or so imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made.  “The party challenging the award bears the burden of producing evidence sufficient to demonstrate a violation of § 52-418.”  Industrial Risk Insurers v. Hartford Steam Boiler Inspection & Ins. Co., supra, 258 Conn. 115.  “In our construction of § 52-418(a)(4), we have, as a general matter, looked to a comparison of the award with the submission to determine whether the arbitrators have exceeded their powers ․ We have also recognized, however, that ․ [a]n award that manifests an egregious or patently irrational application of the law is an award that should be set aside pursuant to § 52-418(a)(4) because the arbitrator has exceeded [his] powers or so imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Harty v. Cantor Fitzgerald & Co., 275 Conn. 72, 81, 881 A.2d 139 (2005).

II

Discussion

It is clear from the award rendered that the panel acted within its broad scope of authority.   The decision was specifically based upon the panel's determination that there was just cause for the discipline imposed upon the grievant Morales.   The panel by the terms of the unrestricted submission by the parties, hereto, was requested to determine whether the discipline issued was for just cause and that's what the panel decided.  “[T]he submission tells the arbitrators what they are obligated to decide.”  Id., 80-81.   In its written decision the arbitration panel specifically stated, “[t]he grievant never exercised his contractual right to file a grievance when in disagreement with this exercise of authority by the Fire Chief.   This conduct alone of insubordination on many occasions would warrant the discipline given the grievant.”

In assessing whether the panel has exceeded its powers, the test is a comparison of the award with the submission to determine whether the award meets the minimum requirements of being mutual, final and definite.   International Broth. of Police Officers, Local 361 v. Town of New Milford, 81 Conn.App. 726, 730-31, citing Rocky Hill Teachers' Ass'n. v. Board of Education, 72 Conn.App. 274, 280 (2002).  “[A]n award must be final as to the matters submitted so that the rights and obligations of the parties may be definitely fixed.”  Id. The award conforms to the submission of the parties.   The court accords the greatest deference to an award that has been made pursuant to unrestricted submissions.  Board of Education v. Civil Service Employees, 88 Conn.App. 559, 568, 870 A.2d 473 (2005).   Accordingly, the award must be confirmed, and the application to vacate said award must be denied.  Amalgamated Transit Union Local 1588 v. Laidlaw Transit, Inc., 33 Conn.App. 1, 4 (1993);  see also, Preston v. State of Connecticut Division of Criminal Justice, 60 Conn.App. 853, 865 (2000).

THE COURT

By Judge Richard E. Arnold

FOOTNOTES

FN1. IAFF Local 834 is the exclusive bargaining agent for certain employees of the Bridgeport Fire Department..  FN1. IAFF Local 834 is the exclusive bargaining agent for certain employees of the Bridgeport Fire Department.

FN2. The eight charges filed against Morales were as follows:1.  Grievant was grossly insubordinate at the May 17, 2006 meeting;2.  Grievant ignored the order of the Acting Fire Marshal Cosgrove to attend the June 19, 2006 meeting;3.  Grievant made insubordinate, racist and outrageous statement to Acting Fire Marshal Cosgrove on June 23, 2006;4.  Grievant made insubordinate remarks to Acting Fire Marshal Cosgrove on June 26, 2006;5.  Grievant failed to enforce inspection policy on July 7, 2006;6.  Grievant failed to comply with the inspection policy and made insubordinate remarks to Acting Fire Marshal Cosgrove on July 11, 2006;7.  Grievant failed to comply with the inspection policy and made insubordinate remarks to Acting Fire Marshal Cosgrove on July 13, 2006;8.  Grievant failed to comply with the inspection policy on July 14, 2006..  FN2. The eight charges filed against Morales were as follows:1.  Grievant was grossly insubordinate at the May 17, 2006 meeting;2.  Grievant ignored the order of the Acting Fire Marshal Cosgrove to attend the June 19, 2006 meeting;3.  Grievant made insubordinate, racist and outrageous statement to Acting Fire Marshal Cosgrove on June 23, 2006;4.  Grievant made insubordinate remarks to Acting Fire Marshal Cosgrove on June 26, 2006;5.  Grievant failed to enforce inspection policy on July 7, 2006;6.  Grievant failed to comply with the inspection policy and made insubordinate remarks to Acting Fire Marshal Cosgrove on July 11, 2006;7.  Grievant failed to comply with the inspection policy and made insubordinate remarks to Acting Fire Marshal Cosgrove on July 13, 2006;8.  Grievant failed to comply with the inspection policy on July 14, 2006.

FN3. On October 6, 2006, Morales was notified that he was found guilty of violation §§ 21.3, 21.4, 21.10, 21.18, 21.42, 21.46, 21.47, 21.48 and 21.49 of the Bridgeport Fire Dept. Rules and Regulations.   Additionally he was found guilty of Rules and Regulations # 9, # 10, # 14 and # 20.   He was also found guilty of the City of Bridgeport Racial and Ethnic Slurs § 23.99;  Dept. Directive # 25, May 19, 2005 (violence in the workplace);  and Chief's Order 07/06 regarding Rumors and Malicious Gossip..  FN3. On October 6, 2006, Morales was notified that he was found guilty of violation §§ 21.3, 21.4, 21.10, 21.18, 21.42, 21.46, 21.47, 21.48 and 21.49 of the Bridgeport Fire Dept. Rules and Regulations.   Additionally he was found guilty of Rules and Regulations # 9, # 10, # 14 and # 20.   He was also found guilty of the City of Bridgeport Racial and Ethnic Slurs § 23.99;  Dept. Directive # 25, May 19, 2005 (violence in the workplace);  and Chief's Order 07/06 regarding Rumors and Malicious Gossip.

FN4. Sec. 52-418 reads as follows:(a) Upon the application of any party to an arbitration, the superior court for the judicial district in which one of the parties resides or, in a controversy concerning land, for the judicial district in which the land is situated or, when the court is not in session, any judge thereof, shall make an order vacating the award if it finds any of the following defects:  (1) If the award has been procured by corruption, fraud or undue means;  (2) if there has been evident partiality or corruption on the part of any arbitrator;  (3) if the arbitrators have been guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone the hearing upon sufficient cause shown or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and material to the controversy or of any other action by which the rights of any party have been prejudiced;  or (4) if the arbitrators have exceeded their powers or so imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made.(b) If an award is vacated and the time within which the award is required to be rendered has not expired, the court or judge may direct a rehearing by the arbitrators.   Notwithstanding the time within which the award is required to be rendered, if an award issued pursuant to a grievance taken under a collective bargaining agreement is vacated the court or judge shall direct a rehearing unless either party affirmatively pleads and the court or judge determines that there is no issue in dispute.(c) Any party filing an application pursuant to subsection (a) of this section concerning an arbitration award issued by the State Board of Mediation and Arbitration shall notify said board and the Attorney General, in writing, of such filing within five days of the date of filing..  FN4. Sec. 52-418 reads as follows:(a) Upon the application of any party to an arbitration, the superior court for the judicial district in which one of the parties resides or, in a controversy concerning land, for the judicial district in which the land is situated or, when the court is not in session, any judge thereof, shall make an order vacating the award if it finds any of the following defects:  (1) If the award has been procured by corruption, fraud or undue means;  (2) if there has been evident partiality or corruption on the part of any arbitrator;  (3) if the arbitrators have been guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone the hearing upon sufficient cause shown or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and material to the controversy or of any other action by which the rights of any party have been prejudiced;  or (4) if the arbitrators have exceeded their powers or so imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made.(b) If an award is vacated and the time within which the award is required to be rendered has not expired, the court or judge may direct a rehearing by the arbitrators.   Notwithstanding the time within which the award is required to be rendered, if an award issued pursuant to a grievance taken under a collective bargaining agreement is vacated the court or judge shall direct a rehearing unless either party affirmatively pleads and the court or judge determines that there is no issue in dispute.(c) Any party filing an application pursuant to subsection (a) of this section concerning an arbitration award issued by the State Board of Mediation and Arbitration shall notify said board and the Attorney General, in writing, of such filing within five days of the date of filing.

FN5. There has been no motion to correct and/or modify the award filed by the Union pursuant to General Statutes § 52-419, which reads as follows:(a) Upon the application of any party to an arbitration, the superior court for the judicial district in which one of the parties resides or, in a controversy concerning land, for the judicial district in which the land is situated, or, when the court is not in session, any judge thereof, shall make an order modifying or correcting the award if it finds any of the following defects:  (1) If there has been an evident material miscalculation of figures or an evident material mistake in the description of any person, thing or property referred to in the award;  (2) if the arbitrators have awarded upon a matter not submitted to them unless it is a matter not affecting the merits of the decision upon the matters submitted;  or (3) if the award is imperfect in matter of form not affecting the merits of the controversy.(b) The order shall modify and correct the award, so as to effect the intent thereof and promote justice between the parties..  FN5. There has been no motion to correct and/or modify the award filed by the Union pursuant to General Statutes § 52-419, which reads as follows:(a) Upon the application of any party to an arbitration, the superior court for the judicial district in which one of the parties resides or, in a controversy concerning land, for the judicial district in which the land is situated, or, when the court is not in session, any judge thereof, shall make an order modifying or correcting the award if it finds any of the following defects:  (1) If there has been an evident material miscalculation of figures or an evident material mistake in the description of any person, thing or property referred to in the award;  (2) if the arbitrators have awarded upon a matter not submitted to them unless it is a matter not affecting the merits of the decision upon the matters submitted;  or (3) if the award is imperfect in matter of form not affecting the merits of the controversy.(b) The order shall modify and correct the award, so as to effect the intent thereof and promote justice between the parties.

Arnold, Richard E., J.