Joshua Gudeahn v. Evan Jensen (2010)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE MOTION TO STRIKE [# 109]

On November 27, 2009, the plaintiff, Joshua Gudeahn, as administrator of the estate of the decedent, Edward Gudeahn, III, brought a four-count complaint against the defendants, Evan Jensen, Natalie Jensen, Time Out Sports Cafe, LLC (Time Out) and Ippokratis Kedioglou.   The action arises out of a fatal accident in which the decedent was struck by an automobile operated by Evan Jensen and owned by Natalie Jensen.¹  Count one of the plaintiff's complaint alleges a wrongful death claim against the defendant and Natalie Jensen.   Count two of the plaintiff's complaint, directed toward the defendant, alleges a statutory recklessness claim and applicable damages pursuant to General Statutes § 14-295.   Counts three and four of the plaintiff's complaint, directed toward Time Out and Kedioglou, allege claims for Dram Shop liability and recklessness, respectively.

On February 9, 2010, the defendant filed a motion to strike count two of the plaintiff's complaint, and the corresponding claim for double or treble damages pursuant to § 14-295, on the ground that the claim fails to allege sufficient facts to make out a claim for statutory recklessness.   The defendant filed a memorandum of law in support of his motion.   On March 17, 2010, the plaintiff filed an objection to the defendant's motion to strike.

DISCUSSION

“The purpose of a motion to strike is to contest ․ the legal sufficiency of the allegations of any complaint ․ to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Fort Trumbull Conservancy, LLC v. Alves, 262 Conn. 480, 498, 815 A.2d 1188 (2003).  “A motion to strike challenges the legal sufficiency of a pleading ․ and, consequently, requires no factual findings by the trial court.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)   Batte-Holmgren v. Commissioner of Public Health, 281 Conn. 277, 294, 914 A.2d 996 (2007).  “It is fundamental that in determining the sufficiency of a complaint challenged by a defendant's motion to strike, all well-pleaded facts and those facts necessarily implied from the allegations are taken as admitted.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Violano v. Fernandez, 280 Conn. 310, 318, 907 A.2d 1188 (2006).  “The court must construe the facts in the complaint most favorably to the plaintiff.”  Faulkner v. United Technologies Corp., 240 Conn. 576, 580, 693 A.2d 293 (1997).

General Statutes § 14-295 provides in relevant part:  “In any civil action to recover damages resulting from personal injury, wrongful death or damage to property, the trier of fact may award double or treble damages if the injured party has specifically pleaded that another party has deliberately or with reckless disregard operated a motor vehicle in violation of section 14-218a, 14-219, 14-222, 14-227a, 14-230, 14-234, 14-237, 14-239 or 14-240a, and that such violation was a substantial factor in causing such injury, death or damage to property.”

As this court previously indicated in Ritacco v. Archila, Superior Court, judicial district of New London, Docket No. CV 08 5006526 (December 31, 2008, Martin, J.), “there is a split of authority regarding the pleading requirements for a claim of statutory recklessness under § 14-295 ․ [and][t]his court is of the view that a plaintiff [need only] allege that the defendant deliberately or with reckless disregard operated a motor vehicle in violation of any of the statutes enumerated in § 14-295, and that the violation was a substantial factor in causing the plaintiff's injuries.”  (Citation omitted, internal quotation mark omitted.)

In count two of his complaint, the plaintiff alleges that the defendant was reckless in “[operating] the motor vehicle in a reckless manner having due regard for traffic, visibility and area of the highway.” and in “[operating] the vehicle at an unreasonable fast rate of speed, in violation of [General Statutes] § 14-218a ․” The plaintiff further alleges in count two of his complaint that the defendant's “recklessness or deliberate disregard ․ was a substantial factor in causing the injuries and death of the ․ decedent ․” As a result, construing the plaintiff's claim most favorably to sustaining its legal sufficiency, the court finds that the plaintiff has met the aforementioned standard, and therefore, the defendant's motion to strike count two of the plaintiff's complaint is denied.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the court hereby denies the defendant's motion to strike count two of the plaintiff's complaint.

Martin, J.

FOOTNOTES

FN1. Natalie Jensen, Time Out and Kedioglou are not parties to the present motion.   Hereinafter, the term the defendant refers to Evan Jensen..  FN1. Natalie Jensen, Time Out and Kedioglou are not parties to the present motion.   Hereinafter, the term the defendant refers to Evan Jensen.

Martin, Robert A., J.