Bank of Southern Connecticut v. 239 LLC (2010)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE MOTION TO STRIKE

Plaintiff seeks to strike each of defendant's four Special Defenses.  “A motion to strike challenges the legal sufficiency of a pleading, and, consequently, requires no factual findings by the trial court.”  Bernhard-Thomas Building Systems, LLC v. Dunican, 286 Conn. 548, 552-53 (2008).  “The allegations of the pleading involved are entitled to the same favorable construction a trier would be required to give in admitting evidence under them and if the facts provable under its allegations would support a defense or a cause of action, the motion to strike must fail.”  Mingachos v. CBS, Inc., 196 Conn. 91, 108-09 (1985).

Plaintiff argues that the Special Defenses should be stricken because they are nothing more than legal conclusions;  an entirely accurate description of the First, Third and Fourth Special Defenses.   There is no clear appellate authority on the issue of whether a bald legal conclusion constitutes a legally sufficient special defense.   To complicate matters further, there has long been a split of authority on this issue at the Superior Court level.   See, Cluney v. Regional School District No. 13, Judicial District of Middlesex at Middletown, Docket No. 99-0089468 (Gordon, J., June 19, 2000).   However, the better reasoned Superior Court cases support the conclusion that the language contained in the Practice Book requires, at a minimum, at least some recital of facts specific to the case at issue:  “ ‘Each pleading shall contain a plain and concise statement of the material facts on which the pleader relies.’   Practice Book § 10-1.  ‘Facts that are consistent with such statements but show, notwithstanding, that the plaintiff has no cause of action, must be specifically alleged.’  Practice Book § 10-50.  ‘The fundamental purpose of a special defense, like other pleadings, is to apprise the court and opposing counsel of the issues to be tried, so that the basic issues are not concealed until the trial is underway.’  Bennett v. Automobile Insurance Co. of Hartford, 230 Conn. 795, 802 (1994).”  Id. See, also, SNET Information Services, Inc., v. A Premier Limousine Service, Inc., Judicial District of New Haven at New Haven, Docket No. CV 07-5015163 (Cosgrove, J., August 13, 2008):  “The brief review of the Practice Book sections directed toward the filing of answers or special defenses leads the court to the conclusion that when a party files a special defense it must identify ‘the material facts on which the pleader relies.’  Practice Book § 10-1.”

Based on the foregoing, the court finds that the total absence of any factual allegations specific to this dispute in the First, Third and Fourth Special Defenses renders them legally insufficient and plaintiff's Motion to Strike the First, Third and Fourth Special Defenses is hereby granted.   However, defendant's Second Special Defense lays a minimal factual foundation for its claim of accord and satisfaction.   While plaintiff may take issue with the facts supporting this claim, it is by no means legally insufficient and, as a result, plaintiff's Motion to Strike defendant's Second Special Defense is hereby denied.

James W. Abrams, Judge

Abrams, James W., J.