Patricia Braumann v. Robert Clavette et al. (2010)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE MOTION TO STRIKE (# 112)

PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND

On March 18, 2009, the plaintiff, Patricia A. Braumann, filed a three-count complaint against the defendants Robert L. Clavette and Kobyluck Construction, Inc. (Kobyluck).  In her complaint the plaintiff alleges the following facts.   On March 2, 2007, the plaintiff was operating an automobile in an easterly direction on the exit 65 ramp off of Interstate 95 northbound in Westbrook, Connecticut.   At the same time, Clavette was operating a box truck owned by Kobyluck on Route 153 southbound near its intersection with the exit 65 ramp.   Pursuant to a green overhead traffic signal, the plaintiff attempted to turn left onto Route 153 northbound when Clavette “suddenly and without warning drove his box truck through the intersection ․ in disobedience to a red overhead traffic signal, colliding with the left front side of the automobile being driven by the [p]laintiff ․ with great force and violence.”   As a result of the collision, the plaintiff suffered injuries.

In count one of her complaint, the plaintiff alleges that her injuries were caused by the negligence and carelessness of Clavette.   In count two, the plaintiff alleges that her injuries were caused by the reckless, deliberate and or wanton and wilful misconduct of Clavette and requests punitive damages pursuant to General Statutes § 14-295 in the prayer for relief.¹  In count three, the plaintiff alleges that Kobyluck, as the owner of the motor vehicle, is liable for the negligence and carelessness of Clavette.

On February 11, 2010, the defendants filed a motion to strike count two of the plaintiff's complaint for the recklessness of Clavette on the ground that it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.   The motion is accompanied by a memorandum of law.   On February 22, 2010, the plaintiff filed an objection and memorandum of law in opposition to the defendants' motion to strike.   Oral argument was heard on the motion at short calendar on March 29, 2010.

DISCUSSION

“The purpose of a motion to strike is to contest ․ the legal sufficiency of the allegations of any complaint ․ to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Fort Trumbull Conservancy, LLC v. Alves, 262 Conn. 480, 498, 815 A.2d 1188 (2003).  “In ruling on a motion to strike, the court is limited to the facts alleged in the complaint.”   (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Faulkner v. United Technologies Corp., 240 Conn. 576, 580, 693 A.2d 293 (1997).   As a result, “[t]he role of the trial court [is] to examine the [complaint], construed in favor of the [plaintiff], to determine whether the [plaintiff has] stated a legally sufficient cause of action.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Dodd v. Middlesex Mutual Assurance Co., 242 Conn. 375, 378, 698 A.2d 859 (1997).  “[I]n determining the sufficiency of a complaint challenged by a defendant's motion to strike, all well-pleaded facts and those facts necessarily implied from the allegations are taken as admitted.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Violano v. Fernandez, 280 Conn. 310, 318, 907 A.2d 1188 (2006).  “If any facts provable under the express and implied allegations in the plaintiff's complaint support a cause of action ․ the complaint is not vulnerable to a motion to strike.”   Bouchard v. People's Bank, 219 Conn. 465, 471, 594 A.2d 1 (1991).   Nevertheless, “[a] motion to strike is properly granted if the complaint alleges mere conclusions of law that are unsupported by the facts alleged.”   (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Fort Trumbull Conservancy, LLC v. Alves, supra, 498.

In their memorandum of law in support of the motion to strike count two, the defendants argue that count two is legally insufficient in that the plaintiff “essentially reiterates and copies the negligence allegations as alleged in [c]ount [o]ne for negligence” and repleads them in count two for recklessness with the addition of “target buzz statutes and words used in all recklessness allegations.”   Therefore, the defendants argue that the allegations of count two give rise to a claim of negligence, not recklessness.   The defendants further argue that the corresponding prayer for relief requesting punitive damages is legally insufficient.²  In response, the plaintiff counters that there is a split of authority within the Superior Court as to what a plaintiff must plead to sufficiently state a claim for recklessness under § 14-295, however, a majority of the Superior Court has “interpreted the statute to require no more than a simple allegation, tracking the language of the statute, that a defendant deliberately or with reckless disregard violated one or more of the motor vehicle laws listed therein, and that said statutory violation was a substantial factor in causing the complained of injuries.”   While the plaintiff “believes that this court should adopt the majority view,” she argues that should the court adopt the minority view, the “allegations contained in the [f]irst [c]ount of her [c]omplaint are completely and totally different from the allegations contained in the [s]econd [c]ount of [her] [c]omplaint ․ [and] that she has most certainly [pleaded] enough additional facts to support a claim of recklessness.”

Section 14-295 provides:  “In any civil action to recover damages resulting from personal injury, wrongful death or damage to property, the trier of fact may award double or treble damages if the injured party has specifically pleaded that another party has deliberately or with reckless disregard operated a motor vehicle in violation of section 14-218a, 14-219, 14-222, 14-227a, 14-230, 14-234, 14-237, 14-239 or 14-240a, and that such violation was a substantial factor in causing such injury, death or damages to property.”   Currently, there is no appellate authority dictating the degree of specificity required in pleading recklessness under § 14-295.   As a consequence, there is a split of authority on this question within the Superior Court.   See Yates v. McKinley, Superior Court, judicial district of Danbury, Docket No. CV 08 6000778 (February 19, 2010, Agati, J.).

“The minority view holds that a plaintiff must not only plead a statutory [violation] as set forth in § 14-295, but also facts that would support a claim of reckless conduct at common law.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Id. “Relying on the usual rules of pleading, these courts generally reason that a plaintiff who is alleging recklessness must allege specific facts that informs both the court and the defendant what conduct is relied upon.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)   Torres v. Siriphongsavath, Superior Court, judicial district of New Britain, Docket No. CV 09 5013135 (January 7, 2010, Swienton, J.).   To permit otherwise, these courts reason, “would enable any negligence claim to be brought as a recklessness claim and thereby make it subject to double and treble damages, ․ effectively dissolv [ing] any distinction between [the two] claims ․” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)   Victor v. Williamson, Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield, Docket No. CV 05 4008786 (July 7, 2006, Owens, J T.R.).

The majority view “distinguishes between pleading common law recklessness and statutory recklessness, thus holding that a plaintiff need only plead the required language in § 14-295, that is, that the defendant violated one or more of the enumerated statutory provisions named therein, and that the violation was a substantial factor in causing the plaintiff's injuries.”   Torres v. Siriphongsavath, supra, Superior Court, Docket No. CV 09 5013135.  “The majority view is based both on an analysis of the legislative history as well as a review of the statutory language of § 14-295 itself.   These cases conclude that as long as the general requirements of the statute are met, such pleading is enough to survive a motion to strike and to state a cause of action under § 14-295.”   Ferens v. Brown, Superior Court, judicial district of New Britain, Docket No. CV 000509116 (October 11, 2001, Quinn, J.).

This court has previously addressed the pleading requirements under § 14-295.   See Maysonet v. Cogdell, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV 08 5024267 (June 8, 2009, Wilson, J.);   see also Ferraiuolo v. Nicholson, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV 09 5031138 (December 7, 2009, Wilson J.) (finding “the majority view ․ persuasive” because “[t]he language of § 14-295 is unambiguous”).  “There does not appear to be any ambiguity in the language of [§ ]14-295 or how it should be applied or construed.   The statute says that in a civil action seeking damages for personal injuries, the trier of fact may award double or treble damages if the plaintiff has specifically pleaded that another party has deliberately or with reckless disregard operated a motor vehicle in violation of ․ [one or more motor vehicle statutes delineated in the statute].   If a further delineation of facts forming the basis of the recklessness claim were necessary, then such an explicit requirement could have been set out in the statute by the legislature ․ Where the language used by the legislature is plain and unambiguous, there is no room for construction by the courts and the statute will be applied as its words direct.”  (Citation omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  Ferraiuolo v. Nicholson, supra.   This court will therefore continue to apply the majority view and need not address whether the plaintiff pleaded sufficient additional facts to support a claim of recklessness at common law.

Under the majority view, the plaintiff has pleaded sufficient facts to support a claim of recklessness under § 14-295.   In count two, the plaintiff alleges injuries “caused by the reckless, deliberate and or wanton and [wilful] misconduct of ․ Clavette, ․ in that he:  (a) [o]perated his motor vehicle at a rate of speed which was greater than was reasonable ․ in violation of ․ General Statutes § 14-218,³ while not paying proper attention to the roadway as he approached the intersection, ․ (b) [o]perated his motor vehicle at a rate of speed which was excessive ․ in violation of ․ General Statutes § 14-219, while not paying proper attention to the roadway as he approached the intersection ․ [and] (c) [o]perated his motor vehicle in a reckless, wanton and dangerous manner ․ in violation of ․ General Statutes § 14-222 by approaching the intersection, ․ which was governed by an overhead traffic signal, at either an unreasonable or excessive rate of speed while not paying proper attention to said roadway and the overhead traffic signal controlling said intersection.”   In count two, the plaintiff further alleges that “Clavette's violation of one or more of the aforementioned statutory provisions in the operation of his motor vehicle ․ was a substantial factor in causing the [p]laintiff ․ to sustain the injuries ․ previously alleged herein.”   This pleading properly tracks the language of § 14-295.   Therefore, the plaintiff has met the plain and unambiguous requirements of § 14-295 and has adequately pled a claim for recklessness.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the defendants' motion to strike count two of the plaintiff's complaint is denied.

Wilson, J.

FOOTNOTES

FN1. Section 14-295 provides specifically for “double or treble damages,” which are a form of punitive damages.   See Campbell v. P.A.M. Dedicated Services, Inc., Superior Court, judicial district of New London, Docket No. CV 08 5006985 (September 16, 2009, Parker, J.T.R.)..  FN1. Section 14-295 provides specifically for “double or treble damages,” which are a form of punitive damages.   See Campbell v. P.A.M. Dedicated Services, Inc., Superior Court, judicial district of New London, Docket No. CV 08 5006985 (September 16, 2009, Parker, J.T.R.).

FN2. The defendants did not include this ground for a motion to strike on the face of the motion.   Therefore, the court will not address this argument..  FN2. The defendants did not include this ground for a motion to strike on the face of the motion.   Therefore, the court will not address this argument.

FN3. The plaintiff cites to the wrong section of the General Statutes in paragraph 9(a) of count two of her complaint.  General Statutes § 14-218, which was repealed in 1971, set out the penalty for causing loss of human life resulting from negligent operation of a motor vehicle.   The plaintiff likely intended to cite to General Statutes § 14-218a because the language in paragraph 9(a) of count two of the plaintiff's complaint tracks closely with § 14-218a and, in addition, § 14-218a is an enumerated statute for purposes of application of § 14-295.   The court will therefore consider paragraph 9(a) of count two of the plaintiff's complaint as alleging a violation of General Statutes § 14-218a..  FN3. The plaintiff cites to the wrong section of the General Statutes in paragraph 9(a) of count two of her complaint.  General Statutes § 14-218, which was repealed in 1971, set out the penalty for causing loss of human life resulting from negligent operation of a motor vehicle.   The plaintiff likely intended to cite to General Statutes § 14-218a because the language in paragraph 9(a) of count two of the plaintiff's complaint tracks closely with § 14-218a and, in addition, § 14-218a is an enumerated statute for purposes of application of § 14-295.   The court will therefore consider paragraph 9(a) of count two of the plaintiff's complaint as alleging a violation of General Statutes § 14-218a.

Wilson, Robin L., J.