Housing Authority of Wethersfield v. Marion Amanek (2010)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION ON MOTION TO DISMISS

This is a summary process action brought by the plaintiff, Housing Authority of the Town of Wethersfield, to recover possession of the premises known as 74 Treat Road, Wethersfield, Connecticut (the “Premises”) from the defendants, Marion Amanek and Nicole Gables.   The plaintiff seeks to terminate the tenants' lease for conduct which the plaintiff alleges constitutes serious nuisance pursuant to Connecticut General Statutes § 47a-15.   The defendants have filed a motion to dismiss the action challenging the court's jurisdiction to hear the matter.   The court conducted a hearing on the defendants' motion on March 9, 2010.   The plaintiff and the defendant, Marion Amanek were represented by counsel.   The defendant Nicole Gables did not appear.

The defendant, Amanek, claims that the notice to quit served by the plaintiff fails to adequately specify conduct that constitutes serious nuisance as set forth in Connecticut General Statutes § 47a-15.   Amanek argues that the plaintiff's failure to adequately describe its claim of serious nuisance renders the notice to quit defective and therefore deprives the court of jurisdiction.

LEGAL STANDARD

Practice Book § 10-31(a) provides in pertinent part:  “The motion to dismiss shall be used to assert (1) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter ․”A motion to dismiss ․ properly attacks the jurisdiction of the court, essentially asserting that the plaintiff cannot as a matter of law and fact state a cause of action that should be heard by the court ․ A motion to dismiss tests, inter alia, whether, on the face of the record, the court is without jurisdiction ․” (Internal quotation marks omitted).  Cox v. Aiken, 278 Conn. 204, 210-11, 897 A.2d 71 (2006).   A valid notice to quit “is a condition precedent to a summary process action” under § 47a-23 that implicates the trial court's subject matter jurisdiction over that action.  Bristol v. Ocean State Job Lot Stores of Connecticut, Inc., 284 Conn. 1, 5, 931 A.2d 837 (2007).

THE NOTICE TO QUIT

In the present case, the notice to quit states that the defendant's lease is terminated for the following reason:

Violation of 47a-23(a)(G) Serious nuisance;  Section 47a-15(C).  “Conduct which presents an immediate and serious danger to the safety of other tenants or the landlord” and/or § 47a-15(D) using the premises for the illegal sale of drugs.

In that it is alleged:

On or about June 17, 2009 the Wethersfield Police Department arrested you on the following charges:

(a) Sale of Certain Illegal Drugs-Felony;

(b) Possession or sale of Controlled Substances within 1500' School or Housing Authority-Felony

(c) Failure to keep Narcotics in Original Container-Felony

DISCUSSION

General Statutes § 47a-15 provides in relevant part:  “For the purposes of this section, ‘serious nuisance’ means (A) inflicting bodily harm upon another tenant or the landlord or threatening to inflict such harm with the present ability to effect the harm and under circumstances which would lead a reasonable person to believe that such threat will be carried out, (B) substantial and wilful destruction of part of the dwelling unit or premises, (C) conduct which presents an immediate and serious danger to the safety of other tenants or the landlord, or (D) using the premises or allowing the premises to be used for prostitution or the illegal sale of drugs or, in the case of a housing authority, using any area within fifteen hundred feet of any housing authority property in which the tenant resides for the illegal sale of drugs.”

The defendant, Amanek, acknowledges that the language in the notice to quit incorporates one of the statutory definitions of serious nuisance set forth in § 47a-15.   However, the defendant argues that the additional language following the phrase “In that it is alleged:” which makes reference to the tenants' arrest, renders the notice to quit defective.

“When good cause for termination of a lease has clearly been shown, and when notices of termination have been sent in strict compliance with statutory timetables, a landlord should not be precluded from pursuing summary eviction proceedings because of hypertechnical dissection of the wording of the notices that he has sent.”  Jefferson Garden Associates v. Greene, 202 Conn. 128, 145, 520 A.2d 173 (1987).

The defendant faults the plaintiff for including the additional language concerning the tenants' arrest and the enumeration of the charges brought by the authorities.   Although there may be instances when a notice to quit can be rendered defective by the addition of superfluous language, in the present case, the additional language in the notice to quit in no way contradicts the statutory language employed in the notice to quit or creates any confusion concerning the reason for the bringing the action.

CONCLUSION

The court finds that the notice to quit properly sets forth the statutory definition of serious nuisance and when taken as a whole, amply informs the defendants of the reason for the summary process action and provided the defendants with the information needed to defend against premature, discriminatory or arbitrary eviction.

The motion to dismiss is denied.

SO ORDERED.

BY THE COURT,

Gilligan, J.

Gilligan, Robert G., J.