IN RE: April C.1 (2010)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

These actions are brought by The Department of Children and Families (“DCF” or “Petitioner”) seeking to terminate the parental rights of the biological mother and the Putative Father and Alleged Father of April C. (hereinafter referred to as “April C.” or “child”).   The biological mother of this child is Lee P. (hereinafter referred to as “Lee P.” or “Mother”).   The Putative Father, John Doe, (hereinafter referred to as “John Doe” or “Father”) and the Alleged Father, Angel C. (hereinafter referred to as “Angel C.” or “Father”) were defaulted and a trial was ordered for 5/11/10.

Mother was incarcerated at York Correctional Facility when April C. was born at Lawrence Memorial Hospital on 10/8/09.

On 10/16/09, DCF sought and obtained an Order of Temporary Custody for April C. and neglect petitions were filed with the court.   The neglect petitions alleged that the child was being denied proper care and attention, physically, educationally or morally and being permitted to live under conditions, circumstances or associations injurious to her wellbeing.   Subsequently, the OTC was sustained and notice of in-hand service and publication were confirmed for Mother, Alleged Father and Putative Father.   Link searches were obtained;  a military affidavit was filed and confirmation was received.   The Neglect Petitions and TPR were re-filed, publication was reconfirmed, and on 2/11/10, both Angel C. and John Doe were defaulted.   A CMC was set for 3/15/10 at 2 pm and a trial with regard to all matters was set for 5/12/10.

The court proceeded with the trial on 5/12/10 as to all parties.   Father failed to appear and the trial commenced.   Counsel for DCF submitted two exhibits:  Exhibit A-Social Study in Support of Neglect and Termination of Parental Rights Petitions dated 11/2/09;  and Exhibit B-Addendum to the Social Study in Support of Co-Terminus Petitions.   One witness testified for DCF and was cross-examined by counsel for Mother.

The court finds that there is no action pending in any other court affecting custody of this child and that this court has jurisdiction in this matter.

The ground of the Petition for TPR as to the biological mother, Lee P., is Failure to Rehabilitate and for Alleged Father, Angel C. and Putative Father, John Doe, Abandonment.

The court has applied the burden of proof applicable to the Termination of Parental Rights and Neglect Petitions, has reviewed the Neglect and the Co-Terminus petitions, and the social studies and the exhibits that were submitted in evidence.   The court has utilized the applicable legal standards in considering the evidence and the testimony of any witnesses.

I

FACTUAL FINDINGSA. Background, Facts Substantiating Allegations of Neglect and Termination

Lee P. has a history with DCF dating back to 2004, with three substantiations in 2004, 2007 and 2008 for physical neglect due to inadequate supervision, physical neglect due to erratic/impaired behavior, and physical neglect due to associations injurious to the well being of a child.   The record also reveals that Mother has had her rights terminated to three of her children.   In August 2006, the Hartford Superior Court for Juvenile Matters terminated Mother's parental rights to Janessa C. due to Mother's inability to address her mental health issues as she continued to refuse services.   In July 2008, the New Britain Superior Court for Juvenile Matters terminated Mother's parental rights to Reynaldo B., due to concerns of physical abuse by his father and the fact that Mother had unaddressed mental health issues.   In August 2009, the Hartford Superior Court for Juvenile Matters terminated Mother's parental rights to Rosalee G. due to Mother's continued lack of cooperation in addressing her mental health issues.

On 10/9/09, DCF met with Mother at Lawrence Memorial Hospital.   At that time, Mother had been incarcerated since July 2009, for possession of drugs in a prohibited place, which Mother attributes to having marijuana on her possession in the park.   She admitted to smoking marijuana when she was five months pregnant.   Mother's paranoid thinking manifested itself in her belief that her stomach pain was a result of food poisoning at York Correctional.

Lee P. receives Social Security benefits, but has refused to provide information regarding these benefits.   She has refused to cooperate with any therapy or mental health treatment facilitated through DCF.

Mother reported that she had minimal family resources, and would prefer that April C. be placed in the care of Norma C., maternal grandmother (“MGM”).  Review of DCF's case record indicates that MGM has a significant history with the Department involving her daughter, Lee P, who was removed from her care in December 2001 and was placed with her sister, Milagros R. She was subsequently removed from Milagros R.'s care in January 2002, and placed in a residential setting to address her aggressive behavior, fire setting, and her unaddressed mental health issues.   During that time, Lee P. was diagnosed with mild mental retardation.   In early May 2002, she refused DCF services to address her ongoing anger and mental health issues, and became whereabouts unknown.

Mother reported that April C.'s father is Angel C., with whom she had a brief relationship.   She informed Angel C. of her pregnancy, and he refused to have any involvement with Mother or the infant.   Mother has no known address, date of birth, or contact information for Father as he has relocated from his last known address.

Prior to being incarcerated, Lee P. was residing with her mother;  however, she claimed that her mother often kicked her out the home and then allowed her back in at a later time.   Lee P. had no living arrangements when she was released from jail.   The public defender planned to assist her in a program through CRT called “Fresh Start” which is a program for troubled mothers, however, this plan was deemed inappropriate as Mother was not willing to address her mental health issues through the Department of Developmental Services.

MGM claims that she has no other family in the State of Connecticut besides her children.   Her son, Jesus C., resides with her daughter, Juana, who is receiving Adolescent Services through DCF. Her daughter, Milagros R., has a history with DCF, including an open case for child protective concerns.

Due to April C.'s infant status, Mother's history of transiency, her lack of cooperation with the Department and lack of follow-through with her mental health issues, the child is considered to be at high risk if placed in Mother's care.

B. Mother, Lee P.

Lee P. was born on August 2, 1984, to Norma C. and Jesus P. in Bronx, New York. She describes her ethnicity as Dominican.   She has one full sibling, Jesus C., DOB 3/4/86, and three maternal half-siblings, Melissa T., DOB 11/13/79, Milagros R., DOB 7/30/77 and Juana F., DOB 3/24/87.   Norma C. and Jesus P. ended their relationship before the birth of Juana in 1987, as the family moved from New York to Connecticut.   It does not appear that Lee P. has any relationship with her biological father.   She does not have a good relationship with her siblings as they have been both physically and verbally abusive towards her and disrespectful to her mother.   She has a close but conflicted relationship with her mother.

Lee P. received special education services through the Hartford Public School system.   She initially attended the Gengras School, but was discharged due to truancy.   She then attended the Hartford Transitional Learning Academy, but they were unable to meet her therapeutic needs.   She was transferred to the Grace Webb School at the Institute of Living, and stopped attending school in the 9th grade.

Lee P. has an extensive history of trauma.   In 1996, DCF confirmed sexual abuse of Lee P. by one of her mother's boyfriends, and at age 9, she was a victim of an attempted rape/fondling by a neighbor.   Lee P. has also been witness to several violent situations.   Between 1998 and 1999, there were multiple incidents in which Norma C.'s children not only witnessed domestic violence, but at times attempted to intervene and were injured.   There was an altercation with a neighbor during which Norma C. cut the neighbor's face with a razor.   Her incarceration for this assault led to Lee P. and her siblings being placed in foster care.

Lee P. has had surgery to remove two benign tumors.   Her IQ is in the mentally retarded range.   She was tested in 1997 at the Gengras Center, at which time she was found to have a verbal IQ of 46, a performance IQ of 74, and a full scale IQ of 58.   Testing done at the Institute of Living in 1999 yielded comparable scores.   Her communication domain was found to be that of a five-year-old eight-month-old child;  her daily living skills domain is that of six-year seven-month-old child;  her socialization domain is that of a three-years ten-month-old child, and her adaptive behavior composition is that of a five-years two-month-old child.   Behavioral concern in this evaluation included cooking, which would pose a risk of Lee P. burning herself;  her inability to anticipate weather changes or look after her own health, as well as her tendency to be aggressive and “play with fire.”

Lee P. suffers from mental health issues and has been hospitalized at the Institute of Living on at least two occasions between April 1999 and January 2000.   Her admission in April 1999 was due to her being suicidal and aggressive.   In addition, there were concerns of psychosis as she reported auditory hallucinations.   Her admission in January 2000 was due to her being suicidal.   The most recent evaluation from the Institute of Living in 2002 diagnosed Lee P. with Oppositional Defiant Disorder, Impulse Control Disorder (not otherwise specified) and Mild Mental Retardation.   She was prescribed Tegretol and Risperdal but was non-compliant with her medications.   As a minor, Lee P. was ineligible for services through the Department of Mental Retardation, however, she has repeatedly refused offerings of services since reaching the age of majority.

Lee P. has a history of marijuana abuse starting in her teens.   She tested positive for marijuana and barbiturates during her pregnancy with her son, Reynaldo, in 2006.

Lee P. is not currently employed and does not appear to have any formal employment history besides babysitting.   She receives SSI due to her diagnosis of mental retardation.

Mother has a criminal history, including an arrest in 2006 for a domestic violence incident with Reynaldo B., following which full protective orders were issued for both parties.   In 2006, Mother was arrested for possession of narcotics, and in 2007 she was charged with failure to appear related to the possession charge.   On 7/25/08, Mother was arrested on the outstanding warrant for the possession and FTA charges, and was placed on non-reporting probation.   On 7/9/09, she was arrested on possession charges, was incarcerated at York Correctional Facility and released in October 2009.   Lee P. has never served in the United States Armed Forces.

Lee P. has never been married.   Her first significant relationship was with Juan C, the father of her child, Janessa.   She has denied any domestic violence in this relationship.   Juan C. has a significant criminal history, and was incarcerated during Mother's pregnancy and throughout DCF's involvement with Janessa.   In 2004, Lee P. became involved with Mr. B. shortly after Jannessa's birth.   The couple had one child in 2006, Reynaldo B. This relationship ended in February 2007, and Lee P. met Benjamin G. in September 2007.

Mother's parental rights to Janessa were terminated on the grounds of Failure to Rehabilitate, and as to Reynaldo on Failure to Rehabilitate with prior TPR. Mother had a child, Rosalee G. with Benjamin G. on 7/30/08.   On 8/7/09, both Lee P. and Benjamin G. consented to the termination of their parental rights with regard to Rosalee G.

C. Alleged Father, Angel C.

Lee P. named Angel C. as the Father of April C. She was unable to provide DCF with an address, phone number or date of birth for Angel C., so no other information could be obtained.

D. Putative Father, John Doe

No information has been obtained for John Doe as his identity and whereabouts are unknown.   DCF believes that Father's identity may be unknown as Mother was only able to provide a name for the Father, but was unable to supply an address or date of birth.   Furthermore, no name is listed on the birth certificate, and no individual has ever come forward to assert paternity.

E. Child, April C.

April C., DOB 10/9/09, is a seven-month-old female of Hispanic descent.   She was discharged from the hospital directly into foster care.   She was diagnosed as having a heart murmur, which is monitored by the pediatrician.   To DCF's knowledge, April C. has three siblings, two of whom have been adopted by a non-relative and reside together.   The third sibling is presently placed with her paternal aunt, and DCF recently finalized this adoption.   This aunt has expressed an interest in maintaining a relationship with April C. and her sister.

F. Siblings

See FACTUAL FINDINGS, paragraphs A and B, above.

G. Relative Resources

Mother presented MGM as a placement resource for April C. MGM is an ineligible resource for DCF licensing due to her own CPS history.   Mother did not present any other resources and since Father has not come forward, no paternal relatives can be assessed.

H. Present Situation

Mother continues not to engage in any services.   She was discharged from St. Francis' parenting program due to her non-compliance, and ADRC reported that they would no longer be able to service her due to the number of appointments that she has missed.   Mother has made statements to DCF regarding the services that she received, but when requested to provide DCF with the name and contact information for these providers, she is unable to do so.

Mother has been fairly consistent with her visitation, although the case aide has ended some of the visits early due to Mother sleeping through most of the visitation.

Father still has not come forward to request visitation or to offer a plan for his child.   The whereabouts of Father is still unknown, although Mother insists that she sees him in Hartford “on the streets” from time to time.

April C. is currently placed in a non-relative legal risk home, where she has been since her discharge from the hospital.   Her foster parents remain committed to adopting April C. should she become available for adoption.   April C. is doing well at this time, and the foster parents have a good grasp of her needs and how to meet them.   She receives Birth to Three services for development of her motor skills, and reports indicate that progress is being made with the help of her foster parents who practice the techniques with her on their own.   Foster parents have also expressed a willingness to maintain contact with Mother should they adopt April C. as they feel that it is important for her to have contact with her biological family.   Foster mother has also requested that DCF reach out to the individuals who have adopted April C.'s siblings so that the sibling connection can be maintained.

II

NEGLECT AND UNCARED FOR ADJUDICATION

The court is required to proceed in three separate stages when neglect and uncared for and termination petitions are conterminously filed.   The court must first determine, by a fair preponderance of the evidence, if the child has been neglected or uncared for as of the date the petition was filed or last amended.  In re Juvenile Appeal (84-AB), 192 Conn. 254, 263, 471 A.2d 1380 (1984);  In re Emmanuel M., 43 Conn.Sup. 108, 111, 648 A.2d 904, aff'd 35 Conn.App. 276, 648 A.2d 881, cert. denied 321 Conn. 915, 648 A.2d 151 (1994).

The court finds by a fair preponderance of the evidence that DCF has proven all of the allegations alleged in its neglect and uncared for petition.  (See FACTUAL FINDINGS, Paragraph A, above).

“Courts have long been supportive of neglect adjudications which are, in effect, based on the prediction that the parent would neglect the child based on the parent's prior conduct or mental illness and the danger such conduct would present to a child left in her care.  In re Valerie D., 223 Conn. 492, 613 A.2d 748 (1992);  In re Kelly S., 29 Conn.App. 600, 616 A.2d 1161 (1992).   No court is required to leave a child in the custody of a parent who is clearly incapable of providing even basic care for the sole purpose of demonstrating that he will suffer actual harm.  In re Kelly S., supra 615.”  In Re Eric A., 1999 Ct.Sup. 16718 (1999).   See also In Re Michael D., 58 Conn.App. 119 (2000).

“Actual incidents of abuse or neglect are not required in determining that a child is uncared for under the ‘specialized needs' section of the statute.”   In re Kelly S., 29 Conn.App. 600, 613, 616 A.2d 1161 (1992), citing In re Carl O., 10 Conn.App. 428, 435-36, 523 A.2d 1339, cert. denied., 204 Conn. 802 (1987).   In this case a fair preponderance of the evidence has shown that the “home” provided by the parent would have lacked the stability, structure, safety;  financial security and parental judgment necessary to assure adequate and competent care for this child.   The situation was totally inadequate, in light of the parent's ongoing deficiencies, to be viewed as an appropriate home for the child.  In re Kelly S., supra.

III

TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS ADJUDICATION

The court must determine whether the proof provides clear and convincing evidence that a pleaded ground exists to terminate Mother, Lee P.'s, and Alleged and Putative Fathers, Angel C.'s and John Doe's rights as of the date of the filing of the petition.

A. Reasonable Efforts Finding

Unless a court has found in an earlier proceeding that efforts to reunify are no longer appropriate, in order to terminate parental rights, DCF initially must show by clear and convincing evidence that it “has made reasonable efforts to locate the parent and to reunify April C. with her parent, unless the court finds in this proceeding that the parent is unable or unwilling to benefit from reunification efforts.”  C.G.S. Sec. 17a-112(j)(1).  “Reasonable efforts means doing everything reasonable, not everything possible.”  In re Jessica B., 50 Conn.App. 554, 566, 718 A.2d 997 (1998).

DCF has been involved with this family since October 2004, because of neglect by Mother due to her addressed mental health and substance abuse issues.

The presenting problems with this family were Mother's untreated mental health and substance abuse issues, cognitive limitations and inadequate housing, and Father's abandonment of his child.

Reasonable efforts to reunify April C. with her Mother are no longer appropriate because of Mother's continued substance abuse, unaddressed mental health issues, and her transiency.

Mother is unwilling to benefit from reasonable efforts because she has refused treatment, believing that she is mentally stable.   While she was in the hospital giving birth to April C., she had paranoid thoughts about her food being poisoned.

Mother was not provided with any services because she has been incarcerated and was unable to participate in services and presently continues to refuse services offered by DCF.

Mother's rights to three of her children were terminated because she was unable to care for them due to her substance abuse.

Mother has failed to rehabilitate, secure stable housing or legal income.   In addition, DCF has made reasonable efforts to achieve the Permanency Plan.

B. Grounds for the Termination:  Failure to Rehabilitate-General Statutes § 17a-112(j)(3)(E) as to biological Mother, Lee P.

The Commissioner has alleged as a ground for termination that Mother has failed to rehabilitate herself after her child had been adjudicated as neglected and her parental rights of other child were previously terminated.   This ground for termination, based upon a prior adjudication of neglect and a failure of personal rehabilitation, is clearly articulated in our statutes.   Conn. Gen.Stat. § 17a-112(j)(3)(E) states in part that:

[t]he Superior Court ․ may grant a petition [to terminate parental rights] if it finds by clear and convincing evidence that ․ the child under the age of seven years ․ has been found by the Superior Court ․ to have been neglected ․ in a prior proceeding ․ and the parent ․ has failed to achieve such degree of personal rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that within a reasonable time, considering the age and needs of the child, such parent could assume a responsible position in the life of the child and such parent's parental rights of another child were previously terminated pursuant to a petition filed by the Commissioner of Child and Families

“Personal rehabilitation as used in [Section 17a-112] refers to the restoration of a parent to his or her former constructive and useful role as a parent ․ [The statute] requires the trial court ․ to find, by clear and convincing evidence, that the level of rehabilitation [she] has achieved, if any, falls short of that which would reasonably encourage a belief that at some future date [she] can assume a responsible position in [her] child's life.   (Citations omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted) In re Eden F., 250 Conn. 674, 706, 741 A.2d 873 (1999) ․ [I]n assessing rehabilitation, the critical issue is not whether the parent has improved [her] ability to manage [her] own life, but rather whether [she] has gained the ability to care for the particular needs of the child at issue.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)   In re Sarah Ann K, 57 Conn.App. 441, 448, 749 A.2d 77 (2000).   See also In re Ashley S., 61 Conn.App. 658, 665, 769 A.2d 718, 718, cert. denied, 255 Conn. 950, 769 A.2d 61 (2001);  In re Alejandro L., 91 Conn.App. 248, 259, 881 A.2d 450 (2005).

Whether the age and needs of the child would support allowance of further time for the parent to rehabilitate must also be considered.  In re Luis C., supra, 210 Conn. 157, 167-68, 5545 A.2d 722 (1989).   The reasonableness of the time period within which rehabilitation is sought to be accomplished is a question of fact for the court.  In re Davon M, 16 Conn.App. 693, 696, 548 A.2d 1350 (1988).   Also, in determining whether further allowance of a reasonable period of time would promote rehabilitation, a court can consider efforts made since the date of the filing of the petition to terminate parental rights.  In re Sarah M., 19 Conn.App. 371, 377, 562 A.2d 566 (1989).

Several aspects of the clear and convincing evidence in this case compel the conclusion that Lee P. has yet to achieve a sufficient “level of rehabilitation ․ which would reasonably encourage a belief that at some future date [she] can assume a responsible position in [her child's life].”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  In re Sarah Ann K., 57 Conn.App. 441, 448, 749 A.2d 77 (2000).   See In re Alejandro L., 91 Conn.App. 248, 259, 881 A.2d 450 (2005);  In re Ashley S., 61 Conn.App. 658, 665, 769 A.2d 718, cert. denied, 255 Conn. 950, 769 A.2d 61 (2001).   The credible evidence in this case, presented through the TPR social study and exhibits, clearly and convincingly establishes that Lee P. has not achieved CGS § 17a-112(j)(3)(E) rehabilitation.   The court credits the DCF reports which show that Lee P. has been unable to achieve her rehabilitation.

Ground E-Failure to Rehabilitate With Child Under Seven Years as to biological Mother, Lee P.

April C. was born on 10/9/09 and therefore is younger than seven.

April C. is a neglected child in that Mother has failed to appropriately address her substance abuse issues;  she has not demonstrated that she is able to provide for this infant.   Mother admitted to the use of marijuana at the time of April C.'s birth.

April C. is a neglected child in that Mother was incarcerated at the time of her birth.   Mother has unaddressed mental health issues and is diagnosed with mild mental retardation and continues to refuse services.   She continues to use marijuana and does not see the benefit of participating in services.

Mother's parental rights to another child, Rosalee G., were terminated on 8/7/09, pursuant to a TPR filed by DCF. Rosalee was removed from Mother due to concerns of domestic violence between her Mother and father, cognitive limitations of both Mother and father, and Mother's lack of involvement with service providers.   Mother was offered services to address her mental health issues, including services offered by the Department of Developmental Services and substance abuse treatment, however, she refused to engage in treatment.   Mother consented to the termination of her parental rights to Rosalee G.

Mother's parental rights to another child, Reynaldo B., were terminated on 7/22/08, pursuant to a TPR filed by DCF. Reynaldo B. was removed from her care due to concerns of physical abuse.   Mother was transient during the life of this case and was often unavailable to DCF and did not comply with visitation.   She was offered a psychological evaluation, services to address her mental health, and substance abuse treatment, however, she refused to engage in treatment.

Mother's parental rights to another child, Jannessa C., were terminated on 8/1/06, pursuant to a termination of parental rights filed by DCF. Janessa C. was removed from Mother's care due to Mother's cognitive limitations and her inability to care for her child as she did not having housing and had unaddressed mental heath needs.   Mother was transient during the life of this case and was whereabouts unknown.   She was offered services to address her mental health issues, including services offered by the Department of Developmental Services, but she refused these services.

Due to April C.'s age, she is in need of a sober, reliable, and competent caretaker.   An infant requires constant care and Mother has shown that she has been unable to meet those needs.   She is unable to provide stable housing or meet the emotional needs of the child due to her unaddressed mental health issues.

Mother has been diagnosed with mild retardation and received services as an adolescent through DCF. She began refusing services at age 18.   Since that time, Mother has had her parental rights to three of her children terminated due to her ongoing mental health issues, her cognitive limitations, substance abuse and transient living.   Mother was recently incarcerated due to possession of marijuana.   She has not made any significant life changes which would demonstrate her ability to provide for or meet the needs of an infant.

C. Grounds for Termination:  Abandonment-General Statutes § 17a-112(j)(3)(A) as to Alleged Father, Angel C., and Putative Father, John Doe.

This ground is established when the child has been abandoned by the parent in the sense that the parent has failed to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern, or responsibility as to the welfare of the child.   Sporadic efforts are insufficient to negate the claim of abandonment.   The test for determining abandonment of a child for purposes of termination of parental rights is not whether a parent has shown “some interest” in his or her child, but rather, whether the parent has maintained any reasonable degree of interest, concern, or responsibility as to the child's welfare.  In re Rayna M., 13 Conn.App. 23, 36, 534 A.2d 897 (1987).

Attempts to achieve contact with a child, telephone calls, the sending of cards and gifts and financial support are indicia of “interest, concern or responsibility.”  In re Migdalia M., 6 Conn.App. 194, 209, 504 A.2d 533 (1986).

The commonly understood general obligations of parenthood entail these minimum attributes:  (1) express love and affection for the child;  (2) express personal concern over the health, education and general well-being of the child;  (3) the duty to supply the necessary food, clothing and medical care;  (4) the duty to provide an adequate domicile;  and (5) the duty to furnish social and religious guidance.  (Citations omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  In re Kezia M., 33 Conn.App. 12, 17-18, 632 A.2d 1122 (1993);  In re Roshawn R., 51 Conn.App. 44, 53, 720 A.2d 1112 (1998).

Ground A-Abandonment as to April C. by Alleged Father, Angel C.

1.  Father has not seen April C. since her birth.

2. Father has never provided financial support for his child.

3. Father has never sent cards, gifts or letters to his child.

4. Father has never acknowledged the child's birthday or other special days.

5. Father has never participated in the child's education or shown an interest in the child's health or welfare.

6. Father has not inquired about his child nor requested visitation with her since March 2009.

Ground A-Abandonment as to April C. by Putative Father, John Doe

1.  John Doe has not seen April C. since her birth.

2. Father has never provided financial support for his child.

3. Father has never sent cards, gifts or letters to his child.

4. Father has never acknowledged the child's birthday or other special days.

5. Father has never participated in the child's education or shown an interest in the child's health or welfare.

6. Father has not inquired about his child nor requested visitation with her.

Summary of Adjudicatory Findings

This court has found that the Commissioner has proved the following adjudicatory grounds by clear and convincing evidence:  Mother, Lee P., has failed to rehabilitate and alleged Father, Angel C. and putative Father, John Doe have abandoned the child after a prior court finding that they had neglected and abandoned April C.

IV

DISPOSITION

Except in the case where termination is based on consent, if grounds have been found to terminate parental rights, applying the appropriate standard of proof the court must then consider whether the facts as of the last day of trial, establish, by clear and convincing evidence, after consideration of the factors enumerated in C.G.S. § 17a-112(k), that termination is in the child's best interest.   If the court does find that termination is in the child's best interest, an order will enter terminating parental rights.

A. C.G.S. § 17a-112(k) Criteria

The court has found by clear and convincing evidence that the statutory grounds alleged by DCF for the termination of parental rights have been proven.

Before making a decision whether or not to terminate Lee P.'s, Angel C.'s and John Doe's parental rights, as they did not consent [but rather default pleas were ordered by the court for Fathers], the court will consider and make findings on each of the seven criteria set forth in C.G.S. § 17a-112(k).  In re Romance M, 229 Conn. 345, 355, 641 A.2d 378 (1994).

These criteria and this court's findings, which have been established by clear and convincing evidence, are as follows:

1. “The timeliness, nature and extent of services offered or provided to the parent and the child by an agency to facilitate the reunion of the child with the parent.”

This court finds by clear and convincing evidence that DCF has made reasonable efforts to reunify April C. with her parents.   Those services were ordered in a timely manner and were appropriate for the circumstances at hand.

Considered carefully, the clear and convincing evidence shows that DCF offered timely, appropriate and comprehensive services to the respondent parents to facilitate their reunification with their child and made reasonable efforts to reunite them with their child.  In re Victoria B., 79 Conn.App. 245, 258-60, 829 A.2d 855 (2003).

Based on this clear and convincing evidence of the circumstances now present in this case, the court finds that the parents are unable and/or unwilling to benefit from reasonable reunification efforts.  CGS § 17a-112(j)(1).   Their serious issues clearly and convincingly make them unable and/or unwilling to benefit from reasonable reunification efforts.  In re Tyqwane V., 85 Conn.App 528, 535-36, 857 A.2d 963 (2004).

DCF was unable to provide services to facilitate the return of the child since Father John Doe and Father Angel C. have not come forward to identify themselves and to establish paternity.

2. “Whether DCF has made reasonable efforts to reunite the family pursuant to the Federal Child Welfare Act of 1980, as amended.”

This court finds that the clear and convincing evidence in this matter proves that the parents are presently unable and/or unwilling to benefit from such reunification services as was contemplated by the federal Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, as amended.

DCF has previously offered services to the respondent Mother.   DCF has made reasonable efforts to obtain the identity of Father, John Doe and Father, Angel C.

3. “The terms of any court order entered into and agreed upon by any individual or agency and the parent, and the extent to which all the parties have fulfilled their obligations of such order.”

The clear and convincing evidence indicates that Lee P. has failed to fully comply with most of the terms ordered by the court.

The court has not issued Specific Steps or orders to John Doe or Angel C. as they have not come forward to identify themselves or to establish paternity.

4. “The feelings and emotional ties of the child with respect to her parents, any guardian of such child's person and any person who has exercised physical care, custody or control of the child for at least one year and with whom the child has developed significant emotional ties.”

The child has been able to exhibit only limited bonding with her Mother based on a condition that was due to Mother's substance abuse and reluctance to accept her role as a parent.

Since Father, John Doe, and Father, Angel C., have not come forward, April C. was unable to bond with them.

5. “The age of the child.”

April C. was born on 10/9/09 and is seven months old.

6. “The efforts the parent has made to adjust such parent's circumstances, conduct or conditions to make it in the best interest of the child to return to such child's home in the foreseeable future, including, but not limited to (A) the extent to which the parent has maintained contact with the child as part of an effort to reunite the child with the parent provided that the court may give weight to incidental visitations, communications or contributions and (B) the maintenance of regular contact or communication with the guardian or other custodian of the child.”

The court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the parents have not made realistic and sustained efforts to conform their conduct to minimally acceptable parental standards.

The clear and convincing evidence indicates that Mother has continued to abuse substances up to the present time and has refused to co-operate with DCF or programs presented.

The court finds, by clear and convincing evidence, that the parents have not made the changes necessary in their lifestyles that would indicate that they would be a safe, responsible and nurturing parents for April C. To permit the child to return to the parents' care would compromise the safety of the child.

7. “The extent to which a parent has been prevented from maintaining a meaningful relationship with the child by the unreasonable act or conduct of the other parent of the child, or the unreasonable act of any other person or by the economic circumstances of the parent.”

This court finds by clear and convincing evidence that no unreasonable conduct by DCF, foster parents, Department of Corrections or third parties prevented the parents from maintaining a relationship with April C., nor did their economic circumstances prevent such relationship, although the limitations and restrictions inherent in the foster care system remained in effect.

B. Best Interest of the Child-C.G.S. § 17a-112(j)(2)

The court is next called upon to determine whether termination of Lee P.'s parental rights to April C. would be in her best interests.²  Applying the appropriate legal standards ³ to the clear and convincing facts of this case, the court finds this issue in favor of the State of Connecticut and DCF.

In determining whether termination of Lee P.'s parental rights would be in the child's best interests, the court has examined multiple relevant factors, including the child's interests in sustained growth, development, well-being, stability and continuity of her environment;  her length of stay in foster care;  the nature of her relationship with her biological parents;  and the degree of contact maintained with her biological parents.⁴  In re Alexander C., 60 Conn.App. 555, 559, 760 A.2d 532 (2000);  In re Shyina B., 58 Conn.App. 159, 167, 752 A.2d 1139 (2000);  In re Savanna M., 55 Conn.App. 807, 816, 740 A.2d 484 (1999).   In a matter such as this, the court is further called upon to balance April C.'s intrinsic needs for stability and permanency against the benefits of maintaining a connection with her parents.   See Pamela B. v. Ment, 244 Conn. 296, 314, 709 A.2d 1089 (1998) (child's physical and emotional well-being must be weighed against the interest in preserving family integrity).

Under such scrutiny, the clear and convincing evidence in this matter establishes that it is not in April C.'s best interests to continue to maintain any legal relationship with her parents.

The clear and convincing evidence also shows that Lee P. has failed to gain insight into becoming a safe, nurturing and responsible parent for April C. The clear and convincing evidence shows that her judgment and conduct still remain questionable, and have not improved since her child was taken into DCF care.

Mother's performance clearly and convincingly shows she lacks the attributes and characteristics necessary to fulfill a valid parental role.   Her recalcitrance concerning referrals clearly and convincingly show that, without commitment to consistent substance abuse treatment, as well as individual and parenting counseling and, without a commitment to complying with the laws of the State of Connecticut, it is likely that she has extinguished what little chance she ever had to able to serve as a safe, nurturing and responsible parent for any child.

An additional factor to consider in this case is time.   The clear and convincing evidence demonstrates April C.'s pressing need for permanence and stability.   Unfortunately, much time would be required for Mother to show that she has forsaken substance abuse, addressed her issues, undertaken the necessary counseling and succeeded in it, established herself in the community and shown that she was capable of being a safe, nurturing and responsible parent to her child.

April C. cannot delay her need for permanence and stability for her Mother's uncertain future.

Based upon Mother's behavior and performance so far, this court cannot foresee her ever having the ability or the opportunity to be able to follow the regimen necessary for this child to maximize her abilities and achievements.

The clear and convincing evidence shows that the time needed for Lee P. to attempt to rehabilitate and establish herself in the community as a safe, nurturing and responsible parent, if that were possible, is time that her daughter cannot afford.

Lee P.'s parental performance clearly and convincingly shows that she lacks the attributes and characteristics necessary to fulfill a valid parental role.   Her conduct clearly and convincingly shows that it is unlikely that she will ever be able to conform her behavior to appropriate norms or be able to serve as a safe, nurturing and responsible parent for April C.

Our courts have recognized that “long-term stability is critical to a child's future health and development ․” In re Eden F., 250 Conn. 674, 709, 741 A.2d 873 (1999).   Furthermore, “[b]ecause of the psychological effects of prolonged termination proceedings on young children, time is of the essence” when resolving issues related to the permanent or temporary care of neglected children.  In re Alexander V., 25 Conn.App. 741, 748, 596 A.2d 934 (1991), aff'd, 223 Conn. 557, 613 A.2d 780 (1992);  see also In re Juvenile Appeal (84-CD), 189 Conn. 276, 292, 455 A.2d 1313 (1983).   The court is obliged to agree with DCF and concludes that the clear and convincing evidence in this case establishes that April C. is entitled to the benefit of ending, without further delay, the period of uncertainty as to the availability of her parents as caretakers.

Having balanced April C.'s individual and intrinsic needs for stability and permanency against the benefits of maintaining a connection with her parents, the clear and convincing evidence in this case establishes that the child's best interests cannot be served by continuing to maintain any legal relationship to her parents.  Pamela B. v. Ment, supra, 244 Conn. 313-14.

Accordingly, with respect to the best interests of the child as contemplated by CGS § 17a-112(j)(2), by clear and convincing evidence, and based upon all of the foregoing, including the testimony and evidence presented, the court finds that termination of the parental rights of these parents as to April C. is in the best interest of the child in question.

V

CONCLUSION

The court having considered all statutory considerations and having found by clear and convincing evidence that grounds exist for termination of parental rights, further finds upon all the facts and circumstances presented, that it is in April C.'s best interest to terminate the parental rights of Lee P., the biological Mother of the child, Angel C., the alleged Father of the child, and John Doe, the putative Father of the child.   Accordingly, it is ordered that their parental rights to April C. are hereby terminated.

It is further ordered that the Commissioner of the Department of Children and Families be appointed the statutory parent for this child for the purpose of securing an adoptive family and a permanent placement for this child.

The statutory parent is ordered to file the appropriate written reports with the court, as are required by state and federal law and which show the efforts to effect the permanent placement of this child.

BY THE COURT,

WOLLENBERG, J.

FOOTNOTES

FN2. The final element of the termination of parental rights statute, CGS § 17a-112(j), requires that before granting a duly noticed petition for such termination, the court must find, “by clear and convincing evidence ․ (2) that termination is in the best interest of the child ․”.  FN2. The final element of the termination of parental rights statute, CGS § 17a-112(j), requires that before granting a duly noticed petition for such termination, the court must find, “by clear and convincing evidence ․ (2) that termination is in the best interest of the child ․”

FN3. “Termination of parental rights means the complete severance by court order of the legal relationship, with all its rights and responsibilities, between the child and the child's parent or parents ․ Termination of parental rights is a most serious and sensitive judicial action.  In re Barbara J., 215 Conn. 31, 44, 574 A.2d 203 (1990).”  (Citation omitted, internal quotation marks omitted.)  In re Steven N., 57 Conn.App. 629, 632, 749 A.2d 678 (2000).  “[T]he question ․ to be decided in a dispositional phase is whether it is in the best interests of the child to sever the parent-child relationship.   That is different from the question of who should have custody of the child if termination of parental rights is determined to be in the best interests of the child.   See Practice Book § 33-5.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  In re Carissa K., 55 Conn.App. 768, 776, 740 A.2d 896 (1999).  “In making this determination, the trial court can consider all events occurring prior to the date of the dispositional hearing, including those occurring after the filing of the termination petition.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  In re Kasheema L., 56 Conn.App. 484, 488, 744 A.2d 441, cert. denied, 252 Conn. 945, 747 A.2d 522 (2000)..  FN3. “Termination of parental rights means the complete severance by court order of the legal relationship, with all its rights and responsibilities, between the child and the child's parent or parents ․ Termination of parental rights is a most serious and sensitive judicial action.  In re Barbara J., 215 Conn. 31, 44, 574 A.2d 203 (1990).”  (Citation omitted, internal quotation marks omitted.)  In re Steven N., 57 Conn.App. 629, 632, 749 A.2d 678 (2000).  “[T]he question ․ to be decided in a dispositional phase is whether it is in the best interests of the child to sever the parent-child relationship.   That is different from the question of who should have custody of the child if termination of parental rights is determined to be in the best interests of the child.   See Practice Book § 33-5.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  In re Carissa K., 55 Conn.App. 768, 776, 740 A.2d 896 (1999).  “In making this determination, the trial court can consider all events occurring prior to the date of the dispositional hearing, including those occurring after the filing of the termination petition.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  In re Kasheema L., 56 Conn.App. 484, 488, 744 A.2d 441, cert. denied, 252 Conn. 945, 747 A.2d 522 (2000).

FN4. “[T]he genetic bond shared by a biological parent and his or her child, although not determinative of the issue of the best interest of the child, is certainly a factor to consider.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  In re Savanna M., 55 Conn.App. 807, 816, 740 A.2d 484 (1999)..  FN4. “[T]he genetic bond shared by a biological parent and his or her child, although not determinative of the issue of the best interest of the child, is certainly a factor to consider.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  In re Savanna M., 55 Conn.App. 807, 816, 740 A.2d 484 (1999).

Wollenberg, William L., J.