Edwin Garcia v. City of Hartford et al. (2010)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

In this action for mandamus and damages, the plaintiff claims he is entitled to additional retirement benefits from the defendants.   The parties submitted joint stipulated facts, and the court conducted a hearing over the course of two days.   The following facts are relevant to the determination of the issue presented.   The plaintiff resigned from the Hartford police department after sixteen years of service.   On the date of his resignation, the plaintiff was subject to, and a beneficiary of, a collective bargaining agreement between the Hartford police union and the city of Hartford that was in effect for the period of July 1, 1994, to June 30, 1996 (Agreement).

Prior to terminating his employment, the plaintiff had accumulated eighty sick days as a Hartford police officer.   At the time the plaintiff terminated his employment, he was not yet eligible to receive retirement benefits because he had not yet reached the twentieth year of his hire date, which would occur on March 24, 2000.   The agreement contains a provision that allows accumulated sick time to be traded in for increased pension benefits.   After the plaintiff began receiving retirement benefits, he requested to trade in accumulated sick time for increased pension benefits.   Specifically, the plaintiff requested to trade in eighty sick days for four years of service time for increased pension benefits.   The request was refused by the defendant.

LAW

This case involves the interpretation of a collective bargaing agreement, which is a contract.

“Principles of contract law guide our interpretation of collective bargaining agreements ․ The intent of the parties as expressed in a contract is determined from the language used interpreted in the light of the situation of the parties and the circumstances connected with the transaction ․ [T]he intent of the parties is to be ascertained by a fair and reasonable construction of the written words and ․ the language used must be accorded its common, natural, and ordinary meaning and usage where it can be sensibly applied to the subject matter of the contract ․ Where the language of the contract is clear and unambiguous, the contract is to be given effect according to its terms.   A court will not torture words to import ambiguity where the ordinary meaning leaves no room for ambiguity ․ Similarly, any ambiguity in a contract must emanate from the language used in the contract rather than from one party's subjective perception of the terms ․ [T]he mere fact that the parties advance different interpretations of the language in question does not necessitate a conclusion that the language is ambiguous ․

“[I]n construing contracts, we give effect to all the language included therein, as the law of contract interpretation ․ militates against interpreting a contract in a way that renders a provision superfluous ․ If a contract is unambiguous within its four corners, intent of the parties is a question of law requiring plenary review ․ When the language of a contract is ambiguous, the determination of the parties' intent is a question of fact, and the trial court's interpretation is subject to reversal on appeal only if it is clearly erroneous.”  (Citations omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)   Honulik v. Greenwich, 293 Conn. 698, 710-11, 980 A.2d 880 (2009).

CONTRACT PROVISIONS

Article III, section 3.6 of the agreement deals with pensions.   The preamble of that section states:  “Effective July 1, 1994, the following pension and survivor benefits shall apply to all sworn police officers who retire effective on or after that date.”   Section 3.6, paragraph 2 provides in relevant part:  “Service retirements will be based upon 2.65% of final average pay for each whole year of service for the first twenty (20) years of continuous service and the following table for each whole year of continuous service thereafter to a maximum of 70% of final average pay.   The forgoing shall be subject to the provisions of Appendix E, Sections E and N. The maximum of the 70% of final average pay shall be subject to the provisions of Section 3.6, Section 8.”

Section 3.6, paragraph 3 provides:  “Normal retirement shall be after twenty (20) years of continuous service.   Employee pension benefits shall be vested after ten (10) years of continuous service.”   Section 3.6, paragraph 4 four provides:  “An employee who vests his or her pension and leaves the service of the City will be entitled to collect a pension benefit commencing on the date he or she would have reached his or her normal retirement date.”

Section 3.6, paragraph 8 of the agreement provides:  “Effective July 1, 1994, an employee whose retirement becomes effective on or after that date, may upon retirement, and prior to any formula reduction, exchange a portion of his or her accumulated sick leave for up to four (4) years (in whole years only) of additional pension service time for the purpose of computing the amount of his or her retirement allowance provided, however, such additional service time shall not be used for establishing eligibility for normal retirement benefits, but shall be used as additional service credits for employees who are qualified or become qualified for normal/disability retirement benefits.   Each additional year of pension service acquired pursuant to this section shall be equal to 2.50% of final average pay.   No employee shall retire over 80% of final average pay through the utilization of this benefit with the exception of those employees included in Appendix E, subsection E of this agreement.   For the purpose of exchange under this section, twenty (20) days shall equal one (1) year of additional pension service time.   Any accumulated sick leave remaining after the exchange shall be subject to the provisions of Article V, Section 5.3.   Negotiations in regards to this benefit shall be locked out until July 1st, 2000.”   It should be noted that this case does not involve disability retirement benefits.   In addition, the referred to Appendix E is an outline of pension provisions under the municipal employee's retirement fund, and it is not as detailed as the agreement.   In fact, Appendix E does not mention the sick leave exchange provision.

Article V, section 5.3 discusses sick leave and the following portions are pertinent.  “Each employee shall earn sick leave with pay during and after his probationary period at the rate of 1.5 days of sick leave for each month of service to a maximum of 15 days in each fiscal year.  “The city will pay an employee 50 percent of his accumulated sick leave upon his retirement.   No payment will be made to an employee who vests his pension benefits and collects a benefit commencing other than at termination of service.”

DISCUSSION

The court has carefully examined the language of the contract to determine the intent of the parties and concludes that the language is clear and unambiguous.   At the hearing, the plaintiff and the defendants presented testimony from witnesses as to the purported intent of the contract language.   Since the language in the contract is plain and unambiguous, the court has not relied on any of the testimony from the witnesses regarding the parties' intent.

The first portion of the first sentence of Article III, section 3.6, paragraph 8 would appear to support the plaintiff's claim.   His normal retirement date is after July 1, 1994.   Upon his receipt of pension benefits, which began after he reached what would have been his normal retirement date, the plaintiff did request the exchange of his accumulated sick leave for additional pension service time.   It is important to note, however, that although the plaintiff had vested pension benefits because he had more than ten years of service, he did not qualify for normal retirement benefits, since he did not have twenty years of continuous service.

The second portion of that sentence specifies which employees are eligible to utilize the sick leave exchange.   That portion states, “however, such additional service time shall not be used for establishing eligibility for normal retirement benefits, but shall be used as additional service credit for employees who are qualified or become qualified for normal/disability retirement benefits.”  (Emphasis added.)   When entire first sentence of section 3.6 paragraph 8 is construed, it is apparent that the plaintiff is not included in the group that may utilize the sick leave exchange.

Under section 3.6, paragraphs 3 and 4, the plaintiff is entitled to collect pension benefits as opposed to normal retirement benefits.   The agreement expressly provides that the additional pension service time derived by a sick leave exchange can only be used by employees who qualify for normal retirement benefits.   The court concludes that the fair and unambiguous language of the contract indicates that the intent of the parties was that the sick leave exchange provision does not apply to employees who have less than twenty years of continuous service and who receive only pension benefits, and not normal retirement benefits.   If the parties intended that the sick leave exchange applied to employees who received only pension benefits they could have so stated.

Additional language in 3.6, paragraph 8 expresses the intent that accumulated sick leave has value for exchange purposes only if the employee reaches normal retirement, after at least twenty years of service.   The paragraph states that sick leave cannot be used to establish eligibility to receive normal retirement benefits, presumably by an employee with less than twenty years of service.   Since sick leave cannot be used to establish eligibility for normal retirement, it is consistent to conclude that sick leave cannot be used to enhance benefits that are not normal retirement benefits.   It is clear that the parties agreed that only those employees who qualified for normal retirement could benefit from the sick leave exchange.

The fact that accumulated sick leave is treated differently between those employees who reach normal retirement, and those who terminate service before normal retirement is also manifested in Section 5.3.   As noted earlier, the city pays an employee 50 percent of his accumulated sick leave upon his retirement.   Payment, however, is not made to an employee who simply has vested pension rights, and thereafter collects a pension benefit other than at the termination of his service.   This provision further indicates that it is the intent of the parties that accumulated sick leave does not have any value to an employee who may be vested, but terminates service before accruing twenty 20 years of continuing service.

CONCLUSION

The clear and unambiguous language of the contract does not allow the plaintiff to exchange accumulated sick time for increased pension benefits since he accumulated less than 20 years of continuous service.

The defendants correctly denied the plaintiff's request.   Judgment may enter in favor of the defendants.

Domnarski, J.

Domnarski, Edward S., J.