Citibank, N.A. v. Andres Soto (2010)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (# 102)

Procedural and Factual Background

The plaintiff, Citibank, N.A., commenced this action by service of process against the defendant, Andres Soto, on November 24, 2008.   The plaintiff alleges the following facts in the complaint.   The defendant had a checking account with the plaintiff.   On or about January 17, 2007, he overdrew his account by the amount of $12,300.   He has not paid the balance of the overdraft.   The plaintiff initiated an action against the defendant in New York to recover the balance.   On or about March 13, 2008, the Honorable Howard Janslow of the New York Supreme Court, Westchester County, entered a judgment against the defendant, who had not answered or appeared after he was served with the plaintiff's complaint and summons.   The amount of the judgment is $14,075.61, which represents the balance of the overdraft, nine percent interest and costs incurred by the plaintiff in initiating the action.   The plaintiff filed the present action to enforce the New York judgment against the defendant, a Connecticut resident.   The defendant filed an answer on December 23, 2008.   The plaintiff filed the present motion for summary judgment accompanied by a memorandum of law and an exhibit, which is a copy of the New York judgment, on March 11, 2010.   The defendant has not objected to the motion.   The court took papers on the matter on March 29, 2010.

Discussion

“Summary judgment is a method of resolving litigation when pleadings, affidavits, and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law ․ The motion for summary judgment is designed to eliminate the delay and expense of litigating an issue when there is no real issue to be tried.”  (Citations omitted.)  Wilson v. New Haven, 213 Conn. 277, 279, 567 A.2d 829 (1989).  “In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the trial court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.”   (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Durrant v. Board of Education, 284 Conn. 91, 99-100 n.7, 931 A.2d 859 (2007).

“The courts hold the movant to a strict standard.   To satisfy his burden the movant must make a showing that it is quite clear what the truth is, and that excludes any real doubt as to the existence of any genuine issue of material fact ․ When documents submitted in support of a motion for summary judgment fail to establish that there is no genuine issue of material fact, the nonmoving party has no obligation to submit documents establishing the existence of such an issue ․ Once the moving party has met its burden, however, the opposing party must present evidence that demonstrates the existence of some disputed factual issue ․” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Zielinski v. Kotsoris, 279 Conn. 312, 318-19, 901 A.2d 1207 (2006).

The plaintiff argues that there is no genuine issue of material fact about whether the New York judgment can be enforced against the defendant in Connecticut under the United States Constitution's Full Faith and Credit Clause and that it is therefore entitled to judgment as a matter of law.   In support, the plaintiff notes that the defendant admitted to or failed to deny the following in his answer:  (1) he is indebted to the plaintiff in the amount of $12,300;  (2) he converted the amount for his own benefit and use;  (3) he has been unjustly enriched by the amount at the plaintiff's expense;  and (4) a New York Supreme Court judgment was entered against him on or about March 13, 2008 in the amount of $14,075.61.   The plaintiff also notes that the defendant has failed to challenge the New York judgment or the present motion.

The constitution of the United States, article four, § 1, provides in relevant part:  “Full faith and credit shall be given in each state to the ․ judicial proceedings of every other state.”  “As a general principle, the full faith and credit clause of the United States Constitution permits a creditor who has obtained a judgment in one state to enforce the judgment in this state.”   Business Alliance Capital Corp. v. Fuselier, 88 Conn.App. 731, 732, 871 A.2d 1051 (2005).  “Only in a select few situations may courts set aside their obligation to afford full faith and credit to final judgments of foreign courts.   In particular, a debtor who seeks to challenge the validity of a foreign judgment that has been registered properly in this state may do so only by raising [c]onstitutionally permissible defenses ․ that destroy the full faith and credit obligation owed to a foreign judgment ․” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Id., 736.  “Such defenses include lack of personal jurisdiction or lack of due process.”  Id. “The United States Supreme Court has consistently held ․ that the judgment of another state must be presumed valid, and the burden of proving a lack of jurisdiction rests heavily upon the assailant ․ Furthermore, the party attacking the judgment bears the burden of proof regardless of whether the judgment at issue was rendered after a full trial on the merits or after an ex parte proceeding.”  (Citations omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  Packer Plastics, Inc. v. Laundon, 214 Conn. 52, 57, 570 A.2d 687 (1990).

The plaintiff has met its summary judgment burden by providing documentary evidence to establish the undisputed fact that the New York judgment is enforceable in Connecticut.   The defendant has taken no action with respect to the present motion, let alone met his summary judgment burden of demonstrating with his own documentary evidence that he disputes the enforceability of the New York judgment.   The plaintiff is therefore entitled to judgment as a matter of law by virtue of the United States Constitution's Full Faith and Credit Clause, since the defendant has not alleged lack of personal jurisdiction, lack of due process or any other “constitutionally permissible defense” that may defeat the court's obligation under the clause.

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment is granted.

Wilson, J.

Wilson, Robin L., J.