Learn About the Law
Get help with your legal needs
FindLaw’s Learn About the Law features thousands of informational articles to help you understand your options. And if you’re ready to hire an attorney, find one in your area who can help.
IN RE: Jaydin V.1
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
These are actions brought by the Department of Children and Families (“DCF”) seeking to terminate the parental rights of the biological mother and the putative father of Jaydin V. (hereinafter referred to as “Jaydin V.” or “child”). The biological mother of the child is Teresa V. (hereinafter referred to as “Teresa V.” or “Mother”) and the putative father is John Doe (hereinafter referred to as “John Doe” or “Father”). The court finds that there is no action pending in any other court affecting Jaydin V.'s custody and that this court has jurisdiction in this matter.
On 10/1/08, DCF invoked a 96-hour hold and filed a Motion for Order of Temporary Custody and a Petition of Neglect on behalf of said child with the Superior Court for Juvenile Matters at Hartford.
On 10/10/08, the Order of Temporary Custody was sustained, and on 11/13/08, the child was adjudicated neglected and committed to the care and custody of the Commissioner of the Department of Children and Families as a neglected child.
On 5/26/10, the date set for trial, the court canvassed Mother and found that she knowingly and voluntarily consented to the termination with the assistance of competent counsel. The court found such termination as to Mother was in the best interest of the child by clear and convincing evidence, and a default had previously been entered for Father for failure to appear.
At the time of the trial on 5/26/10, DCF submitted seven exhibits. After the State rested, no further evidence was offered and the Court ordered the default of the Father.
The grounds of this petition for the Termination of Parental Rights as to Father are abandonment and no ongoing parent-child relationship. The grounds as to Mother were dropped and the ground of consent was substituted at the time of trial.
The court carefully considered all the evidence presented at trial. The court applied the burden of proof applicable to the termination of parental rights petitions. Only evidence relevant to the adjudication date was considered as a part of adjudication proceedings on the termination petitions.
I
FACTUAL FINDINGSA. Background/Present Situation/Reasons for Petition
DCF filed a petition for Termination of Parental Rights due to the fact that Mother, Teresa V., is not willing or able to provide competent, safe, and nurturing parenting for the child.
This family has been involved with DCF since 1999 due to issues of substance abuse.
On 2/19/06, Mother gave birth to her third child, Jaydin V., whose urine screen at the time of delivery was positive for PCP. Although Jaydin V. tested positive for substances, Mother's urine tested negative and the child remained in her care. She was offered services, but continued to abuse substances, with the result that Jaydin V. was removed from her care on 10/01/08. Mother tested positive for PCP six times by way of hair tests conducted on 3/17/06, 11/14/06, 12/13/07, 08/01/08, 05/11/09 and 12/2/09. She has continued to actively use illegal substances despite services offered to her. Mother has not provided DCF with any information about Father and he has not come forward with a plan for his child.
On 10/12/02, Mother gave birth to her second child, Nyasha G. She reported that she was using marijuana and PCP during her pregnancy but Mother and child tested negative for illegal substances at the time of birth.
On 4/25/03, Mother was arrested for risk of injury to a minor. Mother and Nyasha G. were passengers in a motor vehicle that was being driven erratically, and it was discovered that both the operator of the vehicle and Mother were smoking marijuana laced with angel dust.
On 4/25/03, DCF invoked a 96-Hour Hold on behalf of Nyasha G. but it was rescinded and child was allowed to remain in the care of paternal aunt, Marlena D., while services were offered to Mother to address her substance abuse issues. She failed to adhere to the substance abuse treatment as she consistently tested positive for PCP on 5/14/03, 10/9/03, 11/3/03 and 12/18/03.
On 7/13/04, DCF invoked a 96-Hour Hold on behalf of Nyasha G., as the child suffered second degree burns on 7/04/04, and Mother did not seek medical attention for her. Mother had left Nyasha G. with her roommate, Kevin S., without his consent and without informing him of her whereabouts. On 11/10/04, Nyasha G. was adjudicated neglected/uncared for and remains in DCF's care.
Mother continued to actively use illegal substances despite all services offered by DCF to facilitate reunification with Nyasha G. and to preserve her custody of Jaydin V.
Mother was unemployed and her cash assistance was cut off as of August 2008. She was depending on friends and family members for income.
Mother has not provided DCF with information concerning Jaydin V.'s Father and he has not come forward with a plan for his child's wellbeing.
B. Teresa V., Mother
Teresa V. completed an intensive outpatient substance abuse program at the Morris Foundation and received a certificate of completion on 03/31/10. She currently attends a relapse prevention program twice a week at the Morris Foundation. Since 02/15/10, Mother has participated in eight random urine screens. She tested positive for PCP on 03/29/10, and tested positive for PCP six times by way of hair tests conducted on 3/17/06, 11/14/06, 12/13/07, 08/01/08, 05/11/09 and 12/2/09.
DCF made a referral for Mother to participate in a hair test on 04/16/10 at 2 p.m., at the Morris Foundation. She contacted the Foundation to report that she could not attend the hair test as she had a scheduled visit with her youngest son Richard at the same time. Mother's visits with Richard are scheduled from 10 a.m.-12 noon. The DCF social worker contacted Mother to inquire why she told the Morris Foundation that she would be at her scheduled visitation at the time of the hair test. She responded that she needed to go to the Social Security Administration with her uncle to translate for him, as he does not speak English, and that his appointment was scheduled at the same time as the hair test. The hair test was rescheduled for 05/10/10.
On 05/04/10, DCF received a phone call from Attorney Quinn, Teresa V.'s attorney. He relayed that Teresa V. had contacted him to report that she had a conflict with her schedule and would not be able to attend the hair test scheduled for 05/10/10. Attorney Quinn requested that the test be rescheduled. On 05/04/10, the Morris Foundation was contacted and Teresa V.'s hair test was rescheduled for 05/14/10 at 2:00 pm. DCF did not contact Teresa V. to inform her of the 05/14/10 date as it was understood that the Morris Foundation would contact her about the appointment. She did not attend the hair test scheduled for 05/14/10.
On 04/28/10, DCF was contacted by the Family Relations office at the Superior Court in Waterbury. They reported that Mother had been involved in an incident of domestic violence with the father of Nyasha G. On 01/18/10, the Waterbury Police was called to Mother's home. According to the police report, a neighbor contacted the police department to report that he heard screaming and yelling from Mother's apartment. When the police arrived, Mother came to the door with a swollen lip, blood coming from her mouth and marks on her arms. Nyasha G.'s father also came to the door with scratch marks on his nose. Mother gave the police several different accounts about what had happened. Nyasha G.'s father was arrested. Mother informed the victim advocate and family relations that she was not pregnant at the time of the incident, and that she had written a letter dated 02/01/10, stating that she was not pregnant, but chubby. She did not wish to press charges against Nyasha G.'s father.
Mother continues to reside in a two bedroom apartment in Waterbury. She claims to have begun working at her aunt's salon two days per week and gets paid under the table.
C. John Doe, Putative Father
Jaydin V.'s Father is unknown as Mother has not provided DCF with any identifying information about him.
D. Jaydin V., Child
Jaydin V. continues to reside in a DCF licensed foster home in which he was placed in May 2009. At that time, his older sibling Nyasha G. was also placed in the home and the foster parents had expressed their desire to adopt both of the children. In August 2009, the foster parents informed DCF that they could no longer be an adoptive resource for Jaydin V. and Nyasha G. Nyasha G. was placed in a paternal relative home in February 2010. Jaydin V. has monthly sibling visits with Nyasha G. and bi-weekly visits with Richard. He gets along well with his siblings and they enjoy having visits together.
When Richard was born, the plan for Jaydin V. was placement in a legal risk home along with his sibling Richard. Jaydin V. was unable to move to the legal risk home as the family had several cats and Jaydin is allergic to cats. The family decided that they did not want to give their cats away as Richard would be moving from the home to a paternal relative foster home.
On 4/30/10, Jaydin V.'s current foster mother contacted DCF and informed DCF that she and her husband had changed their minds and wished to be an adoptive resource for Jaydin V. They did not want him to be removed from the home and were willing and able to be a permanent resource for him. The DCF social worker explained to the foster mother that she would need confirmation from the foster father to verify his agreement with the plan for Jaydin V.'s adoption. On 05/21/10, DCF contacted foster father and he stated that he was not in agreement with adoption and felt that it is best for him and his wife to continue with foster care only.
Mother provided the name and information of her sister, Maria V., an aunt, Jacqueline V., and her former foster parents as placement resources for Jaydin V. and sibling Richard. Relative application packets were sent to each family member for them to complete and return to the Department. Maria V. returned the application and a walkthrough of her home was completed. She has five children and an extensive DCF history. Jacqueline V. has a criminal history, and her live-in boyfriend has an extensive criminal history. Mother's former foster parents have not returned the application packet.
Through its own research, DCF found a maternal aunt in New York that may be a possible resource for Jaydin V. A letter was mailed to her inquiring if she would be willing to be a placement resource for Jaydin V. She contacted DCF and reported that she had given birth to her third child on 4/27/10, and needed to have time to settle in with the new baby, but agreed she would consider being a resource at a later time. DCF agreed to contact her in approximately a month's time to see if she was able and willing to be a placement resource for Jaydin V.
Jaydin continues to do well in his foster home and is current up-to-date. He was seen at Hartford Allergy Associates in March 2010, and it was determined that he is allergic to cats, pollen, dust, dogs and roaches. He is not on any medication for his allergies as his current foster home does not have any pets. Foster mother has not observed Jaydin V. having had any allergic reactions in the home. Jaydin V. has also been diagnosed with asthma, but he has not had any problems and has not used his inhaler in over a year. Jaydin V.'s physical, emotional, educational and medical needs have consistently been met by his foster parents.
II
TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS ADJUDICATION
The court must determine whether there is clear and convincing evidence that a pleaded ground exists to terminate parental rights to Jaydin V. as of the date of the filing of the petition.
A. Reasonable Efforts Finding
Unless a court, in order to terminate parental rights, DCF initially must show by clear and convincing evidence that it “has made reasonable efforts to locate the parent and to reunify the child[ren] with the parent, unless the court finds in this proceeding that the parent is unable or unwilling to benefit from reunification efforts.” C.G.S. § 17a-112(j)(1). “Reasonable efforts means doing everything reasonable, not everything possible.” In re Jessica B., 50 Conn.App. 554, 566, 718 A.2d 997 (1998).
DCF has been involved with Mother and Jaydin V. since 10/1/08. The presenting problems with this family were Mother's lack of a safe living environment; lack of parenting skills, unstable living arrangement; and substance abuse issues; and Father's lack of involvement in the life of the child.
Reasonable efforts to reunify Jaydin V. with mother, Teresa V. are no longer appropriate due to Mother's unaddressed parenting and substance abuse issues.
Reasonable efforts to reunify Jaydin V. with father, John Doe are not possible because Father's identity and whereabouts are unknown.
Mother is unwilling or unable to benefit from reunification services in that she has failed to adequately address her parenting and substance abuse issues. She continues to use illegal drugs and she has recently been involved in domestic violence incidences.
DCF has been involved with this family since 10/12/02. In addition, DCF has made reasonable efforts to achieve the Permanency Plan. All court findings were made by clear and convincing evidence.
B. Grounds for Termination: Abandonment-General Statutes § 17a-112(j)(3)(A) as to Putative Father, John Doe
This ground is established when the child has been abandoned by the parent in the sense that the parent has failed to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern, or responsibility as to the welfare of the child. Sporadic efforts are insufficient to negate the claim of abandonment. The test for determining abandonment of a child for purposes of termination of parental rights is not whether a parent has shown “some interest” in his or her child, but rather, whether the parent has maintained any reasonable degree of interest, concern, or responsibility as to the child's welfare. In re Rayna M., 13 Conn.App. 23, 36, 534 A.2d 897 (1987).
Attempts to achieve contact with a child, telephone calls, the sending of cards and gifts and financial support are indicia of “interest, concern or responsibility.” In re Migdalia M., 6 Conn.App. 194, 209, 504 A.2d 533 (1986).
“The commonly understood general obligations of parenthood entail these minimum attributes: (1) express love and affection for the child; (2) express personal concern over the health, education and general well-being of the child; (3) the duty to supply the necessary food, clothing and medical care; (4) the duty to provide an adequate domicile; and (5) the duty to furnish social and religious guidance.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Kezia M., 33 Conn.App. 12, 17-18, 632 A.2d 1122 (1993); In re Roshawn B., 51 Conn.App. 44, 53, 720 A.2d 1112 (1998).
Ground A-Abandonment as to Jaydin V. by Putative Father, John Doe
1. The child has been in the continuous care of the Department since 10/1/08.
2. Father has failed to be an active participant in the life of the child.
3. Father has never visited the child.
4. Father has not provided financial support for the child.
5. Father has never acknowledged the child's birthday or other special days.
6. Father has never sent cards, gifts or letters to the child.
7. Father has never contacted DCF to inquire about the well-being of the child or to request contact with him.
8. Father has never shown an interest in the child's health or welfare.
9. Father has failed to make an alternative plan for the child.
10. Father has never participated in Administrative Case Reviews held by the Department regarding the Treatment Plan for the child.
11. Father has never appeared at any scheduled hearings held by the Superior Court for Juvenile Matters regarding the child.
12. Father has failed to participate in the permanency planning for the child.
C. Grounds for Termination: No Ongoing Parent-Children Relationship-General Statutes § 17a-112(j)(3)(D) as to Putative Father, John Doe
This ground alleged by DCF requires proof by clear and convincing evidence, that there is no ongoing parent-child relationship, which means “the relationship that ordinarily develops as a result of a parent having met on a day-to-day basis the physical, emotional, moral and educational needs of the child and to allow further time for the establishment or reestablishment of such parent-child relationship would be detrimental to the best interest of the child.”
This statutory definition, as it has been interpreted in case law, requires a finding that “no positive emotional aspects of the relationship survive.” In re Jessica M., 217 Conn. 459, 470, 586 A.2d 597 (1991). “It is inherently ambiguous when applied to noncustodial parents who must maintain their relationship with their child through visitation.” Id., 459; In re Valerie D., 223 Conn. 492, 531, 613 A.2d 748 (1992). Although the ultimate question is usually whether the child has any present memories or feelings for the natural parent, the existence of a loving relationship or a “psychological parent” relationship with one other than the natural parent does not, of itself, establish the no ongoing parent-child relationship ground for termination. In re Jessica M., supra, 473-75.
Unlike the other nonconsensual grounds to terminate parental rights, the absence of a parent-child relationship is considered a “no fault” ground for termination. To establish this ground requires the trial court to make a two-pronged determination. First, there must be a determination that no parent-child relationship exists; and second, the court must look to the future and determine whether it would be detrimental to the child's best interest to allow time for such a relationship to develop. The absence of a parent-child relationship can be demonstrated in situations where a child has never known his or her parents so that no relationship ever developed between them, or where the child has lost that relationship so that despite its former existence, it has now been completely displaced. In re Juvenile Appeal (Anonymous), 177 Conn. 648, 670, 420 A.2d 875 (1979).
Judicial interpretation has imposed a requirement that a child have “present memories or feelings” for the parent, and “at least some aspects of these memories and feelings are positive” to overcome this ground. In re Jessica M., supra, 217 Conn. 475; In re Juvenile Appeal (84-6), 2 Conn.App. 705, 709, 483 A.2d 1101, cert. denied, 195 Conn. 801 (1984). The existence of positive feelings usually depends on the viewpoint of the child. In re Rayna M., 13 Conn.App. 23, 35, 534 A.2d 897 (1987). As the Appellate Court recently noted, “the feelings of the child are of paramount importance.” In re Tabitha T., 51 Conn.App. 595, 602 (1999). “Feelings for the natural parent connotes feelings of a positive nature only.” Id.
Ground D-No Ongoing Parent-Children Relationship as to Putative Father, John Doe
1. Paragraphs one through twelve of Ground A as to Jaydin V. by John Doe are hereby incorporated by reference.
2. The child would not recognize his Father should the opportunity of a meeting present itself, as they have never met.
3. The Father is a stranger to the child.
4. The child is four years two months old and has spent the last twelve months of his life in the care of the Department.
5. There is currently no ongoing parent-child relationship between the Father and the child. Given the age and needs of said child, to permit additional time for the establishment of such relationships would be detrimental to the child's best interest.
Summary of Adjudicatory Findings
This court has found that the Commissioner has proved the following adjudicatory grounds by clear and convincing evidence: (1) that the putative Father, John Doe, has legally abandoned Jaydin V. and has not maintained an ongoing parent-child relationship with the child.
Mother consented to the termination of her parental rights in open court. She filed written consent. This court found that Mother voluntarily and knowingly consented to the termination of her rights, having received the advice and assistance of competent legal counsel and having understood the consequences of her actions. Her consent was accepted by this court.
The court finds that notice has been given in accordance with the Connecticut General Statutes and the Practice Book.
The court took jurisdiction in this matter; there is no pending action affecting custody of the child in any other court.
The petition has been amended to allege as the sole ground for termination of the Mother, her consent to the termination.
The court having read the verified petition and the social studies, made the following findings by clear and convincing evidence.
Adjudication. The Mother has consented to the termination of her rights to her child and the consent was accepted by the court.
No findings are necessary to be made pursuant to Conn. Gen.Stat. § 17a-112 with regard to the Mother due to her consent.
III
DISPOSITION
Except in the case where termination is based on consent, if grounds have been found to terminate parental rights applying the appropriate standard of proof, the court must then consider whether the facts as of the last day of trial establish, by clear and convincing evidence, after consideration of the factors enumerated in C.G.S. § 17a-112(k), that termination is in the child's best interest. If the court does find that termination is in the child's best interest, an order will enter terminating parental rights.
A. C.G.S. § 17a-112(k) Criteria
The court has found by clear and convincing evidence that the statutory grounds alleged by DCF for the termination of parental rights have been proven.
Before making a decision whether or not to terminate John Doe's parental rights, as he did not consent [but rather a default plea was found by the court], the court will consider and make findings on each of the seven criteria set forth in C.G.S. § 17a-112(k). In re Romance M., 229 Conn. 345, 355, 641 A.2d 378 (1994).
These criteria and this court's findings, which have been established by clear and convincing evidence, are as follows:
1. “The timeliness, nature and extent of services offered or provided to the parent and the child by an agency to facilitate the reunion of the child with the parent.”
Father's concern and interest in his child is non-existent and he has not presented himself as a resource for the child in order for DCF to assist him in securing the appropriate services. It is unlikely that he could assume a responsible position in the life of the child in the foreseeable future.
2. “Whether DCF has made reasonable efforts to reunite the family pursuant to the Federal Children Welfare Act of 1980, as amended.”
Father is unwilling or unable to benefit from reunification efforts in that his whereabouts and interest is unknown and he has failed to become involved in the life of the child.
3. “The terms of any court order entered into and agreed upon by any individual or agency and the parent, and the extent to which all the parties have fulfilled their obligations of such order.”
Father is unknown therefore no orders have been made by the court.
4. “The feelings and emotional ties of the child with respect to his parents, any guardian of such child's person and any person who has exercised physical care, custody or control of the child for at least one year and with whom the child has developed significant emotional ties.”
The child has no positive feelings towards Father but appears bonded to and has significant emotional ties with his current foster parent with whom he has lived exclusively since May 2009.
5. “The age of the child.”
Jaydin V. (DOB 2/19/06) is four years two months old.
6. “The efforts the parent has made to adjust such parent's circumstances, conduct or conditions to make it in the best interest of the child to return to such child's home in the foreseeable future, including, but not limited to (A) the extent to which the parent has maintained contact with the child as part of an effort to reunite the child with the parent provided that the court may give weight to incidental visitations, communications or contributions and (B) the maintenance of regular contact or communication with the guardian or other custodian of the child.”
The court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the parents have not made realistic and sustained efforts to conform their conduct to minimally acceptable parental standards.
The clear and convincing evidence indicates that they have refused to cooperate with DCF or programs presented.
The court finds, by clear and convincing evidence, that the parents have not made the changes necessary in their lifestyles that would indicate that they would be safe, responsible and nurturing parents for Jaydin V. To permit the child to return to the parents' care would compromise the safety of the child.
7. “The extent to which a parent has been prevented from maintaining a meaningful relationship with the child by the unreasonable act or conduct of the other parent of the child, or the unreasonable act of any other person or by the economic circumstances of the parent.”
This court finds by clear and convincing evidence that no reasonable conduct by DCF, foster parents, the Department of Corrections or third parties prevented Teresa V. or John Doe from maintaining a relationship with Jaydin V., nor did their economic circumstances prevent such relationship, although the limitations and restrictions inherent in the foster care system remained in effect.
B. Best Interest of the Child
Termination of Parental Rights is in the best interest of Jaydin V. as to his parents. Mother consented to the termination of her parental rights on 5/26/10.
Given the age of the child, the child's need to have his individual emotional and educational needs met, his need to have a permanent and stable home, his need to be raised in a nurturing and stable home, Teresa V. and John Doe cannot, within a reasonable period of time, assume a responsible position in his life.
Mother has a history of parenting issues and substance issues and has not adequately addressed the issues which led to the removal of the child and she has not addressed her other issues to an extent necessary to reunify with her child.
John Doe has shown a lack of interest or ability to care for the child to the extent that he has no ongoing relationship with the child.
In May 2009, Jaydin V. was placed in a DCF licensed foster home where he has remained. He seems very happy and comfortable in his foster home and is clearly bonded to his foster parents. Should Jaydin V. become legally free for adoption, the foster parents may be willing to adopt him but this is not a certainty.
Termination of parental rights is in the best interest of Jaydin V. so he can have permanency in his life. The child has bonded to his foster parents who have provided excellent care for him virtually since his removal.
The court finds by clear and convincing evidence that it is in Jaydin V.'s best interests for Termination of Parental Rights to enter with respect to Teresa V., his biological Mother and John Doe, his putative Father.
IV
CONCLUSION
The court, having considered all statutory considerations and having found by clear and convincing evidence that grounds exist for termination of parental rights, further finds upon all the facts and circumstances presented, that it is in Jaydin V.'s best interest to terminate the parental rights of Teresa V., the biological Mother and John Doe, the putative Father of the child. Accordingly, it is ordered that their parental rights to Jaydin V. are hereby terminated.
It is further ordered that the Commissioner of the Department of Children and Families be appointed the statutory parent for the child for the purpose of securing an adoptive family and a permanent placement for the child.
The statutory parent is ordered to file the appropriate written reports with the court, as are required by state and federal law and which show the efforts to effect the permanent placement of this child.
BY THE COURT,
WOLLENBERG, J.
Wollenberg, William L., J.T.R.
Thank you for your feedback!
A free source of state and federal court opinions, state laws, and the United States Code. For more information about the legal concepts addressed by these cases and statutes visit FindLaw's Learn About the Law.
Docket No: H12CP08012150A
Decided: June 09, 2010
Court: Superior Court of Connecticut.
Search our directory by legal issue
Enter information in one or both fields (Required)
Harness the power of our directory with your own profile. Select the button below to sign up.
Learn more about FindLaw’s newsletters, including our terms of use and privacy policy.
Get help with your legal needs
FindLaw’s Learn About the Law features thousands of informational articles to help you understand your options. And if you’re ready to hire an attorney, find one in your area who can help.
Search our directory by legal issue
Enter information in one or both fields (Required)