State of Connecticut v. Mark Richardson (2010)

SENTENCE AFFIRMED

The petitioner, Mark Richardson, was convicted at a jury trial of the crimes of risk of injury to a minor ¹ and sexual assault in the fourth degree ² and was sentenced to 20 years suspended after 7 years of incarceration, followed by 15 years of probation.

The facts underlying the petitioner's conviction are as follows.   On October 25, 2006 the petitioner's wife and the 14-year-old victim, who was the couple's daughter, complained to the Plainville police that the petitioner had sexually assaulted the girl.   The daughter initially told her mother that the petitioner had touched her breast and her vagina.   Both of the parents and the daughter all went to a counseling session with the family pastor and the petitioner admitted in that session that he had in fact touched his daughter in a sexual manner.   The pastor encouraged the petitioner to speak with the police about the incident, but he never did.   Ultimately the mother and child reported the incident to the police and the petitioner was arrested.

The petitioner claims that his sentence is “inappropriate” and “disproportionate” pursuant to Practice Book Section 43-28 ³ because the petitioner had an unblemished criminal record prior to this incident;  he had a steady work history;  he is a “good family man” and he is remorseful for his actions.   In addition, the petitioner claims that the “average” sentence for persons convicted of the same statutory section of risk of injury as he was is four years.⁴  Therefore, he argues, he is entitled to have a sentence ranging from two to four years.

The state urges the Division to reject the petitioner's arguments.   It points out that the petitioner, in violating his own daughter, did great emotional and psychological harm to the victim.   It also reminds the Division that both the mother and the daughter spoke at great length and with great passion at the sentencing about the pain, humiliation and breach of trust that the family suffered on account of the petitioner's criminal conduct.

The Division, after carefully considering all of the parties' claims, has concluded that the sentence imposed by the trial court is well within the parameters of Section 43-28.   The petitioner's sexual misconduct in this case was both selfish and callous.   He acted without concern for his daughter, her future well being and the effect of his actions on his family.   Further, the trial court was entitled to consider the unique factual scenario of this case, along with consequences of the crime on the victim, when determining the punishment.   The sentence imposed by the trial court is, under the totality of the circumstances and notwithstanding any statistical average, both appropriate and proportionate.

The sentence is AFFIRMED.

White, J.

Iannotti, J.

White, J. and Iannotti, J. participated in this decision.⁵

FOOTNOTES

FN1. See General Statutes Section 53-21(a)(2).   This offense carries a maximum sentence of twenty years of incarceration..  FN1. See General Statutes Section 53-21(a)(2).   This offense carries a maximum sentence of twenty years of incarceration.

FN2. See General Statutes Section 53a-73a(1)(A).   This offense carries a maximum of five years of incarceration..  FN2. See General Statutes Section 53a-73a(1)(A).   This offense carries a maximum of five years of incarceration.

FN3. Section 43-28 indicates that the Division shall “determine whether the sentence should be modified because it is inappropriate or disproportionate in light of the nature of the offense, the character of the offender, the protection of the public interest, the deterrent, rehabilitative, isolative, and denunciatory purposes for which the sentence was intended.”.  FN3. Section 43-28 indicates that the Division shall “determine whether the sentence should be modified because it is inappropriate or disproportionate in light of the nature of the offense, the character of the offender, the protection of the public interest, the deterrent, rehabilitative, isolative, and denunciatory purposes for which the sentence was intended.”

FN4. In her brief and at the sentence review hearing, counsel for the petitioner based her claim regarding the average sentence for persons convicted of risk of injury on statistics she gathered from an official in the judicial branch..  FN4. In her brief and at the sentence review hearing, counsel for the petitioner based her claim regarding the average sentence for persons convicted of risk of injury on statistics she gathered from an official in the judicial branch.

FN5. At the time of the petitioner's sentence review application hearing, the judges who participated in this decision were the only ones available and the petitioner was offered an opportunity to postpone his sentence review hearing until a later date when a third judge would be available.   He was also told that if he wanted to proceed, the two judges who were available would proceed with the hearing and render a decision as authorized by General Statutes § 51-194.   After consulting with his counsel and being canvassed by Iannotti, J., the petitioner voluntarily decided to proceed with a two-judge panel in lieu of a three-judge panel..  FN5. At the time of the petitioner's sentence review application hearing, the judges who participated in this decision were the only ones available and the petitioner was offered an opportunity to postpone his sentence review hearing until a later date when a third judge would be available.   He was also told that if he wanted to proceed, the two judges who were available would proceed with the hearing and render a decision as authorized by General Statutes § 51-194.   After consulting with his counsel and being canvassed by Iannotti, J., the petitioner voluntarily decided to proceed with a two-judge panel in lieu of a three-judge panel.

White, Gary J., Iannotti, Frank A., Js.