State of Connecticut v. Miguel Gonzalez (2010)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE MOTION TO SUPPRESS STATEMENT

The defendant, Miguel Gonzalez, stands charged with murder arising out of the October 7, 2007 shooting death of Miguel Vasquez.   This homicide occurred on Ogden Street in Bridgeport.   The defendant's first trial on this charge ended in a mistrial when the jury was unable to reach a unanimous verdict.   Prior to the first trial, the trial judge (Hauser, J.) had granted a defense motion to suppress an oral statement made by the defendant to the police.   In connection with the present trial, the state has asked this court to review that ruling.   The state asserts that the motion to suppress should now be denied because of (1) additional facts it seeks to present and (2) a decision of the United States Supreme Court that was announced after Judge Hauser made his ruling.

This court conducted an evidentiary hearing on the motion to suppress on June 23, 2010.   At that hearing, the state presented testimony from Detective Daniel Kalagian, as well as introducing as evidence the defendant's prior criminal record and a Bridgeport Police Department rights form.

For the reasons set forth below, and notwithstanding the new material presented by the state, this court believes that Judge Hauser's ruling was correct and that the motion to suppress should be granted.¹

FACTS

Based upon the transcript of the testimony presented to Judge Hauser as well as the evidence presented in this present proceeding, this court makes the following findings of fact.

On October 24, 2007, the defendant was arrested by Bridgeport police officers on a gun charge.   After booking, he was taken to an interview room in the detective bureau of the police department.   Present with the defendant were Officer Jeffrey Long and Detective Daniel Kalagian.   Detective Kalagian read the defendant his so-called Miranda ² rights from a Bridgeport Police Department form.   Although Kalagian had no specific recollection as to this case, it was his habit to have all interviewees also read the following sentence contained on the form:  “Before I am interviewed or asked any questions, I am aware that that I must be advised of my rights and I must fully understand those rights.”

The entire interview lasted between five and ten minutes.   At no time during the interview was the defendant asked whether, in fact, he understood his rights.

The defendant refused to sign the form and would not initial it in the space provided after each Miranda right.   The defendant said he was not going to sign anything.

Kalagian then engaged the defendant in conversation about inconsequential matters and the defendant spoke to the detective.   When Kalagian asked the defendant about the gun case for which he was just arrested, he responded, “I don't want to talk about that.”   After some further small talk, Kalagian asked the defendant about the homicide on Ogden Street.   The defendant said, “I wasn't there and if you want to talk to me about it, I want a lawyer.”

During the interview, the defendant told the police that he did not want to give a statement.   Kalagian interpreted this to mean that the defendant was unwilling to give a written statement.   In addition, the defendant was in police custody throughout the interview with one of his hands handcuffed to the interview chair.

At the time of the interview, the defendant was twenty-seven years old and had been arrested by the Bridgeport Police Department on five previous occasions dating back to 1997.

DISCUSSION

The state concedes that the defendant was subject to custodial interrogation.   In addition, there is no dispute that the police provided the defendant with the Miranda warnings.   Accordingly, whether his statement about the homicide must be suppressed turns on the resolution of two separate issues:  (1) whether, prior to the statement, the defendant invoked his right to remain silent;  and (2) whether the defendant waived his right to remain silent.

A.

In Berghuis, Warden v. Thompkins, 08-1470, 560 U.S. (2010),³ The United States Supreme Court held that in order to invoke the Miranda right to remain silent a suspect must do so “unambiguously.”  Id. In this regard, the Supreme Court adopted the standard that had previously only applied to asserting a right to counsel.   See Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 459 (1994).   Once an accused invokes the right to remain silent, the police must honor such invocation and cut off questioning.  Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 103 (1975).

In the present case, the defendant asserts that when he told the police that he did not want to talk about the gun case, the police should have ceased all questioning.   This position is unpersuasive.   It appears that the defendant talked a fair amount during the short interview-albeit on irrelevant topics.   His declaration that he did not want to talk about the gun case, while adequate to cut off questioning on that subject, cannot fairly be construed as an unambiguous invocation of the right to remain silent on all matters.   See generally Strauss, The Sounds of Silence:  Reconsidering The Invocation of the Right to Remain Silent under Miranda, 17 Wm. & Mary Bill Rights J. 773, 788-802 (2009) (collecting cases on selective invocation of right to remain silent).

This court finds that the defendant did not invoke his right to remain silent.

B.

Even absent the accused's invocation of the right to remain silent, an accused's statement during custodial interrogation is inadmissible at trial unless the prosecution can establish that the accused in fact knowingly and intelligently waived the Miranda rights when making the statement.  North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 373 (1979).   Such waiver can be implied from all the circumstances.  Id., 376.   Moreover, the prosecution's burden is to establish waiver by a fair preponderance of the evidence.  Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 168 (1986).

In Butler, the Supreme Court stated that a waiver of Miranda rights may be implied through the defendant's silence, coupled with an understanding of his rights and a course of conduct indicating waiver.  North Carolina v. Butler, supra, 441 U.S. 373.   In the recent case of Berghuis, Warden v. Thompkins, the Supreme Court went further stating:

Where the prosecution shows that a Miranda warning was given and that it was understood by the accused, an accused's uncoerced statement establishes an implied waiver of his right to remain silent.

Id. The court reasoned that “as a general proposition, the law can presume that an individual who, with full understanding of his or her rights, acts in a manner inconsistent with their exercise has made a deliberate choice to relinquish the protection those rights afford.”  Id.

These United States Supreme Court decisions must be applied in the context of our Connecticut jurisprudence.   Our Supreme Court has ruled that Miranda warnings have an independent basis in article first, § 8 of the Connecticut constitution.  State v. Burge, 195 Conn. 232, 246 n.15 (1985).   In addition, it is clear under Connecticut law that the state bears the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that a defendant has knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily waived the rights that inhere in the privilege against self-incrimination.  State v. Weidenhof, 205 Conn. 262, 267 (1987).   Moreover, a finding of waiver must be supported by substantial evidence.   Id., 268.   Finally, our Supreme Court has stated that courts must presume that a defendant did not waive his rights.  State v. Wilson, 183 Conn. 280, 284 (1981).

The state asserts that under Berghuis, Warden v. Thompkins, Judge Hauser's ruling suppressing the defendant's statement must be reconsidered and rejected.   The defense position is that, notwithstanding the new case, the state has not proved that the defendant waived his right to remain silent.

Although it is a close question, this court finds that the facts and circumstances of this case, when considered in their totality, are insufficient to establish an implied waiver.   While the police did advise the defendant of his Miranda rights, whether the defendant had a full understanding of those rights is less clear.   As noted above, the police never asked him if he understood his rights and he never voluntarily stated that he did.   It is true that familiarity with the Miranda rights may be inferred from a person's criminal record.  State v. Cobb, 164 Conn. 402, 421, cert. denied, 414 U.S. 861 (1973).   Given the number of prior arrests in this case, it is likely that the defendant had on multiple occasions been advised of the Miranda rights.

The main problem with the state's waiver claim is that virtually everything the defendant did during the short interview session demonstrated an intent not to cooperate with the police and not to give them a statement regarding the crimes they were investigating.   From the very beginning the defendant refused to sign or initial the rights waiver form and refused the police request that he give a statement.   Unlike some other cases, this was not a situation where a suspect refuses to give a written statement but agrees to talk orally.   See e.g. North Carolina v. Butler, supra, 441 U.S. 371 (after being read the Miranda warnings Butler told the police “I will talk to you”).   The defendant in the present case agreed to nothing.   In addition, when asked about the gun charge he flatly refused to talk about it.   Even the statement that the state claims demonstrates waiver (“I wasn't there and if you want to question me, I want a lawyer”) amounts to an invocation of his right to counsel.

In accordance with the dictates of our Supreme Court, this court must presume that the defendant did not waive his rights and insist that the state put forward substantial evidence to prove waiver.   Applying the preponderance of the evidence standard, this court finds that the state has not met its burden of proof.

The motion to suppress the defendant's statement is granted.

So Ordered at Bridgeport, Connecticut this 25th day of June 2010.

ROBERT J. DEVLIN, JR., J.

FOOTNOTES

FN1. The fact that Judge Hauser's ruling is the “law of the case” does not preclude this court from examining the issue.   The law of the case is not an inflexible principle and in a proper situation a judge may modify or depart from an interlocutory ruling of another coordinate magistrate, in whole or in part.  State v. Almeda, 211 Conn. 441, 453 (1989)..  FN1. The fact that Judge Hauser's ruling is the “law of the case” does not preclude this court from examining the issue.   The law of the case is not an inflexible principle and in a proper situation a judge may modify or depart from an interlocutory ruling of another coordinate magistrate, in whole or in part.  State v. Almeda, 211 Conn. 441, 453 (1989).

FN2. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)..  FN2. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).

FN3. Since this case was decided on June 1, 2010, there is no further citation available to the Supreme Court Reporter or Lawyer's Education Reports..  FN3. Since this case was decided on June 1, 2010, there is no further citation available to the Supreme Court Reporter or Lawyer's Education Reports.

Devlin, Robert J., J.