Lakeridge Association et al. v. The City of Torrington (2010)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

The plaintiff, Lakeridge Association, is the homeowners association for the Lakeridge condominium complex in Torrington.   The plaintiff, Lakeridge Tax District, was established to assess and levy the home owners of the Lakeridge condominium complex for common improvements and infrastructure repairs.   The plaintiffs claim that the defendant, City of Torrington (“City”), owns the water line on Burr Mountain Road which brings water to the condominium.   The plaintiffs seek a declaratory judgment as to future maintenance, and monetary damages as to past repairs of the water line.

The plaintiffs' complaint dated June 4, 2009 is in three counts.   Count one alleges violations of Title IX, § C9-1, of the Torrington City Charter.¹  Count two alleges the violation of C.G.S. § 16-262u.²  Count three alleges a violation of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (“CUTPA”), C.G.S. § 42-110a et seq.   The City denies the essential allegations of the plaintiffs' complaint.

The case was tried on November 3 and 4, 2009.   The parties filed simultaneous briefs on January 15, 2010 and presented oral argument on March 4, 2010.

Thirty-seven years have passed since the initial events which give rise to the conflict in this case.   These events have proven to be difficult to reconstruct, in part because documents in the City records are either missing or inconclusive, and, in part, because most of the people who were involved in those events have died or are not available.   Against that backdrop the court makes the following findings from the available evidence.

During 1972 and 1973 the 472-unit Lakeridge condominium complex was built on Burr Mountain Road in Torrington.   It was developed and built by Lakeridge Development Company, a partnership between George L. Giguere and U.S.F. Constructors, Inc. The complex receives its water via an underground pipe running up Burr Mountain Road from its connection to a public water supply line at the foot of the mountain.

Most of the public water supply lines in the City of Torrington are owned and operated by the Torrington Water Company, a private water company which owns reservoir land on which water is held.   The water line on a portion of Winsted Road is an exception.   It was installed with money from a federal grant which was used to construct the Torrington Industrial Park. As part of that grant, the City was required to create a public waterworks company to supply the water to customers on the Winsted Road line.   For this reason, the City owns the water supply line on Winsted Road as part of a small municipal waterworks system, known as Torrington Water Supply, which has about 250 customers in the Winsted Road area.   The City buys water from the Torrington Water Company, supplies this water to its customers, and bills its customers directly.   The City has an agreement with Torrington Water Company that Torrington Water Company will make repairs on the Winsted Road water line and will bill the City for that work.

The water supply line at issue in this case runs from the Lakeridge community down Burr Mountain Road and attaches to the municipal Torrington Water Supply line on Winsted Road. Water is pumped approximately one mile up the line on Burr Mountain Road to the Lakeridge community by a pumping station built by Lakeridge Development Company on land owned by the City on the east side of Winsted Road. The water supplied through the Burr Mountain Road line is provided and billed by the City, acting as Torrington Water Supply, directly to the plaintiffs.   Winsted Road and Burr Mountain Road in this area are both highways maintained by the State of Connecticut.

Construction of the water line on Burr Mountain Road took place during the spring and summer of 1973 at the same time as construction of the sewer line leading from Winsted Road to Lakeridge.   These two lines were laid next to each other beneath the surface of Burr Mountain Road. Both installations were preceded by a permitting process.   The available evidence of this process is confined to four documents.

First, there is a letter dated December 8, 1972, from Francis Sattin, Torrington Director of Public Works, to Lakeridge Development Co., Attention Mr. George Giguere which states:  “The City of Torrington will allow your company to connect to our water line at the foot of Burr Mountain Road.” There is no similar letter in evidence concerning the sewer line.

Second, because both Winsted Road and Burr Mountain Road are State of Connecticut highways, Lakeridge needed permission from the State dig up the highways to attach the sewer and water lines in the Winsted Road and to run the lines up Burr Mountain Road. There is a document which reflects this permission which was offered by the plaintiffs and objected to by the defendant as hearsay.   The document is a State of Connecticut Department of Transportation form dated April 18, 1973 granting permission for the City and Fusco Construction to excavate and install sanitary sewer lines and water lines on Burr Mountain Road in accordance with plans prepared for Lakeridge Development Company.   The document was in the plaintiff's files.   There is no copy of this document in DOT files, but there was testimony from a DOT official that documents of this sort are only saved for seven years.   The court admitted this document into evidence under the residual exception to the hearsay rule.   See, Connecticut Code of Evidence § 8-9.   The State DOT form contains this statement:  “The owner of the property for whom this work is being performed agrees to accept all future maintenance responsibility for the work as described herein.”   This statement is followed by the signature of “Joseph J. Babic” with an address of “Municipal Bldg. Torrington.”   Joseph Babic was an Assistant City Engineer in Torrington at that time.

The third permitting document in evidence is an easement from the State of Connecticut to the City to cross property at Burr Mountain State Park with the water and sewer lines.   The Park is adjacent to the Lakeridge property.   Once the water and sewer lines reach the Park, they must cross Park property for 525 feet to reach the Lakeridge community.   The easement refers to an attached map entitled “Lakeridge Development Company Easement, through Property of State of Connecticut-Burr Mountain Road-Torrington, Conn.” The easement obligates the City to restore the property to its present condition following construction.

The fourth permitting document in evidence is an agreement between the City and the Lakeridge developer, Lakeridge Development Company dated April 25, 1973.   It provides:  “Whereas, said Lakeridge is desirous of constructing sewer and water lines to its property located south of Burr Mountain road and north and west of land of the State of Connecticut, known as Burr Pond State Park in the Town of Torrington, and whereas, the said Lakeridge, intends to transfer said sewer lines to the said City upon completion of construction, and whereas, the State of Connecticut has granted an easement to said City conveying to the City the right to construct, install and maintain underground sewer and water pipes through a portion of said Burr Pond State Park, and whereas, as a condition of said easement the City is obligated to landscape and seed the construction area and remove all equipment and debris from said area.   Now therefore, in consideration of the City accepting said easement from the State of Connecticut, the said Lakeridge agrees to landscape and seed the construction area and remove all equipment and debris from the same and pay the entire expenses connected wherewith without any contribution from the City.”

There is a 5-page post-construction document in evidence which was identified as the “as built” drawings for the sewer line.   An “as built” drawing is required by the City when it takes over responsibility for a public improvement.   This document was prepared by Storch Engineers of Wethersfield and was signed on February 20, 1973.   It is titled:  “Sewer & Water Contract No. 1.” The drawings in the document show both the water and sewer lines but contain the following notation:  “Sewer As-Built Drawings-Oct 1973.”   The City has assumed control of the sewer line since completion of construction.

When the Lakeridge community was constructed, each unit and each common building had its own water meter.³  Each of the individual units were billed separately by Torrington Water Supply for water used.   The plaintiff, Lakeridge Tax District received a bill for water used in the common buildings.

In 1977 the Torrington Planning and Zoning Commission approved the construction of a private home by Beth and Barry Southworth at 340 Burr Mountain Road, a location which is between the Lakeridge community and the pumping station on Winsted Road. Minutes of the planning and zoning meeting contain a letter from the City Engineer which states:  “Mr. George Giguere of Lakeridge has indicated that he has no objection to permitting Barry Southworth to connect to the Lakeridge water main in Burr Mountain Road. The sanitary sewer at this location belongs to the City of Torrington and is available.”   This private home had its own water meter and was billed separately for its own water use.

In September 1984 the City engaged Torrington Water Company to install a single meter at the pumping station on Winsted Road. Thereafter, the use of individual water meters was discontinued, and the City has sent the plaintiff Tax District a single bill for all of the water used on the Burr Mountain Road water line, including the private home at 340 Burr Mountain Road. The Tax District has paid these bills but presently has no way to allocate the amount paid among the 474 unit owners, the common elements owned by the association, and the private Southworth home, based upon actual water use.   The plaintiffs neither requested, nor authorized, the City to discontinue individual meters and to install a bulk meter.

The evidence is that the plaintiffs paid for the installation of the water line on Burr Mountain Road and have paid for all maintenance and repair of it since its installation.   In 2004 the plaintiffs paid the Torrington Water Company $718.65 to help repair a break in the water line on Burr Mountain Road. In 2005 the plaintiffs paid P & G Pepper Construction Services, Inc. $7,498.99 for work on a break in the water line on Burr Mountain Road. In 2006 the plaintiffs paid the Torrington Water Company $1,060 for repair of a break in the water line on Burr Mountain Road. The plaintiffs also paid $35,474.47 to P & G Pepper Construction Services, Inc. for work on the same break.   After the 2006 break in the line, the plaintiffs attempted to get the City to pay for the repairs.   The City has refused to pay for the repairs to the water line on Burr Mountain Road on the ground that the line is owned by the plaintiffs, and the City has never assumed responsibility for it.

Counsel for the plaintiffs and the City's Corporation Counsel, Ernestine Weaver, had an exchange of letters prior to suit being brought by the plaintiffs.   The plaintiffs offered the letter of May 7, 2007 in which Attorney Weaver stated:  “With respect to the discussion regarding the water lines on Burr Mountain road, as I have stated in previous correspondence, the City is responsible for water lines only for the distance to the meter, including the meter.   However, the distance from the meter to end-user is the responsibility of the property owner.   This applies to every user in Torrington, and no exception was made or implied for Lakeridge.   As you are probably aware Lakeridge has but one meter that is located on Winsted Road, but all of the breakages have occurred on Burr Mountain road, which is Lakeridge's privately owned water system.   The City does not own the water lines and will not pay for the water line's recent repair or any other charge.”  (Emphasis in original.)

Based upon the facts stated above, each count of the complaint will be discussed separately.   The first count of the plaintiffs' complaint alleges that the City is violating Title IX, § C9-1 of the Torrington City Charter by failing to assume responsibility for maintenance and repair of the Burr Mountain Road water line.   That section provides, in relevant part:  “There shall be a Department of Public Works which shall, subject to the powers of the Board of Councilmen as provided in this Chapter, have supervision and control of the maintenance of all City-owned structures, except such structures as are under the control of the Board of Education, and of the planning, surveying, construction and reconstructing, altering, paving, repairing, maintaining, cleaning, lighting and inspecting of highways, sidewalks and curbs, storm and sanitary sewers, sewage disposal facilities, water pollution control plants, public and private drains, other public improvements, City buildings, and preservation, care and removal of trees within highways or public places, all engineering work of the City and the collection and disposal of garbage, rubbish and ash.”   The plaintiffs argue that the Burr Mountain Road water line is a City-owned structure or a public improvement which the City is obligated to maintain.

The evidence presented in this case does not preponderate in favor of a finding that the City has ever owned or assumed control over the Burr Mountain Road water line as a public improvement.   The evidence cited by the plaintiffs for this proposition is that:  1) Assistant City Engineer Joseph Babic, on behalf of the City, applied to the State Department of Transportation for the permit to construct the waterline within the State highway, 2) the permit from the DOT was issued to the City, and 3) Mr. Babic acknowledged that:  “The owner of the property for whom this work is being performed agrees to accept all future maintenance responsibility for the work.”   Although this evidence is supportive of the plaintiffs' position, it is outweighed by the other probative evidence.

The contrary evidence weighs in favor of a conclusion that the intention of the developer of the Lakeridge community, Lakeridge Development Company, was to maintain ownership and control of the water line, and that the City never intended to assume ownership or control of the water line.   Although issuance of a DOT permit to the City and Fusco Construction could be viewed as evidence that the City would own the Burr Mountain Road water line, it is offset by the evidence that the Lakeridge Developer, Lakeridge Development Company, paid for construction of the line and never created any documentation of a transfer of ownership or control.   Also, it is significant that the DOT form relates to both the sewer and water lines.   There is no dispute that the City assumed ownership and control over the sewer line.   Therefore, as to the sewer line, the permit reflects the true state of affairs.   As to the water line, Mr. Babic's signature conflicts with most of the other evidence that, in contrast to the sewer line, the parties did not intend to have the City assume ownership and control of the water line.

The April 25, 1973 written agreement between Lakeridge Development Company and the City refers to transfer of the sewer line to the defendant but no mention is made of the water line.   It stands to reason that transfer of the water line would have been mentioned if it was being treated the same as the sewer line.⁴  Likewise, the City's records contain an “as built” drawing with a specific notation about the sewer line but not the water line, even though the water line is also shown on the drawings.   The exclusion of the water line from the reference on the “as built” document is extremely telling as to the intent of the developer and the City.

Also highly probative of the intent of the developer and the City is the 1977 planning and zoning minutes which mention that George Giguere, the developer of Lakeridge, gave permission for the owners of the private residence at 340 Burr Mountain Road to connect to “the Lakeridge water main in Burr Mountain Road. The sanitary sewer at this location belongs to the City of Torrington and is available.”   Thus, four years after construction, the developer and the City were in agreement that the City owned and controlled the sewer line but not the water line.   This evidence lead to the conclusion that the water line on Burr Mountain Road was intended to be owned by the Lakeridge Community, not the City of Torrington.   The payment of repair bills by the plaintiffs, rather than by the defendant, adds to the conclusion that the plaintiffs own the line.

The court must address whether Mr. Babic had authority to bind the City to assume responsibility for the future maintenance of a water line that the City was not going to own or control.   There is no evidence that Mr. Babic had such authority.   There is no evidence as to the authority of an assistant City engineer in 1973 or that he was given any authority to bind the City to a maintenance agreement.

Nor did the plaintiff prove that Mr. Babic had apparent authority to bind the City. “Apparent authority is that semblance of authority which a principal, through his own acts or inadvertences, causes or allows third persons to believe his agent possesses ․ Consequently, apparent authority is to be determined, not by the agent's own acts, but by the acts of the agent's principal ․ The issue of apparent authority is one of fact to be determined based on two criteria ․ First, it must appear from the principal's conduct that the principal held the agent out as possessing sufficient authority to embrace the act in question, or knowingly permitted [the agent] to acts as having such authority ․ Second, the party dealing with the agent must have, acting in good faith, reasonably believed, under all the circumstances, that the agent had the necessary authority to bind the principal to the agent's action.”  Host America Corp. v. Ramsey, 107 Conn.App. 849, 857-58 (2008).   There is no evidence on either of the two criteria set forth above.   Because of the absence of available documentation and witnesses, the plaintiffs were unable to prove either actual or apparent authority on the part of Mr. Babic to bind the City to maintain the water line.

Alternatively, the plaintiffs argue that even if the water line was originally owned by the Lakeridge, the City subsequently acquired the Burr Mountain Road water line through common-law dedication.  “Dedication is an appropriation of land to some public use, made by the owner of the fee, and accepted for such use by and in behalf of the public.”  Whippoorwill Crest Co. v. Stratford, 145 Conn. 268, 271 (1958).   Most frequently used in relation to roads, both the owner's intention to dedicate the way to public use and acceptance by the public must exist, but the intention to dedicate the way to public use may be implied from the acts and conduct of the owner, and public acceptance may be shown by proof of the actual use of the way by the public.  Wamphassuc Point Property Owners Assn. v. Public Utilities Commission, 154 Conn. 674, 681 (1967).   Thus, two elements are essential to a valid dedication:  (1) a manifested intent by the owner to dedicate the land involved for the use of the public;  and (2) an acceptance by the proper authorities or by the general public.  DiCioccio v. Wethersfield, 146 Conn. 474, 479 (1959).   The existence of an intent to dedicate and of acceptance by the public is a question of fact for the trier.  Whipporwill Crest Co. v. Stratford, supra, 272.

The plaintiffs claim to have proven both elements of dedication by a fair preponderance of the evidence.   Toward proof of their manifested intention to dedicate the water line to the City, the plaintiffs suggest that the developer's decision to have water meters installed on all units indicates an intention that the City assume responsibility for the water line up to the Lakeridge property.   They make this argument based upon Corporation Counsel Weaver's letter in which she states the City policy that “the City is responsible for water lines only for the distance to the meter, including the meter.”   The plaintiffs also rely on George Guigere's agreement that Barry and Beth Southworth could connect to the water line, and to their failure to object to the City's removal of the individual meters.

The evidence of “manifested intention” to dedicate is unconvincing.   As the court has already found, the evidence supports a finding that the developer and the City intended that Lakeridge continue to own and control the water line after construction.   While the Corporation Counsel undoubtedly expressed the correct general principle in her letter, this expression does not outweigh the evidence set forth above that the developer of Lakeridge and the City both intended that Lakeridge would continue to own and control the water line.   Also, the installation of individual water meters and change to a single meter, although contrary to the general principle expressed by Attorney Weaver, does not overcome the weight of the other evidence.   Finally, George Guigere's permission to allow the Southworths to connect to the water line is powerful evidence of Lakeridge's intention to maintain control of the water line, not of an intention to dedicate the line to the City.

The evidence that the City has accepted the dedication by the plaintiffs is unavailing.   The plaintiffs claim that the use of the water line by the residents of Lakeridge and by the Southworths is sufficient to establish a general public use which equates with acceptance of the dedication.   This does not follow.   As the court has already found, the intention of the developer and the City was that Lakeridge would continue ownership and control of the water line.   The water use by the residents of Lakeridge is in accord with the original intent.   It is not evidence of acceptance of dedication.   The Southworth arrangement was made with the agreement of Lakeridge and, therefore, cannot be viewed as acceptance of dedication by the City.

Next, the plaintiffs argue that the City is estopped to deny ownership of the water line.  “There are two essential elements to an estoppel-the party must do or say something that is intended or calculated to induce another to believe in the existence of certain facts and to act upon that belief, and the other party, influenced thereby, must actually change his position or do some act to his injury which he otherwise would not have done ․ [I]n order for a court to invoke municipal estoppel, the aggrieved party must establish that:  (1) an authorized agent of the municipality had done or said something calculated or intended to induce the party to believe that certain facts existed and to act on that belief, (2) the party had exercised due diligence to ascertain the truth and not only lacked knowledge of the true state of things, but also had no convenient means of acquiring that knowledge;  (3) the party had changed its position in reliance on those facts;  and (4) the party would be subjected to a substantial loss if the municipality were permitted to negate the acts of its agents.”  (Citation omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  O'Connor v. Waterbury, 286 Conn. 732, 757-58 (2008).  “The party claiming estoppel ․ has the burden of proof.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Id., 758.

The plaintiffs point to several actions of the City which they claim led them believe the City had assumed control and authority over the water line.   The plaintiffs point to Mr. Babic's signature on the DOT application, the easement which the City received from the State, and the Planning and Zoning Commission approval of the Southworth home as such actions.   These can be dismissed without much discussion.   In 1977, when the Southworth home was added to the water line, the Planning and Zoning minutes clearly record that George Giguere, developer of Lakeridge, had no objection to permitting the Southworth house to “connect to the Lakeridge water main in Burr mountain Road.” Therefore, at least until that time, the City had done nothing which was intended or calculated to induce Lakeridge to think that it had taken over control of the water line in Burr Mountain Road. If it had done so, it would not have needed Mr. Giguere's permission to connect the Southworth house to the water line, just as it did not need Lakeridge's permission to connect to the sewer line.

Next, the plaintiffs point to the City's removal of individual water meters and installation of a single meter as evidence of an action taken by the City which was intended to induce the plaintiffs to think that the City had assumed control of the Burr Mountain water line.   This argument cannot be dismissed as easily as the previous one.   In 1984 the City took unilateral action to discontinue the use of individual water meters at Lakeridge, and to install a bulk meter at the foot of Burr Mountain Road. This action demonstrates a degree of control over the water line which the City has had a hard time explaining.   It has caused the use of water at the Southworth home to be billed to Lakeridge.   It has made it impossible for Lakeridge to equitably allocate the bulk water bill to their residents and to segregate the use of water at the Lakeridge common buildings, although Lakeridge residents (and the Southworth house) now pay a bulk rate which is lower than an individual rate.

In determining whether the City's action in converting to a bulk meter amounts to “something calculated or intended to induce the party to believe that certain facts existed and to act on that belief,” the court is mindful that municipal estoppel may be invoked only with great caution and only if the plaintiffs have changed their position in reliance upon the action of the City, and only if the plaintiffs would be subjected to a substantial loss.   Cortese v. Planning & Zoning Board of Appeals, 274 Conn. 411, 418-19 (2005).   Acting with great caution, I do not find sufficient evidence to support estoppel in this case.   First, the actions of City in changing the water meters is suggestive of control but does not rise to the level of a preponderance of the evidence.   Next, there is no evidence that the plaintiffs changed their position based upon the actions of the City. The plaintiffs have been attempting to have the City assume responsibility for repairs since before the meters were changed.   There is no evidence that they relied upon the City's action in any way.   Finally, the evidence of damages is for repairs made in the past.   There was no evidence of any future damages.   For all these reasons, municipal estoppel cannot be invoked to force the City to assume control of the water line.   Judgment must enter for the City on the first count.

The second count sets forth a cause of action based upon a violation of C.G.S. § 16-262u(b).  This claim can be disposed of easily because § 16-262u(b) only applies to a “water company” as defined in C.G.S. § 16-1(10).   A “water company' does not include “a municipal waterworks system established under chapter 102.”   The defendant operates the water line on Winsted Road as part of a municipal waterworks system.   For this reason, § 16-262u(b) does not apply.

The third count sets forth a CUTPA violation.   The essence of this claim is that it was an unfair or deceptive act or practice for the defendant to cause the individual water meters to be replaced with a single meter at the foot of Burr Mountain Road when the defendant should have known that it would result in the plaintiffs being charged for water use at the individual residence at 340 Burr Mountain Road. The defendant claims that CUTPA is not applicable to actions of a governmental agency, as a matter of law, even if that conduct, performed by a private person, might be considered to commercial overtones.

“General statutes § 42-110b(a) provides:  ‘No person shall engage in unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade of commerce.’  Section 42-110a(4) defines ‘trade’ and ‘commerce’ [as] the advertising, the sale or rent or lease, the offering for sale or rent or lease, or the distribution of any services and any property, tangible or intangible, real, personal or mixed, and any other article, commodity, or thing of value in this state.   Even if we were to assume that, in collecting real estate taxes owed to it, the city was engaged in trade or commerce, we conclude that Philbury's special defense founders on General Statutes § 42-110c(a), which provides in relevant part:  Nothing in this chapter shall apply to:  (1) Transactions or actions otherwise permitted under law as administered by any regulatory board or officer acting under statutory authority of state or of the United States ․” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Danbury v. Dana Investment Corp., 249 Conn. 1, 19 (1999).

“In Connelly v. Housing Authority, 213 Conn. 354, 362, 567 A.2d 1212 (1990), we held that the actions of a municipal housing agency were exempt from CUTPA because the agency, a creature of statute, was acting pursuant to and was regulated pervasively by statutes and regulations that set forth in great detail the municipal landlord's responsibilities and provide[d] carefully balanced and provide[d] carefully balanced procedural and substantive remedies ․ In addition, using the history of the Federal Trade Commission Act as the lodestar for interpreting CUTPA, we were unable to discover any instances in which that act ha[d] been applied to any act or practice of a local public agency ․ The same rationale applies to the city in the present case.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.   Internal citations omitted.)   Id., 19-20.

The facts of this case are similar to those in Connelly v. Housing Authority and Danbury v. Dana Investment Corp. Torrington Water Supply, which is owned and operated by the defendant, may be considered to be engaged in a trade or business, but its actions fall within the exception for transactions or actions otherwise permitted under law as administered by a board or officer acting under statutory authority of the state.   Chapter 102 of the General Statutes provides for the creation of a municipal waterworks system.   The statutes in that section regulate the financing of such a system including the issuance of bonds, trust indentures and temporary notes, the fixing of rates, and the creation of accounts.   The safety of water is regulated by the Commissioner of Public of Health pursuant to Chapter 474 Part III of the General Statutes.   All phases of the operation of the defendant's water supply company are authorized and regulated expressly by a persuasive statutory scheme.   Pursuant to the exception provided, the defendant cannot be held liable for a violation of CUTPA.

Judgment shall enter for the City on all counts.

BY ORDER OF THE COURT,

John W. Pickard

FOOTNOTES

FN1. The Torrington City Charter, Title IX, Sect. C9-1, provides, in relevant part:  “There shall be a Department of Public Works which shall ․ have supervision and control of the maintenance of all City-owned structures ․ and of the repairing, maintaining ․ and inspecting of ․ public improvements ․ and all engineering work of the City ․”.  FN1. The Torrington City Charter, Title IX, Sect. C9-1, provides, in relevant part:  “There shall be a Department of Public Works which shall ․ have supervision and control of the maintenance of all City-owned structures ․ and of the repairing, maintaining ․ and inspecting of ․ public improvements ․ and all engineering work of the City ․”

FN2. C.G.S. Sect. 16-262u(b) provides:  “In the case of a water company having annual revenues of twenty thousand dollars or more, all replacements and repairs of service connections shall be by the company at its own expense.”.  FN2. C.G.S. Sect. 16-262u(b) provides:  “In the case of a water company having annual revenues of twenty thousand dollars or more, all replacements and repairs of service connections shall be by the company at its own expense.”

FN3. The Lakeridge Bylaws even require that each condominium unit have its own water meter, and that individual unit owners pay for their individual use of water..  FN3. The Lakeridge Bylaws even require that each condominium unit have its own water meter, and that individual unit owners pay for their individual use of water.

Pickard, John W., J.