The Chandlery at Essex, Inc. v. Phillip Schonberger et al (2010)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION # 160

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On June 3, 2010, this court issued a memorandum of decision denying the motion for summary judgment brought by the defendants, Philip Schonberger, d/b/a Albermarle Equities, LLC and Albermarle Equities, LLC (the defendants).   This action arises out of an aborted commercial real estate transaction, in which the defendants, as buyers, backed out of a contract to purchase property located at 9 Novelty Lane in Essex that was owned by the plaintiff, the Chandlery at Essex, Inc. In the operative two-count complaint, the plaintiff alleges claims for interpleader and breach of contract against the defendants who are parties to the motion, as well as the co-defendant Chicago Title Insurance Company (Chicago Title).   This operative complaint alleges that pursuant to the parties' contract, the defendants deposited $36,700 in earnest money with Chicago Title, which is an escrow agent.   The contract further provided that the defendants would deposit an additional $110,100 within five business days of the conclusion of the buyer's due diligence period.   Pursuant to the parties' agreement, the plaintiff could keep this deposit as liquidated damages in the event of a breach of contract by the defendants.   The basis of the plaintiff's interpleader cause of action is a disagreement over the rightful ownership of the $36,700 deposit that is currently being held in escrow by Chicago Title.   In denying the defendants' motion for summary judgment, this court determined that the defendants had failed to demonstrate the absence of all genuine issues of material fact as to whether the plaintiff had suffered actual damages as a result of the defendants' breach of contract.

Following this court's decision, the defendants filed a motion for reconsideration on June 7, 2010.¹  The defendants move for reconsideration of the court's denial of their motion for summary judgment as to count one for interpleader.   Specifically, the defendants argue that the court should reverse its previous ruling because the operative complaint does not directly seek liquidated damages and the plaintiff only requests general contract damages.   The plaintiff filed a memorandum of law in opposition to the defendants' motion on June 15, 2010.   On June 21, 2010, the defendants also filed a reply memorandum.   The court granted reargument and the parties appeared at short calendar on June 22, 2010.

DISCUSSION

“[T]he purpose of a reargument is ․ to demonstrate to the court that there is some decision or some principle of law which would have a controlling effect, and which has been overlooked, or that there has been a misapprehension of facts ․ It also may be used to address ․ claims of law that the [movant] claimed were not addressed by the court ․ [A] motion to reargue [however] is not to be used as an opportunity to have a second bite of the apple.”   (Citations omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  Opoku v. Grant, 63 Conn.App. 686, 692-93, 778 A.2d 981 (2001).  “The granting of a motion for reconsideration ․ is within the sound discretion of the court.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Mangiante v. Niemiec, 98 Conn.App. 567, 575-77, 910 A.2d 235 (2006).  “A reconsideration implies reexamination and possibly a different decision by the [court] which initially decided it.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Id., 577.

In their motion, the defendants argue that the plaintiff cannot legally obtain the deposit held by ChicagoTitle because the operative complaint does not request liquidated damages.   It should be noted that the defendants already raised this argument in their original motion for summary judgment.   When rejecting this position, this court noted:  “The defendants provided no authority in support of this proposition.   As the subject contract was attached to the original complaint, and, therefore, considered part of the complaint;  see Practice Book § 10-29;  and the plaintiff is seeking damages for breach of a contract that provides for liquidated damages, the plaintiff is not absolutely barred from recovering liquidated damages.”   The defendant's motion for reconsideration cites Sanitary Services Corp. v. Greenfield Village Assn., Inc., 36 Conn.App. 395, 651 A.2d 269 (1994), for the defendants' position that the plaintiff cannot obtain liquidated damages because liquidated damages are not alleged in the operative complaint.   A close examination of that case, however, reveals that it does not provide for such a rule of law.   Rather, the court in Sanitary Services Corp. determined that, as a general principle, a plaintiff can obtain either liquidated or actual damages, but not both.

The defendants' reply memorandum also references a number of boilerplate quotations from Supreme and Appellate Court cases standing for the proposition that a plaintiff's recovery is limited to the allegations of its complaint.   While the court agrees that a plaintiff can only successfully obtain relief for causes of action that are provided for in its complaint, the plaintiff in the present case has alleged a claim for breach of contract.   As liquidated damages are a legally appropriate remedy for breach of contract in certain circumstances, the plaintiff could conceivably obtain liquidated damages if it succeeds on its breach of contract claim.   The defendants have still failed to provide the court with a citation to any authority stating an absolute rule of law that the plaintiff must specifically request liquidated damages in its complaint in order to obtain this remedy for the breach of contract that authorizes liquidated damages.

Therefore, the court declines the defendant's request to reconsider its previous decision and upholds the determinations set forth in its June 3, 2010 memorandum of decision.   The defendants' motion for summary judgment is denied in its entirety.

THE COURT

Brazzel-Massaro, J.

FOOTNOTES

FN1. The court notes that the correct name of the motion authorized by Practice Book § 11-12 is a “motion to reargue,” not a “motion for reconsideration.”.  FN1. The court notes that the correct name of the motion authorized by Practice Book § 11-12 is a “motion to reargue,” not a “motion for reconsideration.”

Brazzel-Massaro, Barbara, J.