Nancy Rembert v. April Pennix (2010)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE MOTION TO DISMISS (# 102)

PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The plaintiff, Nancy Rembert, who is pro se, filed the complaint in this action on December 29, 2009.   In her complaint, the plaintiff alleges the following facts.   The defendant, April Pennix, owned, occupied and controlled the premises at 1601 East Market Street, Greensboro, North Carolina.   The plaintiff was born in Bridgeport, Connecticut and lived in New Haven, Connecticut for the majority of her life.   In July 2006, the plaintiff moved from New Haven to Greensboro after receiving a two-year full scholarship, whereby she would live on-campus for the first year and off-campus for her second year.   The plaintiff agreed to live off-campus her second year on the condition that the cost of living was covered by her basketball scholarship.   In her second semester, the plaintiff did not receive a “house check” in the amount of $1,820.   As a result, she was unable to pay rent in the summer of 2008 and for a speeding ticket she received in Greensboro.   In addition, she did not receive athletic scholarship money in the amount of $383.60, rent money in the amount of $440.11 and a “manual refund check in 2008.”   The plaintiff further alleges that the defendant was “responsible for the [p]laintiff ․” because she received the checks before they were sent to students and knew that the plaintiff did not receive the money.   As a result of the defendant's carelessness, the plaintiff has been unable to pay her bills and has been unable to work because her drivers license has been revoked.   The plaintiff claims that she has suffered great physical and mental pain and suffering as a result of the defendant's carelessness.

On February 9, 2010, the defendant, who is also pro se, filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the court lacks personal jurisdiction over her.   The motion is accompanied by a memorandum of law.   On March 8, 2010, the plaintiff filed a memorandum in opposition to the defendant's motion to dismiss.   She filed a second memorandum in opposition on March 29, 2010.   Thereafter, the plaintiff filed two motions for order, on April 1, 2010 and April 5, 2010, respectively.   These motions were denied by

“When a defendant files a motion to dismiss challenging the court's jurisdiction, a two-part inquiry is required.   The trial court must first decide whether the applicable state longarm statute authorizes the assertion of jurisdiction over the [defendant].   If the statutory requirements [are] met, its second obligation [is] then to decide whether the exercise of jurisdiction over the [defendant] would violate constitutional principles of due process.”   (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Knipple v. Viking Communications, Ltd., 236 Conn. 602, 606, 674 A.2d 426 (1996).  “Only if we find the statute to be applicable do we reach the question [of] whether it would offend due process to assert jurisdiction.”  Lombard Bros., Inc. v. General Asset Management Co., 190 Conn. 245, 250, 460 A.2d 481 (1983).

Connecticut's longarm statute provides in relevant part:  “As to a cause of action arising from any of the acts enumerated in this section, a court may exercise personal jurisdiction over any nonresident individual ․ who in person or through an agent:  (1) Transacts any business within the state;  (2) commits a tortious act within the state ․ (3) commits a tortious act outside the state causing injury to person or property within the state ․ if such person or agent (A) regularly does or solicits business, or engages in any other persistent course of conduct, or derives substantial revenue from goods used or consumed or services rendered, in the state, or (B) expects or should reasonably expect the act to have consequences in the state and derives substantial revenue from interstate or international commerce;  (4) owns, uses or possesses any real property situated within the state;  or (5) uses a computer ․ or a computer network ․ located within the state.”  General Statutes § 52-59b(a).   Only subsections (a)(2) and (3) are at issue in the present action.

Here, the defendant argues that the plaintiff has not alleged that she engaged in any of the conduct described in § 52-59b(a).   In support of her motion to dismiss and in lieu of appearing at short calendar, the defendant submitted an affidavit in which she makes several attestations relevant to the court's exercise of longarm jurisdiction over her.   She attests that she has not:  (1) committed a tortious act within Connecticut;  (2) committed a tortious act outside Connecticut that has caused any injury to person or property within Connecticut;  or (3) engaged in any activity in Connecticut that would lead her to expect or should reasonably lead her to expect that her acts would have consequences in Connecticut.¹

From what the court can discern from the plaintiff's memoranda, she makes three central arguments.   First, she appears to argue that the defendant committed a tortious act outside Connecticut, which caused injury to the plaintiff, a resident of Connecticut.   Next, she seems to assert that the defendant committed a tortious act and engaged in activity in Connecticut that would lead her to believe her acts would have consequences in Connecticut.   Finally, the plaintiff argues that the defendant was properly served and the defendant has waived all claims for insufficient process.²

At the Standard Tallow hearing, evidence was presented by the plaintiff.   This evidence illuminated the plaintiff's claims and established the following facts.   The plaintiff attended North Carolina Agricultural and Technical State University (the university), on a basketball scholarship.   The plaintiff has made numerous attempts to collect what she believes to be missing scholarship and financial aid refund monies from the university.   These attempts involved correspondence with the defendant, an accounting technician and notary public employed by the comptroller's office of the university.   On February 15, 2010, the defendant obtained a “temporary no-contact order for stalking” against the plaintiff in North Carolina.   In that complaint, the defendant alleged that the plaintiff feels that the university owes her money and that the plaintiff harassed her for over a year about the money she feels she is owed.   She further alleged that the plaintiff opened a civil suit against her, which was dismissed.   The North Carolina court found that the defendant had been harassed by the plaintiff and that threats were made by the plaintiff after the plaintiff's civil suit was dismissed on February 11, 2010.³  The North Carolina court ordered that the plaintiff cease all contact with the defendant.   During the Standard Tallow hearing, before this court, the plaintiff admitted that the defendant's alleged tortious conduct took place in North Carolina, but she maintained that the defendant has had contact with her in Connecticut, via the mail and telephone calls.

Looking at the evidence as a whole, the statutory requirements of § 52-59b have been met, and therefore the court cannot exercise personal jurisdiction over the defendant.   The evidence presented by the plaintiff is not sufficient to refute the defendant's attestations that she did not commit a tortious act within Connecticut or tortious activity outside Connecticut that caused injury to a person within Connecticut.   Moreover, even if the tortious conduct alleged by the plaintiff caused injury to the plaintiff within Connecticut, the plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that the defendant regularly does or solicits business, engages in any persistent course of conduct, derives revenue from goods used or consumed or services rendered in this state.   Furthermore, the plaintiff has not presented evidence to support her allegation that the defendant should have expected or should have reasonably expected her acts to have consequences in Connecticut.   Accordingly, since the requirements of Connecticut's longarm statute have not been met, the court need not reach the issue of whether an exercise of jurisdiction over the defendant would violate due process.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the defendant's motion to dismiss is granted.

Wilson, J.

FOOTNOTES

FN1. The defendant also attests that she:  has not regularly solicited business, or engaged in any other persistent course of conduct, or derived substantial revenue from goods used or consumed or services rendered in Connecticut;  has not transacted any business within Connecticut;  does not derive substantial revenue from interstate or international commerce;  does not own, use or possess any real property within Connecticut;  and does not use a computer or a computer network located within Connecticut.   It does not appear from the face of the plaintiff's complaint or briefs that she contests any of these attestations.   Moreover, the court rejects the potential implication that the defendant transacted business in Connecticut simply because of the nature of her position with the comptroller's office at North Carolina Agricultural and Technical State University..  FN1. The defendant also attests that she:  has not regularly solicited business, or engaged in any other persistent course of conduct, or derived substantial revenue from goods used or consumed or services rendered in Connecticut;  has not transacted any business within Connecticut;  does not derive substantial revenue from interstate or international commerce;  does not own, use or possess any real property within Connecticut;  and does not use a computer or a computer network located within Connecticut.   It does not appear from the face of the plaintiff's complaint or briefs that she contests any of these attestations.   Moreover, the court rejects the potential implication that the defendant transacted business in Connecticut simply because of the nature of her position with the comptroller's office at North Carolina Agricultural and Technical State University.

FN2. In her March 8, 2010 memorandum, the plaintiff argues that the defendant waived a claim for insufficient process because the defendant's motion to dismiss was filed more than thirty days before her appearance date, and therefore the defendant has submitted herself to the court's jurisdiction.   In contrast, in her March 29, 2010 memorandum, the plaintiff argues that the defendant waived a claim for insufficient process because the motion to dismiss was filed more than thirty days after the return date.   The plaintiff's arguments regarding the sufficiency of process on the defendant are irrelevant.   The defendant has not moved to dismiss the plaintiff's complaint on that ground..  FN2. In her March 8, 2010 memorandum, the plaintiff argues that the defendant waived a claim for insufficient process because the defendant's motion to dismiss was filed more than thirty days before her appearance date, and therefore the defendant has submitted herself to the court's jurisdiction.   In contrast, in her March 29, 2010 memorandum, the plaintiff argues that the defendant waived a claim for insufficient process because the motion to dismiss was filed more than thirty days after the return date.   The plaintiff's arguments regarding the sufficiency of process on the defendant are irrelevant.   The defendant has not moved to dismiss the plaintiff's complaint on that ground.

FN3. Neither party refers to this civil suit in its pleadings or other documents filed with the court..  FN3. Neither party refers to this civil suit in its pleadings or other documents filed with the court.

Wilson, Robin L., J.