Lucas B. Stone et al. v. Norman A. Pattis et al. (2010)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION MOTION TO STRIKE # 129

FACTS

On May 11, 2009, the plaintiffs, Lucas B. Stone and Joan L. Zygmunt, filed a fifteen-count complaint against the defendants Norman A. Pattis, the Law Offices of Norman A. Pattis, LLC (Pattis, LLC), John Radshaw III, Thomas R. Gerarde, and Howd & Ludorf, LLC (Howd & Ludorf).   The plaintiffs allege breach of contract as to Pattis, Pattis, LLC in count one, breach of fiduciary duty as to Pattis and Pattis, LLC in count two, fraud as to Pattis and Pattis, LLC in count three, conspiracy as to all defendants in count four, CUTPA as to Pattis and Pattis, LLC in count five, CUTPA as to Pattis and Pattis, LLC in count six, negligent infliction of emotional distress as to Pattis and Pattis, LLC in count seven, malpractice as to Pattis and Pattis, LLC in count eight, tortuous interference with a fiduciary relationship as to Radshaw, Gerarde, and Howd & Ludorf in count nine, abuse of due process as to Radshaw, Gerarde, and Howd & Ludorf in count ten, fraud as to Radshaw, Gerarde, and Howd & Ludorf in count eleven, breach of fiduciary duty as to Radshaw, Gerade, and Howd & Ludorf in count twelve, CUTPA as to Radshaw, Gerarde, and Howd & Ludorf in count thirteen, CUTPA as to Radshaw, Gerarde, Howd & Ludorf in count fourteen, and negligent infliction of emotional distress as to Radshaw, Gerarde, and Howd & Ludorf in count fifteen.

The underlying facts of this action are as follows.   On or about December 28, 2003, the plaintiffs retained Pattis of Pattis, LLC to represent them in a federal civil law suit against the town of Westport and four of its police officers.   The defendants in that case were represented by Radshaw and Gerearde, of Howd & Ludorf.   While this matter was pending, Howd & Ludorf hired Attorney Christy H. Doyle, who had been an attorney at Pattis, LLC. Upon becoming dissatisfied with their representation, the plaintiffs filed a grievance against Pattis with the Federal Grievance Committee.   Subsequently, Pattis withdrew from the action, and the plaintiffs proceeded pro se, until withdrawing the action.   The plaintiffs have now proceeded to commence the present action.

On January 14, 2010, the defendants Radshaw, Gerarde, and Howd and Ludorf, filed a motion to strike counts four, nine, ten, eleven, thirteen, fourteen and fifteen of the plaintiffs' amended complaint filed October 19, 2009.¹  The plaintiffs filed a memorandum of law in opposition on January 25, 2010.   The matter was heard at short calendar on February 1, 2010.

DISCUSSION

“The purpose of a motion to strike is to contest ․ the legal sufficiency of the allegations of any complaint ․ to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Fort Trumbull Conservancy, LLC v. Alves, 262 Conn. 480, 498, 815 A.2d 1188 (2003).  “It is fundamental that in determining the sufficiency of a [pleading] challenged by a [party's] motion to strike, all well-pleaded facts and those facts necessarily implied from the allegations are taken as admitted.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Gazo v. Stamford, 255 Conn. 245, 260, 765 A.2d 505 (2001).   The role of the court in ruling on a motion to strike is “to examine the [complaint], construed in favor of the [plaintiff], to determine whether the [pleading party has] stated a legally sufficient cause of action.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Dodd v. Middlesex Mutual Assurance Co., 242 Conn. 375, 378, 698 A.2d 859 (1997).  “Moreover ․ [w]hat is necessarily implied [in an allegation] need not be expressly alleged.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Violano v. Fernandez, 280 Conn. 310, 318, 907 A.2d 118 (2006).

PRELIMINARY PROCEDURAL ISSUES

Before addressing the individual counts as to the motion to strike, the court must resolve a preliminary procedural issue as to the propriety of the present motion to strike.   In response to the defendants' motion to strike, detailing arguments as to every single count moving to be stricken, the plaintiffs respond with solely procedural arguments, rather than substantively addressing the individual counts.   The plaintiffs argue that the defendants' motion to strike wrongly refers to the plaintiffs' substitute complaint dated October 17, 2009, when in fact the complaint is dated October 19, 2009.   The plaintiffs further argue that this error requires the defendants to replead, and that such repleading would be untimely and dilatory under Practice Book §§ 10-61 and 10-8, defiant of orders of the court issued December 18, 2009, filed pursuant to undue influence and impropriety by a judicial authority, and that such influence occurred at a hearing about the original motion to strike the original complaint, and the motion to reargue.

The plaintiffs' procedural arguments fail for the following reasons.   As specifically stated in Practice Book § 10-61, as cited by the plaintiffs, “[w]hen any pleading is amended the adverse party may plead thereto within the time provided by Section 10-8 or, if the adverse party has already pleaded, altered the pleading, if desired, within ten days after such amendment or such other time as the rules of practice, or the judicial authority, may prescribe ․” (Emphasis added.)   In the present case, the defendants initially reclaimed their original motion after the amended complaint was filed, however, they were told by the court on January 11, 2010, Tierney, J.T.R., to refile their motion to strike, which they did on January 14, 2010.   Moreover, the typographical error of the wrong date on the face of the motion, which is correctly stated in the attached memorandum of law, is not fatal to the motion, which, therefore, must not be repleaded.   Accordingly, the present motion to strike is timely and proper, and will be addressed by the court.

The defendants argue that Connecticut does not recognize a cause of action for civil conspiracy, as alleged in count four.   The plaintiffs respond that the fourth count is not legally insufficient because Connecticut does recognize civil conspiracy as a cause of action.  “Pursuant to Connecticut's jurisprudent, there is precisely speaking, no independent claim for civil conspiracy.   Rather, [t]he action is for damages caused by acts committed pursuant to a formed conspiracy rather than by the conspiracy itself ․ [T]he purpose of a civil conspiracy claim is to impose civil liability for damages on those who agree to join in a tortfeasor's conduct and, thereby, become liable for the ensuing damage, simply by virtue of their agreement to engage in the wrongdoing.”  (Citations omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)   Chapman Lumber, Inc. v. Tager, 288 Conn. 69, 100-10, 952 A.2d 1 (2008).²

In the present case, the plaintiffs allege conspiracy as an individual count.   Although the plaintiffs may replead to include their conspiracy allegations in another count, a claim of conspiracy cannot stand on its own.   Accordingly, the motion to strike count four of the plaintiffs' complaint relating to the present defendants is granted.

NINTH COUNT-TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE WITH A FIDUCIARY RELATIONSHIP

The defendants argue that the plaintiffs' ninth count, tortious interference with a fiduciary relationship, is invalid and a threat to the attorney-client relationship.   Specifically, they argue that Connecticut appellate courts have never allowed such a claim against an adversary's lawyer, and the plaintiffs have failed to allege any tortuous conduct.   Although other jurisdictions permit this cause of action, “the court could find no Connecticut appellate authority regarding that specific tort as pleaded by the plaintiff.”   Deer Creek Fabrics, Inc. v. Colyer, Superior Court, complex litigation docket at Stamford-Norwalk, Docket No. X05 CV 05 4002792 (March 2, 2007, Shay, J.)

“Our Supreme Court has refused to recognize an attorneys liability to his clients' opponents in all cases except those involving claims for abuse of process and vexatious litigation.”   Carabetta Construction Co., Inc. v. Martinez, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV 05 4003241 (November 9, 2006, Taylor, J.) (42 Conn. L. Rptr. 300, 302).   “[D]etermining when attorneys should be held liable to parties with whom they are not in privity is a question of public policy ․ A central dimension of the attorney-client relationship is the attorney's duty of [e]ntire devotion to the interest of the client ․ This obligation would be undermined were an attorney to be held liable to third parties.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Clukey v. Sweeney, 112 Conn.App. 534, 543, 963 A.2d 711 (2009).   Accordingly, as a cause of action for tortuous interference with a fiduciary relationship does not exist in Connecticut and it is against public policy to sue opposing counsel, the motion to strike count nine is granted.

TENTH COUNT-ABUSE OF PROCESS

The defendants further argue that count ten, the plaintiffs' “abuse of due process” count, is baseless, as there are no allegations that the defendants misused any legal process, and the plaintiffs' claim against opposing counsel violates Connecticut public policy.  “An action for abuse of process lies against any person using a legal process against another in an improper manner or to accomplish a purpose for which it was not designed ․ Because the tort arises out of the accomplishment of a result that could not be achieved by the proper and successful use of process, the Restatement Second (1977) of Torts, § 682, emphasizes that the gravamen of the action for abuse of process is the use of a legal process ․ against another primarily to accomplish a purpose for which it is not designed ․ Comment b to § 682 explains that the addition of [the word] primarily is meant to exclude liability when the process is used for the purpose of which it is intended, but there is an incidental motive of spite or an ulterior purpose of benefit to the defendant ․

“In Mozzochi [v. Beck, 204 Conn. 490, 529 A.2d 171 (1987) ], [the Connecticut] Supreme Court established a specific test to determine the scope of potential liability of an attorney for abuse of process arising out of his or her professional representation of the interest of his or her clients.   The court noted that this cause of action competed against the policy of ensuring unfettered access to the courts ․ In an effort to avoid adoption of rules which will have a chilling and inhibitory effect on would-be litigants of justiciable issue ․ [The Connecticut] Supreme Court concluded that although attorneys have a duty to their clients and to the judicial system not to pursue litigation that is utterly groundless, that duty does not give rise to a third party action for abuse of process unless the third party can point to specific misconduct intended to cause specific injury outside of the normal contemplation of private litigation.   Any other rule would ineluctably interfere with the attorney's primary duty of robust representation of the interests of his or her client ․ The court concluded that the plaintiffs' general allegation to inflict injury on the plaintiff and to enrich themselves and their said client failed to satisfy the requirement of showing the use of legal process primarily to accomplish a purpose for which it is not designed ․” (Citations omitted;  emphasis added;  emphasis in original;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  Bernhard-Thomas Building Systems, LLC v. Duncan, 100 Conn.App. 63, 77-78, 918 A.2d 889 (2007), aff'd, 286 Conn. 548, 944 A.2d 3269 (2008).   Moreover, the court, Skolnick, J. has held in Fitzpatrick v. Hall-Brook, Inc., Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield, Docket No. CV 98 0353724 (November 13, 2000, Skolnick, J.), that “[i]n arguing that [the defendant's] alleged violation of procedural requirements ․ constitutes ․ [an] abuse of due process, the plaintiff seeks to greatly expand the narrow scope of the causes of action that a third party may bring against an attorney for conduct that the attorney engages in the course of representing a client.”

In the present case, the plaintiffs allege that the defendants, without the plaintiffs' knowledge and authorization, subpoenaed four witnesses for depositions, that the defendants “conspired to fabricate four notices of deposition and faked two part certified mail receipts and certificates of service to submit to the federal court to cover up their collusion in issuing the bogus subpoenas,” illegally scheduled witnesses, and tampered with witnesses.   The plaintiffs further allege that there was secret ex-parte contact with witnesses by illegally subpoenaing them, and that the defendants failed to file a stipulation to allow the attorneys to take the depositions.   The resulting damages pled by the plaintiffs are the $400,000 plus in potential damages from the federal lawsuit.   This allegation of damages is insufficient to constitute a “specific injury” as required by case law, as the amount stated is merely damages the plaintiffs would like to have received from an action, of which the outcome was uncertain.   Moreover, the “specific misconduct” by the defendants must have been intended to cause specific injury.   The plaintiffs, however, fail to allege how the subpoenaing of witnesses, whether done properly or not, caused the loss of those potential damages.   Merely not following procedure properly, by itself, is not sufficient to constitute an abuse of process.   As the plaintiffs fail to point out specific misconduct intended to cause specific injury, as required, the court need not address whether the legal processes utilized were indeed used in an illegal manner.   Therefore, the motion to strike count ten is granted.

ELEVENTH COUNT-FRAUD

The defendants further argue that the plaintiffs have failed to meet the heightened pleading requirement of a fraud claim in count eleven.  “Fraud consists in deception practiced in order to induce another to part with property or surrender some legal right, and which accomplishes the end designed ․ The elements of a fraud action are:  (1) a false representation was made as a statement of fact;  (2) the statement was untrue and known to be so by its maker;  (3) the statement was made with the intent of inducing reliance thereon;  (4) the other party relied on the statement to his detriment.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Weinstein v. Weinstein, 275 Conn. 671, 882 A.2d 53 (2005).   Additionally, “[b]ecause specific acts must be pleaded, the mere allegation that a fraud has been perpetrated is insufficient.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Whitaker v. Taylor, 99 Conn.App. 719, 730, 916 A.2d 834 (2007).   Finally, in Visconti v. Pepper Partners Ltd. Partnership, 77 Conn.App. 675, 683, 825 A.2d 210 (2003), the court noted that “[t]o prevail ․ the plaintiff must ․ [allege] sufficient facts to demonstrate his reliance on the statement made by [the defendant].”

In the present case, although the plaintiffs make various allegations against the defendants, they fail to allege how the defendants' conduct induced them to act to their detriment.   The implication appears to be that the defendants' conduct caused the defendants to remain in the case, eventually causing them to lose out on a potential win.   As fraud, however, must be pleaded with specificity, the plaintiffs' vague allegations and conclusory statements are insufficient.   In addition, it is against Connecticut policy to file an action against opposing counsel.   See Carabetta Construction Co., Inc. v. Martinez, supra, Superior Court, 42 Conn. L. Rptr. 302;  Clukey v. Sweeney, supra, 112 Conn.App. 543.   Therefore, the motion to strike count eleven is granted.

TWELFTH COUNT-BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY

The defendants further allege that count twelve, the plaintiffs' “breach of fiduciary duty” count is dangerous and without merit, in that neither Attorney Doyle, nor the defendants owed the plaintiffs a fiduciary duty.   The plaintiffs have failed to plead a breach and the plaintiffs' claim is improperly based upon an alleged violation of the rules of professional conduct.  “It is axiomatic that a party cannot breach a fiduciary duty to another party unless a fiduciary relationship exists between them.  [A] fiduciary or confidential relationship is characterized by a unique degree of trust and confidence between the parties, one of whom has superior knowledge, skill or experience and is under a duty to represent the interests of the other ․ The superior position of the fiduciary or dominant party affords him great opportunity for abuse of the confidence reposed in him ․ Once a [fiduciary] relationship is found to exist, the burden of proving fair dealing properly shifts to the fiduciary ․ Moreover, [a]lthough [the Connecticut Supreme Court has] not expressly limited the application of these traditional principles of fiduciary duty to cases involving only fraud, self-dealing or conflict of interest, the cases in which we have invoked them have involved such deviations ․ Finally, [p]rofessional negligence alone ․ does not give rise automatically to a claim for breach of fiduciary duty ․ [Thus] not every instance of professional negligence results in a breach of [a] fiduciary duty ․ Professional negligence implicates a duty of care, while breach of a fiduciary duty implicates a duty of loyalty and honesty.”  (Citations omitted;  emphasis in original;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  Sherwood v. Danbury Hospital, 278 Conn. 163, 195-96, 896 A.2d 777 (2006).

In addition, ‘[t]he Rules of Professional Conduct caution those who seek to rely on their provisions.   They provide a framework for the ethical practice of law ․ Violation of a Rule should not give rise to a cause of action nor should it create any presumption that a legal duty has been breached.   The Rules are designed to provide guidance to lawyers and to provide a structure for regulating conduct through disciplinary agencies.   They are not designed to be a basis for civil liability.”  Gagne v. Vaccaro, 255 Conn. 390, 401, 766 A.2d 416 (2001).

In the present case, the defendants did not have a fiduciary duty to the plaintiffs, as opposing counsel does not have a fiduciary duty to the opposing client.   The plaintiffs claim that the fiduciary duty by opposing counsel arises out of the fact that Doyle was an attorney at Pattis, LLC and then switched to Howd & Ludorf while the plaintiffs' case was still in progress.   The plaintiffs fail to allege, however, that Doyle was in any way involved in the case on either side.   This coincidence, absent more specific allegations, is too attenuated to give rise to a fiduciary duty between the plaintiffs and the defendants.   Moreover, rules of professional responsibility do not give rise to a civil cause of action for the plaintiffs.   There is no duty, there cannot be a breach of such a duty, and thus the motion to strike count twelve is granted.

THIRTEENTH COUNT-CUTPA

The defendants argue that count thirteen, the plaintiffs' CUTPA count, is baseless and contrary to law.   They further argue that the plaintiffs' CUTPA claim violates public policy and runs afoul of binding precedent, and is not related to the entrepreneurial aspects of the defendants' practice of law.   “CUTPA [General Statutes § 42-110b(a) ] provides that [n]o person shall be engaged in unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce ․ To enforce this prohibition, CUTPA provides a private cause of action to [a]ny person who suffers any ascertainable loss of money or property, real or personal, as a result of the use or employment of a [prohibited method, act or practice ․”

“The purpose of CUTPA is to protect the public from unfair practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce ․ In determining whether certain acts constitute a violation of CUTPA, our Supreme Court has adopted the criteria set out in the Federal Trade Commission's cigarette rule:  (1)[W]hether the practice, without necessarily having been previously considered unlawful, offends public policy as it has been established by statutes, the common law, otherwise-whether, in otherwords, it is within at least the penumbra of some common law, statutory, or other established concept of unfairness;  (2) whether it is immoral, unethical, oppressive, or unscrupulous;  (3) whether it causes substantial injury to consumers [competitors or other businessmen] ․

“To state a claim under CUTPA, the plaintiff must allege that the actions of the defendant were performed in the conduct of trade or commerce ․ Moreover, a CUTPA violation may not be alleged for activities that are incidental to an entity's primary trade or commerce.”  (Citations omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  Sovereign Bank v. Licata, 116 Conn.App. 483, 493-94, 977 A.2d 228, cert. granted, 293 Conn. 935, 981 A.2d 1080 (2009).   Specifically, addressing the practice of law, “only the entrepreneurial aspects of the practice of law are covered by CUTPA.”  Haynes v. Yale-New Haven Hospital, 243 Conn. 17, 34, 699 A.2d 964 (1997).  “[T]he most significant question in considering a CUTPA claim against an attorney is whether the allegedly improper conduct is part of the attorney's professional representation of a client or is part of the entrepreneurial aspect of practicing law.”  Suffield Development Associates Ltd. Partnership v. National Loan Investors, L.P., 260 Conn. 766, 781, 802 A.2d 44 (2002).  “The ‘entrepreneurial’ exception is just that, a specific exception from CUTPA immunity for a well-defined set of activities-advertising and bill collection, for example.”  Id., 782;  see Haynes v. Yale-New Haven Hospital, supra, 243 Conn. 34-38.

Finally, the Connecticut Supreme Court has “conclude[d] that in a situation where a party to a lawsuit sues the adversary's lawyer, CUTPA does not provide a private cause of action.”  Jackson v. R.G. Whipple, Inc., 225 Conn. 705, 726 n.15, 627 A.2d 374 (1993);  see also Larsen Chelsey Realty Co. v. Larsen, 232 Conn. 480, 496, 656 A.2d 1009 (1995).

In the present case, the plaintiffs are suing the attorneys who represented the defendants in the underlying federal action.   Accordingly, this is a lawsuit against the adversary's lawyers, for which a CUTPA claim does not exist.   Additionally, the plaintiffs fail to make sufficient allegations of actions by the defendants affecting the entrepreneurial aspects of the practice of law.   The plaintiffs allege that as a result of the defendants' conduct “the plaintiffs have suffered an ascertainable loss of money or property, including an amount of money equal to the amounts of a settlement or compensatory and punitive damages we would have gained in the federal case had not the defendants obstructed justice in interfering with our exercise of our due process rights, the loss of the use of such money, and the profits from business we lost to pursue the study of the law and self representation in the case.”   Although the plaintiffs do allege that the actions of the defendants were “done to retain a lucrative insurance carrier client,” they do not state what the connection may be between the alleged misconduct in the practice of law, and being retained as counsel.   These are all not allegations as to billing practices, or other entrepreneurial aspects but rather allegations addressing the practice of law, which is specifically exempt from CUTPA.   Accordingly, as CUTPA does not permit for this cause of action, and further because CUTPA is insufficiently alleged, the motion to strike count thirteen is granted.

FOURTEENTH COUNT-CUTPA

The defendants further argue that no factual basis exists for the plaintiffs' CUTPA claim for punitive damages in count fourteen.   In the present case, because a cause of action under CUTPA does not exist for the plaintiffs in count thirteen, then count fourteen, the motion to strike the CUTPA claim in this count is also be granted.

FIFTEENTH COUNT-NEGLIGENT INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS

Finally, the defendants argue that count fifteen, the plaintiffs' “negligent infliction of emotional distress” count, is legally insufficient as the plaintiffs have failed to plead a viable emotional distress claim, and the plaintiffs' claim violates public policy.  “To prevail on a claim of negligent infliction of emotional distress, the plaintiff must plead and prove the following:  (1) the defendant's conduct created an unreasonable risk of causing the plaintiff emotional distress;  (2) the plaintiff's distress was foreseeable;  (3) the emotional distress was severe enough that it might result in illness or bodily harm;  and (4) the defendant's conduct was the cause of the plaintiff's distress ․ Thus, [t]he plaintiff must prove that the defendant should have realized that its conduct involved an unreasonable risk of causing emotional distress and that that distress, if it were caused, might result in illness or bodily harm.”  (Citations omitted;  emphasis added;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  Davis v. Davis, 112 Conn.App. 56, 68, 962 A.2d 140 (2009).  “This ․ test essentially requires that the fear or distress experienced by the plaintiffs be reasonable in light of the conduct of the defendants.   If such [distress] were reasonable in light of the defendants' conduct, the defendants should have realized that their conduct created an unreasonable risk of causing distress, and they therefore, properly would be held liable.   Conversely, if the [distress] were reasonable in light of the defendants' conduct, the defendants would not have recognized that their conduct could cause this distress and, therefore, they would not be liable.”   (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Larobina v. McDonald, 274 Conn. 394, 410, 876 A.2d 522 (2005).

In the present case, the plaintiffs allege that the defendants' “repeated conduct of deception, unfairness and negligence against [the plaintiffs]” caused them harm.   The damages alleged are “loss of income, depletion of personal savings, injury to [the plaintiffs'] personal reputations, mental anguish, emotional distress, humiliation and embarrassment.”   Although monetary loss is not a valid harm, the remaining allegations are sufficient.   The general policy in Connecticut is not to sue opposing counsel for their conduct as attorney.   Negligent infliction of emotional distress, however, does not necessitate a pre-existing duty.   Accordingly, the plaintiffs sufficiently allege that there was a physical manifestation of the stress allegedly caused by the defendants' actions.   The motion to strike count fifteen is denied.

CONCLUSION

Because there is a general policy in Connecticut not to sue opposing counsel, there is no independent action for conspiracy in Connecticut, a claim for tortious interference with a fiduciary relationship does not exist in Connecticut, the allegation of abuse of due process is insufficient as the plaintiffs fail to plead a specific injury, fraud is not specifically pleaded, there was no fiduciary duty between the parties and therefore, no breach, and a CUTPA claim against opposing counsel does not exist in Connecticut.   The court grants the motion to strike as to counts four, nine, ten, eleven, twelve, thirteen, and fourteen.   The plaintiff has sufficiently alleged a negligent infliction of emotional distress, therefore the motion to strike is denied as to count fifteen.

THE COURT

Brazzel-Massaro, J.

FOOTNOTES

FN1. As Radshaw, Gerarde, and Howd and Ludorf are the moving defendants, this memorandum will refer to them as the “defendants.”.  FN1. As Radshaw, Gerarde, and Howd and Ludorf are the moving defendants, this memorandum will refer to them as the “defendants.”

FN2. See also Biro v. Hirsch, 62 Conn.App. 11, 17, 771 A.2d 129 (“all conspirators are civilly liable for the damage resulting from any overt act committed by one of them pursuant to the combination” [internal quotation marks omitted] ), cert. denied, 256 Conn. 908, 772 A.2d 601 (2001);  1S. Speiser, C. Krause & A. G Ans, American Law of Torts (2003) § 3:4, p. 405 (“[o]nce a conspiracy is proven, each co-conspirator is responsible for all acts done by any of the conspirators in furtherance of the unlawful combination” [internal quotation marks omitted] )..  FN2. See also Biro v. Hirsch, 62 Conn.App. 11, 17, 771 A.2d 129 (“all conspirators are civilly liable for the damage resulting from any overt act committed by one of them pursuant to the combination” [internal quotation marks omitted] ), cert. denied, 256 Conn. 908, 772 A.2d 601 (2001);  1S. Speiser, C. Krause & A. G Ans, American Law of Torts (2003) § 3:4, p. 405 (“[o]nce a conspiracy is proven, each co-conspirator is responsible for all acts done by any of the conspirators in furtherance of the unlawful combination” [internal quotation marks omitted] ).

Brazzel-Massaro, Barbara, J.